The Annexation of the Transvaal.
[Sidenote: Dangers Without, Difficulties Within]
In the years immediately following 1872 the disorganization and public
weakness of the Transvaal Boers became dangerous to themselves and
inimical to the peace of all South Africa. The emigrant farmers had
for two decades been living in a chronic state of war with the
ever-increasing number of natives around them and, while successful in
their raids upon individual Bantu kraals, were entirely unsuccessful in
the subjection of the tribes as a whole. They would not submit to
taxation, what little paper money they possessed had in 1870
depreciated to a quarter of its face value, and the few business
transactions indulged in were carried out on lines of barter not
dissimilar to the aboriginal customs around them. No public
improvements were made and no administrative system existed further
than a nominal Presidency which was helpless in the face of the
surrounding disorganization. The accession of Mr. Burghers to the
position, in 1872, did not remedy matters and the repulse of the Boers
from the stronghold of Sekukuni on their north-eastern border, in 1876,
precipitated a situation which resulted in the British annexation of
the Republic.
[Sidenote: Authoritative Questions]
So much of the subsequent discussion regarding this policy turns upon
the then existing internal situation of the Transvaal that a couple of
authoritative quotations may be given here. Mr. James Bryce, who has
since made himself unpopular in England by his opposition to the War of
1899, states in his _Impressions of South Africa_ that: "The weakness
and disorders of the Republic had become a danger not only to the
British subjects who had begun to settle in it but also to the
neighbouring British territories and especially Natal." Dr. George M.
Theal, a recognized authority upon South African affairs, despite a
pronounced tendency to sympathize with the Dutch, refers in the _Story
of the Nations_ Series, to the troubles with Sekukuni and then
proceeds; "But the country was quite unable to bear the strain. The
ordinary charges of government and the interest on the public debt
could not be met, much less an additional burden. And so the whole
administrative machinery broke down. The Republic was really in a
pitiable state, without money or an army, with rebellion triumphant and
a general election approaching that was feared might be attended with
civil war."
[Sidenote: A Great Peril]
National bankruptcy and the danger arising from 300,000 threatening
natives surrounding, within the Transvaal, some 30,000 people of Dutch
descent were also added to by the possibility of external attack from
the Zulus. There can be no doubt of the reality of this peril although
the events which followed led the Dutch to minimize its extent.
Cetywayo, in 1876, had a large army of trained and physically powerful
warriors numbering at least 30,000 men. He had immense reserves of
savage population, in the event of war, both in the Transvaal and
Natal, and all were bound together by a bond of hatred against the
Boer--the only tie recognized by native tribes. He had his men in
threatening positions upon the frontier from time to time and had
announced that his _Impis_ must have an opportunity of wetting their
spears in the blood of an enemy. But at this point the Zulu chieftain
touched British interests. If he attacked the Boers and was successful
it meant a future onslaught with increased power upon Natal, and, in
any case, might easily involve the hundreds of thousands of related
tribes in the Colony. For the safety of the scattered British
settlements it was therefore necessary to protect the now almost
helpless Boer. Of course, the commandos of the latter would have put
up a good fight against the invading hordes and the enmity of
surrounding natives, but, without provisions, without ammunition,
without fortifications, and without money (the Transvaal Treasury was
so empty in 1876 that it could not pay for the transportation of some
ammunition from Durban to Pretoria) the result must have been extremely
disastrous.
[Sidenote: The Federation Policy of Lord Carnarvon]
It was at this junction that the Federation policy of Lord Carnarvon,
Colonial Secretary in the Beaconsfield Government, combined with the
apparent local necessities of the case to cause the intervention of the
Imperial authorities. Lord Beaconsfield was an Imperialist of the
strongest type, imaginative yet practical, initiative in policy and
also courageous in execution. His Government had bought the Suez Canal
shares in order to ensure the trade route of the Empire to India, and
had made the Queen an eastern Empress and the Prince of Wales the
centre of Oriental hospitality and magnificence, in order to appeal to
the sentiment of those vast regions and teeming populations. Lord
Carnarvon had, in 1867, as Colonial Secretary, presided over the
Confederation of British America, and his present great ambition was to
help in creating a federated South Africa. But it was too late so far
as South Africa was concerned; too early so far as Imperialistic
sentiment at home was concerned. When Sir Bartle Frere reached Cape
Town he found that the Transvaal had just been annexed, and that one
great apparent difficulty had been removed from his path. At the same
time, however, he found the Orange Free State opposed to federation
though ready for a customs union; and two years later the malcontents
in the Transvaal, roused and encouraged by Mr. Gladstone's public
sentiments as Leader of the Liberal Opposition and in defence of the
Boer right to independence, were in rebellion and able to influence
their racial allies at Cape Town in the vetoing of the Commissioner's
general policy of federation. Such was the story in a brief summary.
[Sidenote: Threatened Anarchy]
The details are both interesting and important. In 1876 the Boer
attack on Sekukuni--a not very strong Kaffir chief upon the Transvaal
border--had, as already stated, been repulsed, and the High
Commissioner of the moment in South Africa, Sir Henry Barkly, wrote to
Lord Carnarvon, under date of October 30th, describing the ensuing
situation of the Transvaal at some length, and concluded with the
following expressive words:
"In short, the whole state of things borders very closely upon anarchy;
and, although in other parts of the Republic lawlessness and inhumanity
are less rampantly exhibited, the machinery of administration is
everywhere all but paralyzed, and the Republic seems about to fall to
pieces through its own weakness. In that event the Boers in each
district would either have to make their own terms with the adjacent
Kaffir tribes or trek onwards into the wilderness, as is their wont,
whilst the position of the large number of British subjects scattered
about on farms, or resident in the towns, or at the gold fields, might
fairly claim the humane consideration of Her Majesty's Government even
if there were not other reasons to save so fine a country from so
miserable a fate."
There was more, however, to be thought of than the mere paralysis of
the functions of Government, bad as it was. Then as now, the Transvaal
was the Turkey of South Africa in its treatment of other races as well
as in a Mahommedan-like superciliousness of religious view. Writing a
few months after the above despatch from the High Commissioner, Lord
Carnarvon--January 25, 1877--in referring to the Boer method of warfare
on the native tribes as particularly illustrated in the Sekukuni
struggle, declared that: "Her Majesty's Government, after having given
full consideration to all the information attainable on the subject,
and with every desire to view matters in the most favorable light,
deeply regret that they are forced to come to the conclusion that the
barbarities alleged to have been committed, though denied by the
Transvaal Government, have, in fact, occurred."
[Sidenote: Sir T. Shepstone's Arrival in Pretoria]
Meanwhile, on October 5, 1876, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who, during
forty years of life and administration in South-eastern Africa had won
the general respect of Englishmen, Boers and natives, received a Royal
Commission to inquire into the Transvaal disturbances and to exercise
power and jurisdiction in the matter subject to the will and welfare of
the people. He arrived at Pretoria on January 22d, after a slow
progress through the country and accompanied only by a small personal
staff and 25 Natal Mounted Police. He had, during this period, in
different parts of the Transvaal and to various portions of the people,
explained his policy of annexation and the necessity of doing something
for the preservation of personal property as well as real liberty.
Everywhere he had been well received, and, for a month after his
Proclamation annexing the Republic to the Empire had been issued on
April 12th, he remained at Pretoria without the support of a single
soldier of the Queen. The general position of the country was well
explained in a despatch to Lord Carnarvon dated at Pretoria on March
6th. The white population was made up, at the outside estimate, of
8,000 men capable of bearing arms, and of these more than 6,000 were
farmers scattered in isolated homesteads over a surface equal to that
of the British Isles. It was patent, he declared, to every observer
that:
[Sidenote: Boer Government's Weakness]
"The Government was powerless to control either its white citizens or
its native subjects, and that it was incapable of enforcing its laws or
collecting its taxes; that the Treasury was empty; that the salaries of
officials had been and are for months in arrears; and that sums payable
for the ordinary and necessary expenses of Government cannot be had;
that payment for such services as postal contracts were long and
hopelessly overdue; that the white inhabitants had become split into
factions; that the large native population within the boundaries of the
State ignore its authority and its laws, and that the powerful ruling
king, Cetywayo, is anxious to seize upon the first opportunity of
attacking a country the conduct of whose warriors at Sekukuni's
mountain has convinced him that it can be easily conquered by his
clamoring regiments."
[Sidenote: Kruger's Visit to London]
President Burgers himself recognized the situation, and a month before
the annexation was consummated told the assembled Volksraad that
"matters are as bad as they ever can be; they cannot be worse."
Practically, he supported the policy of Sir T. Shepstone, and shortly
afterwards retired on a pension to live at Cape Town. The Hollanders,
who stood to lose heavily by the supremacy of British ideas and
intelligence in the country, did their utmost to arouse the fanaticism
of the farmers by printed manifestoes and memorials of the most
inflammatory character, but without much success. In the end the only
practical opposition made was the appointment by the expiring Executive
Council, on the day before the Proclamation, of a delegation to England
composed of Mr. Paul Kruger, Vice-President, and Dr. E. J. P.
Jorrissen, Attorney-General. These gentlemen went to London and were
well received personally, and a similar result followed from a second
deputation headed by, Mr. Kruger in 1878. One evil, however, came from
these visits. Instead of the astute Paul Kruger being impressed by the
power of Great Britain, or conciliated by the courtesy of political
leaders, he seems to have been interested chiefly in the study of party
tactics and of the disintegrating influence of politics when carried
into the field of Colonial government and foreign affairs. Coupled
with the knowledge thus gained of a Radical faction which was already
denouncing Lord Carnarvon's Confederation scheme, and of the
anti-expansion views of Mr. Gladstone, Mr. John Morley and Sir William
Harcourt, was a keen appreciation of the strength of the Home Rule
issue then evolving such incipient power in the field of partisan
battle. It was not hard for Mr. Kruger to discern, or hope for, the
coming fall of the Beaconsfield Government; the growing power of a
Radical element which would parallel the case of the Transvaal with
that of Ireland; and a future in which some strong movement in the now
quiet and peace-environed Boer country would result in a reversal of
British policy.
But the annexation was now a fact. In England it was received with
comparative indifference by the Tories and with a sort of passive
hostility by the Liberals. No one seemed to know very much of the real
state of affairs, and when, in the autumn of 1879, Mr. Gladstone
practically urged the independence of the Boers as a portion of Liberal
policy, his party opponents did not themselves realize the greatness of
the issue involved or the inevitable consequences of playing with
Empire questions as with measures for the building of a local bridge or
the amending of some local law. In South Africa the English element
rejoiced greatly at the annexation, and never dreamt of its reversal.
[Sidenote: Dr. Moffat's Joy Over Annexation]
The Rev. Dr. Robert Moffat, writing privately on July 27, 1877, with
all his long accumulated experience in the South African missionary
field,[1] declared that: "I have no words to express the pleasure the
annexation of the Transvaal Territory has afforded me. It is one of
the most important measures our Government could have adopted as
regards the Republic as well as the aborigines. I have no hesitation
in pronouncing the step one fraught with incalculable benefit to both
parties, _i.e._, the settlers and the native tribes. A residence of
more than half a century beyond the Colonial boundary is quite
sufficient to authorize me to write with confidence that Lord
Carnarvon's action will be the commencement of an era of blessing to
South Africa." Such was the general view of the English element at the
Cape, and such would have been the expressed view of Dutchmen like
President Brand of the Free State if they could have ventured to
explain their own sentiments. But Lord Carnarvon proposed, and Mr.
Kruger's astute perception, combined with Hollander scheming and the
fickleness of British party policy, disposed.
[1] Letter to Alexander McArthur, M.P., published in the _English
Independent_ of August 16, 1877.
[Sidenote: Dutch Appeal to Gladstone]
Slowly but surely Kruger played upon Boer ignorance and local
prejudices, intense aversion to taxation and dislike of the English.
Slowly and steadily he worked upon the racial sentiment of the Dutch at
the Cape, until, in 1880, they largely signed an address to Mr.
Gladstone asking his support for the "liberties" of their kinsmen.
Eventually, he defeated, by indirect means, Sir Bartle Frere's policy
of federating Cape Colony, Natal, Griqualand West and the Transvaal
when it came before the Cape Legislature in June, 1880. Carefully, but
with certainty, he built upon the shifting sands of England's Colonial
policy that later structure of personal supremacy so well described by
Kipling:
"Cruel in the shadow, crafty in the sun,
Far beyond his border shall his teaching run.
Sloven, sullen, savage, secret, uncontrolled,
Laying on a new land evil of the old."
For a couple of years, however, matters went on without open rebellion.
The administration of Sir T. Shepstone was, upon the whole, a wise one.
The former officials were largely retained, provision was made for a
dual official language, the finances were got into fairly good shape,
and the natives were conciliated. Sir Bartle Frere, looking on from
Cape Town, wished to establish complete responsible government, and had
his policy been carried out, it is possible that the war might have
been averted, and certain that the growing influence of Kruger would
have been checked. Two Dutch deputations had gone to London, and the
restoration of independence had been refused them by both the
Beaconsfield Government and the succeeding one of Mr. Gladstone. High
officials of all kinds--Frere, Wolseley, Shepstone and Lanyon--had
declared that it was an absolute impossibility, and, certainly, no
overt attempts were made to obtain it while British troops were present
in South Africa in large numbers engaged in crushing the Zulu enemy or
the lesser power of the Sekukuni.
[Sidenote: Encouragement from England]
Unofficially, however, the Boer idea of independence received
substantial encouragement from England. Before coming into power Mr.
Gladstone, in his famous Midlothian speeches, proclaimed that "if those
acquisitions were as valuable as they are worthless, I would repudiate
them because they are obtained by means dishonorable to the character
of the country." When he came into office he practically repudiated
his own statements; but they had meanwhile done the mischief which so
often accompanies demagogic or thoughtless oratory when uttered by
highly-placed public men. In 1880 Colonel Sir Owen Lanyon became
Administrator of the Transvaal in place of Sir T. Shepstone, who was
paying a visit to England. He has been described as an "orthodox
military man, somewhat pompous and a trifle haughty to inferiors," and,
in reality, was the worst possible personage to be placed at the head
of affairs in a country now seething with discontent and ripe for
insurrection.
[Sidenote: Taxation the Cause of War in 1880-81]
One of the real and immediate causes of the war of 1880-81 was the
question of taxation--not in any constitutional sense, as it might have
been in an English community, but in the personal objection of the Boer
to paying taxes of any kind to any person or any Government. The
proceedings of the Volksraad from 1868 to 1877 teem with references to
the difficulty of obtaining payment of the most ordinary and necessary
taxes until, in March of the latter year, and just before the
annexation was consummated, that body declared that the greater amount
of the taxes had not been paid, that the Government of the country
could not be carried on, and that the Government be authorized "to
collect all outstanding taxes by summary process." There was, however,
no personal objection to the drawing of money from the Government to
any obtainable limit. Sir Owen Lanyon stated, as an illustration of
this fact, and in a despatch to Lord Kimberley on December 5, 1880,
that "Mr. Kruger's case exemplifies this (the avoidance of paying taxes
on the ground of conscientious scruples against the Government), for he
continued to draw salary as a member of the Executive Council for a
period of eight and a half months after the annexation. In fact, he
would doubtless be drawing it now, for notwithstanding his term of
office expired on the 4th of November, 1877, he applied for and
received pay up to the close of the year." Whatever the immediate
cause of the rebellion, however, there can be no doubt of many of the
collateral issues. Love of independence was one, and the careful
manipulation of this sentiment by Mr. Kruger was perhaps as important a
factor as any other. Hardly less so, in his hands and in those of
clever Hollander intriguers, were the party utterances of English
leaders. The men of the veldt knew nothing of England or English life,
and how should they comprehend the complex character of partisan
statements and eloquent platform vagaries? Hence it was that they were
only too willing to believe that a show of force and the shock of a
sudden revolt would break the back of the Gladstone Government's
new-found objection to a recognition of their complete independence.
[Sidenote: Sudden Coming of the War]
The war came with apparent suddenness to the unprepared
authorities--lack of preparation being, however, a not uncommon
condition of South African history. Yet there was really ample
warning. At a great mass meeting in December, 1879, the strongest
possible sentiment had been expressed in favor of independence. Mr. M.
W. Pretorius, a former President, had been arrested for sedition, and
several others were in prison for the same reason. Passive resistance
had everywhere become the order of the day, and a proclamation against
seditious meetings was necessarily issued. Later on, Sir Garnet
Wolseley, who had been recently appointed High Commissioner for
South-eastern Africa, wrote to the Colonial Office (October 29, 1880)
regarding the "continuance of grave discontent," and added: "I am
informed on all sides that it is the intention of the Boers to fight
for independence. There is no doubt, I think, that the people are
incited to discontent and rebellion by ambitious agitators, ... and
that the main body of the Dutch population is disaffected to our rule."
Nothing of importance was done, however. Of course, Sir Garnet
Wolseley did all he could in the careful disposition of his small
force; but at home there was only wavering and uncertainty. The fact
is, that the Gladstone Government was afraid to give way and did not
want to hold on. They cared nothing for the Transvaal, but were face
to face with repeated official pledges regarding its retention, as well
as with their own unofficial advocacy of its abandonment. So they
waited, and events drifted into the inevitable rebellion. The first
overt action was the forcible resistance of a farmer, named
Bezuidenhout, who had been served with a notice and then with an
attachment for the sum of £27 5_s._, unpaid taxes.
[Sidenote: Armed Boers Take Possession of Town]
Then a great public meeting was announced for January 8, 1881, but was
held instead on December 15th at Paardekraal. Armed Boers came in
thousands, and, on the succeeding day, took possession of the Town of
Heidelberg, declared their independence, and established a republican
government, with Paul Kruger as President, Piet Joubert as
Commandant-General, E. J. P. Jorrissen as Attorney-General, and a man
named Bok as Acting State Secretary. Four days later a portion of the
94th Regiment, consisting of some 250 men, were surprised and shot down
to the number of 120. Owing to the clever _ruse_ of the Boers in
announcing their mass-meeting for nearly a month ahead of its real
date, the breaking out of active rebellion had not been expected for
some weeks.
The British force was so small in the Transvaal that the Boers had it
all their own way. The tiny garrisons were shut up and closely
besieged, and the rebels advanced into Natal and occupied a favorable
position in the mountains at a place called Laing's Nek. It was
attacked on January 27th by Major-General Sir George Colley, commanding
the troops in the Colony, with about a thousand men. He was driven
back with heavy losses, owing partly to a lack of artillery and partly,
on his own admission, to attempting a flank movement with inadequate
means. Another unsuccessful fight took place at Ingogo, and then, on
February 26th, he occupied Majuba Hill, and on the succeeding day met
his second and famous defeat. Death buries mistakes, but there is no
doubt that, once more, over-confidence had led a British officer into
disaster. The results were more serious than those which usually
follow such passing incidents.
[Sidenote: Attitude of Gladstone's Government]
The Gladstone Government did not want the Transvaal; did not like the
preceding situation of suspended sedition; did not understand or care
for the necessity and vital import of the country to a future united
South Africa; did not desire to fight the Boers in any way, shape or
form; did not know anything practical regarding the nature of Dutch
politics and racial cohesion in South Africa, except to have vague
fears of a general war; did not understand how greatly peace in such
regions depends upon _prestige_ or at how low an ebb British military
reputation in South Africa already was. To them these little defeats
were an excuse and a means to an end. Telegram followed telegram,
after Majuba Hill, urging Sir Evelyn Wood--who had succeeded to the
military command[2]--to obtain a meeting with the Boer leaders for the
discussion of terms of peace. On March 5th, Sir Evelyn Wood
telegraphed to Lord Kimberley, Colonial Secretary, that: "In discussing
settlement of country, my constant endeavors shall be to carry out the
spirit of your orders; but, considering the disasters we have
sustained, I think that the happiest result will be that, after
accelerating successful action which _I hope to fight in about fourteen
days_, the Boers should disperse without any guarantee, and then many,
now undoubtedly coerced, will readily settle down." But the Government
was not willing to wait even fourteen days, and Mr. Gladstone had
already stated in the House of Commons that he hoped to come to terms
with the Boers. Accordingly, on March 12th, Lord Kimberley telegraphed
Wood as follows:
[2] Sir Garnet Wolseley had returned to England some months before the
outbreak of the war in order to take up the Quartermaster-Generalship
of the Forces.
[Sidenote: Proposition for Peace]
"Inform Boer leaders that if Boers will undertake to desist from armed
opposition and disperse to their homes we are prepared to name the
following as Commissioners: Sir H. Robinson (High Commissioner), Chief
Justice de Villiers (of Cape Colony) and yourself. President Brand
would be asked to be present at proceedings as representing friendly
State. Commission would be authorized to consider following points:
Complete self-government under British suzerainty with British Resident
and provisions for protection of native interests and as to frontier
affairs. Control over relations with foreign Powers to be reserved."
[Sidenote: Self-Government, but not Independence]
Four days later the meeting took place under the shadow of Laing's Nek,
and President Kruger accepted the terms of Lord Kimberley's telegram.
On March 21st, the armistice having meanwhile been prolonged and
President Brand not having turned up, a new meeting of President
Kruger, Sir E. Wood and others was held and a draft treaty drawn up.
Schedule 2d stated that: "We, Kruger, Pretorius and Joubert, declare
our readiness to accept the suzerainty of the reigning Sovereign of
Great Britain and Ireland according to the explanation given by Sir E.
Wood." Schedule 3d declared that: "I, Sir Evelyn Wood, acknowledge the
right of the Transvaal people to complete self-government, subject to
the Suzerain rights." Everywhere throughout these negotiations the
phrase "self-government" is used as contradistinguished from
"independence." Not even the Boer leaders then suggested the latter as
a possible policy. They were willing to accept the supremacy of the
Queen, the British control of their foreign policy, the management of
their relations with the natives and even the control of their border
policy. But whatever they did ask for they received. The Lydenberg
District, for instance, was distinctly debatable ground, with a mainly
British and white population, and covering the region once ruled by
Sekukuni and subdued by British troops on behalf of the Boers. This
region the latter now demanded, though not very strenuously, and on
March 31st Lord Kimberley telegraphed to the Royal Commissioners, in
the concluding words of a somewhat fatuous discussion of the question,
that: "Her Majesty's Government are averse, on general grounds of
policy, to the extension of British territory in South Africa." Of
course Lydenberg was ultimately given up and the Boer position further
strengthened and consolidated. On June 13th the Royal
Commission--Robinson, Wood and De Villiers--met the new Boer Government
at Pretoria, and on August 3d the Convention of 1881 was signed and
made public.
[Illustration: THE GOVERNMENT BUILDING, PRETORIA, TRANSVAAL. A VIEW OF
MAJUBA HILL FROM THE RAILWAY]
[Illustration: PRESIDENT KRUGER WORSHIPPING IN CHURCH]
[Sidenote: Suzerainty of the Queen]
The document carefully guarded the Queen's supremacy, and declared in
its important preamble that: "Her Majesty's Commissioners for the
settlement of the Transvaal Territory, duly appointed as such by a
Commission passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet bearing date
April 5, 1881, do hereby undertake and guarantee on behalf of Her
Majesty that, from and after the 8th day of August, 1881, complete
self-government, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs
and successors, will be accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal
Territory." Then follow the Articles of the Convention giving terms
and conditions, reservations and limitations. [Sidenote: Rights
Guaranteed Residents] Control was preserved over the natives; a British
Resident was to be appointed at Pretoria; the right to move British
troops through the State was acceded; "the control of the external
relations of the said State, including the conclusion of treaties and
the conduct of diplomatic intercourse with foreign Powers," was given
to Britain; no slavery or "apprenticeship partaking of slavery" was to
be tolerated; complete freedom of religion was promised; boundaries
were defined and the independence of the Swazis "fully recognized."
Finally, Article 26 declared that "All persons other than natives
conforming themselves to the laws of the Transvaal State will have full
liberty, with their families, to enter, travel or reside in any part of
the Transvaal State; they will be entitled to hire or possess houses,
manufactories, warehouses, shops and premises; they may carry on their
commerce either in person or by any agents whom they may think fit to
employ; they will not be subject in respect to their persons or
property, or in respect to their commerce or industry to any taxes,
whether general or local, other than those which are, or may be,
imposed upon Transvaal citizens." This Article, reaffirmed in the same
words by the ensuing Convention of 1884, and taken in conjunction with
the guarantee of self-government to all the inhabitants of the
Transvaal--not to the Boers alone--constitutes the charter of right to
the Uitlander of a later day. Another point must also be considered in
the same connection. Prior to the signing of the Convention a
discussion[3] took place as to the existing rights of aliens or British
subjects in the new State and in the following terms:
[3] See British Government _Blue Book_ c. 3219, pp. 24 and 53.
[Sidenote: What the Rights of Uitlanders were]
"Question 239. Sir H. Robinson. Before annexation had British
subjects complete freedom of trade throughout the Transvaal? were they
on the same footing as citizens?
" 240. Mr. Kruger. They were on the same footing as the burghers;
there was not the slightest difference, in accordance with the Sand
River Convention.
" 241. Sir H. Robinson. I presume you will not object to that
continuing?
" 242. Mr. Kruger. No, there will be equal protection for everybody.
" 243. Sir E. Wood. And equal privileges?
" 244. Mr. Kruger. We make no difference as far as burgher rights are
concerned. There may perhaps be some slight difference in the case of
a young person who has just come into the country.
" 245. There are no disabilities with regard to trade, are there?
" 246. Mr. Kruger. No.
"1037. Dr. Jorissen. At No. 244 the question was: 'Is there any
distinction in regard to the privileges or rights of Englishmen in the
Transvaal?' and Mr. Kruger answered, 'No, there is no difference;' and
then he added, 'There maybe some slight difference in the case of a
young person just coming into the country.' I wish to say that that
might give rise to a wrong impression. What Mr. Kruger intended to
convey was this: according to our law a newcomer has not his burgher
rights immediately. The words young person do not refer to age, but to
the time of residence in the Republic. According to our Grondwet
(Constitution) you have to reside a year in the country.
"1038. Sir H. de Villiers. Is the oath of allegiance required from a
person, not being born in the Transvaal, coming to reside there, who
claims burgher rights?
"1039. Dr. Jorissen. In the law relating to the franchise there is a
stipulation for the oath of allegiance to be taken to the State.
"1040. Then it is not every burgher who has a vote; it is only the
burghers who have taken the oath of allegiance that have a vote?
"1041. Dr. Jorissen. Yes, the last revision of that law was made in
1876."
[Sidenote: Complete Equality of Races]
It is therefore plain that when the re-cession of the Transvaal took
place complete equality of races existed and was pledged to continue;
while a fair system of franchise was in force which required only a
year's residence and the usual oath of allegiance--similar to that
always used in the Orange Free State, and not like the one afterwards
created which compelled a repudiation in set terms of allegiance to the
Queen. The very term "self-government" naturally involved freedom of
franchise under similar conditions for both Boer and Briton, and not
even Kruger himself then claimed otherwise; whilst the British
Government and the Commissioners took it as a matter of course that
Englishmen would be kept upon the same level in the Transvaal as they
always had been and as were the Dutch in Cape Colony and Natal.
[Sidenote: Effort to Get Rid of British Suzerainty]
However, results were still a matter of the future, and in the meantime
the Convention, as signed by S. J. P. Kruger, M. W. Pretorius and P. J.
Joubert, was ratified, on October 20th, by the Volksraad, though under
protest from Joubert and others, and with the remarkable statement from
Lord Kimberly that "no proposals for its modification could be
entertained until it was ratified." This statement, coupled with the
hostility secretly raised in the Volksraad by Kruger, and openly
expressed as representative of public opinion, paved the way for a
reconsideration of its terms along ultimate lines which should limit
the Queen's Government to a supervision of the Transvaal's foreign
affairs instead of their direction and control; which should abrogate
the clause permitting interference with internal legislation, or with
the policy pursued towards native tribes; and should strip the Resident
of any authority other than that of a Minister or Consul. The aim was
to get rid of British suzerainty by degrees, and Kruger, from his study
of British political parties, believed he could eventually succeed.
Bold preliminary steps were taken. In open disregard of the
Convention, a law was passed in 1882 providing that a newcomer must
reside five years in the country, become duly registered and pay a sum
of $125 before obtaining the privilege of naturalization. In 1884
President Kruger again visited London, accompanied by two other
Delegates--Messrs. S. J. du Toit and N. J. Smit, and a clever Hollander
lawyer named Van Blockland. Mr. Gladstone was still Premier, and Lord
Derby, the weakest and most vacillating of modern British Ministers,
was Colonial Secretary. As the hero of a retirement which had
practically killed the Government of Lord Beaconsfield and of a New
Guinea fiasco which had merited and received the execration of
Australians, he was eminently fitted to become an instrument for
trouble in South Africa under the shrewd manipulation of Kruger.
[Sidenote: British Power Relinquished]
The new Convention was duly negotiated, and all reference to the
suzerainty omitted. Practically every power retained by the British
Government in 1881 was now given up. As a "matter of convenience" the
authority of the British Resident was wiped off the slate, and the
right of the British Sovereign to move troops through the State in time
of war with bordering natives was abrogated. The right to conduct
diplomatic negotiations was also freely given up, and the only shred of
authority visibly maintained was the power to veto treaties publicly
entered into.
[Sidenote: Loophole in the New Arrangement]
Fortunately the declaration of suzerainty was not abrogated in set
terms, and, of course, until that was done the British authority under
which the first Convention was signed and sealed and the second
Convention created remained the same. Moreover, the terms of the
preamble to the second agreement simply stated that "the following
_Articles_ of the new Convention ... shall be _substituted for the
Articles_ embodied in the Convention of August 3, 1881," so that there
was no direct substitution of authority. However, the new arrangement,
through not definitely reasserting the suzerainty, gave President
Kruger the opening he desired for some future period when he might
claim that there was no longer any such authority; and in making
possible this technical and vague claim the indifferent Lord Derby laid
one of the foundation stones of great future trouble. The Transvaal
State now became the South African Republic, and its Delegates
negotiated treaties in Berlin, Paris and Lisbon. Gold soon began to be
produced in great quantities, the revenues swelled into millions of
pounds sterling, salaries of officials grew apace, President Kruger
became one of the wealthy men of the world, alien settlers were treated
like native inferiors, the oppressed Uitlander came into prominence,
and presently the British Empire found itself face to face with an
organized, compact, wealthy and powerful enemy.