Before long, at his instigation, the mob collected about the prison,

uttering imprecations against the judges and their clemency. “They are

traitors!” cried Tichelaer, “but let us first take vengeance on those

whom we have.” John van Witt had been brought to the prison by a message

supposed to have come from the ruart. In vain had his daughter conjured

him not to respond to it. “What are you come here for?” exclaimed

Cornelius, on seeing his brother enter. “Did you not send for me?”

“No, certainly not.” Then we are lost,” said John van Witt, calmly. The

shouts of the crowd redoubled; a body of cavalry still preserved order; a

rumor suddenly spread that the peasants from the environs were marching

on the Hague to plunder it; the States of Holland sent orders to the

Count of Tilly to move against them; the brave soldier demanded a written

order. “I will obey,” he said, “but the two brothers are lost.”

[Illustration: The Brothers Witt----436]

The troops had scarcely withdrawn, and already the doors of the prison

were forced; the ruart, exhausted by the torture, was stretched upon his

bed, whilst his brother sat by his side reading the Bible aloud; the

madmen rushed into the chamber, crying, “Traitors, prepare yourselves;

you are going to die.” Cornelius van Witt started up, joining his hands

in prayer; the blows aimed at him did not reach him. John was wounded.

They were both dragged forth; they embraced one another; Cornelius,

struck from behind, rolled to the bottom of the staircase; his brother

would have defended him; as he went out into the street, he received a

pike-thrust in the face; the ruart was dead already; the murderers vented

their fury on John van Witt; he had lost nothing of his courage or his

coolness, and, lifting his arms towards heaven, he was opening his mouth

in prayer to God, when a last pistol-shot stretched him upon his back.

“There’s the perpetual edict floored!” shouted the assassins, lavishing

upon the two corpses insults and imprecations. It was only at night, and

after having with difficulty recognized them, so disfigured had they

been, that poor Jacob van Witt was able to have his sons’ bodies removed;

he was before long to rejoin them in everlasting rest.

William of Orange arrived next day at the Hague, too late for his fame,

and for the punishment of the obscure assassins, whom he allowed to

escape. The compassers of the plot obtained before long appointments and

rewards. “He one day assured me,” says Gourville, “that it was quite

true he had not given any orders to have the Witts killed, but that,

having heard of their death without having contributed to it, he had

certainly felt a little relieved.” History and the human heart have

mysteries which it is not well to probe to the bottom.

For twenty years John van Witt had, been the most noble exponent of his

country’s traditional policy. Long faithful to the French alliance, he

had desired to arrest Louis XIV. in his dangerous career of triumph;

foreseeing the peril to come, he had forgotten the peril at hand; he had

believed too much and too long in the influence of negotiations and the

possibility of regaining the friendship of France. He died unhappy, in

spite of his pious submission to the will of God; what he had desired for

his country was slipping from him abroad as well as at home; Holland was

crushed by France, and the aristocratic republic was vanquished by

monarchical democracy. With the weakness characteristic of human views,

he could not open his eyes to a vision of constitutional monarchy freely

chosen, preserving to his country the independence, prosperity, and order

which he had labored to secure for her. A politician as, bold as and

more far-sighted than Admiral Coligny, twice struck down, like him, by

assassins, John van Witt remained in history the unique model of a great

republican chief, virtuous and able, proud and modest, up to the day at

which other United Provinces, fighting like Holland for their liberty,

presented a rival to the purity of his fame, when they chose for their

governor General Washington.

For all their brutal ingratitude, the instinct of the people of Holland

saw clearly into the situation. John van Witt would have failed in the

struggle against France; William of Orange, prince, politician, and

soldier, saved his country and Europe from the yoke of Louis XIV.

On quitting his army, the king had inscribed in his notebook, “My

departure.--I do not mean to have anything more done.” The temperature

favored his designs; it did not freeze, the country remained inundated

and the towns unapproachable; the troops of the Elector of Brandenburg,

together with a corps sent by the emperor, had put themselves in motion

towards the Rhine; Turenne kept them in check in Germany. Conde covered

Alsace; the Duke of Luxembourg, remaining in Holland, confined himself to

burning two large villages--Bodegrave and Saammerdam. “There was a grill

of all the Hollanders who were in those burghs,” wrote the marshal to the

Prince of Conde, “not one of whom was let out of the houses. This

morning we were visited by two of the enemy’s drummers, who came to claim

a colonel of great note amongst them (I have him in cinders at this

moment), as well as several officers that we have not, and that are

demanded of us, who, I suppose, were killed at the approaches to the

villages, where I saw some rather pretty little heaps.” The attempts of

the Prince of Orange on Charleroi had failed, as well as those of

Luxembourg on the Hague; the Swedes had offered their mediation, and

negotiations were beginning at Cologne; on the 10th of June, 1673, Louis

XIV. laid siege to Maestricht; Conde was commanding in Holland, with

Luxembourg under his orders; Turenne was observing Germany. The king was

alone with Vauban. Maestricht held out three weeks. “M. de Vauban, in

this siege as in many others, saved a number of lives by his ingenuity,”

wrote a young subaltern, the Count of Alligny. “In times past it was

sheer butchery in the trenches, now he makes them in such a manner that

one is as safe as if one were at home.” “I don’t know whether it ought

to be called swagger, vanity, or carelessness, the way we have of showing

ourselves unadvisedly and without cover,” Vauban used to say; “ but it is

an original sin of which the French will never purge themselves, if God,

who is all-powerful, do not reform the whole race.” Maestricht taken,

the king repaired to Elsass, where skilful negotiations delivered into

his hands the towns that had remained independent: it was time to

consolidate past conquests; the coalition of Europe was forming against

France; the Hollanders held the sea against the hostile fleets; after

three desperate fights, Ruyter had prevented all landing in Holland; the

States no longer entertained the proposals they had but lately submitted

to the king at Utrecht; the Prince of Orange had recovered Naarden, and

just carried Bonn, with the aid of the Imperialists, commanded by

Montecuculli; Luxembourg had already received orders to evacuate the

province of Utrecht; at the end of the campaign of 1673, Gueldres and

Over-Yssel were likewise delivered from the enemies who had oppressed and

plundered them; Spain had come forth from her lethargy; and the emperor,

resuming the political direction of Germany, had drawn nearly all the

princes after him into the league against France. The Protestant qualms

of the English Parliament had not yielded to the influence of the Marquis

of Ruvigny, a man of note amongst the French Reformers, and at this time

ambassador of France in London; the nation desired peace with the

Hollanders; and Charles II. yielded, in appearance at least, to the

wishes of his people.

On the 21st of February, 1674, he repaired to Parliament to announce to

the two Houses that he had concluded with the United Provinces “a prompt

peace, as they had prayed, honorable, and, as he hoped, durable.” He at

the same time wrote to Louis XIV., to beg to be condoled with, rather

than upbraided, for a consent which had been wrung from him. The

regiments of English and Irish auxiliaries remained quietly in the

service of France; and the king did not withdraw his subsidies from his

royal pensioner.

Thus was being undone, link by link, the chain of alliances which Louis

XIV. had but lately twisted round Holland. France, in her turn, was

finding herself alone, with all Europe against her; scared, and,

consequently, active and resolute; the congress of Cologne had broken up;

not one of the belligerents desired peace; the Hollanders had just

settled the heredity of the stadtholderate in the house of Orange. Louis

XIV. saw the danger. “So many enemies,” says he in his Memoires,

“obliged me to take care of myself, and think what I must do to maintain

the reputation of my arms, the advantage of my dominions, and my personal

glory.” It was in Franche-Comte that Louis XIV. went to seek these

advantages. The whole province was reduced to submission in the month of

June, 1674. Turenne had kept the Rhine against the Imperialists; the

marshal alone escaped the tyranny of the king and Louvois, and presumed

to conduct the campaign in his own way; when Louis XIV. sent him

instructions, he was by this time careful to add, “You will not bind

yourself down to what I send you hereby as to my intentions, save when

you think that the good of my service will permit you, and you will give

me of your news the oftenest you find it possible.” (30th of March,

1674.) Turenne did not always write, and it sometimes happened that he

did not obey.

