_This Marine patrol scouts out the rugged terrain and enemy positions
on the reverse slope of one of the hills in the path of the 1st
Division’s southerly attack._]
The more open country in the south gave General del Valle the
opportunity to further refine the deployment of his tank-infantry
teams. No unit in the Tenth Army surpassed the 1st Marine Division’s
synchronization of these two supporting arms. Using tactical lessons
painfully learned at Peleliu, the division never allowed its tanks to
range beyond direct support of the accompanying infantry and artillery
forward observers. As a result, the 1st Tank Battalion was the only
armored unit in the battle not to lose a tank to Japanese suicide
squads--even during the swirling close-quarters frays within Wana Draw.
General del Valle, the consummate artilleryman, valued his attached
Army 4.2-inch mortar battery. “The 4.2s were invaluable on Okinawa,”
he said, “and that’s why my tanks had such good luck.” But good luck
reflected a great deal of application. “We developed the tank-infantry
team to a fare-thee-well in those swales--backed up by our 4.2-inch
mortars.”
Colonel “Big Foot” Brown of the 11th Marines took this coordination
several steps further as the campaign dragged along:
Working with LtCol “Jeb” Stuart of the 1st Tank Battalion,
we developed a new method of protecting tanks and reducing
vulnerability to the infantry in the assault. We’d place an
artillery observer in one of the tanks with a radio to one of
the 155mm howitzer battalions. We’d also use an aerial observer
overhead. We used 75mm, both packs and LVT-As, which had airburst
capabilities. If any Jap [suicider] showed anywhere we opened fire
with the air bursts and kept a pattern of shell fragments pattering
down around the tanks.
Lieutenant Colonel James C. Magee’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, used
similar tactics in a bloody but successful day-long assault on Hill 69
west of Ozato on 10 June. Magee lost three tanks to Japanese artillery
fire in the approach, but took the hill and held it throughout the
inevitable counterattack that night.
Beyond Hill 69 loomed Kunishi Ridge for the 1st Marine Division,
a steep, coral escarpment which totally dominated the surrounding
grasslands and rice paddies. Kunishi was much higher and longer than
Sugar Loaf, equally honeycombed with enemy caves and tunnels, and while
it lacked the nearby equivalents of Half Moon and Horseshoe to the rear
flanks, it was amply covered from behind by Mezado Ridge 500 yards
further south. Remnants of the veteran _32d Infantry Regiment_ infested
and defended Kunishi’s many hidden bunkers. These were the last of
Ushijima’s organized, front-line troops, and they would render Kunishi
Ridge as deadly a killing ground as the Marines would ever face.
Japanese gunners readily repulsed the first tank-infantry assaults by
the 7th Marines on 11 June. Colonel Snedeker looked for another way.
“I came to the realization that with the losses my battalions suffered
in experienced leadership we would never be able to capture (Kunishi
Ridge) in daytime. I thought a night attack might be successful.”
Snedeker flew over the objective in an observation aircraft,
formulating his plan. Night assaults by elements of the Tenth Army were
extremely rare in this campaign--especially Snedeker’s ambitious plan
of employing two battalions. General del Valle voiced his approval. At
0330 the next morning, Lieutenant Colonel John J. Gormley’s 1/7 and
Lieutenant Colonel Spencer S. Berger’s 2/7 departed the combat outpost
line for the dark ridge. By 0500 the lead companies of both battalions
swarmed over the crest, surprising several groups of Japanese calmly
cooking breakfast. Then came the fight to stay on the ridge and expand
the toehold.
With daylight, Japanese gunners continued to pole-ax any relief columns
of infantry, while those Marines clinging to the crest endured showers
of grenades and mortar rounds. As General del Valle put it, “The
situation was one of the tactical oddities of this peculiar warfare.
We were _on_ the ridge. The Japs were _in_ it, on both the forward and
reverse slopes.”
[Illustration: _A Marine-manned, water-cooled, .30-caliber Browning
machine gun lays down a fierce base of fire as Marine riflemen maneuver
to attack the next hill to be taken in the drive to the south of
Okinawa, where the enemy lay in wait._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 121760
]
The Marines on Kunishi critically needed reinforcements and resupplies;
their growing number of wounded needed evacuation. Only the Sherman
medium tank had the bulk and mobility to provide relief. The next
several days marked the finest achievements of the 1st Tank Battalion,
even at the loss of 21 of its Shermans to enemy fire. By removing two
crewmen, the tankers could stuff six replacement riflemen inside each
vehicle. Personnel exchanges once atop the hill were another matter.
No one could stand erect without getting shot, so all “transactions”
had to take place via the escape hatch in the bottom of the tank’s hull.
These scenes then became commonplace: a tank would lurch into the
beleaguered Marine positions on Kunishi, remain buttoned up while the
replacement troops slithered out of the escape hatch carrying ammo,
rations, plasma, and water; then other Marines would crawl under,
dragging their wounded comrades on ponchos and manhandle them into the
small hole. For those badly wounded who lacked this flexibility, the
only option was the dubious privilege of riding back down to safety
while lashed to a stretcher topside behind the turret. Tank drivers
frequently sought to provide maximum protection to their exposed
stretcher cases by backing down the entire 800-yard gauntlet. In this
painstaking fashion the tankers managed to deliver 50 fresh troops and
evacuate 35 wounded men the day following the 7th Marines’ night attack.
Encouraged by these results, General del Valle ordered Colonel Mason
to conduct a similar night assault on the 1st Marines’ sector of
Kunishi Ridge. This mission went to 2/1, who accomplished it smartly
the night of 13-14 June despite inadvertent lapses of illumination
fire by forgetful supporting arms. Again the Japanese, furious at
being surprised, swarmed out of their bunkers in counterattack. Losses
mounted rapidly in Lieutenant Colonel Magee’s ranks. One company lost
six of its seven officers that morning. Again the 1st Tank Battalion
came to the rescue, delivering reinforcements and evacuating 110
casualties by dusk.
General del Valle expressed great pleasure in the success of these
series of attacks. “The Japs were so damned surprised,” he remarked,
adding, “They used to counterattack at night all the time, but they
never felt we’d have the audacity to go and do it to them.” Colonel
Yahara admitted during his interrogation that these unexpected night
attacks were “particularly effective,” catching the Japanese forces
“both physically and psychologically off-guard.”
By 15 June the 1st Marines had been in the division line for 12
straight days and sustained 500 casualties. The 5th Marines relieved
it, including an intricate night-time relief of lines by 2/5 of 2/1 on
15-16 June. The 1st Marines, back in the relative safety of division
reserve, received this mindless regimental rejoinder the next day:
“When not otherwise occupied you will bury Jap dead in your area.”
The battle for Kunishi Ridge continued. On 17 June the 5th Marines
assigned K/3/5 to support 2/5 on Kunishi. Private First Class Sledge
approached the embattled escarpment with dread: “Its crest looked so
much like Bloody Nose that my knees nearly buckled. I felt as though I
were on Peleliu and had it all to go through again.” The fighting along
the crest and its reverse slope took place at point-blank range--too
close even for Sledge’s 60mm mortars. His crew then served as stretcher
bearers, extremely hazardous duty. Half his company became casualties
in the next 22 hours.
[Illustration: