Marine Corps Historical Center

_The amphibious task force under one of the first destructive heavy_

kamikaze _attacks off Okinawa’s southwest coast on L plus 5. The_

kamikazes _were to make many such visits to Okinawa before the

operation ended, causing much damage._]

The situation at sea grew so critical that on one occasion smoke

from burning ships and screening escorts offshore blinded Yontan

Airfield, causing three returning CAP planes to crash. As the onslaught

continued, Admiral Spruance observed frankly, “The suicide plane is a

very effective weapon which we must not underestimate.” Spruance spoke

from firsthand experience. _Kamikazes_ knocked his first flagship, the

heavy cruiser _Indianapolis_, out of the battle early in the campaign,

then severely damaged his replacement flagship, the battleship _New

Mexico_, a few weeks later.

[Illustration: _A U.S. ship badly damaged by a_ kamikaze _hit receives

a survey inspection within the protected anchorage of Kerama Retto,

where the Navy repaired its damaged fleet._

Marine Corps Historical Center

]

The Japanese attacking the U.S. fleet off Okinawa also introduced

their newest weapon, the “_Ohka_” (cherry blossom) bomb (called by the

Americans “_Baka_,” a derisive Japanese term meaning “foolish”). It was

a manned, solid-fuel rocket packed with 4,400 pounds of explosives,

launched at ships from the belly of a twin-engined bomber. The _Baka_

bombs became in effect the first antiship guided missiles, screaming

towards the target at an unheard-of 500 knots. One such weapon blew

the destroyer _Manert L. Abele_ out of the water. Fortunately, most of

the _Bakas_ missed their targets, the missiles proving too fast for

inexperienced pilots to control in their few seconds of glory.

The ultimate suicide attack was the final sortie of the superbattleship

_Yamato_, the last of the world’s great dreadnoughts, whose feared

18.1-inch guns could outrange the biggest and newest U.S. battleships.

_IGHQ_ dispatched _Yamato_ on her last mission, a bizarre scheme, with

no air cover and but a handful of surface escorts and only enough fuel

for a one-way trip. She was to distract the American carriers to allow

a simultaneous _kikusui_ attack against the remainder of the fleet.

Achieving this, _Yamato_ would beach itself directly on Okinawa’s west

coast, using her big guns to shoot up the thin-skinned amphibious

shipping and the landing force ashore. The plan proved absurd.

In earlier years of the war the sortie of this mammoth warship would

have caused consternation among the fleet protecting an amphibious

beachhead. Not now. Patrolling U.S. submarines gave Spruance early

warning of _Yamato_’s departure from Japanese waters. “Shall I take

them or will you?” asked Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, commanding the

fast carriers of Task Force 58. Spruance knew his battleship force

yearned for a surface battle to avenge their losses at Pearl Harbor,

but this was no time for sentiment. “You take them,” he signaled.

With that, Mitscher’s Hellcats and Avengers roared aloft, intercepted

_Yamato_ a hundred miles from the beachhead, and sank her in short

order with bombs and torpedoes. The cost: eight U.S. planes, 12 men.

Another bizarre Japanese suicide mission proved more effective. On

the night of 24-25 May, a half-dozen transport planes loaded with

_Giretsu_, Japanese commandos, approached the U.S. airbase at Yontan.

Alert antiaircraft gunners flamed five. The surviving plane made a

wheels-up belly landing on the airstrip, discharging troops as she slid

in sparks and flames along the surface. The commandos blew up eight

U.S. planes, damaged twice as many more, set fire to 70,000 gallons of

aviation gasoline, and generally created havoc throughout the night.

Jittery aviation and security troops fired at shadows, injuring their

own men more than the Japanese. It took 12 hours to hunt down and kill

the last raider.

[Illustration: _Japanese night raiders are met on 16 April with a

spectacular network of antiaircraft fire by Marine defenders based at

Yontan airfield. In the foreground, silhouetted against the interlaced

pattern of tracer bullets, are Corsairs of VMF-311._

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 118775

]

Admiral Spruance at sea and General Mulcahy ashore exerted Herculean

efforts to reduce the effectiveness of these suicide strikes. The fast

carriers struck Japanese airfields in Kyushu and Formosa time and

again, but these numbered more than 100, and as usual the Japanese

proved adept at camouflage. Small landing parties of soldiers and

Marines seized outlying islands (see sidebar) to establish early

warning and fighter direction outposts. And fighter planes from all

three services took to the air to intercept the intermittent waves of

enemy planes.

[Illustration:

The Final Campaign: Marines in the Victory on Okinawa · 第 16 / 43 题