This redounded to his honor in the campaign of 1674. Conde had gained,

on the 11th of August, the bloody victory of Seneffe over the Prince of

Orange and the allied generals; the four squadrons of the king’s

household, posted within range of the fire, had remained for eight hours

in order of battle, without any movement but that of closing up as the

men fell. Madame de Sdvigne, to whom her son, standard-bearer in the

dauphin’s gendarmes, had told the story, wrote to M. de BussyRabutin,

“But for the Te Deum, and some flags brought to Notre-Dame, we should

have thought we had lost the battle.” The Prince 6f Orange, ever

indomitable in his cold courage, had attacked Audenarde on the 15th of

September; but he was not in force, and the, approach of Conde had

obliged him to raise the siege; to make up, he had taken Grave, spite of

the heroic resistance made by the Marquis of Chemilly, who had held out

ninety-three days. Advantages remained balanced in Flanders; the result

of the campaign depended on Turenne, who commanded on the Rhine. “If the

king had taken the most important place in Flanders,” he wrote to

Louvois, “and the emperor were master of Alsace, even without Philipsburg

or Brisach, I think the king’s affairs would be in the worst plight in

the world; we should see what armies we should have in Lorraine, in the

Bishoprics, and in Champagne. I do assure you that, if I had the honor

of commanding in Flanders, I would speak as I do.” On the 16th of June

he engaged in battle, at Sinzheim, with the Duke of Lorraine, who was

coming up with the advance-guard. “I never saw a more obstinate fight,”

said Turenne: “those old regiments of the emperor’s did mighty well.”

He subsequently entered the Palatinate, quartering his troops upon it,

whilst the superintendents sent by Louvois were burning and plundering

the country, crushed as it was under war-contributions. The king and

Louvois were disquieted by the movement of the enemy’s troops, and wanted

to get Turenne back into Lothringen. “An army like that of the enemy,”

wrote the marshal to Louvois, on the 13th of Septem ber, “and at the

season it is now, cannot have any idea but that of driving the king’s

army from Alsace, having neither provisions nor means of getting into

Lorraine, unless I be driven from the country.” On the 20th of

September, the burgesses of the free city of Strasburg delivered up

the bridge over the Rhine to the Imperialists who were in the heart

of Elsass. The victory of Ensheim, the fights of Mulhausen and

Turckheim, sufficed to drive them back; but it was only on the 22d

of January, 1675, that Turenne was at last enabled to leave Elsass

reconquered. “There is no longer in France an enemy that is not a

prisoner,” he wrote to the king, whose thanks embarrassed him.

“Everybody has remarked that M. de Turenne is a little more bashful than

he was wont to be,” said Pellisson.

The coalition was proceeding slowly; the Prince of Orange was ill; the

king made himself master of the citadel of Liege and some small places.

Limburg surrendered to the Prince of Conde, without the allies having

been able to relieve it; Turenne was posted with the Rhine in his rear,

keeping Montecuculli in his front; he was preparing to hem him in, and

hurl him back upon Black Mountain. His army was thirty thousand strong.

“I never saw so many fine fellows,” Turenne would say, “nor better

intentioned.” Spite of his modest reserve, he felt sure of victory.

“This time I have them,” he kept saying; “they cannot escape me.”

On the 27th of June, 1675, in the morning, Turenne ordered an attack on

the village of Salzbach. The young Count of St. Hilaire found him at the

head of his infantry, seated at the foot of a tree, into which he had

ordered an old soldier to climb, in order to have a better view of the

enemy’s manoeuvres. The Count of Roye sent to conjure him to reconnoitre

in person the German column that was advancing. “I shall remain where I

am,” said Turenne, “unless something important occur;” and he sent off

re-enforcements to M. de Roye; the latter repeated his entreaties; the

marshal asked for his horse, and, at a hard gallop, reached the right of

the army, along a hollow, in order to be under cover from two small

pieces of cannon, which kept up an incessant fire. “I don’t at all want

to be killed to-day,” he kept saying. He perceived M. do St. Hilaire,

the father, coming to meet him, and asked him what column it was on

account of which he had been sent for. “My father was pointing it out to

him, writes young St. Hilaire, “when, unhappily, the two little pieces

fired: a ball, passing over the quarters of my father’s horse, carried

away his left arm and the horse’s neck, and struck M. de Turenne in the

left side; he still went forward about twenty paces on his horse’s neck,

and fell dead. I ran to my father, who was down, and raised him up.

‘No need to weep for me,’ he said; ‘it is the death of that great man;

you may, perhaps, lose your father, but neither your country nor you will

ever have a general like that again. O, poor army, what is to become of

you?’ Tears fell from his eyes; then, suddenly recovering himself, ‘Go,

my son, and leave me,’ he said; ‘with me it will be as God pleases; time

presses; go and do your duty.’” [_Memoires du Marquis de St. Hilaire,_

t. i. p. 205.] They threw a cloak over the corpse of the great general,

and bore it away. “The soldiers raised a cry that was heard two leagues

off,” writes Madame de Sevigne; “no consideration could restrain them;

they roared to be led to battle, they wanted to avenge the death of their

father, with him they had feared nothing, but they would show how to

avenge him, let it be left to them; they were frantic, let them be led to

battle.” Montecuculli had for a moment halted. “Today a man has fallen

who did honor to man,” said he, as he uncovered respectfully. He threw

himself, however, on the rearguard of the French army, which was falling

back upon Elsass, and recrossed the Rhine at Altenheim. The death of

Turenne was equivalent to a defeat.

[Illustration: Death of Turenne----443]

The Emperor Napoleon said of Turenne, “He is the only general whom

experience ever made more daring.” He had been fighting for forty years,

and his fame was still increasing, without effort or ostentation on his

part. “M. de Turenne, from his youth up, possessed all good qualities,”

wrote Cardinal de Retz, who knew him well, “and the great he acquired

full early. He lacked none but those that he did not think about. He

possessed nearly all virtues as it were by nature; he never possessed the

glitter of any. He was believed to be more fitted for the head of an

army than of a party, and so I think, because he was not naturally

enterprising; but, however, who knows? He always had in everything, just

as in his speech, certain obscurities, which were never cleared up save

by circumstances, but never save to his glory.” He had said, when he set

out, to this same Cardinal de Retz, then in retirement at Commercy, “Sir,

I am no _talker (diseur),_ but I beg you to believe that, if it were not

for this business in which perhaps I may be required, I would go into

retirement as you have gone, and I give you my word that, if I come back,

I, like you, will put some space between life and death.” God did not

leave him time. He summoned suddenly to Him this noble, grand, and

simple soul. “I see that cannon loaded with all eternity,” says Madame

de Sevigne: “I see all that leads M. de Turenne thither, and I see

therein nothing gloomy for him. What does he lack? He dies in the

meridian of his fame. Sometimes, by living on, the star pales. It is

safer to cut to the quick, especially in the case of heroes whose actions

are all so watched. M. de Turenne did not feel death: count you that for

nothing?” Turenne was sixty-four; he had become a convert to Catholicism

in 1668, seriously and sincerely, as he did everything. For him Bossuet

had written his Exposition of faith. Heroic souls are rare, and those

that are heroic and modest are rarer still: that was the distinctive

feature of M. de Turenne. “When a man boasts that he has never made

mistakes in war, he convinces me that he has not been long at it,” he

would say. At his death, France considered herself lost. “The premier-

president of the court of aids has an estate in Champagne, and the farmer

of it came the other day to demand to have the contract dissolved; he was

asked why: he answered that in M. de Turenne’s time one could gather in

with safety, and count upon the lands in that district, but that, since

his death, everybody was going away, believing that the enemy was about

to enter Champagne.” [_Lettres de Madame de Sevigne_.] “I should very

much like to have only two hours’ talk with the shade of M. de Turenne,”

said the Prince of Conde, on setting out to take command of the army of

the Rhine, after a check received by Marshal Crequi. “I would take the

consequences of his plans if I could only get at his views, and make

myself master of the knowledge he had of the country, and of

Montecuculli’s tricks of feint.” “God preserves you for the sake of

France, my lord,” people said to him; but the prince made no reply beyond

a shrug of the shoulders.

[Illustration: TURENNE.----444]

It was his last campaign. The king had made eight marshals, “change for

a Turenne.” Crequi began by getting beaten before Treves, which

surrendered to the enemy. “Why did--the marshal give battle?” asked a

courtier. The king turned round quickly. “I have heard,” said he, “that

the Duke of Weimar, after the death of the great Gustavus, commanded the

Swedish allies of France; one Parabere, an old blue ribbon, said to him,

speaking of the last battle, which he had lost, ‘Sir, why did you give

it?’ ‘Sir,’ answered Weimar, ‘because I thought I should win it.’ Then,

leaning over towards somebody else, he asked, ‘Who is that fool with the

blue ribbon?’” The Germans retired. Conde returned to Chantilly once

more, never to go out of it again. Montecuculli, old and ill, refused to

serve any longer. “A man who has had the honor of fighting against

Mahomet Coprogli, against the prince, and against M. de Turenne, ought

not to compromise his glory against people who are only just beginning to

command armies,” said the, veteran general to the emperor on taking his

retirement. The chiefs were disappearing from the scene, the heroic

period of the war was over.

Europe demanded a general peace; England and Holland desired it

passionately. “I am as anxious as you for an end to be put to the war,”

said the Prince of Orange to the deputies from the Estates, “provided

that I get out of it with honor.” He refused obstinately to separate

from his allies. “It is not astonishing that the Prince of Orange does

not at once give way even to things which he considers reasonable,” said

Charles II., “he is the son of a father and mother whose obstinacy was

carried to extremes; and he resembles them in that.” Meanwhile, William

had just married (November 15, 1677), the Princess Mary, eldest daughter

of the Duke of York and Anne Hyde. An alliance offensive and defensive

between England and Holland was the price of this union, which struck

Louis XIV. an unexpected blow. He had lately made a proposal to the

Prince of Orange to marry one of his natural daughters. “The first

notice I had of the marriage,” wrote the king, “was through the bonfires

lighted in London.” “The loss of a decisive battle could not have scared

the King of France more,” said the English ambassador, Lord Montagu. For

more than a year past negotiations had been going on at Nimeguen; Louis

XIV. resolved to deal one more great blow.

[Illustration: An Exploit of John Bart’s----446]

The campaign of 1676 had been insignificant, save at sea. John Bart, a

corsair of Dunkerque, scoured the seas and made foreign commerce tremble;

he took ships by boarding, and killed with his own hands the Dutch

captain of the Neptune, who offered resistance. Messina, in revolt

against the Spaniards, had given herself up to France; the Duke of

Vivonne, brother of Madame de Montespan, who had been sent thither as

governor, had extended his conquests; Duquesne, quite young still, had

triumphantly maintained the glory of France against the great Ruyter, who

had been mortally wounded off Catana; on the 21st of April. But already

the possession of Sicily was becoming precarious, and these distant

successes had paled before the brilliant campaign of 1677; the capture of

Valenciennes, Cambrai, and St. Omer, the defence of Lorraine, the

victory of Cassel, gained over the Prince of Orange, had confirmed the

king in his intentions. “We have done all that we were able and bound to

do,” wrote William of Orange to the Estates, on the 13th of April, 1677,

“and we are very sorry to be obliged to tell your High Mightinesses that

it has not pleased God to bless on this occasion the arms of the state

under our guidance.”

[Illustration: Duquesne victorious over Ruyter---446a]

“I was all impatience,” says Louis XIV. in his Memoires, “to commence

the campaign of 1678, and greatly desirous of doing something therein as

glorious as, and more useful than, what had already been done; but it was

no easy matter to come by it, and to surpass the lustre conferred by the

capture of three large places and the winning of a battle. I examined

what was feasible, and Ghent being the most important of all I could

attack, I fixed upon it to besiege.” The place was invested on the 1st

of March, and capitulated on the 11th; Ypres, in its turn, succumbed on

the 25th, after a vigorous resistance. On the 7th of April the king

returned to St. Germain, “pretty content with what I had done,” he says,

“and purposing to do better in the future, if the promise I had given not

to undertake anything for two months were not followed by the conclusion

of peace.” Louis XIV. sent his ultimatum to Nimeguen.

Holland had weight in congress as well as in war, and her influence was

now enlisted on the side of peace. “Not only is it desired,” said the

grand pensionary Fagel, “but it is absolutely indispensable, and I would

not answer for it that the States General, if driven to extremity by the

sluggishness of their allies, will not make a separate peace with France.

I know nobody in Holland who is not of the same opinion.” The Prince of

Orange flew out at such language. “Well, then, I know somebody,” said

he, “and that is myself; I will oppose it to the best of my ability;

but,” he added more slowly, upon reflection, “if I were not here, I know

quite well that peace would be concluded within twenty-four hours.”

One man alone, though it were the Prince of Orange, cannot long withstand

the wishes of a free people. The republican party, for a while cast down

by the death of John van Witt, had taken courage again, and Louis XIV.

secretly encouraged it. William of Orange had let out his desire of

becoming Duke of Gueldres and Count of Zutphen: these foreshadowings of

sovereignty had scared the province of Holland, which refused its

consent; the influence of the stadtholder was weakened thereby; the

Estates pronounced for peace, spite of the entreaties of the Prince of

Orange. “I am always ready to obey the orders of the state,” said he,

“but do not require me to give my assent to a peace which appears to me

not only ruinous, but shameful as well.” Two deputies from the United

Provinces set out for Brussels.

“It is better to throw one’s self out of the window than from the top of

the roof,” said the Spanish plenipotentiary to the nuncio, when he had

cognizance of the French proposals, and he accepted the treaty offered

him. “The Duke of Villa Hermosa says that he will accept the conditions;

for ourselves, we will do the same,” said the Prince of Orange, bitterly,

“and so here is peace made, if France continues to desire it on this

footing, which I very much doubt.”

At one moment, in fact, Louis XIV. raised fresh pretensions. He wished

to keep the places on the Meuse, until the Swedes, almost invariably

unfortunate in their hostilities with Denmark and Brandenburg, should

have been enabled to win back what they had lost. This was to postpone

peace indefinitely. The English Parliament and Holland were disgusted,

and concluded a new alliance. The Spaniards were preparing to take up

arms again. The king, who had returned to the army, all at once cut the

knot. “The day I arrived at the camp,” writes Louis XIV., I received

news from London apprising mee that the King of England would bind

himself to join me in forcing my enemies to make peace, if I consented to

add something to the conditions he had already proposed. I had a battle

over this proposal, but the public good, joined to the glory of gaining a

victory over myself, prevailed over the advantage I might have hoped for

from war. I replied to the King of England that I was quite willing to

make the treaty he proposed to me, and, at the same time, I wrote to the

States General a letter, stronger than the first, being convinced that,

since they were wavering, they ought not to have time given them to take

counsel upon the subject of peace with their allies, who did not want

it.” Beverninck went to visit the king at Ghent; and he showed so much

ability that the special peace concluded by his pains received, in

Holland, the name of Beverninck’s peace. “I settled more business in an

hour with M. de Beverninck than the plenipotentiaries would have been

able to conclude in several days,” said Louis XIV.; “the care I had taken

to detach the allies one from another, overwhelmed them to such an

extent, that they were constrained to submit to the conditions of which I

had declared myself in favor at the commencement of my negotiations. I

had resolved to make peace, but I wished to conclude one that would be

glorious for me and advantageous for my kingdom. I wished to recompense

myself, by means of the places that were essential, for the probable

conquests I was losing, and to console myself for the conclusion of a war

which I was carrying on with pleasure and success. Amidst such turmoil,

then, I was quite tranquil, and saw nothing but advantage for myself,

whether the war went on or peace were made.”

All difficulties were smoothed away Sweden had given up all stipulations

for her advantage; the firm will of France had triumphed over the

vacillations of Charles II. and the allies. “The behavior of the French

in all this was admirable,” says Sir W. Temple, an experienced

diplomatist, long versed in all the affairs of Europe, “whilst our own

counsels and behavior resembled those floating islands which winds and

tide drive from one side to the other.”

On the 10th of August, in the evening, the special peace between Holland

and France was signed after twenty-four hours’ conference. The Prince of

Orange had concentrated all his forces near Mons, confronting Marshal

Luxembourg, who occupied the plateau of Casteau; he had no official news

as yet from Nimeguen, and on the 14th he began the engagement outside the

abbey of St. Denis. The affair was a very murderous one, and remained

indecisive: it did more honor to the military skill of the Prince of

Orange than to his loyalty. Holland had not lost an inch of her

territory during this war; so long, so desperate, and notoriously

undertaken in order to destroy her; she had spent much money, she had

lost many men, she had shaken the confidence of her allies by treating

alone and being the first to treat, but she had furnished a chief to the

European coalition, and she had shown an example of indomitable

resistance; the States General and the Prince of Orange alone, besides

Louis XIV., came the greater out of the struggle. The King of England

had lost all consideration both at home and abroad, and Spain paid all

the expenses of the war.

Peace was concluded on the 17th of September, thanks to the energetic

intervention of the Hollanders. The king restored Courtray, Audenarde,

Ath, and Charleroi, which had been given him by the treaty of Aix-la-

Chapelle, Ghent, Linmburg, and St. Ghislain; but he kept by definitive

right St. Omer, Cassel, Aire, Ypres, Cambray, Bouchain, Valenciennes, and

all Franche-Comte; henceforth he possessed in the north of France a line

of places extending from Dunkerque to the Meuse; the Spanish monarchy was

disarmed.

It still required a successful campaign under Marshal Crequi to bring the

emperor and the German princes over to peace; exchanges of territory and

indemnities re-established the treaty of Westphalia on all essential

points. The Duke of Lorraine refused the conditions on which the king

proposed to restore to him his duchy; so Louis XIV. kept Lorraine.

The King of France was at the pinnacle of his greatness and power.

“Singly against all,” as Louvois said, he had maintained the struggle

against Europe, and he came out of it victorious; everywhere, with good

reason, was displayed his proud device, _Nec pluribus impar_. “My will

alone,” says Louis XIV. in his Memoires, “concluded this peace, so much

desired by those on whom it did not depend; for, as to my enemies, they

feared it as much as the public good made me desire it, and that

prevailed on this occasion over the gain and personal glory I was likely

to find in the continuation of the war. . . . I was in full enjoyment

of my good fortune and the fruits of my good conduct, which had caused me

to profit by all the occasions I had met with for extending the borders

of my kingdom at the expense of my enemies.”

“Here is peace made,” wrote Madame de Sevigne to the Count of Bussy.

“The king thought it handsomer to grant it this year to Spain and Holland

than to take the rest of Flanders; he is keeping that for another time.”

The Prince of Orange thought as Madame de Seigne: he regarded the peace

of Nimeguen as a truce, and a truce fraught with danger to Europe. For

that reason did he soon seek to form alliances in order to secure the

repose of the world against the insatiable ambition of King Louis XIV.

Intoxicated by his successes and the adulation of his court, the King of

France no longer brooked any objections to his will or any limits to his

desires. The poison of absolute power had done its work. Louis XIV.

considered the “office of king” grand, noble, delightful, “for he felt

himself worthy of acquitting himself well in all matters in which he

engaged.” “The ardor we feel for glory,” he used to say, “is not one of

those feeble passions which grow dull by possession; its favors, which

are never to be obtained without effort, never, on the other hand, cause

disgust, and whoever can do without longing for fresh ones is unworthy of

all he has received.”

Standing at the king’s side and exciting his pride and ambition, Louvois

had little by little absorbed all the functions of prime minister without

bearing the title. Colbert alone resisted him, and he, weary of the

struggle, was about to succumb before long (1683), driven to desperation

by the burdens that the wars and the king’s luxury caused to weigh

heavily upon France. Peace had not yet led to disarmament; an army of a

hundred and forty thousand men remained standing, ever ready to uphold

the rights of France during the long discussions over the regulation of

the frontiers. In old papers ancient titles were found, and by degrees

the villages, Burghs, and even principalities, claimed by King Louis XIV.

were re-united quietly to France; King Charles XI. was thus alienated, in

consequence of the seizure of the countship of Deux-Ponts, to which

Sweden laid claim. Strasburg was taken by a surprise. This free city

had several times violated neutrality during the war; Louvois had kept up

communications inside the place; suddenly he had the approaches and the

passage over the Rhine occupied by thirty-five thousand men on the night

between the 16th and 17th of September, 1681; the burgesses sent up to

ask aid from the emperor, but the messengers were arrested; on the 30th

Strasburg capitulated, and Louis XIV. made his triumphant entry there on

the 24th of October. “Nobody,” says a letter of the day, “can recover

from the consternation caused by the fact that the French have taken

Strasburg without firing a single shot; everybody says it is one of the

wheels of the chariot to be used for a drive into the empire, and that

the door of Elsass is shut from this moment.”

The very day of the surrender of Strasburg (September 30, 1681), Catinat,

with a corps of French troops, entered Casale, sold to Louis XIV. by the

Duke of Mantua. The king thought to make sure of Piedmont by marrying

his niece, Monsieur’s daughter, to the Duke of Savoy, Victor-Amadeo,

quite a boy, delicate and taciturn, at loggerheads with his mother and

with her favorites. Marie Louise d’Orleans, elder sister of the young

Duchess of Savoy, had married the King of Spain, Charles II., a sickly

creature of weak intellect. Louis XIV. felt the necessity of forming new

alliances; the old supports of France had all gone over to the enemy.

Sweden and Holland were already allied to the empire; the German princes

joined the coalition. The Prince of Orange, with an ever-vigilant eye on

the frequent infractions of the treaties which France permitted herself

to commit, was quietly negotiating with his allies, and ready to take up

arms to meet the common danger. “He was,” says Massillon, “a prince

profound in his views, skilful in forming leagues and banding spirits

together, more successful in exciting wars than on the battle-field, more

to be feared in the privacy of the closet than at the head of armies, a

prince and an enemy whom hatred of the French name rendered capable of

conceiving great things and of executing them, one of those geniuses who

seem born to move at their will both peoples and sovereigns.” French

diplomacy was not in a condition to struggle with the Prince of Orange.

M. de Pomponne had succeeded Lionne; he was disgraced in 1679. “I order

his recall,” said the king, “because all that passes through his hands

loses the grandeur and force which ought to be shown in executing the

orders of a king who is no poor creature.” Colbert de Croissy, the

minister’s brother, was from that time employed to manage with foreign

countries all the business which Louvois did not reserve to himself.

Duquesne had bombarded Algiers in 1682; in 1684, he destroyed several

districts of Genoa, which was accused of having failed in neutrality

between France and Spain; and at the same time Marshals Humieres and

Crequi occupied Audenarde, Courtray, and Dixmude, and made themselves

masters of Luxemburg; the king reproached Spain with its delays in the

regulation of the frontiers, and claimed to occupy the Low Countries

pacifically; the diet of Ratisbonne intervened; the emperor, with the aid

of Sobieski, King of Poland, was occupied in repelling the invasions of

the Turks; a truce was concluded for twenty-four years; the empire and

Spain acquiesced in the king’s new conquests. “It seemed to be

established,” said the Marquis de la Fare, “that the empire of France was

an evil not to be avoided by other nations.” Nobody was more convinced

of this than King Louis XIV.

He was himself about to deal his own kingdom a blow more fatal than all

those of foreign wars and of the European coalition. Intoxicated by so

much success and so many victories, he fancied that consciences were to

be bent like states, and he set about bringing all his subjects back to

the Catholic faith. Himself returning to a regular life, under the

influence of age and of Madame de Maintenon, he thought it a fine thing

to establish in his kingdom that unity of religion which Henry IV. and

Richelieu had not been able to bring about. He set at nought all the

rights consecrated by edicts, and the long patience of those Protestants

whom Mazarin called “the faithful flock;” in vain had persecution been

tried for several years past; tyranny interfered, and the edict of Nantes

was revoked on the 13th of October, 1685. Some years later, the

Reformers, by hundreds of thousands, carried into foreign lands their

industries, their wealth, and their bitter resentments. Protestant

Europe, indignant, opened her doors to these martyrs to conscience,

living witnesses of the injustice and arbitrary power of Louis XIV.

All the princes felt themselves at the same time insulted and threatened

in respect of their faith as well as of their puissance. In the early

months of 1686, the league of Augsburg united all the German princes,

Holland, and Sweden; Spain and the Duke of Savoy were not slow to join

it. In 1687, the diet of Ratisbonne refused to convert the twenty years’

truce into a definitive peace. By his haughty pretensions the king gave

to the coalition the support of Pope Innocent XI.; Louis XIV. was once

more single-handed against all, when he invaded the electorate of Cologne

in the month of August, 1686. Philipsburg, lost by France in 1676, was

recovered on the 29th of October; at the end of the campaign, the king’s

armies were masters of the Palatinate. In the month of January, 1689,

war was officially declared against Holland, the emperor, and the empire.

The commander-in-chief of the French forces was intrusted to the dauphin,

then twenty-six years of age. “I give you an opportunity of making your

merit known,” said Louis XIV. to his son: “exhibit it to all Europe, so

that when I come to die it shall not be perceived that the king is dead.”

The dauphin was already tasting the pleasures of conquest, and the

coalition had not stirred. They were awaiting their chief; William of

Orange was fighting for them in the very act of taking possession of the

kingdom of England. Weary of the narrow-minded and cruel tyranny of

their king, James II., disquieted at his blind zeal for the Catholic

religion, the English nation had summoned to their aid the champion of

Protestantism; it was in the name of the political liberties and the

religious creed of England that the Prince of Orange set sail on the 11th

of November, 1688; on the flags of his vessels was inscribed the proud

device of his house, I will maintain; below were the words, _Pro

libertate et Protestante religione._ William landed without obstacle at

Torbay, on the 15th of November; on the 4th of January, King James,

abandoned by everybody, arrived in France, whither he had been preceded

by his wife, Mary of Modena, and the little Prince of Wales; the

convention of the two Houses in England proclaimed William and Mary

_kings_ (rois--? king and queen); the Prince of Orange had declined the

modest part of mere husband of the queen. “I will never be tied to a

woman’s apron-strings,” he had said.

By his personal qualities as well as by the defects and errors of his

mind Louis XIV. was a predestined acquisition to the cause of James II.;

he regarded the revolution in England as an insolent attack by the people

upon the kingly majesty, and William of Orange was the most dangerous

enemy of the crown of France. The king gave the fallen monarch a

magnificent reception. “The king acts towards these majesties of England

quite divinely,” writes Madame de Sevigne, on the 10th of January, 1689:

“for is it not to be the image of the Almighty to support a king

out-driven, betrayed, abandoned as he is? The king’s noble soul is

delighted to play such a part as this. He went to meet the Queen of

England with all his household and a hundred six-horse carriages; he

escorted her to St. Germain, where she found herself supplied, like the

queen, with all sorts of knick-knacks, amongst which was a very rich

casket with six thousand louis d’or. The next day the King of England

arrived late at St. Germain; the king was there waiting for him, and went

to the end of the Guards’ hall to meet him; the King of England bent down

very low, as if he meant to embrace his knees; the king prevented him,

and embraced him three or four times over, very cordially. At parting,

his Majesty would not be escorted back, but said to the King of England,

‘This is your house; when I come hither you shall do me the honors of it,

as I will do you when you come to Versailles.’ The king subsequently

sent the King of England ten thousand louis. The latter looked aged and

worn, the queen thin and with eyes that have wept, but beautiful black

ones; a fine complexion, rather pale, a large mouth, fine teeth, a fine

figure and plenty of wits; all that makes up a very pleasing person. All

she says is quite just and full of good sense. Her husband is not the

same; he has plenty of spirit, but a common mind which relates all that

has passed in England with a want of feeling which causes the same

towards him. It is so extraordinary to have this court here that it is

the subject of conversation incessantly. Attempts are being made to

regulate ranks and prepare for permanently living with people so far from

their restoration.”

In his pride and his kingly illusions, Louis XIV. had undertaken a burden

which was to weigh heavily upon him to the very end of his reign.

Catholic Ireland had not acquiesced in the elevation of William of Orange

to the throne of England; she invited over King James. Personally brave,

and blinded by his hopes, he set out from St. Germain on the 25th of

February, 1689. “Brother,” said the king to him on taking leave, “the

best I can wish you is not to see you back.” He took with him a corps of

French troops commanded by M. de Rosen, and the Count of Avaux as

adviser. “It will be no easy matter to keep any secret with the King of

England,” wrote Avaux to Louis XIV.; “he has said before the sailors of

the St. Michael what he ought to have reserved for his greatest

confidants. Another thing which may cause us trouble is his indecision,

for he has frequent changes of opinion, and does not always determine

upon the best. He lays great stress on little things, over which he

spends all his time, and passes lightly by the most essential. Besides,

he listens to everybody, and as much time has to be spent in destroying

the impressions which bad advice has produced upon him as in inspiring

him with good. It is said here that the Protestants of the north will

intrench themselves in Londonderry, which is a pretty strong town for

Ireland, and that it is a business which will probably last some days.”

The siege of Londonderry lasted a hundred and five days; most of the

French officers fell there; the place had to be abandoned; the English

army had just landed at Carrickfergus (August 25), under the orders of

Marshal Schomberg. Like their leader, a portion of Schomberg’s men were

French Protestants who had left their native country after the revocation

of the edict of Nantes; they fought to the bitter end against the French

regiments of Rosen. The Irish Parliament was beginning to have doubts

about James II. “Too English,” it was said, “to render full justice to

Ireland.” There was disorder everywhere, in the government as well as in

the military operations; Schomberg held the Irish and French in check; at

last William III. appeared.

He landed on the 14th of June, and at once took the road to Belfast; the

Protestant opposition was cantoned in the province of Ulster, peopled to

a great extent by Cromwell’s Scotch colonists; three parts of Ireland

were still in the hands of the Catholics and King James. “I haven’t come

hither to let the grass grow under my feet,” said William to those who

counselled prudence. He had brought with him his old Dutch and German

regiments, and numbered under his orders thirty-five thousand men;

representatives from all the Protestant churches of Europe were there

in arms against the enemies of their liberties.

The forces of King James were scarcely inferior to those of his

son-in-law; Louis XIV. had sent him a re-enforcement of eight thousand

men under the orders of the Duke of Lauzun. On the 1st of July the two

armies met on the banks of the Boyne, near the town of Drogheda.

William had been slightly wounded in the shoulder the evening before

during a reconnaissance. “There’s no harm done,” said he at once to his

terrified friends, “but, as it was, the ball struck quite high enough.”

He was on horseback at the head of his troops; at daybreak the whole

army plunged into the river; Marshal Schomberg commanded a division; he

saw that the Huguenot regiments were staggered by the death of their

leader, M. de Caillemotte, younger brother of the Marquis of Ruvigny.

He rushed his horse into the river, shouting, “Forward, gentlemen;

yonder are your persecutors.” He was killed, in his turn, as he touched

the bank. King William himself had just entered the Boyne; his horse

had taken to swimming, and he had difficulty in guiding it with his

wounded arm; a ball struck his boot, another came and hit against the

butt of his pistol; the Irish infantry, ignorant and undisciplined,

everywhere took flight. “We were not beaten,” said a letter to Louvois

from M. de la Hoguette, a French officer, “but the enemy drove the Irish

troops, like sheep, before them, without their having attempted to fire

a single musket-shot.” All the burden of the contest fell upon the

troops of Louis XIV. and upon the Irish gentlemen, who fought furiously;

William rallied around him the Protestants of Enniskillen, and led them

back to the charge; the Irish gave way on all sides; King James had

prudently remained at a distance, watching the battle from afar; he

turned bridle, and hastily took the road back to Dublin. On the 3d of

July he embarked at Waterford, himself carrying to St. Germain the news

of his defeat. “Those who love the King of England must be very glad to

see him in safety,” wrote Marshal Luxembourg to Louvois; “but those who

love his glory have good reason to deplore the figure he made.” “I was

in trouble to know what had become of the king my father,” wrote Queen

Mary to William III.; “I dared not ask anybody but Lord Nottingham, and

I had the satisfaction of learning that he was safe and sound. I know

that I need not beg you to spare him, but to your tenderness add this,

that for my sake the world may know that you would not have any harm

happen to him. You will forgive me this.” The rumor had spread at Paris

that King William was dead; the populace lighted bonfires in the

streets; and the governor of the Bastille fired a salute. The anger and

hatred of a people are perspicacious.

The insensate pride of king and nation was to be put to other trials; the

campaign of 1689 had been without advantage or honor to the king’s arms.

Disembarrassed of the great Conde, of Turenne, and even of Marshal

Luxembourg, who was compromised in some distressing law proceedings,

Louvois exercised undisputed command over generals and armies; his harsh

and violent genius encountered no more obstacles. He had planned a

defensive war which was to tire out the allies, all the while ravaging

their territories. The Palatinate underwent all its horrors. Manheim,

Heidelberg, Spires, Worms, Bingen, were destroyed and burned. “I don’t

think,” wrote the Count of Tesse to Louvois, “that for a week past my

heart has been in its usual place. I take the liberty of speaking to you

naturally, but I did not foresee that it would cost so much to personally

look to the burning of a town with a population, in proportion, like that

of Orleans. You may rely upon it that nothing at all remains of the

superb castle of Heidelberg. There were yesterday at noon, besides the

castle, four hundred and thirty-two houses burned; and the fire was still

going on. I merely caused to be set apart the family pictures of the

Palatine House; that is, the fathers, mothers, grandmothers, and

relatives of Madame; intending, if you order me or advise me so, to make

her a present of them, and have them sent to her when she is somewhat

distracted from the desolation of her native country; for, except

herself, who can take any interest in them? Of the whole lot there is

not a single copy worth a dozen livres.” The poor Princess Palatine,

Monsieur’s second wife, was not yet distracted from her native country,

and she wrote in March, 1689, “Should it cost me my life, it is

impossible for me not to regret, not to deplore, having been, so to

speak, the pretext for the destruction of my country. I cannot look on

in cold blood and see the ruin at a single blow, in poor Manheim, of all

that cost so much pains and trouble to the late prince-elector, my

father. When I think of all the explosions that have taken place, I am

so full of horror that every night, the moment I begin to go to sleep, I

fancy myself at Heidelberg or Manheim, and an eye-witness of the ravages

committed. I picture to myself how it all was in my time, and to what

condition it has been reduced now, and I cannot refrain from weeping hot

tears. What distresses me above all is, that the king waited to reveal

his orders until the very moment of my intercession in favor of

Heidelberg and Manheim. And yet it is thought bad taste for me to be

afflicted!”

The Elector of Bavaria, an able prince and a good soldier, had roused

Germany to avenge his wrongs; France had just been placed under the ban

of the empire; and the grand alliance was forming. All the German

princes joined it; the United Provinces, England, and Spain combined for

the restoration of the treaties of Westphalia and of the Pyrenees.

Europe had mistaken hopes of forcing Louis XIV. to give up all his

conquests. Twenty years of wars and reverses were not to suffice for

that. Fortune, however, was tiring of being favorable to France;

Marshals Duras and Humieres were unable to hamper the movements of the

Duke of Lorraine, Charles V., and of the Elector of Bavaria; the French

garrisons of Mayence and of Bonn were obliged to capitulate after an

heroic defence their munitions failed. The king recalled Marshal

Luxembourg to the head of his armies. The able courtier had managed to

get reconciled with Louvois. “You know, sir,” he wrote to him on the 9th

of May, 1690, “with what pleasure I shall seek after such things as will

possibly find favor with the king and give you satisfaction. I am too

well aware how far my small authority extends to suppose that I can

withdraw any man from any place without having written to you previously.

It is with some repugnance that I resolve to put before you what comes

into my head, knowing well that all that is good can come only from you,

and looking upon anything I conceive as merely simple ideas produced by

the indolence in which we are living here.”

[Illustration: Marshal Luxembourg---461]

The wary indolence and the observations of Luxembourg were not long in

giving place to activity. The marshal crossed the Sambre on the 29th of

June, entered Charleroi and Namur, and on the 2d of July attacked the

Prince of Waldeck near the rivulet of Fleurus. A considerable body of

troops had made a forced march of seven leagues during the night, and

came up to take the enemy in the rear; it was a complete success, but

devoid of result, like the victory of Stafarde, gained by Catinat over

the Duke of Savoy, Victor-Amadeo, who had openly joined the coalition.

The triumphant naval battle delivered by Tourville to the English and

Dutch fleets off Beachy Head was a great humiliation for the maritime

powers. “I cannot express to you,” wrote William III. to the grand

pensionary Heinsius, holding in his absence the government of the United

Provinces, “how distressed I am at the disasters of the fleet; I am so

much the more deeply affected as I have been informed that my ships did

not properly support those of the Estates, and left them in the lurch.”

[Illustration: Heinsius----461]

William had said, when he left Holland, “The republic must lead off the

dance.” The moment had come when England was going to take her part in

it.

In the month of January, 1691, William III. arrived in Holland. “I am

languishing for that moment,” he wrote six months before to Heinsius.

All the allies had sent their ambassadors thither. “It is no longer the

time for deliberation, but for action,” said the King of England to the

congress “the King of France has made himself master of all the

fortresses which bordered on his kingdom; if he be not opposed, he will

take all the rest. The interest of each is bound up in the general

interest of all. It is with the sword that we must wrest from his grasp

the liberties of Europe, which he aims at stifling, or we must submit

forever to the yoke of servitude. As for me, I will spare for that

purpose neither my influence, nor my forces, nor my person, and in the

spring I will come, at the head of my troops, to conquer or die with my

allies.”

The spring had not yet come, and already (March 15) Mons was invested by

the French army. The secret had been carefully kept. On the 21st, the

king arrived in person with the dauphin; William of Orange collected his

troops in all haste, but he did not come up in time: Mons capitulated on

the 8th of April; five days later, Nice, besieged by Catinat, surrendered

like Mons; Louis XIV. returned to Versailles, according to his custom

after a brilliant stroke. Louvois was pushing on the war furiously; the

naturally fierce temper of the minister was soured by excess of work and

by his decline in the king’s favor; he felt his position towards the king

shaken by the influence of Madame de Maintenon; venting his wrath on the

enemy, he was giving orders everywhere for conflagration and bombardment,

when on the 17th of July, 1691, after working with the king, Louvois

complained of pain; Louis XIV. sent him to his rooms; on reaching his

chamber he fell down fainting; the people ran to fetch his third son, M.

de Barbezieux; Madame do Louvois was not at Versailles, and his two elder

sons were in the field; he arrived too late; his father was dead.

“So he is dead, this great minister, this man of such importance, whose

egotism (_le moi_), as M. Nicole says, was so extensive, who was the

centre of so many things! What business, what designs, what projects,

what secrets, what interests to unfold, what wars begun, what intrigues,

what beautiful moves-in-check to make and to superintend! Ah! my God,

grant me a little while; I would fain give check to the Duke of Savoy and

mate to the Prince of Orange! No, no, thou shalt not have one, one

single moment!” Thus wrote Madame do Sevigne to her daughter Madame de

Grignan. Louis XIV., in whose service Louvois had spent his life, was

less troubled at his death. “Tell the King of England that I have lost a

good minister,” was the answer he sent to the complimentary condolence of

King James, “but that his affairs and mine will go on none the worse.”

In his secret heart, and beneath the veil of his majestic observance of

the proprieties, the king thought that his business, as well as the

agreeableness of his life, would probably gain from being no longer

subject to the tempers and the roughnesses of Louvois. The Grand

Monarque considered that he had trained (_instruit_) his minister, but he

felt that the pupil had got away from him. He appointed Barbezieux

secretary for war. “I will form you,” said he. No human hand had formed

Louvois, not even that of his father, the able and prudent Michael le

Tellier; he had received straight from God the strong qualities,

resolution, indomitable will, ardor for work, the instinct of

organization and command, which had made of him a minister without equal

for the warlike and ambitious purposes of his master. Power had spoiled

him, his faults had prevailed over his other qualities without destroying

them; violent, fierce, without principle and without scruple in the

execution of his designs, he had egged the king on to incessant wars,

treating with disdain the internal miseries of the kingdom as well as any

idea of pity for the vanquished; he had desired to do everything, order

everything, grasp everything, and he died at fifty-three, dreaded by all,

hated by a great many, and leaving in the government of the country a

void which the king felt, all the time that he was angrily seeking to

fill it up.

Louvois was no more; negotiations were beginning to be whispered about,

but the war continued by land and sea; the campaign of 1691 had

completely destroyed the hopes of James II. in Ireland; it was decided to

attempt a descent upon England; a plot was being hatched to support the

invasion. Tourville was commissioned to cover the landing. He received

orders to fight, whatever might be the numbers of the enemy. The wind

prevented his departure from Brest; the Dutch fleet had found time to

join the English. Tourville wanted to wait for the squadrons of Estrees

and Rochefort; Pontchartrain had been minister of finance and marine

since the death of Seignelay, Colbert’s son, in 1690; he replied from

Versailles to the experienced sailor, familiar with battle from the age

of fourteen, “It is not for you to discuss the king’s orders; it is for

you to execute them and enter the Channel; if you are not ready to do it,

the king will put in your place somebody more obedient and less discreet

than you.” Tourville went out and encountered the enemy’s squadrons

between the headlands of La Hogue and Barfleur; he had forty-four vessels

against ninety-nine, the number of English and Dutch together. Tourville

assembled his council of war, and all the officers were for withdrawing;

but the king’s orders were peremptory, and the admiral joined battle.

After three days’ desperate resistance, backed up by the most skilful

manoeuvres, Tourville was obliged to withdraw beneath the forts of La

Hogue in hopes of running his ships ashore; but in this King James and

Marshal Bellefonds opposed him.

[Illustration: Battle of St. Vincent 465a]

Tourville remained at sea, and lost a dozen vessels. The consternation

in France was profound; the nation had grown accustomed to victory; on

the 20th of June the capture of Namur raised their hopes again; this time

again William III. had been unable to succor his allies; he determined

to--revenge himself on Luxembourg, whom he surprised on the 31st of

August, between Enghaep and Steinkirk; the ground was narrow and uneven,

and the King of England counted upon thus paralyzing the brilliant French

cavalry. M. de Luxembourg, ill of fever as he was, would fain have

dismounted to lead to the charge the brigades of the French guards and of

the Swiss, but he was prevented; the Duke of Bourbon, the Prince of

Conti, the Duke of Chartres, and the Duke of Vendome, placed themselves

at the head of the infantry, and, sword in hand, led it against the

enemy; a fortunate movement on the part of Marshal Boufflers resulted in

rendering the victory decisive. Next year at Neerwinden (29th of July,

1693) the success of the day was likewise due to the infantry. On that

day the French guards had exhausted their ammunition; putting the bayonet

at the end of their pieces they broke the enemy’s battalions; this was

the first charge of the kind in the French armies. The king’s household

troops had remained motionless for four hours under the fire of the

allies: William III. thought for a moment that his gunners made bad

practice; he ran up to the batteries; the French squadrons did not move

except to close up the ranks as the files were carried off; the King of

England could not help an exclamation of anger and admiration. “Insolent

nation!” he cried.

[Illustration: The Battle of Neerwinden----465]

The victory of Neerwinden ended in nothing but the capture of Charleroi;

the successes of Catinat at Marsaglia, in Piedmont, had washed out the

shame of the Duke of Savoy’s incursion into Dauphiny in 1692. Tourville

had remained with the advantage in several maritime engagements off Cape

St. Vincent, and burned the English vessels in the very roads of Cadiz.

On every sea the corsairs of St. Malo and Dunkerque, John Bart and

Duguay-Trouin, now enrolled in the king’s navy, towed at their sterns

numerous prizes; the king and France, for a long time carried away by a

common passion, had arrived at that point at which victories no longer

suffice in the place of solid and definitive success. The nation was at

last tiring of its glory. “People were dying of want to the sound of the

Te Deum,” says Voltaire in the Siecle de Louis XIV.; everywhere there was

weariness equal to the suffering. Madame de Maintenon and some of her

friends at that time, sincerely devoted to the public good, rather

Christians than warriors, Fenelon, the Dukes of Beauvilliers and

Chevreuse, were laboring to bring, the king over to pacific views; he saw

generals as well as ministers falling one after another; Marshal

Luxembourg, exhausted by the fatigues of war and the pleasures of the

court, died on the 4th of January, 1695, at sixty-seven years of age. An

able general, a worthy pupil of the great Conde, a courtier of much wits

and no shame, he was more corrupt than his age, and his private life was

injurious to his fame; he died, however, as people did die in his time,

turning to God at the last day. “I haven’t lived like M. de Luxembourg,”

said Bourdaloue, “but I should like to die like him.” History has

forgotten Marshal Luxembourg’s death and remembered his life.

Louis XIV. had lost Conde and Turenne, Luxembourg, Colbert, Louvois, and

Seignelay; with the exception of Vauban, he had exhausted the first rank;

Catinat alone remained in the second; the king was about to be reduced to

the third: sad fruits of a long reign, of an incessant and devouring

activity, which had speedily used up men and was beginning to tire out

fortune; grievous result of mistakes long hidden by glory, but glaring

out at last before the eyes most blinded by prejudice! “The whole of

France is no longer anything but one vast hospital,” wrote Fenelon to the

king under the veil of the anonymous. “The people who so loved you are

beginning to lose affection, confidence, and even respect; the allies

prefer carrying on war with loss to concluding a peace which would not be

observed. Even those who have not dared to declare openly against you

are nevertheless impatiently desiring your enfeeblement and your

humiliation as the only resource for liberty and for the repose of all

Christian nations. Everybody knows it, and none dares tell you so.

Whilst you in some fierce conflict are taking the battle-field and the

cannon of the enemy, whilst you are storming strong places, you do not

reflect that you are fighting on ground which is sinking beneath your

feet, and that you are about to have a fall in spite of your victories.

It is time to humble yourself beneath the mighty hand of God; you must

ask peace, and by that shame expiate all the glory of which you have made

your idol; finally you must give up, the soonest possible, to your

enemies, in order to save the state, conquests that you cannot retain

without injustice. For a long time past God has had His arm raised over

you; but He is slow to smite you because He has pity upon a prince who

has all his life been beset by flatterers.” Noble and strong language,

the cruel truth of which the king did not as yet comprehend, misled as he

was by his pride, by the splendor of his successes, and by the concert of

praises which his people as well as his court had so long made to

reverberate in his ears.

Louis XIV. had led France on to the brink of a precipice, and he had in

his turn been led on by her; king and people had given themselves up

unreservedly to the passion for glory and to the intoxication of success;

the day of awakening was at hand.

Louis XIV. was not so blind as Fenelon supposed; he saw the danger at the

very moment when his kingly pride refused to admit it. The King of

England had just retaken Namur, without Villeroi, who had succeeded

Marshal Luxembourg, having been able to relieve the place. Louis XIV.

had already let out that he “should not pretend to avail himself of any

special conventions until the Prince of Orange was satisfied as regarded

his person and the crown of England.” This was a great step towards that

humiliation recommended by Fenelon.

The secret negotiations with the Duke of Savoy were not less significant.

After William III., Victor-Amadeo was the most active and most devoted as

well as the most able and most stubborn of the allied princes. In the

month of June, 1696, the treaty was officially declared. Victor-Amadeo

would recover Savoy, Suza, the countship of Nice and Pignerol dismantled;

his eldest daughter, Princess Mary Adelaide, was to marry the Duke of

Burgundy, eldest son of the dauphin, and the ambassadors of Piedmont

henceforth took rank with those of crowned heads. In return for so many

concessions, Victor-Amadeo guaranteed to the king the neutrality of

Italy, and promised to close the entry of his dominions against the

Protestants of Dauphiny who came thither for refuge. If Italy refused

her neutrality, the Duke of Savoy was to unite his forces to those of the

king and command the combined army.

Victory would not have been more advantageous for Victor-Amadeo than his

constant defeats were; but, by detaching him from the coalition, Louis

XIV. had struck a fatal blow at the great alliance: the campaign of 1696

in Germany and in Flanders had resolved itself into mere observations and

insignificant engagements; Holland and England were exhausted, and their

commerce was ruined; in vain did Parliament vote fresh and enormous

supplies. “I should want ready money,” wrote William III. to Heinsius,

“and my poverty is really incredible.”

There was no less cruel want in France. “I calculate that in these

latter days more than a tenth part of the people,” said Vauban, “are

reduced to beggary, and in fact beg.” Sweden had for a long time been

proffering mediation: conferences began on the 9th of May, 1697, at

Nieuburg, a castle belonging to William III., near the village of

Ryswick. These great halls opened one into another; the French and the

plenipotentiaries of the coalition of princes occupied the two wings, the

mediators sat in the centre. Before arriving at Ryswick, the most

important points of the treaty between France and William III. were

already settled.

Louis XIV. had at last consented to recognize the king that England had

adopted; William demanded the expulsion of James II. from France; Louis

XIV. formally refused his consent. “I will engage not to support the

enemies of King William directly or indirectly,” said he: “it would not

comport with my honor to have the name of King James mentioned in the

treaty.” William contented himself with the concession, and merely

desired that it should be reciprocal. “All Europe has sufficient

confidence in the obedience and submission of my people,” said Louis

XIV., “and, when it is my pleasure to prevent my subjects from assisting

the King of England, there are no grounds for fearing lest he should find

any assistance in my kingdom. There can be no occasion for reciprocity;

I have neither sedition nor faction to fear.” Language too haughty for a

king who had passed his infancy in the midst of the troubles of the

Fronde, but language explained by the patience and fidelity of the nation

towards the sovereign who had so long lavished upon it the intoxicating

pleasures of success.

France offered restitution of Strasburg, Luxembourg, Mons, Charleroi, and

Dinant, restoration of the house of Lorraine, with the conditions

proposed at Nimeguen, and recognition of the King of England. “We have

no equivalent to claim,” said the French plenipotentiaries haughtily;

“your masters have never taken anything from ours.”

On the 27th of July a preliminary deed was signed between Marshal

Boufflers and Bentinck, Earl of Portland, the intimate friend of King

William; the latter left the army and retired to his castle of Loo; there

it was that he heard of the capture of Barcelona by the Duke of Vendime;

Spain, which had hitherto refused to take part in the negotiations, lost

all courage, and loudly demanded peace; but France withdrew her

concessions on the subject of Strasburg, and proposed to give as

equivalent Friburg in Brisgau and Brisach. William III. did not

hesitate. Heinsius signed the peace in the name of the States General

on the 20th of September at midnight; the English and Spanish

plenipotentiaries did the same; the emperor and the empire were alone in

still holding out: the Emperor Leopold made pretensions to regulate in

advance the Spanish succession, and the Protestant princes refused to

accept the maintenance of the Catholic worship in all the places in which

Louis XIV. had restored it.

Here again the will of William III. prevailed over the irresolution of

his allies. “The Prince of Orange is sole arbiter of Europe,” Pope

Innocent XII. had said to Lord Perth, who had a commission to him from

James II; “peoples and kings are his slaves; they will do nothing which

might displease him.”

“I ask,” said William, “where anybody can see a probability of making

France give up a succession for which she would maintain, at need, a

twenty years’ war; and God knows if we are in a position to dictate laws

to France.” The emperor yielded, despite the ill humor of the Protestant

princes. For the ease of their consciences they joined England and

Holland in making a move on behalf of the French Reformers. Louis XIV.

refused to discuss the matter, saying, “It is my business, which concerns

none but me.” Up to this day the refugees had preserved some hope,

henceforth their country was lost to them; many got themselves

naturalized in the countries which had given them asylum.

The revolution of 1789 alone was to re-open to their children the gates

of France.

For the first time since Cardinal Richelieu, France moved back her

frontiers by the signature of a treaty. She had gained the important

place of Strasburg, but she lost nearly all she had won by the treaty of

Nimeguen in the Low Countries and in Germany; she kept Franche-Comte, but

she gave up Lothringen. Louis XIV. had wanted to aggrandize himself at

any price and at any risk; he was now obliged to precipitately break up

the grand alliance, for King Charles II. was slowly dying at Madrid, and

the Spanish Succession was about to open. Ignorant of the supreme evils

and sorrows which awaited him on this fatal path, the King of France

began to forget, in this distant prospect of fresh aggrandizement and

war, the checks that his glory and his policy had just met with.

A Popular History of France from the Earliest Times, Volume 5 · 第 4 / 9 章