_Men of Company G, 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, found themselves fighting
in an urban environment in their house-to-house attack against the
Japanese in Naha._]
This was the situation encountered by the 1st Marine Division in its
unexpectedly easy advance to Shuri Ridge on 29 May as described in the
opening paragraphs. The 5th Marines suddenly possessed the abandoned
castle. While General del Valle tried to placate the indignation of
the 77th Division commander at the Marines’ “intrusion” into his
zone, he got another angry call from the Tenth Army. It seems that
the Company A, 1/5 company commander, a South Carolinian, had raised
the Stars and Bars of the Confederacy over Shuri Castle instead of
the Stars and Stripes. “Every damned outpost and O.P. that could see
this started telephoning me,” said del Valle, adding, “I had one
hell of a hullabaloo converging on my telephone.” Del Valle agreed
to erect a proper flag, but it took him two days to get one through
the intermittent fire of Ushijima’s surviving rear guards. Lieutenant
Colonel Richard P. Ross, commanding the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,
raised this flag in the rain on the last day of May, then took cover.
Unlike Sugar Loaf, Shuri Castle could be seen from all over southern
Okinawa, and every Japanese gunner within range opened up on the hated
colors.
The Stars and Stripes fluttered over Shuri Castle, and the fearsome
Yonabaru-Shuri-Naha defensive masterpiece had been decisively breached.
But the _Thirty-second Army_ remained as deadly a fighting force as
ever. It was an army that would die hard defending the final eight
miles of shell-pocked, rain-soaked southern Okinawa.
[Sidebar (page 30): Marine Artillery at Okinawa
The nature of the enemy defenses and the tactics selected by the Tenth
Army commander made Okinawa the biggest battle of the war for Marine
artillery units. General Geiger landed with 14 firing battalions within
IIIAC; the total rose to 15 in June when Lieutenant Colonel Richard G.
Weede’s 2/10 came ashore in support of the 8th Marines.
Brigadier General David R. Nimmer commanded III Corps Artillery and
Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Burton, Jr., commanded the 2d Provisional
Field Artillery Group, which contained three batteries of 155mm
howitzers and three of 155mm “Long Tom” guns. Colonel Wilburt S.
(“Big Foot”) Brown commanded the 11th Marines and Colonel Robert B.
Luckey, the 15th Marines. The Marine divisions had greatly enhanced
their firepower since the initial campaigns in the Pacific. While one
75mm pack howitzer battalion remained (1/11), the 105mm howitzer had
become the norm for division artillery. Front-line infantry units also
were supported by the 75mm fire of medium tanks and LVT-As, 105mm
fire from the new M-7 self-propelled “siege guns,” 4.5-inch multiple
rocket launchers fired by the “Buck Rogers Men,” and the attached Army
4.2-inch mortar platoons.
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick P. Henderson described this combination
of fire support: “Not many people realize that the artillery in Tenth
Army, plus the LVT-As and naval gunfire equivalent gave us a guns/mile
of front ratio on Okinawa that was probably higher than any U.S. effort
in World War II.”
General Buckner urged his corps commanders to integrate field artillery
support early in the campaign. With his corps artillery and the 11th
Marines not fully committed during the opening weeks, General Geiger
quickly agreed for these units to help the XXIV Army Corps in their
initial assaults against the outer Shuri defenses. In the period of 7
April-6 May, these artillery units fired more than 54,000 rounds in
support of XXIV Corps. This was only the beginning. Once both Marine
divisions of IIIAC entered the lines, they immediately benefited from
Army artillery support as well as their own organic fire support. As
one example, prior to the 5th Marines launching a morning attack on the
Awacha Pocket on 6 May, the regiment received a preliminary bombardment
of the objective from four battalions--two Army, two Marine.
By the end of the battle, the Tenth Army artillery units would fire
2,046,930 rounds down range, all in addition to 707,500 rockets,
mortars, and shells of five-inch or larger from naval gunfire ships
offshore. Half of the artillery rounds would be 105mm shells from
howitzers and the M-7 self-propelled guns. Compared to the bigger
guns, the old, expeditionary 75mm pack howitzers of 1/11 were the
“Tiny Tims” of the battlefield. Their versatility and relative
mobility, however, proved to be assets in the long haul. Colonel Brown
augmented the battalion with LVT-As, which fired similar ammunition.
According to Brown, “75mm ammo was plentiful, as contrasted with the
heavier calibers, so 1/11 (Reinforced) was used to fire interdiction,
harassing, and ‘appeasement’ missions across the front.”
Generals Geiger and del Valle expressed interest in the larger weapons
of the Army. Geiger particularly admired the Army’s eight-inch
howitzer, whose 200-pound shell possessed much more penetrating and
destroying power than the 95-pound shell of the 155mm guns, the largest
weapon in the Marines’ inventory. Geiger recommended that the Marine
Corps form eight-inch howitzer battalions for the forthcoming attack on
of Japan. For his part, del Valle prized the accuracy, range, and power
of the Army’s 4.2-inch mortars and recommended their inclusion in the
Marine division.
On some occasions, artillery commanders became tempted to orchestrate
all of this killing power in one mighty concentration. “Time on target”
(TOT) missions occurred frequently in the early weeks, but their high
consumption rate proved disadvantageous. Late in the campaign Colonel
Brown decided to originate a gargantuan TOT by 22 battalions on
Japanese positions in the southern Okinawan town of Makabe. The sudden
concentration worked beautifully, he recalled, but “I neglected to tell
the generals, woke everyone out of a sound sleep, and caught hell from
all sides.”
General Geiger insisted that his LVT-As be trained in advance as field
artillery. This was done, but the opportunity for direct fire support
to the assault waves fizzled on L-Day when the Japanese chose not to
defend the Hagushi beaches. Lieutenant Colonel Louis Metzger commanded
the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion and supported the 6th Marine
Division up and down the length of the island. Metzger’s LVT-As fired
19,000 rounds of 75mm shells in an artillery support role after L-Day.
The Marines made great strides towards refining supporting arms
coordination during the battle for Okinawa. Commanders established
Target Information Centers (TICs) at every level from Tenth Army down
to battalion. The TICs functioned to provide a centralized target
information and weapons assignment system responsive to both assigned
targets and targets of opportunity. Finally, all three component
liaison officers--artillery, air, and naval gunfire--were aligned with
target intelligence information officers. As described by Colonel
Henderson, the TIC at IIIAC consisted of the corps artillery S-2
section “expanded to meet the needs of artillery, NGF, and CAS on a
24-hour basis.... The Corps Arty Fire Direction Center and the Corps
Fire Support Operations Center were one and the same facility--with NGF
and air added.”
Such a commitment to innovation led to greatly improved support to the
foot-slogging infantry. As one rifle battalion commander remarked, “It
was not uncommon for a battleship, tanks, artillery, and aircraft to be
supporting the efforts of a platoon of infantry during the reduction of
the Shuri position.”
[Illustration:
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 12446
]
]
[Sidebar (page 34): Marine Tanks at Okinawa
The Sherman M-4 medium tank employed by the seven Army and Marine Corps
tank battalions on Okinawa would prove to be a decisive weapon--but
only when closely coordinated with accompanying infantry. The Japanese
intended to separate the two components by fire and audacity. “The
enemy’s strength lies in his tanks,” declared Lieutenant General
Mitsuru Ushijima before the invasion. Anti-tank training received
the highest priority within his _Thirty-second Army_. These urgent
preparations proved successful on 19 April when the Japanese knocked
out 22 of 30 Sherman tanks of the 27th Division, many by suicide
demolitionists.
The Marines fared better in this regard, having learned in earlier
campaigns to integrate infantry and artillery as a close, protective
overwatch to their accompanying tanks, keeping the “human bullet”
suicide squads at bay. Although enemy guns and mines took their toll
of the Shermans, only a single Marine tank sustained damage from a
Japanese suicide foray.
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Stuart commanded the 1st Tank Battalion
during the Okinawa campaign. The unit had fought with distinction at
Peleliu a half-year earlier, despite shipping shortfalls which kept a
third of its tanks out of the fight. Stuart insisted on retaining the
battalion’s older M-4A2 Shermans because he believed the twin General
Motors diesel engines were safer in combat. General del Valle agreed:
“The tanks were not so easily set on fire and blown up under enemy
fire.”
By contrast, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Denig’s 6th Tank Battalion
preferred the newer M-4A3 model Shermans. Denig’s tankers liked the
greater horsepower provided by the water-cooled Ford V-8 engine and
considered the reversion to gasoline from diesel an acceptable risk.
The 6th Tank Battalion would face its greatest challenge against
Admiral Minoru Ota’s mines and naval guns on Oroku Peninsula.
The Sherman tank, much maligned in the European theater for its
shortcomings against the heavier German Tigers, seemed ideal for
island fighting in the Pacific. By Okinawa, however, the Sherman’s
limitations became evident. The 75mm gun proved too light against
some of Ushijima’s fortifications; on these occasions the new M-7
self-propelled 105mm gun worked better. And the Sherman was never known
for its armor protection. At 33 tons, its strength lay more in mobility
and reliability. But as Japanese antitank weapons and mines reached the
height of lethality at Okinawa, the Sherman’s thin-skinned weak points
(1.5-inch armor on the sides and rear, for example) became a cause for
concern. Marine tank crews had resorted to sheathing the sides of their
vehicles with lumber as a foil to hand-lobbed Japanese magnetic mines
as early as the Marshalls campaign. By the time of Okinawa, Marine
Shermans were festooned with spot-welded track blocks, wire mesh,
sandbags, and clusters of large nails--all designed to enhance armor
protection.
[Illustration:
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 123166
]
Both tank battalions fielded Shermans configured with dozer
blades, invaluable assets in the cave fighting to come,
but--surprisingly--neither outfit deployed with flame tanks. Despite
rave reports of the success of the USN Mark I turret-mounted flame
system installed in eight Shermans in the battle of Iwo Jima, there
would be no massive retrofit program for the Okinawa-bound Marine tank
units. Instead, all flame tanks on Okinawa were provided courtesy of
the U.S. Army’s 713th Armored Flamethrower Battalion. Company B of that
unit supported the IIIAC with brand-new H-1 flame tanks. Each carried
290 gallons of napalm-thickened fuel, good for two-and-a-half minutes
of flame at ranges out to 80 yards. The Marines received consistently
outstanding support from this Army company throughout the battle.
The Marines employed the newly developed T-6 “Tank Flotation Devices”
to get the initial assault waves of Shermans ashore on L-Day. The T-6
featured a series of flotation tanks welded all around the hull, a
provisional steering device making use of the tracks, and electric
bilge pumps. Once ashore, the crew hoped to jettison the ungainly rig
with built-in explosive charges, a scary proposition.
The invasion landing on 1 April for the 1st Tank Battalion was truly
“April Fool’s Day.” The captain of an LST carrying six Shermans
equipped with the T-6 launched the vehicles an hour late and 10 miles
at sea. It took this irate contingent five hours to reach the beach,
losing two vehicles on the reef at ebb tide. Most of Colonel Stuart’s
other Shermans made it ashore before noon, but some of his reserves
could not cross the reef for 48 hours. The 6th Tank Battalion had
better luck. Their LST skippers launched the T-6 tanks on time and
in close. Two tanks were lost--one sank when its main engine failed,
another broke a track and veered into an unseen hole--but the other
Shermans surged ashore, detonated their float tanks successfully, and
were ready to roll by H plus 29.
Japanese gunners and mine warfare experts knocked out 51 Marine Corps
Shermans in the battle. Many more tanks sustained damage in the
fighting but were recovered and restored by hard-working maintenance
crews, the unsung heroes. As a result of their ingenuity, the assault
infantry battalions never lacked for armored firepower, mobility, and
shock action. The concept of Marine combined-arms task forces was now
well underway.
]
_Closing the Loop_
The retreating Japanese troops did not escape scot-free from their
Shuri defenses. Naval spotter planes located one southbound column and
called in devastating fire from a half dozen ships and every available
attack aircraft. In short order several miles of the muddy road were
strewn with wrecked trucks, field guns, and corpses. General del Valle
congratulated the Tactical Air Force: “Thanks for prompt response this
afternoon when Nips were caught on road with kimonos down.”
[Illustration: _A Marine who had his clothing blown from his back by a
Japanese mortar explosion, but is otherwise unwounded, is helped to the
rear by an uninjured buddy._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 120280
]
Successful interdictions, however, remained the exception. Most of
Ushijima’s _Thirty-second Army_ survived the retreat to its final
positions in the Kiyamu Peninsula. The Tenth Army missed a golden
opportunity to end the battle four weeks early, but the force, already
slowed by heavy rains and deep mud, was simply too ponderous to
respond with alacrity.
[Illustration: