CHAPTER III

The Great Trek and its First Results.

[Sidenote: Abolition of Slavery]

The abolition of slavery is one of the landmarks in South

African history. The motive for the expenditure of a

hundred million of dollars in freeing slaves within the bounds of

the British Empire was noble beyond all criticism. The act itself

was wise and necessary. But the immense distance of the British

Government from the scene in South Africa and the unfortunate

ignorance of the Colonial Office, at times, concerning conditions

in those far-away regions, produced mistakes in the carrying out of

their policy of freedom which created a distinct injustice and made

memories which still rankle in the breasts of Dutchmen from the

Cape to the Zambesi. The Slave Emancipation

Act came into force in Cape Colony on

December 1st, 1833, and by the terms of its

administration $6,235,000 was apportioned to the Cape proprietors,

as against the $15,000,000 at which they had valued their

property. The difference was considerable and, as many of the

slaves were mortgaged it is apparent that some measure of trouble

must have followed even had the whole six million dollars been

promptly distributed amongst the farmers. As it was, the period

of seven years' apprenticeship originally granted in order to prepare

all parties for the inevitable change of condition was shortened

to five years, while the money itself was doled out from London

after individual proof of claim. The result, through a natural and

complete ignorance of procedure amongst the farmers, was the

wholesale disposal of claims against the Government for mere

trifles and the enrichment of hordes of agents at the expense of

the settlers.

[Sidenote: A Disastrous Measure]

To many this meant ruin. Their source of labour was gone;

they could not, or would not, themselves perform manual work;

their discontent with the British Government was intensified by a

bitter feeling that the missionaries were their sworn enemies and

were installed at the ear of the Governor and in the heart of the

Colonial Office; their belief in British power was at a minimum

owing to weakness in dealing with the Kaffirs; their homes had

been harried along the border during many Kaffir wars and sometimes

in days of peace; their pleas for a vagrancy law which should

restrain wandering Kaffirs or Hottentots while

within the Colony had been refused from fear

of harshness in its local administration; their

whole social system, religious sentiment and racial pride seemed

in a state of revolt against existing conditions. At this

unfortunate moment another Kaffir war broke out. There had

been warning signs of danger along the eastern frontier of the

Province, much alarm had been felt and expressed and appeals

were sent to Cape Town for protection. Dr. Philip, the political

missionary and self-constituted defender of all natives, declared these

fears unwarranted, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban, who had just come

out as Governor, failed to take any serious measures for defence.

The result was that on December 23rd, 1834, 10,000 Kaffirs swept

over the frontier, plundered the farms, murdered fifty Europeans

within a week and, before the Colony was cleared of them, had

wholly, or partially destroyed 806 farm-houses and captured, or

destroyed sixty wagons, 5700 horses, 111,000 horned-cattle and

161,000 sheep. This was the final blow to thousands of Dutch

settlers. Had they been naturally loyal to British institutions and

allegiance, their repeated misfortunes must have produced some

discontent, and, as it was, they were said to create an absolutely

impossible situation.

[Sidenote: The Trek Commences]

Disregarded by their own slaves, whom they

despised and often ill-treated; pillaged by the native tribes, whom

they hated with a bitter hatred and oppressed wherever possible;

governed by the English, whom they had learned to dislike intensely

and to in some measure despise; controlled by rules of administration

which they failed to understand and by laws of liberty which aimed

at their individual right of control over human chattels,

while striving to permeate by education the

dense mass of their inherited ignorance; they prepared

their caravan-covered wagons, gathered together their

household possessions and flocks and herds, and withdrew in

thousands from the Colony, and, as they hoped, from British rule.

[Sidenote: Qualities and Mode of Life]

Such is a brief pen-picture of the immediate and surface causes

of the Great Trek. It gives the most favorable view for the

emigrant farmer, and constitutes, in various forms, the basis for the

belief in foreign countries that the Boers were forced to migrate

from Cape Colony by British tyranny or maladministration; that

they deserved their independence if ever a people did; and that Great

Britain had no right to interfere further with them in the interior.

Such an opinion is far from correct. As we have seen in preceding

pages, the British Government had made sundry serious mistakes in

policy; but they had occurred under conditions of exceptional

difficulty and from motives of the highest and best. The Boers, in fact,

did not want firm government or free institutions; they desired

liberty to do as they liked with their own living

chattels and with the natives of the soil. They

deliberately cultivated modes of life and thought diametrically

opposed to everything the Englishman holds dear, and carefully

fanned the smouldering embers of dislike and distrust in their own

breasts until they became a flame of active hatred. The development

of conditions, therefore, which in Canada or Australia would have

produced protests and elicited eventual and satisfactory reforms only

served, in South Africa, to intensify individual bitterness, to increase

the racial misunderstandings and prejudices, and to hasten the great

migration into the interior.

There are some important details to consider in this connection.

Many of England's troubles in administering the eastern part of the

Colony were due to Boer arrogance and contempt of native rights and

property; while the wars which resulted in the destruction of Dutch

property, in turn, were natural though regrettable ebullitions of that

spirit of revenge which is not always confined to savages. Unwise

as Lord Glenelg's despatch to Sir Benjamin D'Urban was, its terms

clearly prove this fact. As to the Trek itself, there is a possibility

that it would have occurred in any case. The Boers were accustomed

to a wandering life in wagons, and, in time, their laagers must

inevitably have extended further and further into native territory. The

loss of their slaves would have naturally driven parties of the more

enterprising and youthful into the vast interior, and the spirit with

which they slaughtered natives as readily and as cheerfully as they

did wild beasts would have surely established Dutch communities to

the north and east without the provocations afforded by missionary

charges of cruelty, the Slaghter's Nek incident, the freeing of the

slaves, or native raids of retribution across the frontier. The pity

of it is that the feeling of hatred toward England and Englishmen

was so early in its origin and so deep-seated in its nature that some

of these occurrences, which superficial writers give as the undoubted

cause of the sentiment, were in reality more like the froth and foam

upon the top of a slow-gathering wave of sullen and stubborn

resentment against a superior racial civilization.

[Sidenote: Troubles with the Natives]

The Boers who migrated were chiefly those of the eastern part

of the Colony, far away from the seat of Government and almost

entirely isolated from communication with English settlers--largely

by their own desire. They were accustomed to

fighting the natives, and had the authorities

allowed them at pleasure to throw off their allegiance

and move into the interior in detached bodies, there would have

been no end to complications with the native tribes, while a

prolonged series of little wars in partial defence of men who were alien

in race and thought and policy would have resulted. At this period,

too, England still maintained throughout the world the principle

that he who is born a British subject is always one, and in South

Africa, up to 1836, it was really good policy to prevent isolated

Dutch settlements in the native regions. When the migration

became too large and too well organized to prevent, later developments

made it still necessary to press this claim of allegiance in

order to try and control, or check, the new régime of strife and

bloodshed which the Boer commandos had established and which

threatened both British interests and settlers in Natal. There was

much of the picturesque and something of the apparently heroic in

this famous migration. Out of Egypt and from the bondage of the

Englishmen--who would not let them retain their bondsmen--the

Boers went to the number of at least ten thousand, and traversed

the vast wilderness stretching through what is now Griqualand East

into the Natal of to-day; or else trekked into the regions north of

the Orange and Vaal Rivers. The interest and striking features

of the migration were undoubted, but the heroism was not at first

so clear. As events turned out there was much of danger and

death in these determined raids into native territory--conquered

and partially cleared of population by the wars of Moselkatze and

Tshaka--but at first the contempt of the Boers for all savages, their

absolute belief in themselves as a chosen people and in their

shotguns as invincible allies, made the movement an apparently simple

matter.

[Sidenote: Preparations and First Party of Trekkers]

In 1836 the Great Trek began. All through the frontier districts

sounded the hum of preparation, while the still primitive roads

became crowded with large wagons laden with

household goods, provisions, ammunition and the

families of the men who rode on either side or

guarded the droves of cattle and horses and the flocks of sheep and

goats which accompanied each caravan. The parties travelling

together were usually made up of related families, and were led by

one of themselves duly elected to the post and to the title of

Commandant. The first party to start was divided into two sections of

about fifty individuals each. One section met the not uncommon

fate of over-confident invaders in a land of savages, and its

members were destroyed with the exception of two children. The other

went away up to the north and east, and only a few finally reached

the Portuguese settlement at Delagoa Bay alive. Fever and the

Tsetse fly had been too much for the expedition.

[Sidenote: The Second Party]

The second party

was a large one under command of an able leader--Hendrik

Potgieter. Slowly and carefully he guided his people

up to an extensive strip of land lying between the

Vet and Vaal Rivers, and of this they took possession.

It was not long, however, before Moselkatze, the potent

Chief of the Matabele, heard of this invasion of his sphere, and some

isolated parties of the farmers were killed by his warriors. Then

came the news that a grand attack was to be made and the settlement

wiped out. Potgieter at once selected a suitable elevation,

made a strong defence with wagons and trees, and with forty men

awaited the attack. The result of fierce onslaughts upon such a

position by the naked bodies and brandishing spears of a Matabele

army was what might have been expected, and 155 corpses of the

enemy were finally left outside the laager.

[Illustration: BRITISH COURIER CARRYING THE NEWS OF THE BEGINNING

OF WAR TO THE ENGLISH SETTLERS]

[Illustration: INSPECTION BY THE COMMANDANT OF THE ASSEMBLED "COMMANDO"

IN THE MARKET PLACE OF A DORP.

BEGINNING OF THE WAR-BOERS LEAVING PRETORIA FOR THE FRONT.]

[Sidenote: The Third Contingent]

Relief came to the party from a third contingent of emigrants

under Gerrit Maritz, who soon after joined forces with them, and

then the Boers with their characteristic and inborn

contempt for the natives organized an expedition of

one hundred and seven farmers to attack the

nearest kraal of the Chief whose name was a household word of

terror amongst alien tribes and a force for unity and fighting power

amongst his own people. The commando surprised a large kraal

from which both Moselkatze and his Induna happened to be absent,

slew at least four hundred warriors, fired the village and returned to

camp with nearly seven thousand cattle as trophies of victory. The

emigrants then established themselves at a place on the Vet River,

which they called Wynburg, and here they were soon joined by other

families from Cape Colony, and, notably, by one band with Pieter Retief

at its head. The latter was elected Commandant-General, and a skeleton

of a constitution, after the Dutch plan, was framed. Instinct,

however, with the roving spirit of their people, many of the continually

arriving bands would not settle down even at this spot, and hankered

after the lowlands and sea-coast of Natal. Pieter Uys, one of the

leaders, had visited this region a couple of years before, and was

eloquent in praise of its beauty, fertility and delightful climate. The

fact that Natal had been partially colonized as early as 1825 by

Englishmen, under arrangements with Tshaka; that it was claimed as a

British possession, and that, in 1835, the settlers at Durban had

petitioned the Imperial Government to take them formally under its

protection; does not seem to have greatly concerned the Boers. The

only point in question was how Dingaan, who had succeeded Tshaka

as head of the Zulus, could be persuaded or coerced into a cession

of territory outside the immediate sphere of British settlement on the

coast.

[Sidenote: How they Obtained Land]

To this end Retief himself crossed the Drakensberg mountains,

paid a visit to Dingaan in what is now Zululand, and found him

apparently quite willing that the farmers should

settle in Natal. Meantime a second Dutch expedition

against the Matabele in the west had been organized,

and the result, as told by Dr. Theal, the Cape Town historian,[1]

is so typical of Boer methods and character in warfare that no

apology is needed for its reproduction here:

[1] _The Story of South Africa_. By George M. Theal,

LL.D. London, 1895.

[Sidenote: Ruthless Warfare]

"It consisted of one hundred and thirty-five farmers in two

divisions, under Hendrik Potgieter and Pieter Uys. Moselkatze

was found on the Marikwa, about fifty miles north of Mosega, and

he had with him at least twelve thousand warriors, all splendidly

trained and as brave as any troops who ever lived. But the advantage

of the farmers in their guns and horses was so great that the

hundred and thirty-five did not hesitate to attack a force which was

to theirs as ninety to one. For nine days the Matabele tried to

reach their opponents, but all their efforts were in

vain. The farmers were more than once nearly

surrounded; still their plans were so perfect that

they were never quite entrapped. They had little

else but dried meat to live upon, and they had no resting-place but

the bare ground with a saddle for a pillow. Only the hardiest of

men and horses could have carried on aggressive operations so long.

The loss of the Matabele was great, so great that at the end of the

nine days Moselkatze gave up the contest and sought only to

escape. With his people and his cattle he fled to the north, and in

the country beyond the Limpopo commenced to destroy the Mashona

tribes as he had destroyed the southern Betshuana. The farmers

were too wearied to follow him, and indeed they could not have

continued in the field much longer under any circumstances, so they

contented themselves by seizing six or seven thousand head of

cattle, with which they returned to Wynburg."

[Sidenote: Subjugation of Matabele]

There seems to have been no particular reason for the expedition

except the driving of the Matabele out of a region which the

Boers wanted and the making of their own position more secure. It

is probable that negotiation would have answered the purpose, as

Moselkatze was more amenable to reason than other native

potentates had proved to be, and was to some slight

extent under the influence of Dr. Moffat. But the

emigrant farmers wanted territory, and despised the

native owners too much to care about taking time and trouble for

its acquisition. Better a bold assault, a speedy and successful

slaughter of the enemy, than an ordinary and peaceful but prolonged

settlement. The immediate result of this raid was a proclamation

issued by Commandant Potgieter in which he declared territory now

including the greater part of the Transvaal, a half of the Orange

Free State, and the whole of northern Bechuanaland, to belong to the

emigrant farmers.

[Sidenote: Pieter Retief]

Not satisfied with this immense acquisition, or

annexation of territory, Retief, in the succeeding year (1838) led a large

party of Boers over the Drakensberg, and went on

himself with about seventy men to Dingaan's

capital--Umkungunhlovu, where he claimed the formal cession

of that part of Natal which had been previously promised him.

The Zulu Chief expressed his approval of the deed which had been

drawn up, affixed his mark to it, and then invited the visitors into his

own private part of the kraal. Unsuspiciously leaving their guns

behind them, the entire party seated themselves, and were then

seized, bound and slaughtered by surrounding guards. Immediately

afterwards ten thousand Zulus left the kraal, and after a march of

eleven days fell upon the nearest Boer encampment at a place since

called Weenen, and destroyed men, women, children and slaves.

The horrors of that massacre have never been forgotten or forgiven

by the Dutch. Had not one young man, sleeping at a distance from

the camp, awakened in time to save himself on a swift horse, every

Dutch emigrant in Natal must have suffered the same fate. As it

was, he succeeded in warning the other scattered parties in time for

them to form their simple laagers and to shoot down the attacking

Zulus until surrounded, literally, by heaps of dead savages.

[Sidenote: War with the Zulus]

Immediately upon hearing of the disaster Potgieter and Uys

collected every available fighting man and crossed the mountains to

the relief of their comrades. The Englishmen of

Port Natal, or Durban, also offered their assistance.

Finally, a force of 347 Boers rode straight for the

Zulu capital, intent only on vengeance. After five days' journey they

were, however, drawn into an ambush and lost ten men, including

Commandant Uys, and much ammunition and baggage. About the

same time seventeen Englishmen, leading fifteen hundred friendly

natives, of whom some four hundred were armed with muskets,

started out to help the Dutch. A little south of the Tugela River

they came upon a Zulu regiment, and were in turn drawn into an

ambush on April 17, 1838, which resulted in one of the bloodiest

battles ever fought in that region of almost continuous conflict. The

little force found itself between the wings of a Zulu army numbering

at least 7,000 men and with thousands more coming in during the

battle. Three times the Englishmen and their little force beat back

the enemy. One division, with four white men and four hundred

blacks, did fight its way down the steep bank of the Tugela and

across the river. The other division, after battling for hours with

the serried masses of savage warriors, was finally

overpowered and slaughtered.

[Sidenote: Natal Overrun by Native Soldiers]

Natal was now

overrun by Dingaan's soldiers, and the remaining

Boer families were gathered together in fortified camps, which the

Zulu armies could not carry by storm.

[Sidenote: Pretorius in Command]

In November, 1838, however, a change came over the scene.

Andries Pretorius, a Boer leader of great natural skill and characteristic

self-confidence, arrived in Natal, was elected to the command

of the scattered forces, and speedily succeeded in getting together a

compact and mobile little army of 464 men. With prayers and psalms

the men rode straight for the place where they expected to find

the enemy. Every precaution against surprise or

ambush was taken, and wherever they camped

they were surrounded with a circle of wagons

lashed together; while scouts were maintained continuously in all

directions. A vow was made that if victory came to the little troop

they would build a church and set apart a yearly thanksgiving day

in commemoration. On the 16th of December, Dingaan's army of

ten or twelve thousand men attacked their camp on the margin of a

stream which has ever since been called Blood River, and for two

hours the brave Zulu warriors faced the storm of bullets from that

deadly laager. It was useless, however. The guns and artillery of

the invaders killed over three thousand of the enemy before they

finally broke and fled. Pretorius followed them to the Zulu capital,

which Dingaan meantime set on fire, and then tried without success

to capture the Zulu Chief, who had fled with some thousands of men

to a part of the country where cavalry could not operate. Finally,

the commando returned to Natal with some 5,000 head of cattle

and the loss of six white men in the entire campaign. Dingaan also

returned and rebuilt his capital, while the Dutch founded

Pietermatitzburg, erected a church in memory of their victory, and

commenced the annual celebration of Dingaan's Day which is still

maintained.

[Sidenote: Durban Re-occupied by the British]

Meanwhile Durban had been re-occupied by a small British

force in accordance with a proclamation issued by Sir George

Napier, Governor of Cape Colony, and dated

November 14, 1838, which declared that it was intended

"to put an end to the unwarranted occupation of

the territories belonging to the natives by certain emigrants from

Cape Colony, being subjects of Her Majesty." No definite

interference was effected, however, and a year later the troops were

withdrawn in one of the multiform mutations of Colonial Office

policy; though Sir George Napier absolutely refused to recognize any

right of control over the country by the Boers, and declared in

January, 1841, that "Her Majesty could not acknowledge the independence

of her own subjects." Despite this Pretorius acted as if he

were the head of a free and all-powerful community, and with a

degree of autocratic contempt for other races and peoples which

was very characteristic. Dingaan, during the year succeeding the

battle on the banks of the Blood River, remained passive, and does

not appear to have had any aggressive intentions.

[Sidenote: Invasion of Zululand]

In September,

1839, however, the Boers made common cause with a local rebellion

raised by his brother Panda, joined the latter in

January, 1840, with four hundred men under

Pretorius, invaded Zululand and defeated Dingaan with

great slaughter. The latter fled to the Delagoa Bay region, and

was shortly afterwards murdered, being replaced by Panda as

"King of the Zulus" under the terms of a curious proclamation

signed by the Boer leader as "Commandant-General of the Right

Worshipful Volksraad of the South African Society," and in which

he claimed for the farmers the whole of Natal by right of conquest.

During this campaign against Dingaan--from which the Dutch

farmers received a booty of 40,000 head of cattle--an event occurred

for which there is no adequate excuse, and which illustrates the

unscrupulous nature of Boer warfare. Dingaan, at one stage of the

invasion, tried to come to terms with his enemy, and sent an officer

named Tambusa to negotiate for peace. Contrary to all the rules

of war, savage or civilized, Pretorius had the envoy arrested, tried

by court-martial for an alleged but unproven share in the

Umkungunhlovu massacre, and executed.

[Sidenote: Republic of Natalia Established]

What was called by the Boers the Republic of Natalia, stretching

from the Umzimvubu to the Tugela and including a claim to much

of modern Zululand, was thus established. The first act of its

Government, toward the close of 1840, was to attack a chief

named N'Capai, living two hundred miles from the

territory of the alleged Republic, and not far from the

border of Cape Colony. Without apparent rhyme or reason, the

men were slaughtered, their cattle captured, and seventeen young

children carried away into slavery. This at last aroused the Colonial

Government, and, in turn, the Home authorities. Sir George Napier

promptly sent some soldiers into the region to watch events and

prevent further aggression upon the natives, announced his intention

to resume the military occupation of Natal, and at the same time

appealed to the Colonial Office for further aid and instructions.

Ultimately it was decided to occupy Natal permanently. But before

this was done there had to be some fighting with the irrepressible

farmers. A small British force had been sent to defend Durban,

but before it reached that place was surprised and almost surrounded

by a number of Boers. After fighting for some time the British

retired, losing their guns and oxen and some nineteen men. Captain

Smith found a new position, strengthened it, and stood a siege at the

hands of Pretorius and his six hundred men, until he was relieved

on June 25, 1842, by troops from Cape Town, who came to his

rescue by sea.

[Sidenote: Further Developments]

The further developments of the situation were peaceful. Lord

Stanley, then Colonial Secretary, wrote a despatch on December 13,

1842, appointing Mr. Cloete as British Commissioner

at Durban, and laying down definite and

important rules in a new system of administration

for the country. Under these instructions the white people were to

be called together and given every opportunity for stating the nature

of the institutions they desired, although full legislative power was

not yet to be granted. "I think it probable," said Lord Stanley,

"looking to the nature of the population, that they will desire those

institutions to be founded on the Dutch rather than on the English

model, and however little some of those institutions may be suited

to a more advanced state of civilization, it is the desire of Her

Majesty's Government that, in this respect, the contentment of the

emigrants, rather than the abstract merits of the institutions, should guide

our decision." There were, of course, to be certain

limitations in this connection. No distinction or

disqualification founded on "color, origin, language

or creed," was to be recognized. No "aggression

upon natives beyond the Colony" was to be tolerated

or sanctioned. Slavery in any shape or form was to be

"absolutely unlawful." But the Boers were incorrigible. They

would not meet with the British Commissioner or fairly discuss his

terms. They would not accept the principle of racial and religious

equality under any condition of affairs. They would not accept any

restriction upon their right to take whatever territory they liked

from the natives outside of Natal and at any time they might feel

disposed. They would not endure the principle of negro freedom in

this new region any more than in the older Colony at the Cape.

Apart from these basic principles of government, practical details

also galled them. The establishment of a Land Court to limit and

define the possessions of settlers and to give legal rights of ownership

to the natives, was especially objectionable, and, by 1847, most

of the emigrant farmers had again trekked away to the Orange Free

State and the country beyond the Vaal.

[Sidenote: British Principles of Government]

There seems to have been no valid reason for this movement.

The British Government, outside of certain fundamental principles

of morality and administration, desired to give the farmers every

possible latitude. It had no wish for territorial expansion, and would

never have interfered at all if the aggressive policy of the Boers

meeting the wild instincts of the Bantu, or Zulus, half-way, had

not drenched the region with blood. But the

deterioration of the Boer character, or rather the

expression of that character in a sphere where it was

practically uncontrolled, had assumed a form in which the possession

of large tracts of land and the compulsory service of natives appeared

as absolute essentials of life, which they had the right to take by

force--in the same way as Moselkatze and Tshaka had done

previously and with apparently no higher motives than those which had

actuated savage chiefs at war with weaker tribes. Moreover, they

had failed signally in this first effort at self-government, and the

rivalry of leaders like Hendrick Potgieter, Gerrit Maritz and Andries

Pretorius had not only helped to prevent the establishment of any

form of administration amongst the people capable of levying taxes

and compelling obedience to the state, but had made constant raids

upon neighboring native tribes appear almost essential to the

holding together of the scattered communities in a common bond of

conflict and territorial acquisition.

[Sidenote: The Trek North of the Vaal River]

With the failure to acquire and hold Durban and to rule themselves

or the regions of Natal which they had taken from the Zulus

ended the first Boer effort to reach the sea and

to establish Dutch independent communities in touch

with the external world. The bulk of the farmers,

as already stated, trekked north of the Orange or the Vaal. Here

they found conditions, in 1845-47, which were scarcely less

perplexing and troubled than their own had been. Over an area of some

700 miles long and 300 wide was established a Dutch population of

about fifteen thousand persons which was constantly at war with the

natives, and, as a result of losses in this connection, did not increase

greatly in numbers despite the numerous accessions from Cape

Colony and Natal. Nominally, and by British theory, they were still

British subjects; practically, from the Orange to the Limpopo they

were independent communities whom the Colonial Office would have

preferred to forget altogether rather than to assert claims over or

make demands upon. But their relation of permanent and bitter

hostility towards the natives appears to have made absolute British

neutrality impossible. Accordingly, in 1843, an effort was made to

further isolate the Boers from Cape Colony, and "buffer states" of

native or half-breed tribes were established and recognized; much

in the same way as in the days of the Kosa tribes on the eastern

frontier of the Colony. Then, however, it was for the protection of

the Dutch farmers against the natives; now it was for the protection

of native and Colonial interests against the turbulent Boers.

[Sidenote: Moshesh the Basuto]

Moshesh the Basuto was at this time established in much

strength upon the borders of the present Orange Free State and in

territory now known as Basutoland. He was one of

the ablest men produced by the Bantu, or Kaffir,

race, and, unlike chiefs of the type of Moselkatze

the Matabele or Tshaka the Zulu, did not build his fortunes and his

power upon bloodshed and devastation. When the regions afterwards

covered by the Dutch republics and Natal were swept by a

sanguinary tide of conquest under the leadership of the two chiefs

mentioned, Moshesh followed in the wake of the wave of slaughter,

gathered together scattered remnants of tribes, conciliated, strengthened

and united them until, by almost imperceptible degrees, he had

established a strong state around the rock-ribbed heights of Thaba

Bosigo--the centre of his kraal and his kingdom. In 1843,

therefore, when the British authorities were looking around for some

means of restricting the sphere of Boer difficulties and aggressions

upon the natives, Moshesh seemed an ideal instrument. He was

intensely ambitious to extend and consolidate his power. He was

not a savage or barbarous potentate in the sense of Dingaan or his

predecessor; and to him the proffered alliance, a small annual

subsidy, an extension of recognized territorial rights and supremacy

over minor chiefs in contiguous regions, was extremely attractive and

easily acceptable. West of his territory lived a tribe of

Griquas--a half-breed people of mixed Dutch and Hottentot blood--numbering

about two thousand and ruled over by a man named Adam Kok.

They were largely influenced by missionaries, and were an inoffensive

and, as it turned out, perishing race.

[Sidenote: Establishment of a Border Native State]

With Kok a similar arrangement

of alliance was made, and he was recognized as ruler of all the

territory from the Basuto border westward to where

Andries Waterboer--another Griqua chief--held

sway over the region afterwards dominated by

Kimberley and including Modder River and the southern portion of the

present Free State. East of Moshesh and the Basuto territory a

similar alliance was made with the Pondo Chief, Faku, and thus the

girdle, or league of allied states between British territory and the

Boers was complete.

[Sidenote: Rebellion by the Boers]

But the plan did not work out as well as was expected. The

racial elements involved were too mutable, the conditions too loose,

the Governments too inadequate in strength and prestige, the Dutch

too aggressive and hostile in character, to admit of its permanent

success. A strong man, backed up continuously with plenty of

British troops, might have saved the situation and averted the wars

which followed; but continuity of policy for these fluctuating

frontiers seems to have never prevailed at either London or Cape Town.

The Treaty States did not prevent personal and commercial

intercourse between the Boers of the Cape and of the interior. They

did not avert further emigration or encourage the return of those

who had left the Colony. The Dutch population in Adam Kok's

territory did not like being ruled by a half-breed chief, and the

greater part of them repudiated the right of Great Britain to

support him in this government. Some of the minor native chiefs

refused to accept the sovereignty of Moshesh. The

first result was a small Boer rebellion against Kok

and the defeat of 250 men by some British troops

under Colonel Richardson. The second was an entire rearrangement

of existing matters by Sir Peregrine Maitland, who had

meantime become Governor at the Cape. Kok's sovereignty over the

whole region was still acknowledged, but he was limited in government

to the portion of it occupied by Griquas; while the whites

living in the other section were placed under the supervision or rule

of a British officer, who, in 1846, established himself at a small place

called Bloemfontein, where some three hundred Boers of a friendly

disposition took the oath of allegiance to the Queen. The rest

moved north to Wynburg and out of the region thus controlled by

Major Warden. With Moshesh much less could be done. He had

been far too shrewd to violate directly the terms of his arrangement

with Great Britain or to accept any proposals which would seriously

alleviate the differences between himself and the bordering tribes or

neighboring Boers. Thus the State, which had been strengthened

with a view to maintaining peace, now threatened to promote

conflict instead, and in this condition matters rested when Sir Harry

Smith came out to Cape Town in 1848 as Governor and High

Commissioner. Now the events which immediately followed came the

Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic.

South Africa and the Boer-British War, Volume I Comprising a History of South Africa and its people, including the war of 1899 and 1900 · 第 3 / 16 章