Such an array of facts, proved experimentally over and over again,

must convince the most tenacious sceptic, and he may feel inclined to

agree with the opinion expressed in the following passage from Sir B.

Brodie:[142]--

"Crites. Then, if I understand you rightly, you have arrived at these

conclusions. First, that there was a time when this earth was not in

a fit state for the maintenance of either animal or vegetable life.

Secondly, that in its present condition there is no evidence of any

law being in operation which would account for any living beings being

called into existence except as the offspring of other living beings

which previously existed; and that from these premises we cannot fail

to arrive at this further conclusion, that the first introduction of

life on earth must have been by some special act of the creative power,

of which we have no experience at present.

"Eubulus. I suspect that this, really and truly, is all we actually

know on the subject."

Notwithstanding this apparently irresistible amount of evidence,

the question of abiogenesis has recently been revived by Dr. C.

Bastian in a well-known book, "The Beginnings of Life." Dr. Bastian

believes that he has demonstrated the origin of living organisms from

organic infusions as well as from solutions of salts containing no

organic matter: nay, even more wonderful facts than these which it is

unnecessary to specify. His experiments are so numerous, his assertions

and figures so clear and definite, and his reputation for previous

good scientific work once so high, that the book has caused no small

stir and discussion. Could Dr. Bastian's facts be only established,

they would inevitably revolutionize the whole science of Biology.

However, the same fate which has overtaken his predecessors has

befallen Dr. Bastian himself. A nearly universal verdict of "Not

proven" has been returned: and not only is the accuracy of his

experimentation denied, but even worse accusations have been brought.

To enter into details of his experiments would require too much space,

but it may not be uninteresting to detail some of the peculiarities and

difficulties which attend on the investigation of such a subject as

Spontaneous Generation.

At the very threshold of the inquiry stands a grand difficulty. Strange

as it may seem, it is nevertheless true, that notwithstanding the

many years, the immense labour bestowed by illustrious men on this

subject, next to nothing is known of the relations existing between

the lowest forms of life, animal or vegetable (especially the latter),

as well as their germs, and varying physical and chemical conditions.

Heat, light, cold and darkness, alkalies and acids with other chemical

compounds, one would imagine to be not without their influence. Yet

what this influence may be in a given case, none can tell. Enough is

known in the way of a few detached facts to make it certain that these

agents have very decided effects. It might be thought that any one

who wished to attack the problem of Spontaneous Generation anew would

first try to obtain some connected knowledge on this point. Indeed,

until it has been cleared up somewhat, it is not very evident what good

Experimentation on Heterogenesis can do. It is much as if a chemist

were to throw a handful of stuff (what he knew not) into a crucible,

and then expect a valuable result. It can scarcely be doubted that

many of these lower organisms live and grow under conditions which _à

priori_ might seem incompatible with vitality.

It is clear also that the work of one experimenter ought to be such as

may admit of repetition by another with the same result. Now no one

who attempts the study of this subject of Spontaneous Generation, can

fail to be struck with the immense mass of conflicting evidence. Some

mischievous spirit appears to have purposely thrown confusion over the

whole. Facts are alternately stated and denied. It is very hard to be

sure of the right road, even for an experienced person.

Another point relates to the value of the evidence when obtained. It

can scarcely be doubted that out of a given number of experiments

undertaken to establish a case of Heterogenesis or Archebiosis, great

value should be attached to the negative evidence afforded by those

that disprove the supposed fact. A little consideration will show the

reason. The precautions to be taken against the intrusion of germs

are innumerable: a slight exposure to the air, accidental contact of

an unheated rod or tube, or neglect of some other particulars may

inoculate the experimental fluid. Hence even with care the chances are

many in favour of some such accidental intrusion, and great caution

should always be exercised before an affirmative result can be regarded

as firmly established.

And further there is the experimentalist himself to be taken into

account. The task requires an intimate knowledge of many minute

organisms, and the different forms they assume; an acquaintance, wide

and accurate, with various experimental methods; a clear view of the

end and the various precautions required to attain that end; a mind

ready to contrive, prone to doubt and to hesitate, rather than to be

convinced. Men vary much in the amount of what is scientifically termed

their personal equation, and one difficulty in accepting the results of

a piece of work is the danger of misplaced confidence.

As was said before, Dr. Bastian's attempt to demonstrate the reality of

Spontaneous Generation has been a failure. His experiments have been

repeated, and failed to give the like results in the hands of competent

men. Witness the following quotation from a careful review of his book

in the Microscopical Journal.[143] It relates to the now celebrated

cheese and turnip solution.

"Nevertheless in consequence of the interest which Dr. Bastian's work

has excited, we have made the experiment (and that repeatedly) as

directed by him. This is not the occasion on which to give the details

of the experiments in question. It will, however, perhaps add some

value to the remarks which it has been our duty to make when we state

that, carefully following Dr. Bastian's directions, using at the same

time great care as to cleanliness and due boiling, we have obtained

results which _in every single instance_, out of more than forty tubes

closed on four separate occasions, simply contradict Dr. Bastian. We

believe, then, that Dr. Bastian's last dogma in archebiosis,--his

belief in turnip solution with a fragment of cheese--must be placed in

the same category as his colloidal urea, his spontaneously generated

bog-moss, his fungi born in crystals, his unmistakable processes of

heterogenesis, and his 'watching' and 'experimentation' in general."

The reviewer proceeds to question whether Dr. Bastian has even the

knowledge requisite for so delicate an investigation. It would be

supposed that he was intimately acquainted with various microscopical

structures; but we read,[144] "Professor Huxley gives a contribution

towards the determination of the personal value in Dr. Bastian's

researches. 'He (Dr. Bastian) will recollect that he wrote to me asking

permission to bring for my examination certain preparations of organic

structures, which he declared he had clear and positive evidence to

prove to have been developed in his closed and digested tubes. Dr.

Bastian will remember that when the first of these wonderful specimens

was put under my microscope I told him at once that it was nothing

but a fragment of the leaf of the common bog-moss (Sphagnum), and he

will recollect that I had to fetch Schacht's book "Die Pflanzenzelle"

and show him a figure which fitted very well with what we had under

the microscope before I could get him to listen to my suggestion, and

that only actual comparison with Sphagnum, after he had left my house,

forced him to admit the astounding blunder which he had made.'

"Of these three pieces of evidence, the last is the most important,

for, whilst it places us on our guard with regard to Dr. Bastian's

accuracy generally, it at the same time furnishes a key to the

explanation of a number of his experiments in which, according to

that precipitate discoverer, 'organisms' were found on opening tubes

containing infusions which had been boiled and sealed hermetically."

How then are we to sum up the case? for or against Dr. Bastian? Can any

thoughtful person admit the conclusions of one apparently so unfit for

his task? The best answer is in the words of his Reviewer.[145]

"Briefly it is to be said that the chapters in this book on

heterogenesis, contain a reckless attempt to revolutionize biological

doctrine without a single demonstration of fact to justify it, even

if it be admitted that the observations and drawings cited are

accurate. Revolution in science as in politics can only be justified by

success--a wanton attempt in either sphere must deserve the severest

condemnation. Dr. Bastian by his exhibition of himself in dealing with

heterogenesis writes himself down as incapable--as inadmissible in the

character of a witness in a scientific investigation. The Sphagnum

delusion is now explained, for it becomes evident that we have to deal

with an individual with whom such delusions are no rare exceptions.

"We should indeed be sorry to believe that Dr. Bastian is himself

aware of the injury which he is doing to the cause of science, by

promulgating these rash assertions as to the beginnings and changes of

living things; we altogether decline to entertain the notion that he

is himself conscious of the baselessness and flimsy character of his

startling discoveries, and is nevertheless willing at the expense of

injury to the cause of intellectual progress, to obtain for himself

a temporary notoriety. On the contrary, we believe that he is under

the influence of a delusion, similar to those which from time to time

obtain notoriety in the case of 'spiritualists,' 'circle-squarers,'

and such victims of belief in the marvellous. The origin and mode of

growth of such delusions form a very interesting psychological study,

and it is only when we have obtained a proper conception of Dr. Bastian

as an abnormal psychological phenomenon that we can hope rightly to

appreciate the whole of the statements made in his book.

"Delusion and self-deception are much commoner than the world is

generally accustomed to consider them. In a very well-known and often

quoted remark we have a recognition of the wide-spread occurrence of

delusions and an attempt to explain their origin; the saying to which

we allude is, 'The wish was father to the thought.' There cannot be the

least doubt that men are unconsciously hindered or misdirected in their

estimate of fact by previously formed desires. Such a desire acts on

the mind like the suggestion of the mesmerist to an individual who has

allowed himself to be brought into the hypnotic condition. In this way

many misconceptions and strange contradictions of testimony are to be

explained."

The importance of the subject is sufficient apology for so long a

quotation. But our quotations allow us to draw one conclusion; that

so far as Spontaneous Generation is concerned human knowledge is

exactly _in statu quo_. Up to this time there is no evidence, worth

consideration, that establishes a single good case of heterogenesis;

nay, rather all evidence points to the conclusion that Protoplasm

is invariably derived from pre-existing Protoplasm, at least under

existing conditions. Then too there is no fact known which enables us

to say how Protoplasm arose in the first instance. On this point we are

in the darkness of complete scientific ignorance. The whole discussion

may be well closed by a striking passage from Professor Huxley's before

quoted address.[146]

"But though I cannot express this conviction of mine too strongly,

I must carefully guard myself against the supposition that I intend

to suggest that no such thing as abiogenesis ever has taken place

in the past, or ever will take place in the future. With organic

chemistry, molecular physics, and physiology yet in their infancy, and

every day making prodigious strides, I think it would be the height

of presumption for any man to say that the conditions under which

matter assumes the properties we call 'vital' may not, some day, be

artificially brought together. All I feel justified in affirming is,

that I see no reason for believing that the feat has been performed yet.

"And, looking back through the prodigious vista of the past, I find

no record of the commencement of life, and therefore I am devoid of

any means of forming a definite conclusion as to the conditions of

its appearance. Belief, in the scientific sense of the word, is a

serious matter, and needs strong foundations. To say, therefore, in the

admitted absence of evidence, that I have any belief as to the mode

in which the existing forms of life have originated, would be using

words in a wrong sense. But expectation is permissible where belief is

not; and if it were given me to look beyond the abyss of geologically

recorded time to the still more remote period when the earth was

passing through physical and chemical conditions, which it can no more

see again than a man can recal his infancy, I should expect to be a

witness of the evolution of living protoplasm from not living matter.

I should expect to see it appear under forms of great simplicity,

endowed, like existing Fungi, with the power of determining the

formation of new protoplasm from such matters as ammonium carbonates,

oxalates and tartrates, alkaline and earthy phosphates, and water,

without the aid of light. That is the expectation to which analogical

reasoning leads me; but I beg you once more to recollect that I have no

right to call my opinion anything but an act of philosophical faith."

Obviously, as Professor Huxley points out, between philosophical faith

and philosophical knowledge there is a chasm to be bridged over. But

should the hypothesis ever be verified, it would make no difference

to the reasonings of the Natural Theologian--since the concurrence

of conditions necessary for the production of the phænomenon would

manifestly ensue upon some definite though recondite law, at present

beyond our ken.

I.--ON MATERIALISM.

The ambiguities attaching to this term were mentioned in a foot-note

on our very first page. Since that note was written, the tendency of

scientific men has been to increase the number of hypotheses respecting

the nature and laws of the material world, and by consequence to

multiply the shades of signification conveyed by the word Materialism.

So long as such distinctions are confined to the territory of pure

science, whether that of the Physicist or of the Biologist, they do

not in themselves affect the religious (or ethico-religious) position

of any thinker; and need not, therefore, occasion any trouble to the

Natural Theologian. But it is worth while to observe how rashly, on

account of some such scientific discussion, a writer is said to be a

Materialist or no Materialist, by persons who (understanding little

or nothing of science themselves) drag the unhappy author outside the

pale of his own domain, and affix to him some religious or irreligious

epithet which he has neither desired nor deserved.

The philosophic idealist often escapes; he is pronounced "no

Materialist," because he doubts the substantive existence of Matter,

yet he may and often does hold that the ideal thing he calls his soul,

has a life inextricably bound up with that other ideal thing he calls

his body, and must perish with it, never to live again.

We may add the useful remark that so far as Ethico-religious

Materialism is concerned it is much more easily tested by the

Doctrine of Soul than the Doctrine of Body. For example, consistent

Materializers will always maintain that the reasoning human soul

differs from the animal soul of brutes, not in quality, but in

quantity. Dr. L. Büchner (sometimes called a "crass Materialist")

makes this assertion repeatedly, and explains it by adding--"Man has

no absolute advantage above the animal; his mental superiority being

merely relative. There is not one intellectual faculty which belongs to

man _exclusively_; his superiority is merely the result of the greater

intensity, and the proper combination, of his capacities. The enlarged

human faculties are, as we have already seen, the natural and necessary

result of the higher and more perfect development of his material organ

of thought."[147]

Turning to a more refined species of Materialism, we find a similar

value always placed on the dogma that whatever differences exist

between man and brute, they amount to a distinction not of kind, but

only of degree. The consequences hence deduced are of the very greatest

importance, and they run much as follows. No one will venture to assert

that the power of what has been hastily called Volition is, or can be,

an endowment of mere animal nature. We do not lay upon the tiger (as we

do popularly lay upon the tyrant) a moral responsibility on account of

his savage appetites. Their indulgence does not flow from any reasoning

faculty of Will. His cruelty is the movement of automatic instincts,

governed by laws like those which rule over the inanimate world; more

complicated probably, but no-ways different in their essence. The

fall of a stone, and the spring of a tiger, are both consequences of

determining laws inherent in their several modes of existence, and

moving both as machinery is moved by a steam engine. Now, a difference

in degree only, argues no difference in those essential laws which

rule equally the greater and the less. The giant and the dwarf are

alike subject to the same laws of body and mind; and man is (as we have

seen) but a mentally taller brute. The tyrant, therefore, resembles

the tiger; the human animal is moved as the other animals are moved,

and, like them, is subject to the determining law, just as the lifeless

world is so subjected. In plain words, then, this human machine is

moved like other machines. What we call Reason, spontaneity, volition,

are, when analysed, no exceptions to the law-governed mechanism of the

world we live in. Our motives make us, not we our motives. The faculty

we exercise under the name of Choice, is really neither more nor less

than a determined, unalterable, impulsion; the result of a mechanical

law. And this law has formed and now constitutes the Universe.[148]

Refined Materialism proceeds to ask in the next place, what more do

we know of Matter than its rigid undeviating reign of Law?--The great

Globe itself obeys the same Laws as the falling stone: they pervade

and direct the mechanism of the starry heavens. Life does not exempt

either vegetable or animal from the same rule of law. We have just

seen that Mankind is _not_ so made to differ, as to permit a plea of

exemption from the same empire. Ascend from Protoplasm to the highest

human intelligence,--one heritage devolves through brute to man. The

same mechanical law accounts for the "Psychogeny" of both. Mechanical

Law, in its ramifications, is (as has been said) all we really know

of Matter. It now turns out that all Mind has been developed by this

same ever-ramifying law; may be analyzed back into its elements; is

most truly expressed by its symbols; and can never be exempted from its

determinations. Mind, therefore, and Matter are resolvable into this

sole unity--the Law of ultimate mechanical movement and impulsion.

We have called this system a refined Materialism; but another name for

one of its most influential shapes has appeared and made considerable

progress, particularly on the continent of Europe. This name is Monism;

and is intended to declare that every other belief must be at best a

Dualism.[149]

What then is the true human meaning of this Monistic creed? Our souls

(if we have souls), possess the image, not of Absolute Being and

Personality, but of abstract Fate, and rayless, eyeless Necessity.

We live machines; those supposed moralities we commonly miscall

our Volitions, spring out from beneath the moving wheels. We die,

as machines go to pieces when the wheels get out of gear; and no

other account need be asked of the broken clock-work. Here lies a

man, close beside him moulders a dog. They are now what they always

were,--copartners in the same inexorable destiny.

Inexorable:--yes; for, standing beside these two graves, we see where

our higher Philosophy and our religious hopes alike lie buried. What

is Mechanical Law to us? The antithesis of Providence; therefore, with

the edict which proclaims its sway, all our prayers are ended. And

what is Man, compared with the equal dog who bears him company? One

event befals them both; yet we may ask whether before or after that one

event, Man has or can have any preeminence above the beast? Let him

be spoken of as statesman, warrior, orator, poet, painter, sculptor,

musician; none of these epithets convey any truth. He may possibly be

a speaking, striking, weaving, drawing, colouring, sound-producing

machine. But the Designer of the Universe and the human artist have

disappeared together. What we took for the author of immortal works,

an original genius, an inspired hero of his kind, "a man and a leader

of men," was a piece of wheel-work driven by unalterable law. There

was the same "must be" to him as to his dog. There never was and never

could have been, nor yet ever will be any _essential_ difference; two

spirits are gone downwards to the earth.

Man has not even the sad preeminence of Sin. Where can he find or make

room for wrong-doing, when impelling Mechanism determines all? And

where Sin is not, Repentance cannot come.

Hope is shut out along with Remorse and its unmeaning pains. Man has no

ladder of ascent left him; and why should he wish to climb? If there

were such a ladder as Jacob dreamed, its base must rest on lifeless

Law, and at its summit there would only be this same Law, enthroned and

Deified.

Thus, when the primæval Nebula arose in Space (how or why it arose

is not told us), its vapoury Law contained all that is, and all that

can be:--Plato and Shakespeare, Moses and St. John glimmered in its

tremulous twilight. Worlds inanimate and animate scintillated from

its fires. What we call Heaven and Earth are its dumb children, its

law-determined Evolutions. Thou and I, O reader, have harboured

strange fancies;--let them go;--we are but parts of the Whole; and

the Whole is a mechanical Unity. Now that we find ourselves disabused

and illuminated, our great difficulty may perhaps be to fall down,

Strauss-like, and worship this _Universum_. Can such worship, or such

an object of worship, bless and satisfy our high aspiring race? Eyes

that have watched for Righteousness, hearts that have yearned after

it, let the answer come from you! In this answer lives or dies the

twofold belief of the Natural Theologian, the twofold hope resulting

to Mankind. The belief, that is to say, in a personal Immortality, the

belief in a personal God.

It may now seem plain that the readiest test of moral or religious

Materialism is its doctrine, not of Body but of Soul. There is no

charm in such a word as Matter to differentiate the character of

a philosophy. Looking at the material world, any thinker may be a

Natural Realist or a Pure Idealist; yet being either or neither, he

may materialize, or the reverse, so far as Morals and Religion are

concerned. The simple question ought rather to be; Is man mechanically

governed by the Law which rules the world of Abiology (the lifeless

inorganic world), or is he, can he become, a Law unto himself?[150]

It would be unfair to omit impressing upon the reader's mind

that physical science _per se_ is by no means answerable for

ethico-religious Materialism. As a question of fact, it does not seem

established that students of Nature, whether physicists or biologists,

have, as such, been the chief offenders. On the contrary, for every

single instance of the kind, it seems quite probable that at least

_two_ metaphysical writers might be found guilty. Obviously, some such

large proportion may reasonably be expected, when we consider that

Determinism, (the word Mill and others prefer to Necessity), is a

theory involving a certain kind of metaphysics.

But the really largest crop of materializers arises from a Debateable

Land. There is a hybrid class of "thinkers," concerning whom the best

physical-science authorities allege that "such nebulous rascals are

mere metaphysicians," while metaphysical speculators, pure and simple,

feel quite sure that "though under a cloud, the gentlemen must be

Physicists."[151]

So far as Biology[152] is concerned, let the reader compare Mr.

Herbert Spencer's latest utterances already referred to, (in _Essays_,

Vol. III. _sub. fin._, especially pp. 249-50), with the following

passages from Mr. Huxley. "I suppose if there be an 'iron' law, it

is that of gravitation; and if there be a physical necessity, it is

that a stone, unsupported, must fall to the ground. But what is all we

really know and can know about the latter phenomenon? Simply, that,

in all human experience, stones have fallen to the ground under these

conditions; that we have not the smallest reason for believing that

any stone so circumstanced will not fall to the ground; and that we

have, on the contrary, every reason to believe that it will so fall.

It is very convenient to indicate that all the conditions of belief

have been fulfilled in this case, by calling the statement that

unsupported stones will fall to the ground, 'a law of nature.' But

when, as commonly happens, we change _will_ into _must_, we introduce

an idea of necessity which most assuredly does not lie in the observed

facts, and has no warranty that I can discover elsewhere. For my part,

I utterly repudiate and anathematize the intruder. Fact I know; and

Law I know; but what is this Necessity, save an empty shadow of my own

mind's throwing? But if it is certain that we can have no knowledge of

the nature of either matter or spirit, and that the notion of necessity

is something illegitimately thrust into the perfectly legitimate

conception of law, the materialistic position that there is nothing in

the world but matter, force, and necessity, is as utterly devoid of

justification as the most baseless of theological dogmas." ("On the

Physical Basis of Life," _Lay Sermons_, pp. 157-8.)

* * * * *

And again (pp. 159-60):--

"We live in a world which is full of misery and ignorance, and the

plain duty of each and all of us is to try to make the little corner he

can influence somewhat less miserable and somewhat less ignorant than

it was before he entered it. To do this effectually it is necessary

to be fully possessed of only two beliefs: the first, that the order

of nature is ascertainable by our faculties to an extent which is

practically unlimited; the second, that our volition counts for

something as a condition of the course of events.

"Each of these beliefs can be verified experimentally, as often as we

like to try. Each, therefore, stands upon the strongest foundation upon

which any belief can rest, and forms one of our highest truths. If we

find that the ascertainment of the order of nature is facilitated by

using one terminology, or one set of symbols, rather than another, it

is our clear duty to use the former; and no harm can accrue, so long as

we bear in mind, that we are dealing merely with terms and symbols."

Symbols, are to the true philosopher like old-fashioned copper

"tokens," privately impressed with letters and devices, but lacking the

Royal image and superscription. They are, as Spencer and Huxley agree,

"unknown quantities;"--relativities not entities. They are employable

enough where they suit,[153] provided Mr. Huxley's _caveat_ (p. 161)

is steadily kept in mind. "The errors of systematic materialism may

paralyze the energies and destroy the beauty of a life."

The reader may be pleased to put the subject of Materialism before

himself in a compendious shape as follows:--If the question asked be,

"_What_ is Matter?" the answer appears little likely to be of moment

to morals or Natural Theology, except so far as human ignorance is

made a plea for Scepticism. But, if it is inquired, "whether the

_Mechanical_ Laws of Matter are the laws of Universal Nature, including

human nature? the issue becomes most momentous. The reply made, answers

another question of the deepest interest:--"Are there any conditions

under which a Science of Natural Theology is possible?" If Mechanism be

the law of the Universe, Natural Theology is plainly impossible.

FOOTNOTES:

[88] Professor Max Müller writes as follows.--"If philosophy has to

explain what is, not what ought to be, there will be and can be no

rest till we admit, what cannot be denied, that there is in man a

(third) faculty, which I call simply the faculty of apprehending the

Infinite, not only in religion, but in all things; a power independent

of sense and reason, a power in a certain sense contradicted by sense

and reason, but yet a very real power, which has held its own from the

beginning of the world, neither sense nor reason being able to overcome

it, while it alone is able to overcome both reason and sense." _Max

Muller's Lectures on the Science of Religion_.--Lect. I. New Ed. p. 20.

The use of the word faculty is defended in a note.

I quote this passage with pleasure, because one main objection brought

against the possible existence of such a faculty is taken from the

_negative form_ of the word Infinite. The Professor maintains that, as

a question of Philology, Infinite signifies an affirmative idea. In his

Lectures on Language, second series, p. 576. he writes thus. "There is

no Infinite, we are told, for as there is a Finite, the Infinite has

its limit in the Finite, it cannot be Infinite. Now all this is mere

playing on words without thoughts. Why is infinite a negative idea?

Because _infinite_ is derived from _finite_ by means of the negative

particle _in_! But this is a mere accident, it is a fact in the history

of language, and no more. The same idea may be expressed by the

Perfect, the Eternal, the Self-existing, which are positive terms, or

contain at least no negative element. That negative words may express

positive ideas was known perfectly to Greek philosophers such as

Chrysippus, and they would as little have thought of calling _immortal_

a negative idea as they would have considered _blind_ positive. The

true idea of the Infinite is neither a negation nor a modification

of any other idea. The Finite, on the contrary, is in reality the

limitation or modification of the Infinite, nor is it possible, if we

reason in good earnest, to conceive of the Finite in any other sense

than as the shadow of the Infinite. Even Language will confess to this,

if we cross-examine her properly." He adds a happy quotation from

Roger Bacon: "'et dicitur infinitum non per privationem terminorum

quantitatis, sed per negationem corruptionis et non esse.' Oxford of

the nineteenth century need not be ashamed, as far as metaphysics are

concerned, of Oxford of the thirteenth." Coleridge's theory of the

Intuitive reason is well known to most readers.

[89] Metaph. XII. 7.

[90] Hamilton's Discussions, vol. 1. Art. 1.

[91] Very few people have ever sate down and sturdily endeavoured to

realize before their mind's eye, the distinct idea of any _other_

mind separate from themselves and independently subsistent. A short

trial will shew the difficulty, perhaps impossibility of the proposed

realization.

Any one who tries and fails, may be glad to learn that eminent

metaphysicians have retreated in despair from the task of justifying,

by _argument_, our belief in any minds other than our own. To common

sense, it may seem a natural inquiry whether this metaphysical failure

holds _morally, in foro conscientiæ_, as a valid excuse for most men's

neglect of other men's rights and interests? If _not_, it would appear

that morality is a more delicate test of certainty, than some sorts of

metaphysics.

[t] For the information of some readers, and the entertainment of

others, a few of the less popularized theories respecting Self-ness or

Personal Identity are thrown into Additional Note A.

[u] Nothing is more common in conversation than for a talker to

affirm that such and such a position must be _untrue_ "because it

is inconceivable." The assertor ought in return to be asked one or

two questions, _e.g._, "Do you mean inconceivable to yourself or to

the generality of Mankind?" If the latter, "Is the contradictory

also inconceivable?" Again, "Do you mean by the word inconceivable,

_unthinkable_ or _unimaginable_?" Few people clearly consider this last

distinction. Further, "If unthinkable, is it absolutely so, or only

very difficult to think?" And it seems likewise important to deliberate

whether any position ought to be pronounced absolutely unthinkable,

unless the human mind lies under a stern necessity of thinking and

accepting its contradictory.

[92] "Conceivable" and other like expressions are always relative to

conceiving minds; and what appears either conceivable or inconceivable

to one mind, may be the contrary to another. A painter not only

conceives,--but draws a Centaur, and places him feeding on a wide

plain or sloping hill side. But, can the Physiologist conceive such a

monstrosity? The solution is easy; the painter thinks of his figure,

the physiologist of the structure; and this example furnishes a good

caution as to the use of similar words.

From words we may pass to ideas. Take any conception involving the

condition of Time or Space,--(those two optical tubes of our mind's

perceiving eye),--and place it before the understanding; first as

a _Finite_ and next as an _Infinite_. The result is a conflict of

arguments, ending in a contradiction of all possibility that _either_

way the conception can be true. Any one moderately acquainted with

Kant's best-known work, is aware that, by thus treating the world's

existence, he raises overwhelming difficulties against its being

_either_ limited or unlimited in extent;--eternal _or_ having a

commencement in duration;--(p. 338. Ed. Rosenkranz) yet, the world

_does_ exist in fact. Kant goes on to subject other cosmological ideas

to the same enigmatical reasoning, with the same consequences.

Some readers of purely modern science, may illustrate this question

of the "_conceivable_" by what has been written on that extraordinary

riddle, the "_four_ dimensions of space." They will see opinions _pro_

and _con_ in an article by Professor Sylvester in Nature vol. 1. A

note (p. 238) contains one conclusion of the Professor's, interesting

as _his_ answer to a question asked by us a few paragraphs back.

He says, "If an Aristotle, or Descartes, or Kant assures me that

he recognises God in the conscience, I accuse my own blindness if

I fail to see with him.... I acknowledge two separate sources of

authority,--the collective sense of mankind, and the illumination of

privileged intellects." Plato then may have really _seen_ more than

Lucretius--Coleridge more than Comte or Littré.

[v] The advantages and defects of the optical structure of our human

eyes have been carefully estimated by Helmholtz. He has also discussed

the difficulties attending eyesight considered as a sensation and

perception. Extracts from his clear yet popular Lectures are given in

Additional Note B.

[93] _Proceedings of the Royal Institution._ V. 456.

[94] All theories of light require these immense numbers. Sir J.

Herschel says there is no "mode of conceiving the subject which does

not call upon us to admit the exertion of mechanical forces which may

well be termed infinite." The numeration in the text is a rough and

ready shape of statement at once intelligible. But it is interesting

to view the subject more exactly.--Light travels in one second

192,000 miles. Each mile contains 63,360 inches, and in each inch are

39,000 waves of red light, calculated at their _mean_ length. Now,

multiply these three sets of figures together, and we get a rate of

474,439,680,000,000 red waves per second. The mean length of a violet

wave is the 1/57500th part of an inch; and by a like multiplication we

find a product of 699,494,400,000,000 of violet light-strokes thrown

upon the retina in each second. The phrase "_millions of millions_"

is used in the text, because few people realize the idea of any

arithmetical whole beyond a million.

[95] "What we hear" writes Professor Max Müller "when listening to

a chorus or a symphony is a commotion of elastic air, of which the

wildest sea would give a very inadequate image. The lowest tone which

the ear perceives is due to about 30 vibrations in one second, the

highest to about 4,000. Consider then what happens in a _Presto_ when

thousands of voices and instruments are simultaneously producing waves

of air, each wave crossing the other, not only like the surface waves

of the water, but like spherical bodies, and, as it would seem, without

any perceptible disturbance; consider that each tone is accompanied

by secondary tones, that each instrument has its peculiar _timbre_,

due to secondary vibrations; and, lastly, let us remember that all

this cross-fire of waves, all this whirlpool of sound, is moderated by

laws which determine what we call harmony, and by certain traditions

or habits which determine what we call melody--both these elements

being absent in the songs of birds--that all this must be reflected

like a microscopic photograph on the two small organs of hearing,

and there excite not only perception, but perception followed by a

new feeling even more mysterious, which we call either pleasure or

pain; and it will be clear that we are surrounded on all sides by

miracles transcending all we are accustomed to call miraculous, and

yet disclosing to the genius of an Euler or a Newton laws which admit

of the most minute mathematical determination." _Science of Language_,

Second Series, p. 115.

[96] There is a much more scientific mode of trying this experiment. A

description of the instrument (Kaleidophone), and cuts of the figures

produced, may be seen in Tyndall on Sound, pp. 132. seq.

[97] There is reason for believing that a large proportion of animal

eyes see much as ours do when in a normal state. Colour blindness

is frequent in Man and occurs between red and green, yet a bull

distinguishes the two like a _healthy_, human being. He is allured by

the sight of a green field, and lashes himself into fury when a red rag

is waved before him.

The eyes of insects are very far removed in structure from ours. A

butterfly's compound eye contains 17,000 tubes, that of the Mordella

beetle 25,000. Their perception of colours appears vivid and distinct.

They resemble birds, reptiles, and other creatures in choosing for

their lairs and resting-places objects _coloured like themselves_.

It is not difficult to mount one of these compound eyes, so as to

look through it by aid of a lens placed in focus. Leeuwenhoeck looked

through the eye of a dragon fly (made up of 12,544 tubes), "and viewed

the steeple of a church which was 299 feet high, and 750 feet from the

place where he stood. He could plainly see the steeple, though not

apparently larger than the point of a fine needle. He also viewed a

house in the same manner, and could discern the front, distinguish the

doors and windows, and perceive whether they were open or shut." See

_Insect Miscellanies_, p. 129.

[98] Two points connected with colour admit of being easily

experimented on, and deserve from their interest to be made the

subjects of repeated observations.

The first has relation to the question of _primary_ colours;--are they

alike in man and in _all_ the lower animals?--In birds and reptiles

there are anatomical reasons for believing the primaries to be red,

yellow, and blue. But are they the same in our race?--may they not

more probably be red, green, and violet? In this case yellow is the

transition from red to green, blue from green to violet. As colour

blindness consists in an insensibility to red, and as the outer circle

of the field of vision is feeble in its reds, the number of experiments

which might be suggested is evidently considerable.

Let a person place two threads respectively red and green near the

bridge of the nose, so as to be seen by the inner angle of the pupil

only. If dexterously moved, both seem green;--if not, both will in

time become black. Where the want of sensitive appreciation of red is

great, the same result follows in every part of the field of sight.

Thus reverend gentlemen in former times have been induced to wear

scarlet hose under the impression that they had put on black silk;

and in these railroad days many persons find themselves unable to

distinguish between the safety and the danger signal lights. It seems

strange indeed that any scientific advisers of railway Boards should

have recommended for use the two colours, above all others, most likely

to get confounded.

The theory which supposes red, green, and violet to be Man's three

primary colours is the hypothesis of our great countryman Dr. Thomas

Young, and deserves much more consideration than was for a long time

awarded it. If we may judge of his theory by his appreciation of

pictures it must have been excellent;--the present writer saw with

admiration in 1845 the grand series of Reynolds' portraits which Dr.

Young had left behind him.

The second topic of interest is the inquiry into the number and tone

of subjective colours. A perfect theory of colour ought, of course, to

embrace all possible human sensations of the kind. Now many persons

are able to see in dreams a rich amber light far softer and more pure

than any tint ever beheld by the Eye. It generally appears to irradiate

Space, and silvery figures, most often the celestial orbs, float within

it. A still more beautiful production of reflex energy exerted after

tranquil rest is the blending of delicate green with a hyacinthine hue

quite strange to this world, and indescribably lovely in its tender

shadings off. By means of this subjective activity the experiments of

Goethe and J. Müller may be varied almost _ad libitum_. The easiest

plan is on first waking to keep the eyelids steadily closed, and

watch for the unbidden rise of tints. Persons of strong pictorial and

poetic powers can, after some practice, control their appearance and

succession; and much diversity may be produced by slightly separating

the fringe of eyelashes and looking between the loosely pressed

fingers. The remarkable point in these and similar experiments seems to

be that we are thus enabled to gaze upon beauties more marvellous than

the outward eye ever beheld--yet we _see_ them.

Another and a painful source of knowledge on this subject consists

in registering the visual impressions of persons bodily or mentally

diseased. The difference between these and the normal impressions of

healthy people would seem to arise from reflex action, the disordered

sensory or mind reacting upon the optic apparatus; or, as it may

be said, the centre of our being is through these aberrations made

manifest in its control of the circumference.

Now, it will be obvious to any reflective person how very important

all information we can acquire respecting this central empire over the

impressions of our sense-nerves may become when we try to estimate the

conditions of human knowledge. If it be true that the Mind imposes

laws of activity on the nervous system even when receiving impressions

from it, then the necessity we are under of _thinking_ in accordance

with certain inly imposed laws receives a most striking illustration.

And the inference from it carries an _a fortiori_ probability

since our thoughts lie nearer to our mental centre than any of our

sense-impressions.

[99] Nerves of common feeling are acutely sensitive when divided, and

the patient animal under a Majendie or a dentist utters a sharp shriek.

The case is different with motor nerves, with those of the sympathetic

system, and with (what is more to our purpose) nerves of sensation. It

seems clear that mechanical injuries, or even touches, excite them in

the direction of their own special functions. Auditory nerves feel a

shock as a sound,--optic nerves receive it as a sudden and brilliant

light. We are doubly assured from these effects of the true functions

belonging to the several sets of nerves. Disease and injury are great

discoverers of what ought to be healthy susceptibilities. In such

cases, however, they prove also something more agreeable to think upon.

They prove that suffering is confined within definite limits, and that

_economy_ of pain forms part of the universal design, for the sensitive

animal as well as the sensitive man. If all our nerves shrank equally

with equal tenderness, life would be a history of protracted agony. Yet

one might have expected, _primâ facie_, that a fibre which telegraphs

shapes and colours with their blendings, would eloquently tell the

story of its own occasional anguish. And our whole nervous framework

might have been conceived as an instrument of torture. It has not been

so constituted.

_Per contra_, the nerves of common feeling assert their own

vocation.--"A brazen canstick turned" sets the teeth on edge, and

troubles the skin with horripilation. Believers in ghosts--and also

disbelievers--are aware that some sights

"Make knotted and combined locks to part,

And each particular hair to stand on end."

For extended information on this subject compare Additional Note C.

[100] Aristotle so described it before Mr. Bain and other modern

writers, "[Greek: to gar horaton esti chrôma]," De Anima II. 7. 1.

As Kampe carefully observes, "so ist die Farbe (nicht die gefärbten

Körper) das Eigenthümliche des Gesichtssinns." See also his note,

Erkenntnisstheorie des Aristoteles, p. 88.

[w] Compare Helmholtz on "The Sensation of Sight," _Lectures_, pp. 256,

7, and 259.

"We have already seen enough to answer the question whether it is

possible to maintain the natural and innate conviction that the quality

of our sensations, and especially our sensations of sight, give us a

true impression of corresponding qualities in the outer world. It is

clear that they do not. The question was really decided by Johannes

Müller's deduction from well ascertained facts of the law of specific

nervous energy. Whether the rays of the sun appear to us as colour,

or as warmth, does not at all depend upon their own properties, but

simply upon whether they excite the fibres of the optic nerve, or

those of the skin. Pressure upon the eyeball, a feeble current of

electricity passed through it, a narcotic drug carried to the retina

by the blood, are capable of exciting the sensation of light just as

well as the sunbeams. The most complete difference offered by our

several sensations, that namely between those of sight, of hearing,

of taste, of smell, and of touch--this deepest of all distinctions,

so deep that it is impossible to draw any comparison of likeness, or

unlikeness, between the sensations of colour and of musical tones--does

not, as we now see, at all depend upon the nature of the external

object, but solely upon the central connections of the nerves which

are affected.... But not only uneducated persons, who are accustomed

to trust blindly to their senses, even the educated, who know that

their senses may be deceived, are inclined to demur to so complete a

want of any closer correspondence in kind between actual objects and

the sensations they produce than the law I have just expounded. For

instance, natural philosophers long hesitated to admit the identity

of the rays of light and of heat, and exhausted all possible means of

escaping a conclusion which seemed to contradict the evidence of their

senses.

"Another example is that of Goethe, as I have endeavoured to show

elsewhere. He was led to contradict Newton's theory of colours,

because he could not persuade himself that white, which appears to

our sensation as the purest manifestation of the brightest light,

could be composed of darker colours. It was Newton's discovery of the

composition of light that was the first germ of the modern doctrine

of the true functions of the senses; and in the writings of his

contemporary, Locke, were correctly laid down the most important

principles on which the right interpretation of sensible qualities

depends. But, however clearly we may feel that here lies the difficulty

for a large number of people, I have never found the opposite

conviction of certainty derived from the senses so distinctly expressed

that it is possible to lay hold of the point of error: and the reason

seems to me to lie in the fact that beneath the popular notions on the

subject lie other and more fundamentally erroneous conceptions."

[101] Is there, asks Idealistic Scepticism, any outside world at all?

We have all of us always believed in the veritable existence of this

outside world from our childhood. So have we believed always in our own

real and continued personal existence. The unyielding objectivities

concerning which our senses inform us--the identical Self which

receives their information--are entities no man ordinarily thinks of

calling in question.

Let any one sit down and try to imagine himself a human animal let

loose upon life without a firm belief in either of these two primary

convictions. What could life be to him? to his descendants? to the

world of men if similarly unbelieving? Yet what are the conditions

or evidences of veracity upon which his and his fellows' present

convictions must necessarily repose? Can he and others help believing

them true? and why?--This "why" is a safe answer to the most plausible

as well as the most refined objection against such primary beliefs as

those premised by Natural Theology.

[102] Cheselden's case is reported in the Philosophical Transactions

for 1728, and also in his Anatomy. Respecting the point above quoted he

is confirmed by Mr. Nunneley, "_On the Organs of Vision_," 1858.

[103] See Dr. Carpenter's Principles of Human Physiology. Ed. 7. p.

713. § 635.

[x] The following quaint apology for our senses at the expense of our

understanding may be new to the majority of my readers:--

"We have seen two notorious instances of _sensitive deception_, which

justifie the charge of _Petron. Arbiter_.

Fallunt nos oculi, vagique sensus

Oppressâ ratione mentiuntur.

And yet to speak properly, and to do our _senses_ right, simply they

are not deceived, but only administer an occasion to our forward

_understandings_ to deceive themselves: and so though they are some

way accessory to our delusion; yet the more principal faculties are

the _Capital offenders_. Thus if the _Senses_ represent the _Earth_ as

_fixt_ and _immoveable_; they give us the truth of their _Sentiments_:

To _sense_ it is _so_, and it would be deceit to present it otherwise.

For (as we have shewn) though it do _move_ in itself; it _rests_ to us,

who are carry'd with it.... But if hence our Understandings falsely

deduct, that there is the same quality in the _external impressor_;

'tis, it is _criminal_, our _sense_ is _innocent_. When the _Ear_

tingles, we really hear a _sound_: If we judge it without us, it's

the fallacy of our _Judgments_. The _apparitions_ of our frighted

_Phancies_ are real _sensibles_: But if we translate them without the

compass of our Brains, and apprehend them as external objects; it's

the unwary rashness of our _Understanding_ deludes us. And if our

disaffected Palates resent nought but bitterness from our choicest

viands, we truly tast the unpleasing quality, though falsely conceive

it in that, which is no more then the occasion of its production. If

any find fault with the novelty of the notion; the learned St. _Austin_

stands ready to confute the charge: and they who revere _Antiquity_,

will derive satisfaction from so venerable a suffrage. He tells us,

_Si quis remum frangi in aquâ opinatur, et, cum_ _aufertur, integrari;

non malum habet internuncium, sed malus est Judex_. And onward to this

purpose, The sense could not otherwise perceive it in the _water_,

neither ought it: For since the _Water_ is one thing, and the _Air_

another; 'tis requisite and necessary, that the _sense_ should be as

different as the _medium_: Wherefore the Eye sees aright; if there be

a mistake, 'tis the Judgement's the Deceiver. Elsewhere he saith, that

our Eyes misinform us not, but faithfully transmit their resentment to

the mind. And against the _Scepticks_, That it's a piece of injustice

to complain of our _senses_, and to exact from them an account, which

is beyond the sphear of their notice: and resolutely determines,

_Quicquid possunt videre oculi, verum vident_. So that what we have

said of the _senses deceptions_, is rigidly to be charg'd only on our

careless Understandings, misleading us through the ill management of

sensible informations." Glanvill, _Vanity of Dogmatizing_. Chap. x.

First Ed. p. 91, seq.

The reader may like to consider how far Glanvill's apology for the

senses is removed from the following propositions laid down by a recent

writer just quoted who thus defends while he limits the veracity of

sense-impressions:--

"What we directly apprehend," writes Professor Helmholtz, "is not

the immediate action of the external exciting cause upon the ends

of our nerves, but only the changed condition of the nervous fibres

which we call the state of _excitation_ or functional activity." And

further on:--"The simple rule for all illusions of sight is this: _we

always believe that we see such objects as would, under conditions

of normal vision, produce the retinal image of which we are actually

conscious_. If these images are such as could not be produced by any

normal kind of observation, we judge of them according to their nearest

resemblance; and in forming this judgment, we more easily neglect the

parts of sensation which are imperfectly than those which are perfectly

apprehended. When more than one interpretation is possible, we usually

waver involuntarily between them; but it is possible to end this

uncertainty by bringing the idea of any of the possible interpretations

we choose as vividly as possible before the mind by a conscious effort

of the will." Helmholtz on _The Recent Progress of the Theory of

Vision_. pp. 230, 31 and p. 307.

[104] Two acute reasoners, who will be alternately acquitted of

madness by contending schools of thought, have arrived at conclusions

very favourable to the sanity of idealizing men. In his first lecture

at the Royal Institution, Professor Masson spoke in the following

terms of _Hume_ and _Fichte_. "There is the system of Nihilism, or,

as it may be better called, Non-Substantialism. According to this

system, the Phænomenal Cosmos, whether regarded as consisting of

two parallel successions of phænomena (Mind _and_ Matter), or of

only one (Mind _or_ Matter), resolves itself, on analysis, into an

absolute Nothingness,--mere appearances with no credible substratum of

Reality; a play of phantasms in a void. If there have been no positive

or dogmatic Nihilists, yet both Hume for one purpose, and Fichte

for another, have propounded Nihilism as the ultimate issue of all

reasoning that does not start with some _à priori_ postulate."--Recent

British Philosophy, p. 66. The reader will observe that to raise the

question fully, we have spoken of the special form of Idealism to

which Mr. Mill gives the first place in his description, (Examination

of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 8.) "According to one of the forms, the

sensations which, in common parlance, we are said to receive from

objects, are not only all that we can possibly know of the objects, but

are all that we have any ground for believing to exist.----Those who

hold this opinion are said to doubt or deny the existence of matter.

They are sometimes called by the name Idealists, sometimes by that of

Sceptics, according to the other opinions which they hold. They include

the followers of Berkeley and those of Hume. Among recent thinkers,

the acute and accomplished Professor Ferrier, though by a circuitous

path, and expressing himself in a very different phraseology, seems to

have arrived at essentially the same point of view. These philosophers

maintain the Relativity of our knowledge in the most extreme form in

which the doctrine can be understood, since they contend, not merely

that all we can possibly know of anything is the manner in which it

affects the human faculties, but that there is nothing else to be

known; that affections of human or of some other minds are all that we

can know to exist."

Mr. Mill's own position will be found in his 11th Chapter. After

defining Matter to be a "Permanent Possibility of Sensation," (p.

227) and explaining his definition, he writes in a note (p. 232),

the following decisive sentences: "My able American critic, Dr. H.

B. Smith, contends through several pages that these facts afford no

proofs that objects _are_ external to us. I never pretended that they

do. I am accounting for our conceiving, or representing to ourselves,

the Permanent Possibilities as real objects external to us. I do not

believe that the real externality to us of anything, except other

minds, is capable of proof."

Mr. O'Hanlon's pamphlet entitled "A Criticism of John Stuart Mill's

Pure Idealism; and an attempt to shew that, if logically carried out,

it is Pure Nihilism," seems less known than it deserves to be. Mr.

Mill noticed and answered it in his 3rd Edition--chiefly among the

criticisms commencing p. 244.----Mr. O'Hanlon's early decease has

given a painful interest to his promising labours. Some paragraphs from

his now scarce pamphlet are placed at the end of Additional Note D, on

"Pure Idealism."

[105] _On Hamilton._ p. 6. Mill is thus echoed from across the

broad Atlantic;--"The profoundest question of philosophy turns

on the relation of Thought to Being, Mind to Matter, Subject to

Object, or (in empiricistic phrase) Organism to Environment. Is

the Organism purely the product of the Environment? Then we have

Empiricism, Sensationalism, Materialism, whose motto is that of

Destutt-Tracy,--"_Penser c'est sentir_." Is the Environment the product

of the Organism? Then we have Transcendentalism, Egoism, Idealism,

whose motto is that of Berkeley,--"The _esse_ of objects is _percipi_."

F. E. Abbot, in _The Index_ (American), for July 27, 1872.

[106] Lord Macaulay has some pertinent and characteristic remarks

concerning this topic in his literary estimate of Dr. Johnson. "How

it chanced that a man who reasoned on his premises so ably, should

assume his premises so foolishly, is one of the great mysteries of

human nature. The same inconsistency may be observed in the schoolmen

of the middle ages. Those writers show so much acuteness and force

of mind in arguing on their wretched data, that a modern reader is

perpetually at a loss to comprehend how such minds came by such data.

Not a flaw in the superstructure of the theory which they are rearing

escapes their vigilance. Yet they are blind to the obvious unsoundness

of the foundation. It is the same with some eminent lawyers. Their

legal arguments are intellectual prodigies, abounding with the happiest

analogies and the most refined distinctions. The principles of their

arbitrary science being once admitted, the statute-book and the reports

being once assumed as the foundations of reasoning, these men must

be allowed to be perfect masters of logic. But if a question arises

as to the postulates on which their whole system rests, if they are

called upon to vindicate the fundamental maxims of that system which

they have passed their lives in studying, these very men often talk

the language of savages or of children." (_Essays_, Ed. 1852. p. 175.)

As to the schoolmen, any one who wishes to form a fair idea of their

acuteness with little trouble to himself, may consult the "Synopsis

Distinctionum" of H. L. Castanæus, a book found in most learned

libraries.

[y] See Additional Note E.--The great interest of this subject for

our purpose lies in the circumstance that the relation of Theory to

Fact is in effect a question most closely akin to the one already

mooted concerning the relation of our Sensations to our Perceptions

(compare Additional Note B). These two questions are indeed so very

similar as to be in the main identical. What we want to learn regarding

both relations, is, _first_, the _extent_ of the relativity to our

human nature; in other words how _much we_ have _mentally put_ into

our Theories and Sensations _before_ we treat them as Facts and

Perceptions. _Secondly_, what reason we have for believing _any_ of

our knowledge comprehended under either or both of these relativities

(Perception and Fact) to be true _beyond_ our human sphere; and, above

all, whether we are able to assert, on good grounds, that such and such

parts of either kind of our knowledge are absolutely and immutably

true?--

If, for example, we ask--Is it thus true that there are real objects

external to ourselves? "I do not believe," Mr. Mill has told us, "that

the real externality to us of anything, except other minds, is capable

of proof." And a few lines further, "The view I take of externality,

in the sense in which I acknowledge it as real, could not be more

accurately expressed than in Professor Fraser's words." These are "For

ourselves we can conceive only--(1) An externality to our present

and transient experience in _our own_ possible experience past and

future, and (2) An externality to our own conscious experience, in the

contemporaneous, as well as in the past or future experience of _other

minds_." (_On Hamilton._ p. 232, note.) This explanation, Mill had

just before observed, is an externality in the only sense we need care

about; and it means in plain words, that we possess no absolutely true

but only some utilitarian knowledge of the real existence of an outside

world. We must, however, and do care infinitely more for another kind

of answer to quite another kind of question. Is the antithesis between

Right and Wrong,--the Moral Imperative "Do this and live, transgress

and die,"--absolutely and immutably true? If not, who would calculate

profit and loss as they are calculated in the Gospel; who would or

could believe in a Righteous that is to say, a Real and True God?

Many minds, appalled by the vastness of these issues, and finding no

satisfactory answer to questions of such infinite importance, have

fallen back on the position of Dr. Newman in his _Grammar of Assent_.

But the unsatisfactory characteristic attaching to this position,

is that there seems to be no _limit_ to such Assents, because there

appears no Reasonable canon or maxim to explain, defend, and regulate

them. To the far larger number of minds the problem states itself

as a dilemma. There are exactly two alternatives open to Man. His

choice lies between two contrasted positions--the most antagonistic

conceivable, yet both resulting from one common supposed fact.

Ignorance and impotence are the truest characters inscribed upon

our Reason. Man must decide either for an unlimited Doubt such as

that which Hume delineates, wide as the universal whole of our human

Existence; or else yield the kind of Assent to which Dr. Newman invites

as being the sole secure refuge for any soul driven by despair into a

recoil from utter absence of belief and hope--the want of everything

to trust and love. Now, let it be observed that an assent transcending

reasonable proof is, in effect, a confession that Reason falls short

of establishing those transcendental truths to which the mind has

thus assented. And contrariwise, limitless Doubt making all else

uncertain, affirms with unmistakeable decisiveness the impotence of

human Reason.--"The observation of human blindness and weakness," says

Hume, "is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn,

in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it." Hence, we see that

Hume's conclusion is identical with that underlying a position directly

antagonistic to his own, and in this respect _les extrêmes se touchent_.

It follows, then, with equal clearness, that any Dilemma which

restricts human choice to the two alternatives above stated, rests

upon a denial that Man's Reason can guide Mankind to truth--(and by

consequence that he can ever feel after and find his God);--whilst,

conversely, this same denial, if posited as a basis of speculation,

permits no human choice beyond the two horns of a Dilemma thus made

necessarily imperative upon us all.

Neither alternative, however, can be accepted by the Natural

Theologian, nor can he possibly receive any such Dilemma as founded in

Truth or Reason. On the one hand the Superhuman, and Supernatural lie

outside his science which has for its sphere Nature, including Man's

Nature; and which steadily endeavours to attain the true interpretation

and evidence yielded by both Natures, to a belief extending beyond

their present territory and fluent conditions. On the other hand,

his science becomes impossible if unlimited Doubt is the sole dreary

prospect open to the philosophic inquirer. And with his science all

other sciences must perish. Doubt saps the foundations of them all;

common-sense facts, scientific theories, and practical every-day

beliefs, are all impartially shewn to be baseless. So far as our

realities are concerned

"We are such stuff

As dreams are made on; and our little life

Is rounded with a sleep."

Science is therefore an alien from Man's world; the soul an outcast

amid her own:--

"As in strange lands a traveller walking slow,

In doubt and great perplexity,

A little before moon-rise hears the low

Moan of an unknown sea;

"And knows not if it be thunder or a sound

Of stones thrown down, or one deep cry

Of great wild beasts; then thinketh, 'I have found

A new land, but I die.'"

"Not for this," says the same reflective poet--

"Not for this

Was common clay ta'en from the common earth,

Moulded by God, and tempered with the tears

Of angels to the perfect shape of man."

Let it be observed in conclusion, that the mode in which common-sense

people are accustomed to treat the primary tenets of most sciences, and

the validity of their own ordinary beliefs, may be placed in curious

contrast with their attitude towards the proofs of Natural Theology.

In the former case, acceptance is easy and wholesale; in the latter,

every mind seems to bristle with objections. Now there are evidently

thousands who _must_ surrender their judgments to the demands of a

present and pressing utility, and must take upon trust a multitude

of maxims which they can never hope to investigate. The difficulties

necessarily involved in each and all of these easy acceptations thus

remain unsuspected, and cannot therefore be placed side by side with

the difficulties of Theism.

But, next arises a serious question. How far can a similar facility of

wholesale acceptance and a similar absence of comparison with deeper

truths, be considered a philosophic or even a fair procedure in the

case of men and women who _think_ themselves into Atheism?

[z] Neither can it be too often repeated that practical truth involves

an enormous amount of speculative difficulty, and is received

as the daily basis of human action in the face of doubts, which

speculatively considered are absolutely insoluble. There is (as will

appear in Chapter IV.) reason to extend this remark beyond what is

commonly called practical truth far into the realm of speculative

knowledge, or to speak more exactly, of all knowledge whatsoever.

Suppose, for instance, the continuity of our inward power of receiving

sense-impressions, of knowing, and reasoning; (our personal Identity)

is a groundless belief;--Suppose too that our sense-impressions

are reflections from self-created shadows and not from objective

realities;--_where_ can any knowledge be truly subsistent save in

that place of exile now generally termed "the Unknowable"? Compare

Additional Notes A and B appended to this present Chapter.

[107] La Philosophie en France. IX. p. 66.

[108] First Principles, p. 108.

[109] Lay Sermon delivered on Sunday, Jan. 7, 1866; in the collected

vol. pp. 19, 20.

[110] Essays I. p. 190.

[111] Ibid. p. 211.

[aa] Mr. Herbert Spencer has been freely criticized by Americans, in

part as not being sufficiently thorough--in part as being untrue to his

own position. A few quotations will be found in Additional Note F, on

"The Unknowable."

[ab] The paragraph, taken in its entireness, is pervaded with the vivid

sense of a Moral Law which can neither change nor perish--a Law at once

human and Divine. This strong protest is both in thought and expression

a complete contrast to the ordinary tone of Mr. Mill's disquisitions,

attempered as they generally are between benevolence and expediency.

Instead of pondering the Utilities of a race which, comparatively

speaking, began to exist yesterday, it appeals with decisive sternness,

once and for ever, to the Immutable and the Absolute. It reminds one of

a torch-bearing Prometheus pitted against the selfish despot of a new

and morally enfeebled Olympus. See Additional Note G.

[112] This sentence contains two propositions; the question of

speculative perplexity has been treated in this Chapter--that of

reasonable necessity is reserved for our next.

[113] On Hamilton, p. 242.

[114] Mill on Hamilton, p. 232, note.

[115] Ibid. p. 233, note.

[116] Ibid. p. 227.

[117] British Association Report, 1870. lxxvii. lxxxiv.

[118] The remark above made respecting a "_living laboratory_" will

be readily understood by every one who remembers the great mistakes

committed, some years ago, in treating the stomach as a mere chemical

workshop;--forgetful of its all-important endowment,--vitality. That

oversight has been alluded to here because it may yield a lesson to

Psychologists; for may not a far higher kind of endowment in like

manner be forgotten when men materialize the principles one and all on

which is conditioned the transforming power of mental assimilation?

[119] Lay Sermons, p. 160.

[120] And of more than one as we shall see hereafter. Its point will be

best understood upon a perusal of Additional Notes F and I.

[121] All these quotations will be found between pp. 332 and 360 of the

Treatise. Ed. 1817.

[122] Compare Mr. Green's Introduction to Hume's _Treatise on Human

Nature_, Vol. I., pp. 263, seq., where he discusses the bearing of this

subject upon Hume's doctrine of Cause and Effect.

[123] He sums up in the words of Goethe, thus given in the translation

of his lectures from which we have quoted--

"Woe! woe!

Thou hast destroyed

The beautiful world

With powerful fist;

In ruin 'tis hurled,

By the blow of a demigod shattered.

The scattered

Fragments into the void we carry,

Deploring

The beauty perished beyond restoring."

[124] "All the different sorts of rays which I have mentioned produce

one effect in common. They raise the temperature of the objects on

which they fall, and accordingly are all felt by our skin as rays of

heat." (p. 237.)

[125] The former of these two latter quotations has been cited already

in a foot-note on p. 164 _ante_. It is repeated here for the sake of

bringing together Masson's classification of Fichte, first as "_Pure_

Idealist," and secondly as "Nihilist." Mr. O'Hanlon's criticism of Mill

reaches exactly the same goal as regards that subtle controversialist.

His position is that Mill's Pure Idealism when analysed, turns out to

be Pure Nihilism.

[126] Compare Note B preceding.

[127] In the pamphlet referred to p. 165 _ante_, note. The quotations

in our text commence on its 5th page. The subject will be most easily

comprehended after a reperusal of the argument of Chap. III. pp.

164-172 inclusive.

[128] On p. 14 the ingenious writer adds a further argument based on

Mill's admissions. "If the fire apart from my consciousness be some

positive condition or conditions of warmth and light, if the corn be

some positive condition or conditions of food, my thesis is made out,

and your Pure Idealism falls to the ground. If, on the other hand, 'the

fire' be nothing positive apart from my consciousness, then, since it

is nothing at all when so apart, you can have no right to speak of

'modifications' taking place in it, whether we are asleep or awake,

present or absent."

[129] It is worth observing how truly our Bishop anticipated the

vulgar objection against his theory. Towards the end of his Dialogues

Hylas (who clings to the olden elemental nature) speaks thus: "To say,

There is no Matter in the World, is still shocking to me. Whereas

to say--There is no Matter, if by that Term be meant an unthinking

Substance existing without the Mind; but if by Matter is meant some

sensible Thing, whose Existence consists in being perceived, then there

is Matter:--this Distinction gives it quite another Turn; and Men will

come into your Notions with small Difficulty, when they are proposed in

that manner." Lord Byron condescended to repeat the "coxcombs' grin"--

"When Bishop Berkeley said there was no matter,

And prov'd it--'twas no matter what he said."

[130] Read for example the following eloquent passages from Berkeley's

"Three Dialogues." Philonous, who represents Berkeley himself, says:

"To me it is evident, for the Reasons you allow of, that sensible

Things cannot exist otherwise than in a Mind or Spirit. Whence I

conclude, not that they have no real Existence, but that seeing they

depend not on my Thought, and have an Existence distinct from being

perceived by me, _there must be some other Mind wherein they exist_. As

sure, therefore, as the sensible World really exists, so sure is there

an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.

"Hylas. What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay,

and all others too who believe there is a God, and that he knows and

comprehends all Things.

"Phil. Ay, but here lies the Difference. Men commonly believe that all

Things are known or perceived by God, because they believed the Being

of a God, whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily

conclude the Being of a God, because all sensible Things must be

perceived by Him.

"Hylas. But so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it

how we come by that Belief?

"Phil. But neither do we agree in the same Opinion. For Philosophers,

tho' they acknowledge all corporeal Beings to be perceived by God, yet

they attribute to them an absolute Subsistence distinct from their

being perceived by any Mind whatever, which I do not. Besides, is there

no Difference between saying, _There is a God, therefore he perceives

all Things_: and saying, _Sensible Things do really exist: and if they

really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite Mind:

therefore there is an infinite Mind, or God?_ This furnishes you with a

direct and immediate Demonstration, from a most evident Principle, of

the _Being of a God_....

Hylas. It cannot be denied, there is something highly serviceable to

Religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like

a Notion entertained by some eminent Moderns, of _seeing all things in

God_?

Phil. I would gladly know that Opinion; pray explain it to me.

Hylas. They conceive that the Soul, being immaterial, is incapable

of being united with material Things, so as to perceive them in

themselves, but that she perceives them by her Union with the Substance

of God, which being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or

capable of being the immediate Object of a Spirit's Thought. Besides,

the Divine Essence contains in it Perfections correspondent to each

created Being; and which are, for that Reason, proper to exhibit or

represent them to the Mind.

Phil. I do not understand how our Ideas, which are Things altogether

passive and inert, can be the Essence, or any Part (or like any Part)

of the Essence or Substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible,

purely active Being. Many more Difficulties and Objections there are,

which occur at first View against this Hypothesis, but I shall only

add, that it is liable to all the Absurdities of the common Hypotheses

in making a created World exist otherwise than in the Mind of a Spirit.

Beside all which it has this peculiar to itself; that it makes that

material World serve to no Purpose. And if it pass for a good Argument

against other Hypotheses in the Sciences, that they suppose Nature or

the Divine Wisdom to make something in vain, or do that by tedious

round-about Methods, which might have been performed in a much more

easy and compendious way, what shall we think of that Hypothesis which

supposes the whole World made in vain?

Hylas. But what say you, are not you too of Opinion that we see all

Things in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.

Phil. I entirely agree with what the Holy Scripture saith, _That in God

we live, and move, and have our Being_. But that we see Things in his

Essence after the manner above set forth, I am far from believing. Take

here in brief my Meaning. It is evident that the Things I perceive are

my own Ideas, and that no Idea can exist, unless it be in a Mind. Nor

is it less plain that these Ideas or Things by me perceived, either

themselves or their Archetypes exist independently of my Mind, since

I know myself not to be their Author, it being out of my Power to

determine at Pleasure what particular Ideas I shall be affected with

upon opening my Eyes or Ears. They must therefore exist in some other

Mind, whose Will it is they should be exhibited to me. The Things, I

say, immediately perceived, are Ideas or Sensations, call them which

you will. But how can any Idea or Sensation exist in, or be produced

by, anything but a Mind or Spirit? This, indeed, is inconceivable: and

to assert that which is inconceivable, is to talk Nonsense: Is it not?.

Hylas. Without doubt.

Phil. But on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should

exist in, and be produced by, a Spirit; since this is no more than I

daily experience in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless Ideas;

and by an Act of my Will can form a great Variety of them, and raise

them up in my Imagination: Tho' it must be confessed, these Creatures

of the Fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and

permanent, as those perceived by my Senses, which latter are called

_Real Things_. From all which I conclude, _there is a Mind which

affects me every Moment with all the sensible Impressions I perceive_.

And from the Variety, Order, and Manner of these, I conclude the Author

of them to be _wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension_. Mark it

well, I do not say, I see Things by perceiving that which represents

them in the intelligible Substance of God. This I do not understand;

but I say, The Things by me perceived are known by the Understanding,

and produced by the Will, of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this

most plain and evident? Is there any more in it, than what a little

Observation of our own Minds, and that which passes in them not only

enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to acknowledge?"

Numberless charming quotations might be added from the "Principles" as

well as the Dialogues, but those already given may suffice, and they

have been chosen now because not very commonly quoted.

[131] Hegel Encyklopädie T. i. S. 95. (Werke VI. 189.) The quotation

above is from Mr. Wallace's translation p. 153. Compare his Index.

[132] In the just published Edition of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature,

I. p. 140. We must all regret the loss of Dean Mansel's ultimate

thoughts on "The real error of Berkeley's Idealism." Letters &c. p.

391. But more than a dozen years earlier, he wrote, (_Prolegomena

Logica_, Chap. V.) "The fault of Berkeley did not consist in doubting

the existence of matter, but in asserting its non-existence." How far

Mansel himself went in the direction of this same doubt may be judged

from the following passage, which occurs in the Prolegomena one page

before. "Beyond the range of conscious beings, we can have only a

negative idea of substance. The name is applied in relation to certain

collections of sensible phenomena, natural or artificial, connected

with each other in various ways; by locomotion, by vegetation, by

contributing to a common end, by certain positions in space. But here

we have no positive notion of substance distinct from phenomena. I do

not attribute to the billiard ball a consciousness of its own figure,

colour, and motion; but, in denying consciousness, I deny the only

form in which unity and substance have been presented to me. I have

therefore no data for thinking one way or the other on the question.

Some kind of unity between the several phenomena may exist, or it may

not; but if it does exist, it exists in a manner of which I can form no

conception; and if it does not exist, my faculties do not enable me to

detect its absence." In other words (as Mr. O'Hanlon might have phrased

it) "My friend Smith is I know a person,--therefore a substance. But

Smith's hat and coat, being unconscious, lack the only forms in which

unity and substance have been presented to me. Smith's coat is blue,

its fabric woollen; his hat black, and of silken texture;--there

may or may not be unities in which these phenomena of colour and

structural appearance cohere; my faculties do not, however, enable me

to decide whether hat and coat are or are not _positively_ substantial

unifications.

It would appear from all this, that hats and coats and other familiar

so-called substances, are as little _essentially_ known to us as

that vast territory of supernatural Being which has been named the

"Unknowable."

[133] From Mr. Wallace's translation of Hegel's Logik, pp. 65, 8, and

9. As the translator preserves the numbering of the Sections, reference

is easy to the original German. Hegel adds a remark well worthy of

attention:--"The scepticism of Hume, by whom this observation was

chiefly made, should be clearly marked off from Greek scepticism. Hume

founds his remarks on the truth of the empirical element, on feeling

and sensation, and proceeds to attack universal truths and laws,

because they do not derive their authority from sense-perception. So

far was ancient scepticism from making feeling and sensation a canon

of truth, that it turned against the deliverances of sense first of

all."--Ibid. p. 69.

[134] Pp. 234-341. The preface to this volume is dated February 1874.

[135] Martineau's conception discussed by Spencer is hampered by a

theory of Matter difficult _per se_.

[136] See back pp. 76-8 and 107 (end of note) and connect with these

passages the oft-repeated Wordsworthian maxim:--

"We murder to dissect."

[137] See our Chapter VI. _On Causation_.

[138] The paragraph cited in the text of Chapter III. concludes with

these words:--"I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when

I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can

sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go."

Now, no man can sit down and _calculate_ himself into Mr. Mill's

conviction thus enounced; neither could any cool process of argument

have ever kindled such a flame. A sternness of purpose like his must be

either the skeleton-armour covering the thoughtless boy in Tennyson's

Gareth and Lynette, or it is the reflection of a light intuitively

flashed through the soul--the echo of a chord struck upon the writer's

very heart-strings. Such and so deep, beyond doubt, was the ingenuous

feeling of Mr. Mill.

[139] La Science au point de Vue Philosophique, pp. 539-542.

[140] Psychological Inquiries, second part, pp. 195-197.

[141] Address (Presidential) to British Association at Liverpool, 1870,

p. 15.

[142] Loc. cit. pp. 199-200.

[143] Quarterly Journal of Microscopical Science, January, 1873, p. 74.

[144] Loc. cit. p. 64.

[145] Loc. cit. pp. 69-70.

[146] Loc. cit. pp. 16-17.

[147] This quotation is from his _Matter and Force_, Chapter XIX.

Büchner is never tired of emphasizing the Materialism of thought. In an

address prefixed to his tenth Edition, speaking of the hypothesis of

Mind acting on Brain he calls it "the tragi-comic pianoforte theory,"

and regrets that there should be so many "human pianofortes out of tune

in the world." Büchner's own Materialism is outspoken, as may be judged

from the following propositions:--

1. Spirit without Body is unimaginable.

2. The Soul brings with it "no innate intuitions"; and

3. It is not an _ens per se_, but a product of external influences.

4. There is no individual immortality nor personal continuance after

death.

5. The Soul's knowledge relates only to earthly things.

6. It becomes a _person_ by being opposed to earthly individualities.

7. (Adopted from C. Vogt) "The soul ... is a product of the development

of the brain; just as muscular activity is a product of muscular

development, and secretion a product of glandular development. So soon

as the substances composing the brain are aggregated in a similar form,

will they exhibit the same functions.... Mental activity changes with

the periods of life, and ceases altogether at death."

Büchner's writings are sufficiently known in this country. In America

they are food for the million.

Proposition No. 6 is particularly noticeable because it re-echoes the

fallacy of Locke (see page 182-3 _ante_) on personal identity. By

opposition to earthly individualities we do not "_become_" persons, but

the sense of antagonism between ourselves and other externalities (both

men and things), sharpens every day our belief in our own personality,

and furnishes its daily verification.

The grossness of this writer's Materialism does not hinder him from

using the word "soul" on almost every page; and in one of his more

recent publications he is candid enough to acknowledge that this

old-fashioned entity is not yet quite improved off the face of the

Earth. He says:--"Just the properties of the human mind and the

impossibility of explaining them, were from the most ancient times one

of the main supports of spiritualism and theological systems. True,

their explanation is still wanting." Büchner, of course, looks for

the speedy elimination of "Soul" proper, on exactly the same grounds

which underlie his own whole system. Mental activity and Brain go

together (he argues), as Force and Matter go together. It may be

answered, that every practical reasoner knows the danger of arguing

from _concomitancies_, however well-established, to _Causality_; and

the risk is evidently much increased when a like argument is used to

_Identity_. Besides, if Mental activity is resolvable into Brain, why

should not Matter be likewise resolved into Force? Thus the whole

Universe, inanimate and animated, material and psychical, becomes

Force. The chain would run in this manner: Mind = Brain = Matter =

Force. But how are we to know that Force must be all of one kind and

description? Or, again, why may not the concomitancies be rather

resolved some other way;--_e.g._, Matter (including Brain) = Force =

Mind? Thus Materialism might slide into Idealism, Pantheism, or even

Theism; since in some shape or other Mind would form and sustain the

Universe. Our last citation of Büchner is taken from a New York Edition

of his _Materialism_, p. 19.

[148] In other words, that kind of law which pervades the lowest sphere

of Nature is conceived as dominant over the highest also. The whole

Universe is submitted to its iron rule. There is of Man's Mind as well

as of the flagstone with which he paves his streets, one account, one

law, one science, one philosophy; nay, strangely enough, as we shall

see further on, one religion! The law of stocks and stones is supreme,

it rules alike Man's present and his future, and ought to be the sole

object of his veneration.

Positivism, as is well known, makes many sciences and classifies them

by an ascending scale of Laws. "La Philosophie Positive," writes Littré

(_Paroles_, p. 10) ... "apercevant que, suivant la vraie conception,

où la matière n'est pas séparable de ses propriétés, le mot de

matérialisme n'avait plus d'emploi philosophique qu'en histoire, elle

l'a renouvelé, et s'en est servie pour caractériser l'intrusion de la

méthode de toute science inférieure dans la science supérieure."

If Littré had said, "the intrusion of the _lowest_ into the highest,"

he would have rightly characterized the systems we are describing.

Von Feuchtersleben puts the practical state of the question thus:--"All

we can say is, that an intellectual world reveals itself to us, by the

law of the true, the good, and the beautiful, and that a physical world

manifests itself by those laws which act in space and time. What lies

beyond these laws, as it were the substance of both worlds, we know

not; we only call that of the physical world, matter or body in the

abstract, that of the super-physical, we call spirit (Geist), and must

never forget that hereby we have only pronounced an abstraction.

"But now we ask further, wherein does this higher law manifest itself

to us, as the physical law does in the material world? Nowhere but

in man, and in him only through the medium of his cultivated and

refined reason. What we feel, what we remember, nay, the very inmost

sensations of our individual existence, may be referred to the world

which surrounds us. Thought alone, exalted to the highest degree shows

us another world. We are ourselves therefore not spirit, but we watch,

as it were, what we call by that name, and which manifests itself

to us only by its laws. (Est Deus in nobis.) Man, therefore, should

be the link which connects the two worlds; and this is the problem,

this is the enigma, which can never be solved." He adds in a note:

"Materialism, that is, the view which will not allow the separation

of the intellectual principle from the corporeal, but looks upon the

former as a higher power of the latter, not only explains nothing,

but makes the enigma still more obscure. _Medical Psychology_, Ed.

Sydenham, pp. 15-16.

[149] Compare footnote (_c_) pp. 56-7 _ante_. This whole theory

is dreamlike,--a sort of romance or revel of a half-metaphysical,

half-materializing imagination. The following rather long extract from

Haeckel's book will shew the hypothesis on its most poetical side.

But alas for its prose, and its plain practical application! "It is

indeed," he writes, "not difficult to arrive through an unprejudiced

consideration of facts, at a clear conviction that Theism, which

has its origin in Mythology, and which, under the name of "Pure

Monotheism," rules the civilized peoples of modern day, and plays

even now so conspicuous a part in organic Morphology as the Myth of

Creation, is in fact not Monotheism but AMPHITHEISM. This

predominant religion was MONOTHEISM only so long as all

Natural Phenomena were, without any exception, taken to be the direct

result of the personal divine government of the world,--only so long

as all inorganic or organic Phenomena--from the blowing of the wind

and the rolling of the thunder, to the light of the sun and the course

of the stars; from the flowery fragrance of plants and the wing of

the bird, to the Mind-formation of Man and the development-history

of peoples;--were direct actions of a monarchical, personal Creator.

But when modern Natural Science demonstrated that the whole realm of

inorganic Nature was governed by fixed, unvarying laws of Nature;

when Physics and Chemistry reduced Abiology to mathematical formulæ,

then the half of his realm was wrested from the personal Creator, and

there remained to him organic Nature alone, and even the half of this

was next set free by recent Physiology, so that organic Morphology

alone remained subject to the personal, arbitrary government of the

mediatised ruler of the world. Thus, out of the earlier Monotheism

grew up that full-blown Amphitheism which at present rules the modern

Cosmology of civilized peoples; and which appears in Science as the

thoroughly perverted Dualism against which we have contended most

determinedly in our General Morphology. For, what else is this Dualism

but the battle between two Gods of fundamentally distinct natures? On

the one hand, we see in the realm of Abiology, dominated by Mechanism,

the exclusive sovereignty of unvarying and necessary Nature-laws, of

the [Greek: anankê], which at all times and in all places constantly

remains one and the same.

"On the other hand, in the realm of Biology (which is still governed

by Teleology), and especially in the realm of organic Morphology, we

see the ridiculous arbitrary government of a personal and thoroughly

humanlike Creator, who vainly wearies himself with endeavouring to

create a 'perfect' Organism, and constantly rejects the earlier

creations of a 'former age,' in that he is continually setting up

new and improved editions in their places. We have already shewn, in

our sixth chapter, why we must entirely reject this pitiful idea of

a personal Creator (Vol. I. p. 173). It is in fact a degradation of

the pure God-Idea. Most men picture to themselves this 'beloved God'

as being thoroughly humanlike: he is in their eyes an architect, who

is engaged in carrying on the construction of the world according

to some previously rejected plan; but who never gets done with it,

because during the process of completion, he is always hitting on new

and better ideas; he is a Stage-manager, who directs the earth like a

great puppet-play, and generally knows how to handle with tolerable

skill the numerous threads by which he manages the hearts of men:

he is a half-deprived king who only rules over the inorganic realm

conditionally, and according to firmly fixed laws; rules on the other

hand over the organic realm absolutely as patriarchal land-father, who

in this domain allows himself to be led into a daily alteration of his

world-plan by the wishes and prayers of his own children, among whom

the most perfect Vertebrates are those principally favoured.

"Let us turn away from this unworthy Anthropomorphism of modern

Dogmatics, which degrade God himself into an aerial Vertebrate, and

let us look on the contrary at the infinitely higher God-Idea to

which Monism conducts us; in that it demonstrates the UNITY OF GOD in

the whole of Nature, and abolishes the antithesis of an organic and

inorganic God which sows the germ of a death-agony in the heart of

that predominating Amphitheism. Our Cosmology knows only ONE SOLE GOD,

and this ALMIGHTY GOD rules the whole of Nature without exception. We

contemplate his operation in all phenomena of every description. To it

the whole inorganic material world is subject, and so too the whole

world of organization. If each body _in vacuo_ falls fifteen feet in

the first second; if three atoms of Oxygen to one of Sulphur always

produce Sulphuric Acid; if the angle which one columnar surface of

rock crystal makes with the neighbouring one is always 120°; then,

these phenomena are the immediate operations of God, equally with the

blossoms of plants, the movements of animals, the thoughts of Mankind.

We all exist by 'God's grace'; the stone as well as the water, the

Radiolarian as well as the pine tree, the gorilla as much as the

Emperor of China.

"This Cosmology which contemplates GOD'S SPIRIT AND POWER IN

ALL NATURAL PHENOMENA is alone worthy of His all-comprehensive

greatness; only when we refer all forces and all phenomena of movement,

all forms and properties of matter, to God, as the Author of all

things, do we attain to that human intuition of God, and veneration

of God, which really befits his immeasurable greatness. For 'in Him

we live and move and have our being.' Thus the philosophy of Nature

becomes in fact Theology. The worship of Nature becomes that true

worship of God of which Göethe says:--'CERTAINLY THERE IS NO MORE

BEAUTIFUL VENERATION OF GOD, THAN THAT WHICH ARISES FROM COMMUNION WITH

NATURE IN OUR OWN BREASTS.'

"GOD IS ALMIGHTY; he is the sole Author, the prime Cause of

all things; that is, in other words, GOD IS THE UNIVERSAL CAUSAL

LAW. God is absolutely perfect; he can never act otherwise than

perfectly rightly, therefore he can never act arbitrarily or freely;

that is to say, GOD IS NECESSITY. God is the sum of all

forces; so also, therefore, of all Matter. Every conception of God,

which separates him from Matter, opposes to him a sum of forces which

are not of divine Nature; every such conception leads to Amphitheism,

consequently to Polytheism.

"Since MONISM demonstrates the UNITY OF THE WHOLE OF

NATURE, it proves, likewise, that only ONE GOD exists,

and that this God manifests himself in the collective phenomena of

Nature. Since Monism grounds the collective phenomena of organic and

inorganic Nature on the UNIVERSAL CAUSAL LAW, and displays

them as the effects of 'active causes,' it shews at the same time,

that GOD IS THE NECESSARY CAUSE OF ALL THINGS AND IS THE LAW

ITSELF. Since Monism acknowledges no other beside the divine

Forces in Nature, since it recognizes all laws of Nature as divine, it

raises itself to the greatest and most elevated conception of which

man, as the most perfect of all animals, is capable, to the conception

of the UNITY OF GOD AND NATURE.

'Was wär' ein Gott, der nur von aussen stiesse,

Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen liesse!

Ihm ziemt's, die Welt im Innern zu bewegen,

Natur in Sich, Sich in Natur zu hegen,

So dass, was in Ihm lebt und webt und ist,

Nie Seine Kraft, nie Seinen Geist vermisst.'"

Haeckel's _Generelle Morphologie der Organismen_. Vol. II. Book viii.

Chap. 30.

No one who reads the latter part of this quotation will doubt that

Haeckel is a refined, or, in other words, a metaphysical Materialist.

That he has produced an effect in materializing circles is evident;

witness the following passages from Büchner "the crass." "To any one

who does not stubbornly and obstinately cling to old prejudices, this

new Cosmology which has superseded the dualism of former systems

of philosophy and thought, must appear as clear, simple, free of

dualism, easily intelligible and perfectly satisfactory. On account

of this very antagonism to the dualistic character of the speculative

philosophy of the past, I should like best to designate the philosophy

of Materialism as _monistic philosophy_, or _philosophy of unity_;

and the cosmology founded upon it as _monism_, in accordance with the

suggestion of Professor Haeckel.... Since the indestructibility of

matter, as previously described, has found its necessary complement

in the indestructibility of force; and since the separation of force

and matter has been recognized as a mere abstraction and existing

only in our thoughts: it is really impossible to speak any longer of

Materialism as a system which derives everything from matter only.

Otherwise we might just as well speak of _Dynamism_, that is of a

system that derives everything from force (dynamis). But in reality

both are identical and inseparable; and therefore a philosophy built

upon those ideas cannot be better designated than as _monistic_, or

a _philosophy of unity_." (_Materialism, ut supra_ p. 24.) This last

phrase is more metaphysical than Büchner's wont; but S. T. Coleridge,

if alive, would tell him that what the world really wants, is a

"Philosophy of Multeity in Unity." To annihilate the Manifold is to

destroy our sole knowledge of the One.

[150] It was previously intimated that the idealizing philosopher often

escapes ethical censure more easily than he deserves. Idealism may,

or may not, be a bar to irreligious materialism. For example:--"The

materialism of Strauss was not inconsistent with an idealism of the

Hegelian type; for, as he showed in his last work, the question

between logically consistent idealists and materialists who carry out

their principles is, at its roots, one of names and terms rather than

of antagonistic principles." _Pall Mall Gazette_ for Feb. 11, 1874.

The Idealism referred to, is that which identifies pure Being with

Impersonal Thought. Now Berkeley's idealism culminated with the Divine

Personality, through whose omnipresence and spiritual subsistence

those properties or modes of existence, called material, are realized

to us, who, together with all the world, exist in and by Him. Yet, as

far as Berkeley's argument rests upon the common ground of idealistic

reasoning, it is approachable by the Atheist or the Sceptic. Of Hobbes

a reviewer has lately remarked: "He clearly demonstrated that the

secondary qualities of body are purely subjective, and his language

is almost strong enough to lead us to believe that he would have gone

a long way with Berkeley. For he claims to have proved that 'as in

vision, so also in _conceptions_ that arise from the other senses,

the subject of their inherence is not the object but the sentient.'"

_Westminster Review_, April, 1874, p. 387.

The truth from which so many theories, physical and metaphysical,

branch out, is thus clearly stated by Professor Huxley. "All the

phenomena of nature are, in their ultimate analysis, known to us only

as facts of consciousness." "On Descartes," _Lay Sermons_, p. 374.

This statement is an incontrovertible proposition; and may help in

persuading us to believe our own souls. At all events, we plainly see

that the sum total of our human knowledge is potentially contained in

their evidence.

[151] A mongrel Word-book would be a valuable addition to popular

science. How many metaphysicians proper, or how many skilled students

of Natural Science, can explain that novel compound "Psychoplasm"? The

_Westminster Review_ is _not_ lost in admiration for either this new

coinage, or another specimen from the same mint,--"Metempirics." (See

No. for July, 1874.) The _Fortnightly_ is more congratulatory.

[152] Ravaisson, the great philosophical critic of France, considers

Biology among the sciences directly antagonistic to Materialism.

He classifies the tendencies of scientific studies thus. There

are, he says, "Deux directions opposées auxquelles nous inclinent

les deux ordres differents de connaissances:--la direction qui

aboutit au Materialisme, et c'est celle dans laquelle nous engagent

les mathématiques et la physique, et la direction qui mène au

spiritualisme, et c'est celle où acheminent la biologie et surtout les

sciences morales et esthétiques." (_La Philosophie en France_, p. 98.)

His description of a certain degree of progress in the mind of Comte

illustrates this same idea:--"Il comprit, en présence de la vie, que

ce n'était pas assez, comme il avait pu le croire dans la sphère des

choses mécaniques et physiques, de considérer des phénomènes à la suite

ou à côté les uns des autres, mais que, de plus, que surtout il fallait

prendre en considération l'ordre et l'ensemble.

"En présence des êtres organisés, on s'aperçoit, disait-il, que le

détail des phénomènes, quelque explication plus ou moins suffisante

qu'on en donne, n'est ni le tout ni même le principal; que le

principal, et l'on pourrait presque dire le tout, c'est l'ensemble dans

l'espace, le progrès dans le temps, et qu'expliquer un être vivant, ce

serait montrer la raison de cet ensemble et de ce progrès, qui est la

vie même....

"Dans les sciences des choses inorganiques, disait-il encore, on

procède par déduction des détails au tout; dans les sciences des êtres

organisés, c'est de l'ensemble que se tire par déduction, la vraie

connaissance des parties.

"De plus, d'accord maintenant avec Platon, Aristote, Leibniz, il

déclarait que l'ensemble étant le résultat et l'expression d'une

certaine unité, à laquelle tout concourt et se co-ordonne et qui est le

but où tout marche, c'est dans cette unité, c'est dans le but, c'est

dans la fin ou cause finale qu'est le secret de l'organisme.

"Le 16 Juillet 1843, écrivant à M. Stuart Mill, il exprimait l'opinion

que, si ce savant ne le suivait pas dans les voies plus larges où

dorénavant il allait marchait, c'est que, très-versé dans les études

mathématiques et physiques, il n'était pas assez familier avec les

phénomènes de la vie. Plus avancé dans la science biologique, M. Mill

aurait mieux compris comment il faut, outre le détail des faits,

quelque chose qui les domine, qui les combine et les co-ordonne."

(_Ibid._ p. 75, _seq._)

[153] These pages are inappropriate to that wide and momentous

controversy:--Has each Science a Method of its own?--and by consequence

its own terminology? That such a question remains to be debated, is a

clear proof that most of our philosophizing is yet tentative; and has

not passed over the critical "first stage."