_During a visit to Marines in late April, the Commandant, Gen Alexander
A. Vandegrift, second from left, called on MajGen Francis P. Mulcahy,
center, commander of the Tactical Air Force, Tenth Army, and three of
his pilots: Maj George C. Axtell, Jr., left; Maj Jefferson D. Dorroh,
second from right; and Lt Jeremiah J. O’Keefe. Maj Axtell commanded
VMF-323, the “Death Rattlers.”_]
_Imperial General Headquarters_, accepting the inflated claims of
the few observers accompanying the _kikusui_ attacks, believed their
suicidal air offensive had fatally crippled the U.S. Fleet. This was
wishful thinking. The Fifth Fleet may have been stressed and battered
by the _kamikazes_, but it was simply too huge a force to be deterred.
The fleet withstood the worst of these seemingly endless air attacks
without for a moment forsaking its primary mission of supporting the
amphibious assault on Okinawa. Naval gunfire support, for example, had
never been so thoroughly effective, beginning with the 3,800 tons of
munitions delivered on L-Day. Throughout much of the campaign, each
front-line regiment received direct support from one “call fire” ship
and one “illumination ship.” Typical of the appreciation most members
of the landing force expressed for the quality of naval gunfire support
was this message from General Shepherd to the Commander, Northern
Attack Force during the 6th Marine Division’s assault on Mount Yae
Take: “The effectiveness of your gunfire support was measured by the
large number of Japanese encountered. Dead ones.”
Similarly, even during the most intense of the _kikusui_ attacks of
1-16 April, the fleet unloaded an astonishing 557,000 tons of supplies
over the Hagushi Beaches to support the Tenth Army, executed the
division-level assault on Ie Shima, and cleared mines and obstacles
under fire to open the port of Nago. The only direct effect the mass
_kamikaze_ raids ever had on the conduct of Tenth Army operations
ashore was the sinking on 6 April of the ammunition ships _Logan
Victory_ and _Hobbs Victory_. The subsequent shortage of 105mm and
155mm artillery ammunition delayed General Buckner’s first great
offensive against the outer Shuri defenses by about three days. In all
respects, the Fifth Fleet deserved its media sobriquet as “The Fleet
That Came to Stay.”
But as April dragged into May, and the Tenth Army seemed bogged down in
unimaginative frontal attacks along the Shuri line, Admirals Spruance
and Turner began to press General Buckner to accelerate his tactics in
order to decrease the vulnerability of the fleet. Admiral Nimitz, quite
concerned, flew to Okinawa to counsel Buckner. “I’m losing a ship and
a half each day out here,” Nimitz said, “You’ve got to get this thing
moving.”
The senior Marines urged Buckner to “play the amphib card,” to execute
a major landing on the southeast coast, preferably along the alternate
beaches at Minatoga, in order to turn the Japanese right flank. They
were joined in this recommendation by several Army generals who
already perceived what a meatgrinder the frontal assaults along the
Shuri line would become. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General
Alexander A. Vandegrift, visited the island and seconded these
suggestions to Buckner. After all, Buckner still had control of the 2d
Marine Division, a veteran amphibious outfit which had demonstrated
effectively against the Minatoga Beaches on L-Day. Buckner had
subsequently returned the embarked division to Saipan to reduce its
vulnerability to additional _kamikaze_ attacks, but the unit still had
its assigned ships at hand, still combat loaded. The 2d Marine Division
could have opened a second front in Okinawa within a few days.
[Illustration: