CONDITIONS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
"The words which the great German poet put into the mouth of
Mephistopheles when describing himself to Faust, afford perhaps
the most concise and forcible statement of what we may call the
anti-scientific spirit:--
'Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint,
Dem alles, was entsteht, zuwider ist.'
The true spirit of science is certainly affirmative, not negative; for,
as I mentioned just now, its history teaches us that the development
of our knowledge usually takes place through two or more simultaneous
ideas of the same phenomenon, quite different from one another, both of
which ultimately prove to be parts of some more general truth; so that
a confident belief in one of those ideas does not involve or justify
a denial of the others."--_Address of the President of the British
Association_, 1873-4. p. 13.
"Philosophy is but wise and disciplined thought upon the subjects
on which all men think. The minds of men, left to their own natural
working, will never cease to think on these things; and if Philosophy
should cease to attempt to think wisely on them, she abandons her
position as a guide. She has been to blame for the carelessness of her
procedure, for the overweeningness of her pretensions. But the remedy
is soberness, not scepticism. Is it, after all, an evil, that in some
directions we fail to attain certainty by mere thinking?... As in
nature, the picture you see is not broad light and dark, but a thousand
tender tones and hues melting into each other, and vibrating together
between the light and dark: so is the mind of man." Archbishop of
York--on _The limits of Philosophical Inquiry_, pp. 25-26.
"To the _knowledge_ of the most contemptible _effect_ in nature, 'tis
necessary to know the whole _Syntax_ of Causes, and their particular
_circumstances_, and _modes_ of action. Nay, we _know nothing_, till we
_know ourselves_, which are the summary of all the world without us,
and the _Index_ of the Creation." Glanvill, _Vanity of Dogmatizing_,
Chap. xxii. Ed. 1. p. 217.
"A branching channel, with a mazy flood?
The purple stream that through my vessels glides,
Dull and unconscious flows, like common tides:
The pipes through which the circling juices stray,
Are not that thinking I, no more than they:
This frame compacted with transcendent skill,
Of moving joints obedient to my will,
Nurs'd from the fruitful glebe, like yonder tree,
Waxes and wastes; I call it mine, not me."
_Dr. Arbuthnot._
"'To the eye of vulgar Logic,' says he, 'what is man? An omnivorous
Biped that wears Clothes. To the eye of Pure Reason what is he? A
soul, a Spirit, and divine Apparition. Round his mysterious Me, there
lies, under all those wool-rags, a Garment of Flesh (or of Senses),
contextured in the Loom of Heaven; whereby he is revealed to his like,
and dwells with them in UNION and DIVISION; and sees and fashions
for himself a Universe, with azure Starry Spaces, and long Thousands
of Years. Deep-hidden is he under that strange Garment; amid Sounds
and Colours and Forms, as it were, swathed in, and inextricably
over-shrouded: yet it is skywoven, and worthy of a God. Stands he not
thereby in the centre of Immensities, in the conflux of Eternities? He
feels; power has been given him to Know, to Believe; nay does not the
spirit of Love, free in its celestial primeval brightness, even here,
though but for moments, look through? Well said Saint Chrysostom, with
his lips of gold, "the true SHEKINAH is Man:" where else is
the GOD'S-PRESENCE manifested not to our eyes only, but to
our hearts, as in our fellow man?'"--_Sartor Resartus_, Chap. x. Pure
Reason.
SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTER III.
This Chapter may be characterized as a parallel between the
difficulties alleged to be fatal against Theism, and the difficulties
attaching to very various departments of human knowledge, embracing
its most necessary and its most certainly accepted kinds. From this
parallel the conclusion becomes evident, that whoever accepts one
set of truths cannot be debarred by these or similar difficulties
from accepting the higher truth likewise. That such an acceptance
is natural and valid appears further evident from the fact that a
knowledge of God belongs to the class of Practical beliefs, and is
enforced by the same reasonable necessity. This topic forms the
transition to Chapter IV. on "Our Reasonable Beliefs."
The same inferences are also stated in a _destructive_ form, _e.g._,
Should a thinker choose to deny the possibility of Theism, he ought
(if consistent) to deny all those truths which stand or fall by a
parallel set of reasonings. But by doing this he lands himself in
a state of doubt, so extreme and thorough, that the whole Universe
becomes a rayless blank.
A corollary is added on Materialism.
_Analysis_--Man the interpreter of Nature. Nature _gives_ by answering
our interrogations; these must depend on our powers of assimilating
knowledge. Some questions inevitable, _e.g._, What are the first
grounds of Truth?
Has Man any faculty of apprehending the Infinite? Can we know our own
Personality or that of others?--or any Thing in itself? Inference
against Scepticism based on human ignorance.
Fallacy of the Unthinkable or Inconceivable. Ideas of Self and
not-Self, inexplicable, yet undoubted. From things as they are, let us
turn to things as they appear. How do we perceive, hear, see?
Perception as an instrument of Intelligence, inscrutable. We
acknowledge the insoluble mystery but accept the fact.
Marvels of eyesight, and their problems. How much and what do we see?
Comparison with Sound;--Form, Colour, Tone. Evidence on which we
receive sense impressions. Comparison between healthy and diseased
sensations,--between our organs of sense and those of animals. We soon
arrive at a twilight territory of knowledge and can explain no more.
Imperfections in our powers of Verification. How great is the
subjective Element in our perceptions? Idealism,--most difficult
to answer when most extreme. Philosophic denial of all proof of
external things as distinguished from Mind (_e.g._, by Mill).
Fact-knowledge, and absurdities involved in the ordinary method
of defining and alleging Facts. Polar tendencies of Phenomenalism
which take the shapes of Idealism and Positivism, resulting in
Nihilism or Indifferentism. The end of these things! Mr. Herbert
Spencer on Theology, compared with Mr. Huxley, and criticized by Mr.
J. Martineau, who denies that the Unknowable can be any object of
religious feeling,--a protest strongly maintained by Mr. J. S. Mill.
The difficulties attending every kind of knowledge paralleled with
the difficulties alleged against Theism. If the Inexplicable be also
the Unknowable, there is an end to all knowledge. We cannot predicate
veracity of our human Mind, we cannot even know that we know anything.
Mr. J. S. Mill accepts Mind as an inexplicable Fact underlying all
other Facts and Beliefs. We _must_ accept _ultimate_ Truths.
Transition to Chapter IV. on the affirmative evidence for our
Reasonable Beliefs.
Corollary on Materialism. Far more difficult than its antithesis.
Conclusion to be drawn from these difficulties.
_Additional Notes and Illustrations._
A.--Account of some theories respecting our Personal Identity.
B.--Helmholtz, Popular Lectures on Recent Progress of the Theory of
Vision.
C.--Helmholtz on Specialties of Sensibility.
D.--Popular account of Pure Idealism with critical remarks.
E.--On the Relations of Fact and Theory.
F.--On the "Unknowable."
G.--Mr. J. S. Mill as an Independent Moralist.
_Additions to Corollary._
Note H.--Archebiosis, or Spontaneous Generation. I.--On Materialism.