_Grinning troops of the 29th Marines hitch a ride on board an M-7
self-propelled 105mm howitzer heading for Chuta in the drive towards
Motobu Peninsula._]
Yae Take proved to be a defender’s dream, broken into steep ravines
and tangled with dense vegetation. The Japanese sowed the approaches
with mines and mounted 20mm dual-purpose machine-cannons and heavier
weapons deep within caves. As Colonel Krulak recalled: “They were just
there--they weren’t going anywhere--they were going to fight to the
death. They had a lot of naval guns that had come off disabled ships,
and they dug them way back in holes where their arc of fire was not
more than 10 or 12 degrees.” One of the artillery battalions of the
15th Marines had the misfortune to lay their guns directly within the
narrow arc of a hidden 150mm cannon. “They lost two howitzers before
you could spell cat,” said Krulak.
The battle of Yae Take became the 6th Marine Division’s first
real fight, five days of difficult and deadly combat against an
exceptionally determined enemy. Both the 4th and 29th Marines earned
their spurs here, developing teamwork and tactics that would put them
in good stead during the long campaign ahead.
[Illustration:
APRIL 20
JAPANESE RESISTANCE
ON MOTOBU PEN. ENDS
]
Part of General Shepherd’s success in this battle stemmed from his
desire to provide proven leaders in command of his troops. On the 15th,
Shepherd relieved Colonel Victor F. Bleasdale, a well-decorated World
War I Marine, to install Guadalcanal veteran Colonel William J. Whaling
as commanding officer of the 29th Marines. When Japanese gunners killed
Major Bernard W. Green, commanding the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines,
Colonel Shapley assigned his own executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel
Fred D. Beans, a former Marine raider, as his replacement. The savage
fighting continued, with three battalions attacking from the west, two
from the east--protected against friendly fire by the steep pinnacle
between them. Logistic support to the fighting became so critical that
every man, from private to general, who ascended the mountain to the
front lines carried either a five-gallon water can or a case of ammo.
And all hands coming down the mountain had to help bear stretchers of
wounded Marines. On 15 April, one company of the 2d Battalion, 4th
Marines, suffered 65 casualties, including three consecutive company
commanders. On 16 April, two companies of the 1st Battalion, 4th
Marines, seized the topographic crest. On the following day, the 29th
Marines received exceptional fire support from the 14-inch guns of the
old battleship _Tennessee_ and low-level, in-your-pocket bombing from
the Corsairs of Marine Fighter Squadron 322.
Colonel Udo and his _Kunigami Detachment_ died to the man at Yae Take.
On 20 April General Shepherd declared the Motobu Peninsula secured.
His division had earned a valuable victory, but the cost had not been
cheap. The 6th Marine Division suffered the loss of 207 killed and 757
wounded in the battle. The division’s overall performance impressed
General Oliver P. Smith, who recorded in his journal:
The campaign in the north should dispel the belief held by some
that Marines are beach-bound and are not capable of rapid movement.
Troops moved rapidly over rugged terrain, repaired roads and blown
bridges, successively opened new unloading points, and reached the
northern tip of the island, some 55 miles from the original landing
beaches, in 14 days. This was followed by a mountain campaign of 7
days duration to clear the Motobu Peninsula.
During the battle for Motobu Peninsula, the 77th Infantry Division
once again displayed its amphibious prowess by landing on the island
of Ie Shima to seize its airfields. On 16 April, Major Jones’ force
reconnaissance Marines again helped pave the way by seizing Minna
Shima, a tiny islet about 6,000 yards off shore from Ie Shima. Here
the soldiers positioned a 105mm battery to further support operations
ashore. The 77th needed plenty of fire support. Nearly 5,000 Japanese
defended the island. The soldiers overwhelmed them in six days of very
hard fighting at a cost of 1,100 casualties. One of these was the
popular war correspondent Ernie Pyle, who had landed with the Marines
on L-Day. A Japanese _Nambu_ gunner on Ie Shima shot Pyle in the head,
killing him instantly. Soldiers and Marines alike grieved over Pyle’s
death, just as they had six days earlier with the news of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s passing.
The 1st Marine Division fought a different campaign in April than their
sister division to the north. Their days were filled with processing
refugees and their nights with patrols and ambushes. Guerrillas and
snipers exacted a small but steady toll. The 7th Marines became engaged
in a hot firefight near Hizaonna, but most of the action remained
small-unit and nocturnal. The “Old Breed” Marines welcomed the cycle of
low intensity. After so many months in the tropics, they found Okinawa
refreshingly cool and pastoral. The Marines grew concerned about the
welfare of the thousands of Okinawan refugees who straggled northwards
from the heavy fighting. As Private First Class Eugene Sledge observed,
“The most pitiful things about the Okinawan civilians were that they
were totally bewildered by the shock of our invasion, and they were
scared to death of us. Countless times they passed us on the way to the
rear with fear, dismay, and confusion on their faces.”
[Illustration: _Uncovered on Motobu Peninsula, hidden in a cave, was
this Japanese 150mm gun waiting to be used against 6th Marine Division
troops advancing northwards._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 122207
]
Sledge and his companions in the 5th Marines could tell by the sound of
intense artillery fire to the south that the XXIV Corps had collided
with General Ushijima’s outer defenses. Within the first week the
soldiers of the 7th and 96th Divisions had answered the riddle of
“where are the Japs?” By the second week, both General Hodge and
General Buckner were painfully aware of Ushijima’s intentions and
the range and depth of his defensive positions. In addition to their
multitude of caves, minefields, and reverse-slope emplacements,
the Japanese in the Shuri complex featured the greatest number of
large-caliber weapons the Americans had ever faced in the Pacific. All
major positions enjoyed mutually supporting fires from adjacent and
interior hills and ridge-lines, themselves honeycombed with caves and
fighting holes. Maintaining rigid adherence to these intricate networks
of mutually supporting positions required iron discipline on the part
of the Japanese troops. To the extent this discipline prevailed, the
Americans found themselves entering killing zones of savage lethality.
[Illustration: