CHAPTER XLII

CLOSING YEARS

After a voyage of sixty-seven days the exiles sighted St.

Helena--"that black wart rising out of the ocean," as Surgeon Henry

calls it. Blank dismay laid hold of the more sensitive as they gazed

at those frowning cliffs. What Napoleon's feelings were we know not.

Watchful curiosity seemed to be uppermost; for as they drew near to

Jamestown, he minutely scanned the forts through a glass. Arrangements

having been made for his reception, he landed in the evening of the

17th October, so as to elude the gaze of the inhabitants, and entered

a house prepared for him in the town.

On the morrow he was up at dawn, and rode with Cockburn and Bertrand

to Longwood, the residence of the Lieutenant-Governor. The orders of

our East India Company, to which the island then belonged, forbade his

appropriation of Plantation House, the Governor's residence; and a

glance at the accompanying map will show the reason of this

prohibition. This house is situated not far from creeks that are

completely sheltered from the south-east trade winds, whence escape by

boat would be easy; whereas Longwood is nearer the surf-beaten side

and offers far more security. After conferring with Governor Wilks and

others, Cockburn decided on this residence.

"At Longwood," wrote Cockburn, "an extent of level ground, easily

to be secured by sentries, presents itself, perfectly adapted for

horse exercise, carriage exercise, or for pleasant walking, which

is not to be met with in all the other parts of the island. The

house is certainly small; but ... I trust the carpenters of the

'Northumberland' will in a little time be able to make such

additions to the house as will render it, if not as good as might

be wished, yet at least as commodious as necessary."[553]

[Illustration: ST. HELENA]

"Napoleon," wrote Glover, "seemed well satisfied with the situation of

Longwood, and expressed a desire to occupy it as soon as possible." As

he disliked the publicity of the house in Jamestown, Cockburn

suggested on their return that he should reside at a pretty little

bungalow, not far from the town, named "The Briars." He readily

assented, and took up his abode there for seven weeks, occupying a

small adjoining annexe, while Las Cases and his son established

themselves in the two garrets. A marquee was erected to serve as

dining-room. It was a narrow space for the lord of the Tuileries, but

he seems to have been not unhappy. There he dictated Memoranda to Las

Cases or Gourgaud in the mornings, and often joined the neighbouring

family of the Balcombes for dinner and the evening. Mr. Balcombe, an

elderly merchant, was appointed purveyor to the party; he and his wife

were most hospitable, and their two daughters, of fifteen and fourteen

years, frequently beguiled Napoleon's evening hours with games of

whist or naïve questions. On one supreme occasion, in order to please

the younger girl, Napoleon played at blindman's buff; at such times

she ventured to call him "Boney"; and, far from taking offence at this

liberty, he delighted in her glee. It is such episodes as these that

reveal the softer traits of his character, which the dictates of

policy had stunted but not eradicated.[554]

In other respects, the time at "The Briars" was dull and monotonous,

and he complained bitterly to Cockburn of the inadequate

accommodation. The most exciting times were on the arrival of

newspapers from Europe. The reports just to hand of riots in England

and royalist excesses in France fed his hopes of general disorders or

revolutions which might lead to his recall. He believed the Jacobins

would yet lord it over the Continent. "It is only I who can tame

them."

Equally noteworthy are his comments on the trials of Labédoyère and

Ney for their treason to Louis XVIII. He has little pity for them.

"One ought never to break one's word," he remarked to Gourgaud, "and I

despise traitors." On hearing that Labédoyère was condemned to death,

he at first shows more feeling: but he comes round to the former view:

"Labédoyère acted like a man without honour," and "Ney dishonoured

himself."[555]

We may hereby gauge the value which Napoleon laid on fidelity. For him

it is the one priceless virtue. He esteems those who staunchly oppose

him, and seeks to gain them over by generosity: for those who _come

over_ he ever has a secret contempt; for those who desert him, hatred.

Doubtless that is why he heard the news of Ney's execution unmoved.

Brilliantly brave as the Marshal was, he had abandoned him in 1814,

and Louis XVIII. in the Hundred Days. The tidings of Murat's miserable

fate, at the close of his mad expedition to Calabria, leave Napoleon

equally cold.--"I announce the fatal news," writes Gourgaud, "to His

Majesty, whose expression remains unchanged, and who says that Murat

must have been mad to attempt a venture like that."--Here again his

thoughts seem to fly back to Murat's defection in 1814. Later on, he

says he loved him for his brilliant bravery, and therefore pardoned

his numerous follies. But his present demeanour shows that he never

forgave that of 1814.[556]

Meanwhile, thanks to the energy of Cockburn and his sailors, Longwood

was ready for the party (December 9th, 1815), and the Admiral hoped

that their complaints would cease. The new abode contained five rooms

for Napoleon's use, three for the Montholons, two for the Las Cases,

and one for Gourgaud: it was situated on a plateau 1,730 feet above

the sea: the air there was bracing, and on the farther side of the

plain dotted with gum trees stretched the race-course, a mile and a

half of excellent turf. The only obvious drawbacks were the occasional

mists, and the barren precipitous ravines that flank the plateau on

all sides. Seeing, however, that Napoleon disliked the publicity of

Jamestown, the isolation of Longwood could hardly be alleged as a

serious grievance. The Bertrands occupied Hutt's Gate, a small villa

about a mile distant.

The limits within which Napoleon might take exercise unaccompanied by

a British officer formed a roughly triangular space having a

circumference of about twelve miles. Outside of those bounds he must

be so accompanied; and if a strange ship came in sight, he was to

return within bounds. The letters of the whole party must be

supervised by the acting Governor. This is the gist of the official

instructions. Napoleon's dislike of being accompanied by a British

officer led him nearly always to restrict himself to the limits and

generally to the grounds of Longwood.

And where, we may ask, could a less unpleasant place of detention have

been found? In Europe he must inevitably have submitted to far closer

confinement. For what safeguards could there have been proof against a

subtle intellect and a personality whose charm fired thousands of

braves in both hemispheres with the longing to start him once more on

his adventures? The Tower of London, the eyrie of Dumbarton Castle,

even Fort William itself, were named as possible places of detention.

Were they suited to this child of the Mediterranean? He needed sun; he

needed exercise; he needed society. All these he could have on the

plateau of Longwood, in a singularly equable climate, where the heat

of the tropics is assuaged by the south-east trade wind, and plants of

the sub-tropical and temperate zones alike flourish.[557]

But nothing pleased the exiles. They moped during the rains; they

shuddered at the yawning ravines; they groaned at the sight of the

red-coats; above all, they realized that escape was hopeless in face

of Cockburn's watchful care. His first steps on arriving at the island

were to send on to the Cape seventy-five foreigners whose presence was

undesirable. He also despatched the "Peruvian" to hoist the British

flag on the uninhabited island, Ascension, in order, as he wrote to

the Admiralty, "to prevent America or any other nation from planting

themselves [_sic_] there ... for the purpose of favouring sooner or

later the escape of General Bonaparte." Four ships of war were also

kept at St. Helena, and no merchantmen but those of the East India

Company were to touch there except under stress of weather or when in

need of water.

These precautions early provoked protests from the exiles. Bertrand

had no wish to draw them up in the trenchant style that the ex-Emperor

desired; but Gourgaud's "Journal" shows that he was driven on to the

task (November 5th). It only led to a lofty rejoinder from Cockburn,

in which he declined to relax his system, but expressed the wish to

render their situation "as little disagreeable as possible." On

December 21st, Montholon returned to the charge with a letter dictated

by Napoleon, complaining that Longwood was the most barren spot on the

island, always deluged with rain or swathed in mist; that O'Meara was

not to count as a British officer when they went beyond the limits,

and had been reprimanded by the Admiral for thus acting; and that the

treatment of the exiles would excite the indignation of all times and

all people. To this the Admiral sent a crushing rejoinder, declining

to explain why he had censured O'Meara or any other British subject:

he asserted that Longwood was "the most pleasant as well as the most

healthy spot of this most healthful island," expressed the hope that,

when the rains had ceased, the party would change their opinion of

Longwood, and declared that the treatment of the party would "obtain

the admiration of future ages, as well as of every unprejudiced person

of the present."

We now know that the Admiral's trust in the judicial impartiality of

future ages was a piece of touching credulity, and that the next

generation, like his own, was greedily to swallow sensational slander

and to neglect the prosaic truth. But, arguing from present signs, he

might well believe that Montholon's letter was a tissue of falsehoods;

for that officer soon confessed to him that "it was written in a

moment of petulance of the General [Bonaparte] ... and that he

[Montholon] considered the party to be in point of fact vastly well

off and to have everything necessary for them, though anxious that

there should be no restrictions as to the General going unattended by

an officer wherever he pleased throughout the island."[558] On the

last point Cockburn was inflexible.

The Admiral's responsibility was now nearly at an end. On April 14th,

1816, there landed at St. Helena Sir Hudson Lowe, the new Governor,

who was to take over the powers wielded both by Cockburn and Wilks.

The new arrival, on whom the storms of calumny were thenceforth

persistently to beat, had served with distinction in many parts. Born

in 1769, within one month of Napoleon, he early entered our army, and

won his commission by service in Corsica and Elba, his linguistic and

military gifts soon raising him to the command of a corps of Corsican

exiles who after 1795 enlisted in our service. With these "Corsican

Rangers" Lowe campaigned in Egypt and finally at Capri, their devotion

to him nerving them to a gallant but unavailing defence of this islet

against a superior force of Murat's troops in 1808.[559] In 1810 Lowe

and his Corsicans captured the Isle of Santa Maura, which he

thereafter governed to the full satisfaction of the inhabitants. Early

in 1813 he was ordered to Russia, and thereafter served as _attaché_

on Blücher's staff in the memorable advance to the Rhine and the

Seine. He brought the news of Napoleon's first abdication to England,

was knighted by the Prince Regent, and received Russian and Prussian

orders of distinction for his services. At the close of 1814 he was

appointed Quartermaster-General of our forces in the Netherlands and

received flattering letters of congratulation from Blücher and

Gneisenau, the latter expressing his appreciation of "Your rare

military talents, your profound judgment on the great operations of

war, and your imperturbable _sang froid_ in the day of battle. These

rare qualities and your honourable character will link me to you

eternally." In 1822, when O'Meara was slandering Lowe's character, the

Czar Alexander met his step-daughter, the Countess Balmain, at Verona,

and in reference to Sir Hudson's painful duties at St. Helena, said of

him: "Je l'estime beaucoup. Je l'ai connu dans les temps

critiques."[560]

Lowe's firmness of character, command of foreign languages, and

intimate acquaintance with Corsicans, seemed to mark him out as the

ideal Governor of St. Helena in place of the mild and scholarly Wilks.

And yet the appointment was in some ways unfortunate. Though a man of

sterling worth, Lowe was reserved, and had little acquaintance with

the ways of courtiers. Moreover, the superstitious might deem that all

the salient events of his career proclaimed him an evil genius dogging

the steps of Napoleon; and, as superstition laid increasing hold on

the great Corsican in his later years, we may reasonably infer that

this feeling intensified, if it did not create, the repugnance which

he ever manifested to _la figure sinistre_ of the Governor. Lowe also

at first shrank from an appointment that must bring on him the

intrigues of Napoleon and of his partisans in England. Only a man of

high rank and commanding influence could hope to live down such

attacks; and Lowe had neither rank nor influence. He was the son of an

army surgeon, and was almost unknown in the country which for

twenty-eight years he had served abroad.

His first visits to Longwood were unfortunate. Cockburn and he

arranged to go at 9 a.m., the time when Napoleon frequently went for a

drive. On their arrival they were informed that the Emperor was

indisposed and could not see them until 4 p.m. of the next day, and it

soon appeared that the early hour of their call was taken as an act of

rudeness. On the following afternoon Lowe and Cockburn arranged to go

in together to the presence; but as Lowe advanced to the chamber,

Bertrand stepped forward, and a valet prevented the Admiral's

entrance, an act of incivility which Lowe did not observe. Proceeding

alone, the new Governor offered his respects in French; but on

Napoleon remarking that he must know Italian, for he had commanded a

regiment of Corsicans, they conversed in Napoleon's mother-tongue. The

ex-Emperor's first serious observation, which bore on the character of

the Corsicans, was accompanied by a quick searching glance: "They

carry the stiletto: are they not a bad people?"--Lowe saw the snare

and evaded it by the reply: "They do not carry the stiletto, having

abandoned that custom in our service: I was very well satisfied with

them." They then conversed a short time about Egypt and other topics.

Napoleon afterwards contrasted him favourably with Cockburn: "This new

Governor is a man of very few words, but he appears to be a polite

man: however, it is only from a man's conduct for some time that you

can judge of him."[561]

Cockburn was indignant at the slight put upon him by Napoleon and

Bertrand, which succeeded owing to Lowe's want of ready perception;

but he knew that the cause of the exiles' annoyance was his recent

firm refusal to convey Napoleon's letter of complaint direct to the

Prince Regent, without the knowledge of the Ministry. Failing to bend

the Admiral, they then sought to cajole the retiring Governor, Wilks,

who, having borne little of the responsibility of their custody, was

proportionately better liked. First Bertrand, and then Napoleon,

requested him to take this letter _without the knowledge of the new

Governor_. Wilks at once repelled the request, remarking to Bertrand

that such attempts at evasion must lead to greater stringency in the

future. And this was the case.[562] The incident naturally increased

Lowe's suspicion of the ex-Emperor.

At first there was an uneasy truce between them. Gourgaud, though cast

down at the departure of the "adorable" Miss Wilks, found strength

enough to chronicle in his "Journal" the results of a visit paid by

Las Cases to Lowe at Plantation House (April 26th): the Governor

received the secretary very well and put all his library at the

disposal of the party; but the diarist also notes that Napoleon took

amiss the reception of any of his people by the Governor. This had

been one of the unconscious crimes of the Admiral. With the hope of

brightening the sojourn of the exiles, he had given several balls, at

which Mmes. Bertrand and Montholon shone resplendent in dresses that

cast into the shade those of the officers' wives. Their triumph was

short-lived. When _la grande Maréchale_ ventured to desert the

Emperor's table on these and other festive occasions, her growing

fondness for the English drew on her sharp rebukes from the ex-Emperor

and a request not to treat Longwood as if it were an inn.[563] Many

jottings in Gourgaud's diary show that the same policy was thenceforth

strictly maintained. Napoleon kept up the essentials of Tuileries

etiquette, required the attendance of his courtiers, and jealously

checked any familiarity with Plantation House or Jamestown.

On some questions Lowe was more pliable than the home Government,

notably in the matter of the declarations signed by Napoleon's

followers. But in one matter he was proof against all requests from

Longwood: this was the extension of the twelve-mile limit. It

afterwards became the custom to speak as if Lowe could have granted

this. Even the Duke of Wellington declared to Stanhope that he

considered Lowe a stupid man, suspicious and jealous, who might very

well have let Napoleon go freely about the island provided that the

six or seven landing-places were well guarded and that Napoleon showed

himself to a British officer every night and morning. Now, it is

futile to discuss whether such liberty would have enabled Napoleon to

pass off as someone else and so escape. What is certain is that our

Government, believing he could so escape, _imposed rules which Lowe

was not free to relax_.

Napoleon realized this perfectly well, but in the interview of April

30th, 1816, he pressed Lowe for an extension of the limits, saying

that he hated the sight of our soldiers and longed for closer

intercourse with the inhabitants. Other causes of friction occurred,

such as Lowe's withdrawal of the privilege, rather laxly granted by

Cockburn to Bertrand, of granting passes for interviews with Napoleon;

or again a tactless invitation that Lowe sent to "General Bonaparte"

to meet the wife of the Governor-General of India at dinner at

Plantation House. But in the midst of the diatribe which Napoleon

shortly afterwards shot forth at his would-be host--a diatribe

besprinkled with taunts that Lowe was sent to be his

_executioner_--there came a sentence which reveals the cause of his

fury: "If you cannot extend my limits, you can do nothing for

me."[564]

Why this wish for wider limits? It did not spring from a desire for

longer drives; for the plateau offered nearly all the best ground in

the island for such exercise. Neither was it due to a craving for

wider social intercourse. There can be little doubt that he looked on

an extension of limits as a necessary prelude to attempts at escape

and as a means of influencing the slaves at the outlying plantations.

Gourgaud names several instances of gold pieces being given to slaves,

and records the glee shown by his master on once slipping away from

the sentries and the British officer. These feelings and attempts were

perfectly natural on Napoleon's part; but it was equally natural that

the Governor should regard them as part of a plan of escape or

rescue--a matter that will engage our closer attention presently.

Napoleon had only two more interviews with Lowe namely, on July 17th

and August 18th. In the former of these he was more conciliatory; but

in the latter, at which Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm was present, he

assailed the Governor with the bitterest taunts. Lowe cut short the

painful scene by saying: "You make me smile, sir." "How smile, sir?"

"You force me to smile: your misconception of my character and the

rudeness of your manners excite my pity. I wish you good day." The

Admiral also retired.[565]

Various causes have been assigned for the hatred that Napoleon felt

for Lowe. His frequents taunts that he was no general, but only a

leader of Corsican deserters, suggests one that has already been

referred to. It has also been suggested that Lowe was not a gentleman,

and references have been approvingly made to comparisons of his

physiognomy with that of the devil, and of his eye with "that of a

hyæna caught in a trap." As to this we will cite the opinion of

Lieutenant (later Colonel) Basil Jackson, who was unknown to Lowe

before 1816, and was on friendly terms with the inmates both of

Longwood and of Plantation House:

"He [Lowe] stood five feet seven, spare in make, having good

features, fair hair, and eyebrows overhanging his eyes: his look

denoted penetration and firmness, his manner rather abrupt, his

gait quick, his look and general demeanour indicative of energy

and decision. He wrote or dictated rapidly, and was fond of

writing, was well read in military history, spoke French and

Italian with fluency, was warm and steady in his friendships, and

popular both with the inhabitants of the isle and the troops. His

portrait, prefixed to Mr. Forsyth's book, is a perfect

likeness."[566]

If overhanging eyebrows, a penetrating glance, and rather abrupt

manners be thought to justify comparisons with the devil or a hyæna,

the art of historical portraiture will assuredly have to be learnt

over again in conformity with impressionist methods. That Lowe was a

gentleman is affirmed by Mrs. Smith (_née_ Grant), who, in later

years, _when prejudiced against him by O'Meara's slanders_, met him at

Colombo without at first knowing his name:

"I was taken in to dinner by a grave, particularly gentlemanly

man, in a General's uniform, whose conversation was as agreeable

as his manner. He had been over half the world, knew all

celebrities, and contrived without display to say a great deal one

was willing to hear.... Years before, with our Whig principles and

prejudices, we had cultivated in our Highland retirement a horror

of the great Napoleon's gaoler. The cry of party, the feeling for

the prisoner, the book of Surgeon O'Meara, had all worked my

woman's heart to such a pitch of indignation that this maligned

name [Lowe] was an offence. We were to hold the owner in

abhorrence. Speak to him, never! Look at him, sit in the same room

with him, never! None were louder than I, more vehement; yet here

was I beside my bugbear and perfectly satisfied with my position.

It was a good lesson."[567]

The real cause of Napoleon's hatred of Lowe is hinted at by Sir George

Bingham in his Diary (April 19th). After mentioning Napoleon's

rudeness to Cockburn on parting with him, he proceeds:

"You have no idea of the dirty little intrigues of himself

[Napoleon] and his set: if Sir H. Lowe has firmness enough not to

give way to them, he will in a short time treat him in the same

manner. For myself, it is said I am a favourite [of Napoleon],

though I do not understand the claim I have to such."[568]

Yes! Lowe's offence lay not in his manners, not even in his features,

but in his firmness. Napoleon soon saw that all his efforts to bend

him were in vain. Neither in regard to the Imperial title, nor the

limits, nor the transmission of letters to Europe, would the Governor

swerve a hair's breadth from his instructions. At the risk of giving a

surfeit of quotations, we must cite two more on this topic. Basil

Jackson, when at Paris in 1828, chanced to meet Montholon, and was

invited to his Château de Frémigny; during his stay the conversation

turned upon their sojourn at St. Helena, to the following effect:

"He [Montholon] enlarged upon what he termed _la politique de

Longwood_, spoke not unkindly of Sir Hudson Lowe, allowing he had

a difficult task to execute, since an angel from Heaven, as

Governor, could not have pleased them. When I more than hinted

that nothing could justify detraction and departure from truth in

carrying out a policy, he merely shrugged his shoulders and

reiterated: '_C'était notre politique; et que voulez-vous?_' That

he and the others respected Sir Hudson Lowe, I had not the shadow

of a doubt: nay, in a conversation with Montholon at St. Helena,

when speaking of the Governor, he observed that Sir Hudson was an

officer who would always have distinguished employment, as all

Governments were glad of the services of a man of his calibre.

"Happening to mention that, owing to his inability to find an

officer who could understand and speak French, the Governor was

disposed to employ me as orderly officer at Longwood, Montholon

said it was well for me that I was not appointed to the post, as

they did not want a person in that capacity who could understand

them; in fact, he said, we should have found means to get rid of

you, and perhaps ruined you."[569]

Las Cases also, _in a passage that he found it desirable to suppress

when he published his "Journal"_ wrote as follows (November 30th,

1815):

"We are possessed of moral arms only: and in order to make the

most advantageous use of these it was necessary to reduce into _a

system_ our demeanour, our words, our sentiments, _even our

privations_, in order that we might thereby excite a lively

interest in a large portion of the population of Europe, and that

the Opposition in England might not fail to attack the Ministry on

the violence of their conduct towards us."[570]

We are now able to understand the real nature of the struggle that

went on between Longwood and Plantation House. Napoleon and his

followers sought by every means to bring odium upon Lowe, and to

furnish the Opposition at Westminster with toothsome details that

might lead to the disgrace of the Governor, the overthrow of the

Ministry, and the triumphant release of the ex-Emperor. On the other

hand, the knowledge of the presence of traitors on the island, and of

possible rescuers hovering about on the horizon, kept Lowe ever at

work "unravelling the intricate plotting constantly going on at

Longwood," until his face wore the preoccupied worried look that

Surgeon Henry describes.

That both antagonists somewhat overacted their parts does not surprise

us when we think of the five years thus spent within a narrow space

and under a tropical sun. Lowe was at times pedantic, witness his

refusal to forward to Longwood books inscribed to the "Emperor

Napoleon," and his suspicions as to the political significance of

green and white beans offered by Montholon to the French Commissioner,

Montchenu. But such incidents can be paralleled from the lives of most

officials who bear a heavy burden of responsibility. And who has ever

borne a heavier burden?[571]

Napoleon also, in his calmer moods, regretted the violence of his

language to the Governor. He remarked to Montholon: "This is the

second time in my life that I have spoilt my affairs with the English.

Their phlegm leads me on, and I say more than I ought. I should have

done better not to have replied to him." This reference to his attack

on Whitworth in 1803 flashes a ray of light on the diatribe against

Lowe. In both cases, doubtless, the hot southron would have bridled

his passion sooner, had it produced any visible effect on the colder

man of the north. Nevertheless, the scene of August 18th, 1816, had an

abiding influence on his relations with the Governor. For the rest of

that weary span of years they never exchanged a word.

Lowe's official reports prove that he did not cease to consult the

comfort of the exiles as far as it was possible. The building of the

new house, however, remained in abeyance, as Napoleon refused to give

any directions on the subject: and the much-needed repairs to Longwood

were stopped owing to his complaints of the noise of the workmen. But

by ordering the claret that the ex-Emperor preferred, and by sending

occasional presents of game to Longwood, Lowe sought to keep up the

ordinary civilities of life; and when the home Government sought to

limit the annual cost of the Longwood household to £8,000, Lowe took

upon himself to increase that sum by one half.

Napoleon's behaviour in this last affair is noteworthy. On hearing of

the need for greater economy, he readily assented, sent away seven

servants, and ordered a reduction in the consumption of wine. A day or

two later, however, he gave orders that some of his silver plate

should be sold in order "to provide those little comforts denied

them." Balcombe was accordingly sent for, and, on expressing regret to

Napoleon at the order for sale, received the reply: "_What is the use

of plate when you have nothing to eat off it?_" Lowe quietly directed

Balcombe to seal up the plate sent to him, and to advance money up to

its value (£250); but other portions of the plate were broken and sold

later on. O'Meara reveals the reason for these proceedings in his

letter of October 10th: "In this he [Napoleon] has also a wish to

excite odium against the Governor by saying that he has been obliged

to sell his plate in order to provide against starvation, _as he

himself told me was his object_."[572]

Another incident that embittered the relations between Napoleon and

the Governor was the arrival from England of more stringent

regulations for his custody. The chief changes thus brought about

(October 9th, 1816) were a restriction of the limits from a

twelve-mile to an eight-mile circumference and the posting of a ring

of sentries at a slight distance from Longwood at sunset instead of at

9 p.m.[573] The latter change is to be regretted; for it marred the

pleasure of Napoleon's evening strolls in his garden; but, as the

Governor pointed out, the three hours after sunset had been the

easiest time for escape. The restriction of limits was needful, not

only in order to save our troops the labour of watching a wide area

that was scarcely ever used for exercise, but also to prevent

underhand intercourse with slaves.

Was there really any need for these "nation-degrading" rules, as

O'Meara called them? Or were they imposed in order to insult the great

man? A reference to the British archives will show that there was some

reason for them. Schemes of rescue were afoot that called for the

greatest vigilance.

As we have seen (page 527, note), a letter had on August 2nd, 1815,

been directed to Mme. Bertrand (really for Napoleon) at Plymouth,

stating that the writer had placed sums of money with well-known firms

of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charlestown on his behalf, and

that he (Napoleon) had only to make known his wishes "_avec le thé de

la Chine ou les mousselines de l'Inde_": for the rest, the writer

hoped much from English merchantmen. This letter, after wide

wanderings, fell into our hands and caused our Government closely to

inspect all letters and merchandise that passed into, or out of, St.

Helena. Its attention was directed specially to the United States.

There the Napoleonic cult had early taken root, thanks to his

overthrow of the kings and his easy sale of Louisiana; the glorifying

haze of distance fostered its growth; and now the martyrdom of St.

Helena brought it to full maturity. Enthusiasm and money alike

favoured schemes of rescue.

In our St. Helena Records (No. 4) are reports as to two of them.

Forwarded by the Spanish Ambassador at Washington, the first reached

Madrid on May 9th, 1816, and stated that a man named Carpenter had

offered to Joseph Bonaparte (then in the States) to rescue Napoleon,

and had set sail on a ship for that purpose. This was at once made

known to Lord Bathurst, our Minister for War and the Plantations, who

forwarded it to Lowe. In August of that year our Foreign Office also

received news that four schooners and other smaller vessels had set

sail from Baltimore on June 14th with 300 men under an old French

naval officer, named Fournier, ostensibly to help Bolivar, but really

to rescue Bonaparte. These fast-sailing craft were to lie out of sight

of the island by day, creep up at night to different points, and send

boats to shore; from each of these a man, _in English uniform_, was to

land and proceed to Longwood, warning Napoleon of the points where the

boats would be ready to receive him. The report concludes:

"Considerable sums in gold and diamonds will be put at his disposal to

bribe those who may be necessary to him. They seem to flatter

themselves of a certain co-operation on the part of certain

individuals domiciled or employed at St. Helena."[574]

Bathurst sent on to Lowe a copy of this intelligence. Forsyth does not

name the affair, though he refers to other warnings, received at

various times by Bathurst and forwarded to the Governor, that there

were traitors in the island who had been won over by Napoleon's gold

to aid his escape.[575] I cannot find out that the plans described

above were put to the test, though suspicious vessels sometimes

appeared and were chased away by our cruisers. But when we are

considering the question whether Bathurst and Lowe were needlessly

strict or not, the point at issue is _whether plans of escape or

rescue existed, and if so, whether they knew of them_. As to this

there cannot be the shadow of doubt; and it is practically certain

that they were the cause of the new regulations of October 9th, 1816.

We have now traced the course of events during the first critical

twelvemonth; we have seen how friction burst into a flame, how the

chafing of that masterful spirit against all restraint served but to

tighten the inclosing grasp, and how the attempts of his misguided

friends in America and Europe changed a fairly lax detention into

actual custody. It is a vain thing to toy with the "might-have-beens"

of history; but we can fancy a man less untamable than Napoleon

frankly recognizing that he had done with active life by assuming a

feigned name (_e.g._, that of Colonel Muiron, which he once thought

of) and settling down in that equable retreat to the congenial task of

compiling his personal and military Memoirs. If he ever intended to

live as a country squire in England, there were equal facilities for

such a life in St. Helena, with no temptations to stray back into

politics. The climate was better for him than that of England, and the

possibilities for exercise greater than could there have been allowed.

Books there were in abundance--2,700 of them at last: he had back

files of the "Moniteur" for his writings, and copies of "The Times"

came regularly from Plantation House: a piano had been bought in

England for £120. Finally there were the six courtiers whose jealous

devotion, varying moods, and frequent quarrels furnished a daily

comedietta that still charms posterity.

What then was wanting? Unfortunately everything was wanting. He cared

not for music, or animals, or, in recent years, for the chase. He

himself divulged the secret, in words uttered to Gallois in the days

of his power: "_Je n'aime pas beaucoup les femmes, ni le jeu--enfin

rien: je suis tout à fait un être politique!_"--He never ceased to

love politics and power. At St. Helena he pictured himself as winning

over the English, had he settled there. Ah! if I were in England, he

said, I should have conquered all hearts.[576] And assuredly he would

have done so. How could men so commonplace as the Prince Regent,

Liverpool, Castlereagh, and Bathurst have made head against the

influence of a truly great and enthralling personality? Or if he had

gone to the United States, who would have competed with him for the

Presidency?

As it was, he chose to remain indoors, in order to figure as the

prisoner of Longwood,[577] and spent his time between intrigues

against Lowe and dictation of Memoirs. On the subject of Napoleon's

writings we cannot here enter, save to say that his critiques of

Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick the Great, are of great interest and

value; that the records of his own campaigns, though highly

suggestive, need to be closely checked by the original documents,

seeing that he had not all the needful facts and figures at hand; and

that his record of political events is in the main untrustworthy: it

is an elaborate device for enhancing the Napoleonic tradition and

assuring the crown to the King of Rome.

We turn, then, to take a brief glance at his last years. The first

event that claims notice is the arrest of Las Cases. This subtle

intriguer had soon earned the hatred of Montholon and Gourgaud, who

detested "the little Jesuit" for his Malvolio-like airs of importance

and the hints of Napoleon that he would have ceremonial precedence

over them. His rapid rise into favour was due to his conversational

gifts, literary ability, and thorough knowledge of the English people

and language. This last was specially important. Napoleon very much

wished to learn our language, as he hoped that any mail might bring

news of the triumph of the Whigs and an order for his own departure

for England. His studies with Las Cases were more persevering than

successful, as will be seen from the following curious letter, written

apparently in the watches of the night: it has been recently

re-published by M. de Brotonne.

"COUNT LASCASES,

"Since sixt week y learn the English and y do not any progress.

Sixt week do fourty and two day. If might have learn fivty word,

for day, i could know it two thousands and two hundred. It is in

the dictionary more of fourty thousand: even he could most twenty;

bot much of tems. For know it or hundred and twenty week, which do

more two years. After this you shall agree that the study one

tongue is a great labour who it must do into the young aged."

How much farther Napoleon progressed in his efforts to absorb our

language by these mathematical methods we do not know; for no other

English letter of his seems to be extant. The arrest and departure of

his tutor soon occurred, and there are good grounds for assigning this

ultimately to the jealousy of the less cultured Generals. Thus, we

find Gourgaud asserting that Las Cases has come to St. Helena solely

"in order to get talked about, write anecdotes, and make money."

Montholon also did his best to render the secretary's life miserable,

and on one occasion predicted to Gourgaud that Las Cases would soon

leave the island.[578]

The forecast speedily came true. The secretary intrusted to his

servant, a dubious mulatto named Scott, two letters for Europe sewn up

in a waistcoat: one of them was a long letter to Lucien Bonaparte. The

servant showed the letters to his father, who in some alarm revealed

the matter to the Governor. It is curious as illustrating the state of

suspicion then prevalent at St. Helena, that Las Cases accused the

Scotts of being tools of the Governor; that Lowe saw in the affair the

frayed end of a Longwood scheme; while the residents there suspected

Las Cases of arranging matters as a means of departure from the

island. There was much to justify this last surmise. Las Cases and his

son were unwell; their position in the household was very

uncomfortable; and for a skilled intriguer to intrust an important

letter to a slave, who was already in the Governor's black books, was

truly a singular proceeding. Besides, after the arrest, when the

Governor searched Las Cases' papers in his presence, they were found

to be in good order, among them being parts of his "Journal." Napoleon

himself thought Las Cases guilty of a piece of extraordinary folly,

though he soon sought to make capital out of the arrest by comparing

the behaviour of our officers and their orderlies with "South Sea

savages dancing around a prisoner that they are about to devour."[579]

After a short detention at Ross Cottage, _when he declined the

Governor's offer that he should return to Longwood_, the secretary was

sent to the Cape, and thence made his way to France, where a judicious

editing of his "Memoirs" and "Journal" gained for their compiler a

rich reward.

Gourgaud is the next to leave. The sensitive young man has long been

tormented by jealousy. His diary becomes the long-drawn sigh of a

generous but vain nature, when soured by real or fancied neglect.

Though often unfair to Napoleon, whose egotism the slighted devotee

often magnifies into colossal proportions, the writer unconsciously

bears witness to the wondrous fascination that held the little Court

in awe. The least attention shown to the Montholons costs "Gogo" a fit

of spleen or a sleepless night, scarcely to be atoned for on the

morrow by soothing words, by chess, or reversi, or help at the

manuscript of "Waterloo." Again and again Napoleon tries to prove to

him that the Montholons ought to have precedence: it is in vain. At

last the crisis comes: it is four years since the General saved the

Emperor from a Cossack's lance at Brienne, and the recollection

renders his present "humiliations" intolerable. He challenges

Montholon to a duel; Napoleon strictly forbids it; and the aggrieved

officer seeks permission to depart.

Napoleon grants his request. It seems that the chief is weary of his

moody humours; he further owes him a grudge for writing home to his

mother frank statements of the way in which the Longwood exiles are

treated. These letters were read by Lowe and Bathurst, and their

general purport seems to have been known in French governmental

circles, where they served as an antidote to the poisonous stories

circulated by Napoleon and his more diplomatic followers. Clearly

nothing is to be made of Gourgaud; and so he departs (February 13th,

1818). Bidding a tearful adieu, he goes with Basil Jackson to spend

six weeks with him at a cottage near Plantation House, when he is

astonished at the delicate reserve shown by the Governor. He then sets

sail for England. The only money he has is _£100_ advanced by Lowe.

Napoleon's money he has refused to accept.[580]

And yet he did not pass out of his master's life. Landing in England

on May 1st, he had a few interviews with our officials, in which he

warned them that Napoleon's escape would be quite easy, and gave a

hint as to O'Meara being the tool of Napoleon. But soon the young

General came into touch with the leaders of the Opposition. No change

in his sentiments is traceable until August 25th, when he indited a

letter to Marie Louise, asserting that Napoleon was dying "in the

torments of the longest and most frightful agony," a prey to the

cruelty of England! To what are we to attribute this change of front?

The editors of Gourgaud's "Journal" maintain that there was no change;

they hint that the "Journal" may have been an elaborate device for

throwing dust into Lowe's eyes; and they point to the fact that before

leaving the island Gourgaud received secret instructions from Napoleon

bidding him convey to Europe several small letters sewn into the soles

of his boots. Whether he acted on these instructions may be doubted;

for at his departure he gave his word of honour to Lowe that he was

not the bearer of any paper, pamphlet, or letter from Longwood.

Furthermore, we hear nothing of these secret letters afterwards; and

he allowed nearly four months to elapse in England before he wrote to

Marie Louise. The theory referred to above seems quite untenable in

face of these facts.[581]

How, then, are we to explain Gourgaud's conduct at St. Helena and

afterwards? Now, in threading the mendacious labyrinths of St. Helena

literature it is hard ever to find a wholly satisfactory clue; but

Basil Jackson's "Waterloo and St. Helena" (p. 103) seems to supply it

in the following passage:

"To finish about Gourgaud, I may add that on his reaching England,

after one or two interviews with the Under-Secretary of State, he

fell into the hands of certain Radicals of note, who represented

to him the folly of his conduct in turning against Napoleon; that,

as his adherent, he was really somebody, whereas he was only

ruining himself by appearing inimical. In short, they so worked

upon the poor weak man, that he was induced to try and make it

appear that he was still _l'homme de l'Empereur:_ this he did by

inditing a letter to Marie Louise, in which he inveighed against

the treatment of Napoleon at the hands of the Government and Sir

H. Lowe, which being duly published, Gourgaud fell to zero in the

opinion of all right-minded persons."

This seems consonant with what we know of Gourgaud's character: frank,

volatile, and sensitive, he could never have long sustained a policy

of literary and diplomatic deceit. He was not a compound of Chatterton

and Fouché. His "Journal" is the artless outpouring of wounded vanity

and brings us close to the heart of the hero-worshipper and his hero.

At times the idol falls and is shivered but love places it on the

shrine again and again, until the fourth anniversary of Brienne finds

the spell broken. Even before he leaves St. Helena the old fascination

is upon him once more; and then Napoleon seeks to utilize his devotion

for the purpose of a political mission. Gourgaud declines the _rôle_

of agent, pledges his word to the Governor, and keeps it; but, thanks

to British officialism or the seductions of the Opposition,

hero-worship once more gains the day and enrolls him beside Las Cases

and Montholon. This we believe to be the real Gourgaud, a genuine,

lovable, but flighty being, as every page of his "Journal" shows.

One cannot but notice in passing the extraordinary richness of St.

Helena literature. Nearly all the exiles kept diaries or memoirs, or

wrote them when they returned to Europe. And, on the other hand, of

all the 10,000 Britons whom Napoleon detained in France for eleven

years, not one has left a record that is ever read to-day.

Consequently, while the woes of Napoleon have been set forth in every

civilized tongue, the world has forgotten the miseries causelessly

inflicted on 10,000 English families. The advantages possessed by a

memoir-writing nation over one that is but half articulate could not

be better illustrated. For the dumb Britons not a single tear is ever

shed; whereas the voluble inmates of Longwood used their pens to such

effect that half the world still believes them to have been bullied

twice a week by Lowe, plied with gifts of poisoned coffee, and nearly

eaten up by rats at night. On this last topic we are treated to tales

of part of a slave's leg being eaten off while he slept at

Longwood--nay, of a horse's leg also being gnawed away at night--so

that our feelings are divided between pity for the sufferers and envy

at the soundness of their slumbers.

Longwood was certainly far from being a suitable abode; but a word

from Napoleon would have led to the erection of the new house on a

site that he chose to indicate. The materials had all been brought

from England; but the word was not spoken until a much later time; and

the inference is inevitable that he preferred to remain where he was

so that he could represent himself as lodged in _cette grange

insalubre._[582] The third of the Longwood household to depart was the

surgeon, O'Meara. The conduct of this British officer in facilitating

Napoleon's secret correspondence has been so fully exposed by Forsyth

and Seaton that we may refer our readers to their works for proofs of

his treachery. Gourgaud's "Journal" reveals the secret influence that

seduced him. Chancing once to refer to the power of money over

Englishmen, Napoleon remarked that that was why we did not want him to

draw sums from Europe, and continued: "_Le docteur n'est si bien pour

moi que depuis que je lui donne mon argent. Ah! j'en suis bien sûr, de

celui-là!"_[583] This disclosure enables us to understand why the

surgeon, after being found out and dismissed from the service, sought

to blacken the character of Sir Hudson Lowe by every conceivable

device. The wonder is that he succeeded in imposing his version of

facts on a whole generation.

The next physician who resided at Longwood, Dr. Stokoe, was speedily

cajoled into disobeying the British regulations and underwent official

disgrace. An attempt was then made, through Montholon, to bribe his

successor, Dr. Verling, who indignantly repelled it and withdrew from

his duty.[584]

There can be no doubt that Napoleon found pleasure in these intrigues.

In his last interview with Stürmer, the Austrian Commissioner at St.

Helena, Gourgaud said, in reference to this topic: "However unhappy he

[Napoleon] is here, he secretly enjoys the importance attached to his

custody, the interest that the Powers take in it, and the care taken

to collect his least words." Napoleon also once remarked to Gourgaud

that it was better to be at St. Helena than as he was at Elba.[585] Of

the same general tenour are his striking remarks, reported by Las

Cases at the close of his first volume:

"Our situation here may even have its attractions. The universe is

looking at us. We remain the martyrs of an immortal cause:

millions of men weep for us, the fatherland sighs, and Glory is in

mourning. We struggle here against the oppression of the gods, and

the longings of the nations are for us.... Adversity was wanting

to my career. If I had died on the throne amidst the clouds of my

omnipotence, I should have remained a problem for many men:

to-day, thanks to misfortune, they can judge of me naked as I am."

In terseness of phrase, vividness of fancy, and keenness of insight

into the motives that sway mankind, this passage is worthy of

Napoleon. He knew that his exile at St. Helena would dull the memory

of the wrongs which he had done to the cause of liberty, and that from

that lonely peak would go forth the legend of the new Prometheus

chained to the rock by the kings and torn every day by the ravening

vulture. The world had rejected his gospel of force; but would it not

thrill responsive to the gospel of pity now to be enlisted in his

behalf? His surmise was amazingly true. The world was thrilled. The

story worked wonders, not directly for him, but for his fame and his

dynasty. The fortunes of his race began to revive from the time when

the popular imagination transfigured Napoleon the Conqueror into

Napoleon the Martyr. Viewed in this light, and thrown up into telling

relief against the sinister policy of the Holy Alliance of the

monarchs, the dreary years spent at St. Helena were not the least

successful of his career. Without them there could have been no second

Napoleonic Empire.

Not that his life there was a "long-drawn agony." His health was

fairly good. There were seasons of something like enjoyment, when he

gave himself up to outdoor recreations. Such a time was the latter

part of 1819 and the first half of 1820: we may call it the Indian

summer of his life, for he was then possessed with a passion for

gardening. Lightly clad and protected by a broad-brimmed hat, he went

about, sometimes spade in hand, superintending various changes in the

grounds at Longwood and around the new house which was being erected

for him hard by. Or at other times he used the opportunity afforded by

the excavations to show how infantry might be so disposed on a hastily

raised slope as to bring a terrific fire to bear on attacking cavalry.

Marshalling his followers at dawn by the sound of a bell, he made them

all, counts, valets, and servants, dig trenches as if for the front

ranks, and throw up the earth for the rear ranks: then, taking his

stand in front, as the shortest man, and placing the tallest at the

rear (his Swiss valet, Noverraz), he triumphantly showed how the

horsemen might be laid low by the rolling volleys of ten ranks.[586]

In May or June he took once more to horse exercise, and for a time his

health benefited from all this activity. His relations with the

Governor were peaceful, if not cordial, and the limits were about this

time extended.

Indoors there were recreations other than work at the Memoirs. He

often played chess and billiards, at the latter using his hand instead

of the cue! Dinner was generally at a very late hour, and afterwards

he took pleasure in reading aloud. Voltaire was the favourite author,

and Montholon afterwards confessed to Lord Holland that the same

plays, especially "Zaïre," were read rather too often.

"Napoleon slept himself when read to, but he was very observant

and jealous if others slept while he read. He watched his audience

vigilantly, and _'Mme. Montholon, vous dormez'_ was a frequent

ejaculation in the course of reading. He was animated with all

that he read, especially poetry, enthusiastic at beautiful

passages, impatient of faults, and full of ingenious and lively

remarks on style."[587]

During this same halcyon season two priests, who had been selected by

the Bonapartes, arrived in the island, as also a Corsican doctor,

Antommarchi. Napoleon was disappointed with all three. The doctor,

though a learned anatomist, knew little of chemistry, and at an early

interview with Napoleon passed a catechism on this subject so badly

that he was all but chased from the room. The priests came off little

better. The elder of them, Buonavita by name, had lived in Mexico, and

could talk of little else: he soon fell ill, and his stay in St.

Helena was short. The other, a Corsican named Vignali, having neither

learning, culture, nor dialectical skill, was tolerated as a

respectable adjunct to the household, but had little or no influence

over the master. This is to be regretted on many grounds, and partly

because his testimony throws no light on Napoleon's religious views.

Here we approach a problem that perhaps can never be cleared up.

Unfathomable on many sides of his nature, Napoleon is nowhere more so

than when he confronts the eternal verities. That he was a convinced

and orthodox Catholic few will venture to assert. At Elba he said to

Lord Ebrington: "_Nous ne savons d'où nous venons, ce que nous

deviendrons_": the masses ought to have some "fixed point of faith

whereon to rest their thoughts."--"_Je suis Catholique parce que mon

père l'étoit, et parce que c'étoit la religion de la France_." He also

once or twice expressed to Campbell scorn of the popular creed: and

during his last voyage, as we have seen, he showed not the slightest

interest in the offer of a priest at Funchal to accompany him. At St.

Helena the party seems to have limited the observances of religion to

occasional reading of the Bible. When Mme. Montholon presented her

babe to the Emperor, he teasingly remarked that Las Cases was the most

suitable person to christen the infant; to which the mother at once

replied that Las Cases was not a good enough Christian for that.

Judging from the entries in Gourgaud's "Journal," this young General

pondered more than the rest on religious questions; and to him

Napoleon unbosomed his thoughts.--Matter, he says, is everywhere and

pervades everything; life, thought, and the soul itself are but

properties of matter, and death ends all. When Gourgaud points to the

majestic order of the universe as bearing witness to a Creator,

Napoleon admits that he believes in "superior intelligences": he avers

that he would believe in Christianity if it had been the original and

universal creed: but then the Mohammedans "follow a religion simpler

and more adapted to their morality than ours." In ten years their

founder conquered half the world, which Christianity took three

hundred years to accomplish. Or again, he refers to the fact that

Laplace, Monge, Berthollet, and Lagrange were all atheists, though

they did not proclaim the fact; as for himself, he finds the idea of

God to be natural; it has existed at all times and among all peoples.

But once or twice he ends this vague talk with the remarkable

confession that the sight of myriad deaths in war has made him a

materialist. "Matter is everything."--"Vanity of vanities!"[588]

Mirrored as these dialogues are in the eddies of Gourgaud's moods,

they may tinge his master's theology with too much of gloom: but,

after all, they are by far the most lifelike record of Napoleon's

later years, and they show us a nature dominated by the tangible. As

for belief in the divine Christ, there seems not a trace. A report has

come down to us, enshrined in Newman's prose, that Napoleon once

discoursed of the ineffable greatness of Christ, contrasting His

enduring hold on the hearts of men with the evanescent rule of

Alexander and Cæsar. One hopes that the words were uttered; but they

conflict with Napoleon's undoubted statements. Sometimes he spoke in

utter uncertainty; at others, as one who wished to believe in

Christianity and might perhaps be converted. But in the political

testament designed for his son, the only reference to religion is of

the diplomatic description that we should expect from the author of

the "Concordat": "Religious ideas have more influence than certain

narrow-minded philosophers are willing to believe: they are capable of

rendering great services to Humanity. By standing well with the Pope,

an influence is still maintained over the consciences of a hundred

millions of men."

Equally vague was Napoleon's own behaviour as his end drew nigh. For

some time past a sharp internal pain--the stab of a penknife, he

called it--had warned him of his doom; in April, 1821, when vomiting

and prostration showed that the dread ancestral malady was drawing on

apace, he bade the Abbé Vignali prepare the large dining-room of

Longwood as a _chapelle ardente_; and, observing a smile on

Antommarchi's face, the sick man hotly rebuked his affectation of

superiority. Montholon, on his return to England, informed Lord

Holland that extreme unction was administered before the end came,

Napoleon having ordered that this should be done as if solely on

Montholon's responsibility, and that the priest, when questioned on

the subject, was to reply that he had acted on Montholon's orders,

without having any knowledge of the Emperor's wishes. It was

accordingly administered, but apparently he was insensible at the

time.[589] In his will, also, he declared that he died in communion

with the Apostolical Roman Church, in whose bosom he was born. There,

then, we must leave this question, shrouded in the mystery that hangs

around so much of his life.

The decease of a great man is always affecting: but the death of the

hero who had soared to the zenith of military glory and civic

achievement seems to touch the very nadir of calamity. Outliving his

mighty Empire, girt around by a thousand miles of imprisoning ocean,

guarded by his most steadfast enemies, his son a captive at the Court

of the Hapsburgs, and his Empress openly faithless, he sinks from

sight like some battered derelict. And Nature is more pitiless than

man. The Governor urges on him the best medical advice: but he will

have none of it. He feels the grip of cancer, the disease which had

carried off his father and was to claim the gay Caroline and Pauline.

At times he surmises the truth: at others he calls out "_le foie_"

"_le foie_." Meara had alleged that his pains were due to a liver

complaint brought on by his detention at St. Helena; Antommarchi

described the illness as gastric fever (_febbre gastrica pituitosa_);

and not until Dr. Arnott was called in on the 1st of April was the

truth fully recognized.

At the close of the month the symptoms became most distressing,

aggravated as they were by the refusal of the patient to take medicine

or food, or to let himself be moved. On May 4th, at Dr. Arnott's

insistence, some calomel was secretly administered and with beneficial

results, the patient sleeping and even taking some food. This was his

last rally: on the morrow, while a storm was sweeping over the island,

and tearing up large trees, his senses began to fail: Montholon

thought he heard the words _France, armée, tête d'armée, Joséphine_:

he lingered on insensible for some hours: the storm died down: the sun

bathed the island in a flood of glory, and, as it dipped into the

ocean, the great man passed away.

By the Governor's orders Dr. Arnott remained in the room until the

body could be medically examined--a precaution which, as Montchenu

pointed out, would prevent any malicious attempt on the part of the

Longwood servants to cause death to appear as the result of poisoning.

The examination, conducted in the presence of seven medical men and

others, proved that all the organs were sound except the ulcerated

stomach; the liver was rather large, but showed no signs of disease;

the heart, on the other hand, was rather under the normal size. Far

from showing the emaciation that usually results from prolonged

inability to take food, the body was remarkably stout--a fact which

shows that that tenacious will had its roots in an abnormally firm

vitality.[590]

After being embalmed, the body was laid out in state, and all

beholders were struck with the serene and beautiful expression of the

face: the superfluous flesh sank away after death, leaving the

well-proportioned features that moved the admiration of men during the

Consulate.

Clad in his favourite green uniform, he fared forth to his

resting-place under two large weeping willow trees in a secluded

valley: the coffin, surmounted by his sword and the cloak he had worn

at Marengo, was borne with full military honours by grenadiers of the

20th and 66th Regiments before a long line of red-coats; and their

banners, emblazoned with the names of "Talavera," "Albuera,"

"Pyrenees," and "Orthez," were lowered in a last salute to our mighty

foe. Salvos of artillery and musketry were fired over the grave: the

echoes rattled upwards from ridge to ridge and leaped from the

splintery peaks far into the wastes of ocean to warn the world beyond

that the greatest warrior and administrator of all the ages had sunk

to rest.

His ashes were not to remain in that desolate nook: in a clause of his

will he expressed the desire that they should rest by the banks of the

Seine among the people he had loved so well. In 1840 they were

disinterred in presence of Bertrand, Gourgaud, and Marchand, and borne

to France. Paris opened her arms to receive the mighty dead; and Louis

Philippe, on whom he had once prophesied that the crown of France

would one day rest, received the coffin in state under the dome of the

_Invalides_. There he reposes, among the devoted people whom by his

superhuman genius he raised to bewildering heights of glory, only to

dash them to the depths of disaster by his monstrous errors.

* * * * *

Viewing his career as a whole, it seems just and fair to assert that

the fundamental cause of his overthrow is to be found, not in the

failings of the French, for they served him with a fidelity that would

wring tears of pity from Rhadamanthus; not in the treachery of this or

that general or politician, for that is little when set against the

loyalty of forty millions of men; but in the character of the man and

of his age. Never had mortal man so grand an opportunity of ruling

over a chaotic Continent: never had any great leader antagonists so

feeble as the rulers who opposed his rush to supremacy. At the dawn of

the nineteenth century the old monarchies were effete: insanity

reigned in four dynasties, and weak or time-serving counsels swayed

the remainder. For several years their counsellors and generals were

little better. With the exception of Pitt and Nelson, who were carried

off by death, and of Wellington, who had but half an army, Napoleon

never came face to face with thoroughly able, well-equipped, and

stubborn opponents until the year 1812.

It seems a paradox to say that this excess of good fortune largely

contributed to his ruin: yet it is true. His was one of those

thick-set combative natures that need timely restraint if their best

qualities are to be nurtured and their domineering instincts curbed.

Just as the strongest Ministry prances on to ruin if the Opposition

gives no effective check, so it was with Napoleon. Had he in his early

manhood taken to heart the lessons of adversity, would he have

ventured at the same time to fight Wellington in Spain and the Russian

climate in the heart of the steppes? Would he have spurned the offers

of an advantageous peace made to him from Prague in 1813? Would he

have let slip the chance of keeping the "natural frontiers" of France

after Leipzig, and her old boundaries, when brought to bay in

Champagne? Would he have dared the uttermost at all points at

Waterloo? In truth, after his fortieth year was past, the fervid

energies of youth hardened in the mould of triumph; and thence came

that fatal obstinacy which was his bane at all those crises of his

career. For in the meantime the cause of European independence had

found worthy champions--smaller men than Napoleon, it is true, but men

who knew that his determination to hold out everywhere and yield

nothing must work his ruin. Finally, the same clinging to unreal hopes

and the same love of fight characterized his life in St. Helena; so

that what might have been a time of calm and dignified repose was

marred by fictitious clamours and petty intrigues altogether unworthy

of his greatness.

For, in spite of his prodigious failure, he was superlatively great in

all that pertains to government, the quickening of human energies, and

the art of war. His greatness lies, not only in the abiding importance

of his best undertakings, but still more in the Titanic force that he

threw into the inception and accomplishment of all of them--a force

which invests the storm-blasted monoliths strewn along the latter

portion of his career with a majesty unapproachable by a tamer race of

toilers. After all, the verdict of mankind awards the highest

distinction, not to prudent mediocrity that shuns the chance of

failure and leaves no lasting mark behind, but to the eager soul that

grandly dares, mightily achieves, and holds the hearts of millions

even amidst his ruin and theirs. Such a wonder-worker was Napoleon.

The man who bridled the Revolution and remoulded the life of France,

who laid broad and deep the foundations of a new life in Italy,

Switzerland, and Germany, who rolled the West in on the East in the

greatest movement known since the Crusades and finally drew the

yearning thoughts of myriads to that solitary rock in the South

Atlantic, must ever stand in the very forefront of the immortals of

human story.

APPENDIX I

LIST OF THE CHIEF APPOINTMENTS AND DIGNITIES BESTOWED BY NAPOLEON

[_An asterisk is affixed to the names of his Marshals_.]

Arrighi. Duc de Padua.

*Augereau. Duc de Castiglione.

*Bernadotte. Prince de Ponte Corvo.

*Berthier. Chief of the Staff. Prince de Neufchâtel. Prince

de Wagram.

*Bessières. Duc d'Istria. Commander of the Old Guard.

Bonaparte, Joseph. (King of Naples.) King of Spain.

" Louis. King of Holland.

" Jerome. King of Westphalia.

*Brune.

Cambacérès. Arch-Chancellor. Duc de Parma.

Caulaincourt. Duc de Vicenza. Master of the Horse. Minister

of Foreign Affairs (1814).

Champagny. Duc de Cadore. Minister of Foreign Affairs

(1807-11).

Chaptal. Minister of the Interior. Comte de Chanteloupe.

Clarke. Minister of War. Duc de Feltre.

Daru. Comte.

*Davoust. Duc d'Auerstädt. Prince d'Eckmühl.

Drouet. Comte d'Erlon.

Drouot. Comte. Aide-Major of the Guard.

Duroc. Grand Marshal of the Palace. Duc de Friuli.

Eugène (Beauharnais). Viceroy of Italy.

Fesch (Cardinal). Grand Almoner.

Fouché. Minister of Police (1804-10). Duc d'Otranto.

*Grouchy. Comte.

Jomini. Baron.

*Jourdan. Comte.

Junot. Duc d'Abrantès.

*Kellermann. Duc de Valmy.

*Lannes. Duc de Montebello.

Larrey. Baron.

Latour-Maubourg. Baron.

Lauriston. Comte.

Lavalette. Comte. Minister of Posts.

*Lefebvre. Duc de Danzig.

*Macdonald. Duc de Taranto.

Maret. Minister of Foreign Affairs (1811-14.) Duc de Bassano.

*Marmont. Duc de Ragusa.

*Masséna. (Duc de Rivoli.) Prince d'Essling.

Miot. Comte de Melito.

Méneval. Baron.

Mollien. Comte. Minister of the Treasury.

*Moncey. Duc de Conegliano.

Montholon. Comte.

*Mortier. Duc de Treviso.

Mouton. Comte de Lobau.

*Murat. (Grand Duc de Berg.) King of Naples.

*Ney. (Duc d'Elchingen.) Prince de la Moskwa.

*Oudinot. Duc de Reggio.

Pajol. Baron.

Pasquier, Duc de. Prefect of Police.

*Pérignon.

*Poniatowski.

Rapp. Comte.

Reynier. Duc de Massa.

Rémusat. Chamberlain.

Savary. Duc de Rovigo. Minister of Police (1810-14).

Sébastiani. Comte.

*Sérurier.

*Soult. Duc de Dalmatia.

*St. Cyr, Marquis de.

*Suchet. Duc d'Albufera.

Talleyrand. Minister of Foreign Affairs (1799-1807). Grand

Chamberlain (1804-8). Prince de Benevento.

Vandamme. Comte.

*Victor. Duc de Belluno.

APPENDIX II

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO

Some critics have blamed me for underrating the _rôle_ of the

Prussians at Waterloo; but after careful study I have concluded that

it has been overrated by some recent German writers. We now know that

the Prussian advance was retarded by Gneisenau's deep-rooted suspicion

of Wellington, and that no direct aid was given to the British left

until nearly the end of the battle. Napoleon always held that he could

readily have kept off the Prussians at Planchenoit, that the main

battle throughout was against Wellington, and that it was decided by

the final charge of British cavalry. The Prussians did not wholly

capture Planchenoit until the French opposing Wellington were in full

flight. But, of course, Blücher's advance and onset made the victory

the overwhelming triumph that it was.

An able critic in the "Saturday Review" of May 10, 1902, has charged

me with neglecting to say that the French left wing (Foy's and

Bachelu's divisions) supported the French cavalry at the close of the

great charges. I stated (p. 502) that French infantry was not "at hand

to hold the ground which the cavaliers seemed to have won." Let me

cite the exact words of General Foy, written in his Journal a few days

after the battle (M. Girod de L'Ain's "Vie militaire du General Foy,"

p. 278): "Alors que la cavalerie française faisait cette longue et

terrible charge, le feu de notre artillerie était déjà moins nourri,

et notre infanterie ne fit aucun mouvement. Quand la cavalerie fut

rentrée, et que l'artillerie anglaise, qui avait cessé de tirer

pendant une demi-heure, eut recommencé son feu, on donna ordre aux

divisions Foy et Bachelu d'avancer droit aux carrés qui s'y étaient

avancés pendant la charge de cavalerie et qui ne s'étaient pas

repliés. L'attaque fut formée en colonnes par échelons de régiment,

Bachelu formant les échelons les plus avancés. Je tenis par ma gauche

à la haie [de Hougoumont]: j'avais sur mon front un bataillon en

tirailleurs. Près de joindre les Anglais, nous avons reçu un feu très

vif de mitraille et de mousqueterie. C'était une grêle de mort. Les

carrés ennemis avaient le premier rang genoux en terre et présentaient

une haie de baïonettes. Les colonnes de la 1're division ont pris la

fuite les premières: leur mouvement a entraîné celui de mes colonnes.

En ce moment j'ai été blessé...."

This shows that the advance of the French infantry was far too late to

be of the slightest use to the cavalry. The British lines had been

completely re-formed.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: Armfeldt to Drake, December 24th, 1803 ("F.O.," Bavaria,

No. 27).]

[Footnote 2: Drake's despatch of December 15th, 1803, _ib_.]

[Footnote 3: Czartoryski, "Memoirs," vol. ii., ch. ii.]

[Footnote 4: The Czar's complaints were: the exile of the King of

Sardinia, the re-occupation of S. Italy by the French, the changes in

Italy, the violation of the neutrality of Baden, the occupation of

Cuxhaven by the French, and the levying of ransom from the Hanse Towns

to escape the same fate ("F.O.," Russia, No. 56).]

[Footnote 5: Lord Harrowby to Admiral Warren ("F.O.," Russia, No.

56).]

[Footnote 6: Garden, "Traités" vol. viii., p. 302; Ulmann,

"Russisch-Preussische Politik," p. 117]

[Footnote 7: See the letter in the "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 170.]

[Footnote 8: "F.O.," Russia, No. 55. See note on p. 28.]

[Footnote 9: Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., chs. ii.-iv.]

[Footnote 10: "Lettres inédites de Napoléon" (May 30th, 1805).]

[Footnote 11: See Novossiltzoff's Report in Czartoryski's "Memoirs,"

vol. ii., ch. iv., and Pitt's note developing the Russian proposals in

Garden's "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 317-323, or Alison, App. to ch.

xxxix. A comparison of these two memoranda will show that on

Continental questions there was no difference such as Thiers affected

to see between the generous policy of Russia and the "cold egotism" of

Pitt. As Czartoryski has proved in his "Memoirs" (vol. ii., ch. x.)

Thiers has erred in assigning importance to a mere first draft of a

conversation which Czartoryski had with that ingenious schemer, the

Abbé Piatoli. The official proposals sent from St. Petersburg to

London were very different; _e.g._, the proposal of Alexander with

regard to the French frontiers was this: "The first object is to bring

back France into its ancient limits or such other ones as might appear

most suitable to the general tranquillity of Europe." It is,

therefore, futile to state that this was solely the policy of Pitt

after he had "remodelled" the Russian proposals.]

[Footnote 12: "Corresp.," No. 8231. See too Bourrienne, Miot de

Melito, vol. ii., ch. iv., and Thiers, bk. xxi.]

[Footnote 13: This refusal has been severely criticised. But the

knowledge of the British Government that Napoleon was still

persevering with his schemes against Turkey, and that the Russians

themselves, from their station at Corfu, were working to gain a

foothold on the Albanian coast, surely prescribed caution ("F.O.,"

Russia, Nos. 55 and 56, despatches of June 26th and October 10th,

1804). It was further known that the Austrian Government had proposed

to the Czar plans that were hostile to Turkey, and were not decisively

rejected at St. Petersburg; and it is clear from the notes left by

Czartoryski that the prospect of gaining Corfu, Moldavia, parts of

Albania, and the precious prize of Constantinople was kept in view.

Pitt agreed to restore the conquests made from France (Despatch of

April 22nd).]

[Footnote 14: Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 328-333. It is clear

that Gustavus IV. was the ruler who insisted on making the restoration

of the Bourbons the chief aim of the Third Coalition. In our "F.O.

Records" (Sweden, No. 177) is an account (August 20th, 1804) of a

conversation of Lord Harrowby with the Swedish ambassador, who stated

that such a declaration would "palsy the arms of France." Our Foreign

Minister replied that it would "much more certainly palsy the arms of

England: that we made war because France was become too powerful for

the peace of Europe."]

[Footnote 15: "Corresp.," No. 8329.]

[Footnote 16: Bailleu, "Preussen und Frankreich," vol. ii., p. 354.]

[Footnote 17: Thiers (bk. xxi.) gives the whole text.]

[Footnote 18: The annexation of the Ligurian or Genoese Republic took

place on June 4th, the way having been prepared there by Napoleon's

former patron, Salicetti, who liberally dispensed bribes. A little

later the Republic of Lucca was bestowed on Elisa Bonaparte and her

spouse, now named Prince Bacciochi. Parma, hitherto administered by a

French governor, was incorporated in the French Empire about the same

time.]

[Footnote 19: Paget to Lord Mulgrave (March 19th, 1805).]

[Footnote 20: Beer, "Zehn Jahre oesterreich. Politik (1801-1810)." The

notes of Novossiltzoff and Hardenberg are printed in Sir G. Jackson's

"Diaries," vol i., App.]

[Footnote 21: See Bignon, vol. iv., pp. 271 and 334. Probably Napoleon

knew through Laforest and Talleyrand that Russia had recently urged

that George III. should offer Hanover to Prussia. Pitt rejected the

proposal. Prussia paid more heed to the offer of Hanover from Napoleon

than to the suggestions of Czartoryski that she might receive it from

its rightful owner, George III. Yet Duroc did not succeed in gaining

more from Frederick William than the promise of his neutrality (see

Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 339-346). Sweden was not a member

of the Coalition, but made treaties with Russia and England.

The high hopes nursed by the Pitt Ministry are seen in the following

estimate of the forces that would be launched against France: Austria,

250,000; Russia, 180,000; Prussia, 100,000 (Pitt then refused to

subsidize more than 100,000); Sweden, 16,000; Saxony, 16,000; Hesse

and Brunswick, 16,000; Mecklenburg, 3,000; King of Sardinia, 25,000;

Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, 25,000; Naples, 20,000. In a P.S. he

adds that the support of the King of Sardinia would not be needed, and

that England had private arrangements with Naples as to subsidies.

This Memoir is not dated, but it must belong to the beginning of

September, before the defection of Bavaria was known ("F.O.," Prussia,

No. 70).]

[Footnote 22: "F.O.," Russia, No. 57; Gower's note of July 22nd,

1805.]

[Footnote 23: Colonel Graham's despatches, which undoubtedly

influenced the Pitt Ministry in favouring the appointment of Mack to

the present command. Paget ("Papers," vol. ii., p. 238) states that

the Iller position was decided on by Francis. The best analysis of

Mack's character is in Bernhardi's "Memoirs of Count Toll" (vol. i.,

p. 121). The State Papers are in Burke's "Campaign of 1805," App.]

[Footnote 24: Marmont, "Mems.," vol. ii., p. 310.]

[Footnote 25: See "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 224; also Schönhals

"Der Krieg 1805 in Deutschland," p. 67.]

[Footnote 26: "Corresp.," No. 9249. See too No. 9254 for the details

of the enveloping moves which Napoleon then (September 22nd)

accurately planned twenty-five days before the final blows were dealt:

yet No. 9299 shows that, even on September 30th, he believed Mack

would hurry back to the Inn. Beer, p. 145.]

[Footnote 27: Rüstow, "Der Krieg 1805." Hormayr, "Geschichte Hofers"

(vol. i., p. 96), states that, in framing with Russia the plan of

campaign, the Austrians forgot to allow for the difference (twelve

days) between the Russian and Gregorian calendars. The Russians

certainly were eleven days late.]

[Footnote 28: "Corresp.," No 9319; Sir G. Jackson's "Diaries," vol.

i., p. 334.]

[Footnote 29: _Ibid_.; also Metternich, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. iii. For

Prussia's protest to Napoleon, which pulverized the French excuses,

see Garden, vol. ix., p. 69.]

[Footnote 30: Schönhals; Ségur, ch. xvi., exculpates Murat and Ney.]

[Footnote 31: Schönhals, p. 73. Thiers states that Dupont's 6,000

gained a victory over 25,000 Austrians detached from the 60,000 who

occupied Ulm!]

[Footnote 32: Marmont, vol. ii., p. 320; Lejeune, "Memoirs," vol. i.,

ch. iii.]

[Footnote 33: Thiers, bk. xxii. During Mack's interview with Napoleon

(see "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 235), when the Emperor asked him why

he did not cut his way through to Ansbach, he replied, "Prussia would

have declared against us." To which the Emperor retorted: "Ah! the

Prussians do not declare so quickly."]

[Footnote 34: "Alexandre I et Czartoryski," pp. 32-34.]

[Footnote 35: See these terms compared with the Anglo-Russian treaty

of April 11th, 1805, in the Appendix of Dr. Hansing's "Hardenberg und

die dritte Coalition" (Berlin, 1899).]

[Footnote 36: Häusser, vol. ii., p. 617 (4th. edit.); Lettow-Vorbeck,

"Der Krieg von 1806-1807," vol. i., _ad init_.]

[Footnote 37: For the much more venial stratagem which Kutusoff played

on Murat at Hollabrunn, see Thiers, bk. xxiii.]

[Footnote 38: Lord Harrowby, then on a special mission to Berlin,

reports (November 24th) that this appeal of the Czar had been "coolly

received," and no Prussian troops would enter Bohemia until it was

known how Prussia's envoy to Napoleon, Count Haugwitz, had been

received.]

[Footnote 39: Thiers says December 1st, which is corrected by

Napoleon's letter of November 30th to Talleyrand.]

[Footnote 40: Thiébault, vol. ii., ch. viii.; Ségur, ch. xviii.; York

von Wartenburg, "Nap. als Feldherr," vol. i., p. 230.]

[Footnote 41: Davoust's reports of December 2nd and 5th in his

"Corresp."]

[Footnote 42: Ségur, Thiébault, and Lejeune all state that Napoleon in

the previous advance northwards had foretold that a great battle would

soon be fought opposite Austerlitz, and explained how he would fight

it.]

[Footnote 43: Thiébault wrongly attributes this succour to Lannes: for

that Marshal, who had just insulted and challenged Soult, Thiébault

had a manifest partiality. Savary, though hostile to Bernadotte, gives

him bare justice on this move.]

[Footnote 44: Harrowby evidently thought that Prussia's conduct would

depend on events. Just before the news of Austerlitz arrived, he wrote

to Downing Street: "The eyes of this Government are turned almost

exclusively on Moravia. It is there the fate of this negotiation must

be decided." Yet he reports that 192,000 Prussians are under arms

("F.O.," Prussia, No. 70).]

[Footnote 45: Jackson, "Diaries," vol. i., p. 137.]

[Footnote 46: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," pp. 205-208.]

[Footnote 47: Metternich, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. iii.]

[Footnote 48: Hanover, along with a few districts of Bavarian

Franconia, would bring to Prussia a gain of 989,000 inhabitants, while

she would lose only 375,000. Neufchâtel had offered itself to

Frederick I. of Prussia in 1688, and its proposed barter to France

troubled Hardenberg ("Mems.," vol. ii., p. 421).]

[Footnote 49: Gower to Lord Harrowby from Olmütz, November 25th, in

"F.O. Records," Russia, No. 59.]

[Footnote 50: "Lettres inédites de Tall.," p. 216.]

[Footnote 51: Printed for the first time in full in "Lettres inédites

de Tall.," pp. 156-174. On December 5th Talleyrand again begged

Napoleon to strengthen Austria as "a needful bulwark against the

barbarians, the Russians."]

[Footnote 52: I dissent, though with much diffidence, from M. Vandal

("Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. i., p. 9) in regard to Talleyrand's

proposal.]

[Footnote 53: Napoleon to Talleyrand (December 14th, 1805): "Sûr de la

Prusse, l'Autriche en passera par où je voudrai. Je ferai également

prononcer la Prusse contre l'Angleterre."]

[Footnote 54: Report of M. Otto, August, 1799.]

[Footnote 55: Czartoryski ("Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xii.) states that

England offered Holland to Prussia. I find no proof of this in our

Records. The districts between Antwerp and Cleves are Belgian, not

Dutch; and we never wavered in our support of the House of Orange.]

[Footnote 56: These proposals, dated October 27th, 1805, were modified

somewhat on the news of Mack's disaster and the Treaty of Potsdam.

Hardenberg assured Harrowby (November 24th) that, despite England's

liberal pecuniary help, Frederick William felt great difficulty in

assenting to the proposed territorial arrangements ("F.O.," Prussia,

No. 70).]

[Footnote 57: Hardenberg's "Memoirs," vol. ii., pp. 377, 382.]

[Footnote 58: Ompteda, p. 188. The army returned in February, 1806.]

[Footnote 59: "F.O.," Prussia, No. 70 (November 23rd).]

[Footnote 60: "Diaries of Right Hon. G. Rose," vol. ii., pp. 223-224.]

[Footnote 61: _Ib._, pp. 233-283; Rosebery, "Life of Pitt," p. 258.]

[Footnote 62: Lord Malmesbury's "Diary," vol. iv., p. 114.]

[Footnote 63: Letter of December 27th, 1805; Jackson, "Diaries," vol.

ii., p. 387.]

[Footnote 64: Mollien, "Mems.," vol. i. _ad fin_., and vol. ii., p.

80, for the budget of 1806; also, Fiévée, "Mes Relations avec

Bonaparte," vol. ii., pp. 180-203.]

[Footnote 65: The Court of Naples asserted that in the Convention with

France its ambassador, the Comte de Gallo, exceeded his powers in

promising neutrality. See Lucchesini's conversation with Gentz, quoted

by Garden, "Traités," vol. x., p. 129.]

[Footnote 66: See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Rev.," April, 1900.]

[Footnote 67: Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Napoléon," p. 11.]

[Footnote 68: Letter of February 7th, 1806. On the same day he blames

Junot, then commander of Parma, for too great lenience to some rebels

near that city. The Italians were a false people, who only respected a

strong Government. Let him, then, burn two large villages so that no

trace remained, shoot the priest of one village, and send three or

four hundred of the guilty to the galleys. "Trust my old experience of

the Italians."]

[Footnote 69: For a list of the chief Napoleonic titles, see Appendix,

_ad fin_.]

[Footnote 70: January 2nd, 1802; so too Fiévée, "Mes Relations avec

Bonaparte," vol. ii., p. 210, who notes that, by founding an order of

nobility, Napoleon ended his own isolation and attached to his

interests a powerful landed caste.]

[Footnote 71: Hardenberg's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 390-394.]

[Footnote 72: Hardenberg to Harrowby on January 7th, "Prussia," No.

70.]

[Footnote 73: I have not found a copy of this project; but in

"Prussia," No. 70 (forwarded by Jackson on January 27th, 1806), there

is a detailed "Mémoire explicatif," whence I extract these details, as

yet unpublished, I believe. Neither Hardenberg, Garden, Jackson, nor

Paget mentions them.]

[Footnote 74: Records, "Prussia," No. 70, dated February 21st.]

[Footnote 75: Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. ii., pp. 463-469; "Nap.

Corresp.," No. 9742, for Napoleon's thoughts as to peace, when he

heard of Fox being our Foreign Minister.]

[Footnote 76: See "Nap. Corresp.," Nos. 9742, 9773, 9777, for his

views as to the weakness of England and Prussia. This treaty of

February 15th, 1806, confirmed the cession of Neufchâtel and Cleves to

France, and of Ansbach to Bavaria; but did not cede any Franconian

districts to Prussia's Baireuth lands. See Hardenberg, "Mémoires,"

vol. ii., p. 483, for the text of the treaty.]

[Footnote 77: The strange perversity of Haugwitz is nowhere more shown

than in his self-congratulation at the omission of the adjectives

_offensive et défensive_ from the new treaty of alliance between

France and Prussia (Hardenberg, vol. ii., p. 481). Napoleon was now

not pledged to help Prussia in the war which George III. declared

against her on April 20th.]

[Footnote 78: It is noteworthy that in all the negotiations that

followed, Napoleon never raised any question about our exacting

maritime code, which proves how hollow were his diatribes against the

tyrant of the seas at other times.]

[Footnote 79: Despatch of April 20th, 1806, in Papers presented to

Parliament on December 22nd, 1806.]

[Footnote 80: Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xiii.]

[Footnote 81: "I do not intend the Court of Rome to mix any more in

politics" (Nap. to the Pope, February 13th, 1806).]

[Footnote 82: I translate literally these N.B.'s as pasted in at the

end of Yarmouth's Memoir of July 8th ("France," No. 73). As Oubril's

instructions have never, I believe, been published, the passage given

above is somewhat important as proving how completely he exceeded his

powers in bartering away Sicily. The text of the Oubril Treaty is

given by De Clercq, vol. ii., p. 180. The secret articles required

Russia to help France in inducing the Court of Madrid to cede the

Balearic Isles to the Prince Royal of Naples; the dethroned King and

Queen were not to reside there, and Russia was to recognize Joseph

Bonaparte as King of the Two Sicilies.]

[Footnote 83: In conversing with our ambassador, Mr. Stuart, Baron

Budberg excused Oubril's conduct on the ground of his nervousness

under the threats of the French plenipotentiary, General Clarke, who

scarcely let him speak, and darkly hinted at many other changes that

must ensue if Russia did not make peace; Switzerland was to be

annexed, Germany overrun, and Turkey partitioned. That Clarke was a

master in diplomatic hectoring is well known; but, from private

inquiries, Stuart discovered that the Czar, in his private conference

with Oubril, seemed more inclined towards peace than Czartoryski: when

therefore the latter resigned, Oubril might well give way before

Clarke's bluster. (Stuart's Despatch of August 9th, 1806, F.O.,

Russia, No. 63; also see Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xiv.;

and Martens, "Traités," Suppl. vol. iv.)]

[Footnote 84: "Memoirs of Karl Heinrich, Knight of Lang."]

[Footnote 85: Garden, vol. ix., pp. 157, 189, 255.]

[Footnote 86: "Corresp.," Nos. 10522 and 10544. For a French account

see the "Mems." of Baron Desvernois, p. 288.]

[Footnote 87: "F.O. Records," Naples, No. 73.]

[Footnote 88: This was on Napoleon's advice. He wrote to Talleyrand

from Rambouillet on August 18th, to give as an excuse for the delay,

"The Emperor is hunting and will not be back before the end of the

week."]

[Footnote 89: So too Napoleon said at St. Helena to Las Cases: "Fox's

death was one of the fatalities of my career."]

[Footnote 90: Despatches of September 26th and October 6th.]

[Footnote 91: Bailleu, "Frankreich und Preussen," Introd.]

[Footnote 92: Decree of July 26th.]

[Footnote 93: See "Corresp." No. 10604, note; also Talleyrand's letter

of August 4th ("Lettres inédites," p. 245), showing the indemnities

that might be offered to Prussia after the loss of Hanover: they

included, of course, little States, Anhalt, Lippe, Waldeck, etc.]

[Footnote 94: Gentz, "Ausgew. Schriften," vol. v., p. 252.

Conversation with Lucchesini.]

[Footnote 95: "Corresp.," Nos. 10575, 10587, 10633.]

[Footnote 96: "Mems.," vol. iii., pp. 115, _et seq._ The

Prusso-Russian convention of July, by which these Powers mutually

guaranteed the integrity of their States, was mainly the work of

Hardenberg.]

[Footnote 97: Bailleu, pp. 540-552. See too Fournier's "Napoleon,"

vol. ii., p. 106.]

[Footnote 98: Bailleu, pp. 556-557. So too Napoleon's letter of

September 5th to Berthier is the first hint of his thought of a

Continental war.]

[Footnote 99: Queen Louisa said to Gentz (October 9th) that war had

been decided on, not owing to selfish calculations, but the sentiment

of honour (Garden, "Traités," vol. x., p. 133).]

[Footnote 100: A memorial was handed in to him on September 2nd. It

was signed by the King's brothers, Henry and William, also by the

leader of the warlike party, Prince Louis Ferdinand, by Generals

Rüchel and Phull, and by the future dictator, Stein. The King rebuked

all of them. See Pertz, "Stein," vol. i., p. 347.]

[Footnote 101: "F.O.," Russia, No. 64. Stuart's despatches of

September 30th and October 21st.]

[Footnote 102: Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben."]

[Footnote 103: Lettow-Vorbeck, "Der Krieg von 1806-7," p. 163.]

[Footnote 104: See Prince Hohenlohe's "Letters on Strategy" (p. 62,

Eng. ed.) for the effect of this rapid marching; Foucart's "Campagne

de Prusse," vol. i., pp. 323-343; also Lord Fitzmaurice's "Duke of

Brunswick."]

[Footnote 105: Höpfner, vol. i.p. 383; and Lettow-Vorbeck, vol. i., p.

345.]

[Footnote 106: Foucart, _op. cit._, pp. 606-623.]

[Footnote 107: Marbot says Rüchel was killed: but he recovered from

his wound, and did good service the next spring.

Vernet's picture of Napoleon inspecting his Guards at Jena before

their charge seems to represent the well-known incident of a soldier

calling out "_en avant_"; whereupon Napoleon sharply turned and bade

the man wait till he had commanded in twenty battles before he gave

him advice.]

[Footnote 108: Foucart, p. 671.]

[Footnote 109: Lang thus describes four French Marshals whom he saw at

Ansbach: "Bernadotte, a very tall dark man, with fiery eyes under

thick brows; Mortier, still taller, with a stupid sentinel look;

Lefebvre, an old Alsatian camp-boy, with his wife, former washerwoman

to the regiment; and Davoust, a little smooth-pated, unpretending man,

who was never tired of waltzing."]

[Footnote 110: Davoust, "Opérations du 3'me Corps," pp. 31-32. French

writers reduce their force to 24,000, and raise Brunswick's total to

60,000. Lehmann's "Scharnhorst," vol. i., p. 433, gives the details.]

[Footnote 111: Foucart, pp. 604-606, 670, and 694-697, who only blames

him for slowness. But he set out from Naumburg before dawn, and,

though delayed by difficult tracks, was near Apolda at 4 p.m., and

took 1,000 prisoners.]

[Footnote 112: For this service, as for his exploits at Austerlitz,

Napoleon gave few words of praise. Lannes' remonstrance is printed by

General Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," p. 169. The Emperor secretly

disliked Lannes for his very independent bearing.]

[Footnote 113: "Nap. Corresp.," November 21st, 1807; Baron Lumbroso's

"Napoleone I e l'Inghilterra," p. 103; Garden, vol. x., p. 307.]

[Footnote 114: This decree, of 10 Brumaire, an V, is printed in full,

and commented on by Lumbroso, _op. cit._, p. 49. See too Sorel,

"L'Europe et la Rév. Fr.," vol. iii., p. 389; and my article,

"Napoleon and English Commerce," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of October,

1893.]

[Footnote 115: This phrase occurs, I believe, first in the

conversation of Napoleon on May 1st, 1803: "We will form a more

complete coast-system, and England shall end by shedding tears of

blood" (Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i., chap. xiv.).]

[Footnote 116: _E.g._, Fauchille, "Du Blocus maritime," pp. 93 _et

seq._]

[Footnote 117: See especially the pamphlet "War in Disguise, or the

Frauds of the Neutral Flags" (1805), by J. Stephen. It has been said

that this pamphlet was a cause of the Orders in Council. The whole

question is discussed by Manning, "Commentaries on the Law of Nations"

(1875); Lawrence, "International Law"; Mahan, "Infl. of Sea Power,"

vol. ii., pp. 274-277; Mollien, vol. iii., p. 289 (first edit.); and

Chaptal, p. 275.]

[Footnote 118: Hausser, vol. iii., p. 61 (4th edit.). The Saxon

federal contingent was fixed at 20,000 men.]

[Footnote 119: Papers presented to Parliament, December 22nd, 1806.]

[Footnote 120: After the interview of November 28th, 1801, Cornwallis

reports that Napoleon "expressed a wish that we could agree to remove

disaffected persons from either country ... and declared his

willingness to send away United Irishmen" ("F.O. Records," No. 615).]

[Footnote 121: Czartoryski, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xv.]

[Footnote 122: In our "F.O. Records," Prussia, No. 74, is a report of

Napoleon's reply to a deputation at Warsaw (January, 1807): "I warn

you that neither I nor any French prince cares for your Polish throne:

I have crowns to give and don't know what to do with them. You must

first of all think of giving bread to my soldiers--'Bread, bread,

bread.' ... I cannot support my troops in this country, where there is

no one besides nobles and miserable peasants. Where are your great

families? They are all sold to Russia. It is Czartoryski who wrote to

Kosciusko not to come back to Poland." And when a Galician deputy

asked him of the fate of his province, he turned on him: "Do you think

that I will draw on myself new foes for one province." Nevertheless,

the enthusiasm of the Poles was not wholly chilled. Their contingents

did good service for him. Somewhat later, female devotion brought a

beautiful young Polish lady to act as his mistress, primarily with the

hope of helping on the liberation of her land, and then as a willing

captive to the charm which he exerted on all who approached him. Their

son was Count Walewska]

[Footnote 123: Marbot, ch. xxviii.]

[Footnote 124: Lettow-Vorbeck estimates the French loss at more than

24,000; that of the Russians as still heavier, but largely owing to

the bad commissariat and wholesale straggling. On this see Sir R.

Wilson's "Campaign in Poland," ch. i.]

[Footnote 125: Napoleon on February 13th charged Bertrand to offer

_verbally, but not in writing_, to the King of Prussia a separate

peace, without respect to the Czar. Frederick William was to be

restored to his States east of the Elbe. He rejected the offer, which

would have broken his engagements to the Czar. Napoleon repeated the

offer on February 20th, which shows that, at this crisis, he did wish

for peace with Prussia. See "Nap. Corresp.," No. 11810; and Hausser,

vol. iii., p. 74.]

[Footnote 126: "I have been repeatedly pressed by the Prussian and

Russian Governments," wrote Lord Hutchinson, our envoy at Memel, March

9th, 1807, "on the subject of a diversion to be made by British troops

against Mortier.... Stettin is a large place with a small garrison and

in a bad state of defence" ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 74). in 1805 Pitt

promised to send a British force to Stralsund (see p. 17).]

[Footnote 127: Lord Cathcart's secret report to the War Office, dated

April 22nd, 1807, dealt with the appeal made by Lord Hutchinson, and

with a _Projet_ of Dumouriez, both of whom strongly urged the

expedition to Stralsund. On May 30th Castlereagh received a report

from a Hanoverian officer, Kuckuck, stating that Hanover and Hesse

were ripe for revolt, and that Hameln might easily be seized if the

North Germans were encouraged by an English force ("Castlereagh

Letters," vol. vi., pp. 169 and 211).]

[Footnote 128: "F.O.," Russia, No. 69.]

[Footnote 129: "Correspond.," No. 12563; also "La Mission du Gen.

Gardane en Perse," par le comte de Gardane. Napoleon in his

proclamation of December 2nd, 1806, told the troops that their

victories had won for France her Indian possessions and the Cape of

Good Hope.]

[Footnote 130: Wilson, "Campaign in Poland"; "Opérations du 3ème Corps

[Davoust's], 1806-1807," p. 199.]

[Footnote 131: "Corresp.," Nos. 12749 and 12751. Lejeune, in his

"Memoirs," also shows that Napoleon's chief aim was to seize

Königsberg.]

[Footnote 132: "Memoirs of Oudinot," ch. i]

[Footnote 133: The report is dated Memel, June 21st, 1807, in "F.O.,"

Prussia, No. 74. Hutchinson thinks the Russians had not more than

45,000 men engaged at Friedland, and that their losses did not exceed

15,000: but there were "multitudes of stragglers." Lettow-Vorbeck

gives about the same estimates. Those given in the French bulletin are

grossly exaggerated.]

[Footnote 134: On June 17th, 1807, Queen Louisa wrote to her father:"

... we fall with honour. The King has proved that he prefers honour to

shameful submission." On June 23rd Bennigsen professed a wish to

fight, while secretly advising surrender (Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol.

iii., p. 469).]

[Footnote 135: "F.O.," Russia, No. 69. Soult told Lord Holland

("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 185) that Bennigsen was plotting to

murder the Czar, and he (S.) warned him of it.]

[Footnote 136: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," p. 468; also Garden,

vol. x., pp. 205-210; and "Ann. Reg." (1807), pp. 710-724, for the

British replies to Austria.]

[Footnote 137: Canning to Paget ("Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 324). So

too Canning's despatch of July 21st to Gower (Russia, No. 69).]

[Footnote 138: Stadion saw through it. See Beer, p. 243.]

[Footnote 139: "Nap. Corresp.," No. 11918.]

[Footnote 140: _Ib._, No. 12028. This very important letter seems to

me to refute M. Vandal's theory ("Nap. et Alexandre," ch. i.), that

Napoleon was throughout seeking for an alliance with _Austria_, or

Prussia, or Russia.]

[Footnote 141: Canning to Paget, May 16th, 1807 ("Paget Papers," vol.

ii., p. 290).]

[Footnote 142: Garden, vol. x., pp. 214-218; and Gower's despatch of

June 17th. 1807 (Russia, No. 69).]

[Footnote 143: All references to the story rest ultimately on Bignon,

"Hist. de France" (vol. vi., p. 316), who gives no voucher for it. For

the reasons given above I must regard the story as suspect. Among a

witty, phrase-loving people like the French, a good _mot_ is almost

certain to gain credence and so pass into history.]

[Footnote 144: Tatischeff, "Alexandre I et Napoléon" (pp. 144-148).]

[Footnote 145: Reports of Savary and Lesseps, quoted by Vandal, _op.

cit._, p. 61; "Corresp.," No. 12825.]

[Footnote 146: Vandal, p. 73, says that the news reached Napoleon at a

review when Alexander was by his side. If so, the occasion was

carefully selected with a view to effect; for the news reached him on,

or before, June 24th (see "Corresp.," No. 12819). Gower states that

the news reached Tilsit as early as the 15th; and Hardenberg secretly

proposed a policy of partition of Turkey on June 23rd ("Mems.," vol.

iii., p. 463). Hardenberg resigned office on July 4th, as Napoleon

refused to treat through him.]

[Footnote 147: "Corresp.," No. 12862, letter of July 6th.]

[Footnote 148: Tatischeff (pp. 146-148 and 163-168) proves from the

Russian archives that these schemes were Alexander's, and were in the

main opposed by Napoleon. This disproves Vandal's assertion (p. 101)

that Napoleon pressed Alexander to take the Memel and Polish

districts.]

[Footnote 149: "Erinnerungen der Gräfin von Voss."]

[Footnote 150: Probably this refers not to the restitution of Silesia,

which he politely offered to her (though he had previously granted it

on the Czar's request), but to Madgeburg and its environs west of the

Elbe. On July 7th he said to Goltz, the Prussian negotiator, "I am

sorry if the Queen took as positive assurances the _phrases de_

_politesse_ that one speaks to ladies" (Hardenberg's "Mems.," vol.

iii., p. 512).]

[Footnote 151: See the new facts published by Bailleu in the

"Hohenzollern Jahrbuch" (1899). The "rose" story is not in any German

source.]

[Footnote 152: In his "Memoirs" (vol. i., pt. iii.) Talleyrand says

that he repeated this story several times at the Tuileries, until

Napoleon rebuked him for it.]

[Footnote 153: Before Tilsit Prussia had 9,744,000 subjects;

afterwards only 4,938,000. See her frontiers in map on p. 215.]

[Footnote 154: The exact terms of the secret articles and of the

secret treaty have only been known since 1890, when, owing to the

labours of MM. Fournier, Tatischeff, and Vandal, they saw the light.]

[Footnote 155: Gower's despatch of July 12th. "F.O.," Russia, No. 69.]

[Footnote 156: De Clercq, "Traités," vol. ii., pp. 223-225; Garden,

vol. x., p. 233 and 277-290. Our envoy, Jackson, reported from Memel

on July 28th: "Nothing can exceed the insolence and extortions of the

French. No sooner is one demand complied with than a fresh one is

brought forward."]

[Footnote 157: That he seriously thought in November, 1807, of leaving

to Prussia less than half of her already cramped territories, is clear

from his instructions to Caulaincourt, his ambassador to the Czar: "Is

it not to Prussia's interest for her to place herself, at once, and

with entire resignation, among the inferior Powers?" A new treaty was

to be framed, under the guise of _interpreting_ that of Tilsit, Russia

keeping the Danubian Provinces, and Napoleon more than half of Prussia

(Vandal, vol. i., p. 509).]

[Footnote 158: Lucchesini to Gentz in October, 1806, in Gentz's

"Ausgewählte Schriften," vol. v., p. 257.]

[Footnote 159: See Canning's reply to Stahremberg's Note, on April

25th, 1807, in the "Ann. Reg.," p. 724.]

[Footnote 160: For Mackenzie's report and other details gleaned from

our archives, see my article "A British Agent at Tilsit," in the "Eng.

Hist. Rev." of October, 1901.]

[Footnote 161: James, "Naval History," vol. iv., p. 408.]

[Footnote 162: "F.O.," Denmark, No. 53.]

[Footnote 163: Garden, vol. x., p. 408.]

[Footnote 164: "Corresp.," No. 12962; see too No. 12936, ordering the

15,000 Spanish troops now serving him near Hamburg to form the nucleus

of Bernadotte's army of observation, which, "in case of events," was

to be strengthened by as many Dutch.]

[Footnote 165: "F.O.," Denmark, No. 53. I published this Memorandum of

Canning and other unpublished papers in an article, "Canning and

Denmark," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of January, 1896. The terms of the

capitulation were, it seems, mainly decided on by Sir Arthur

Wellesley, who wrote to Canning (September 8th): "I might have carried

our terms higher ... had not our troops been needed at home" ("Well.

Despatches," vol. iii., p. 7).]

[Footnote 166: Castlereagh's "Corresp.," vol. vi. So too Gower

reported from St. Petersburg on October 1st that public opinion was

"decidedly averse to war with England, ... and it appears to me that

the English name was scarcely ever more popular in Russia than at the

present time."]

[Footnote 167: Letters of July 19th and 29th.]

[Footnote 168: The phrase is that of Viscount Strangford, our

ambassador at Lisbon ("F.O.," Portugal, No. 55). So Baumgarten,

"Geschichte Spaniens," vol. i., p. 136.]

[Footnote 169: Report of the Portuguese ambassador, Lourenço de Lima,

dated August 7th, 1807, inclosed by Viscount Strangford ("F.O.,"

Portugal, No. 55).]

[Footnote 170: This statement as to the date of the summons to

Portugal is false: it was July 19th when he ordered it to be sent,

that is, long before the Copenhagen news reached him.]

[Footnote 171: "Corresp.," No. 12839.]

[Footnote 172: See Lady Blennerhasset's "Talleyrand," vol. ii., ch.

xvi., for a discussion of Talleyrand's share in the new policy. This

question, together with many others, cannot be solved, owing to

Talleyrand's destruction of most of his papers. In June, 1806, he

advised a partition of Portugal; and in the autumn he is said to have

favoured the overthrow of the Spanish Bourbons. But there must surely

be some connection between Napoleon's letter to him of July 19th,

1807, on Portuguese affairs and the resignation which he persistently

offered on their return to Paris. On August 10th he wrote to the

Emperor that that letter would be the last act of his Ministry

("Lettres inédites de Tall.," p. 476). He was succeeded by Champagny.]

[Footnote 173: "Corresp.," Nos. 13235, 37, 43.]

[Footnote 174: "Corresp.," Nos. 13314 and 13327. So too, to General

Clarke, his new Minister of War, he wrote: "Junot may say anything he

pleases, so long as he gets hold of the fleet" ("New Letters of Nap.,"

October 28th, 1807).]

[Footnote 175: Strangford's despatches quite refute Thiers' confident

statement that the Portuguese answers to Napoleon were planned in

concert with us. I cannot find in our archives a copy of the

Anglo-Portuguese Convention signed by Canning on October 22nd, 1807;

but there are many references to it in his despatches. It empowered us

to occupy Madeira; and our fleet did so at the close of the year. In

April next we exchanged it for the Azores and Goa.]

[Footnote 176: "Corresp.," July 22nd, 1807.]

[Footnote 177: Between September 1st, 1807, and November 23rd, 1807,

he wrote eighteen letters on the subject of Corfu, which he designed

to be his base of operations as soon as the Eastern Question could be

advantageously reopened. On February 8th, 1808, he wrote to Joseph

that Corfu was more important than Sicily, and that "_in the present

state of Europe, the loss of Corfu would be the greatest of

disasters_." This points to his proposed partition of Turkey.]

[Footnote 178: Letter of October 13th, 1807.]

[Footnote 179: "Ann. Register" for 1807, pp. 227, 747.]

[Footnote 180: _Ibid._, pp. 749-750. Another Order in Council

(November 25th) allowed neutral ships a few more facilities for

colonial trade, and Prussian merchantmen were set free (_ibid._, pp.

755-759). In April, 1809, we further favoured the carrying of British

goods on neutral ships, especially to or from the United States.]

[Footnote 181: Bourrienne, "Memoirs." The case against the Orders in

Council is fairly stated by Lumbroso, and by Alison, ch. 50.]

[Footnote 182: Gower reported (on September 22nd) that the Spanish

ambassador at St. Petersburg had been pleading for help there, so as

to avenge this insult.]

[Footnote 183: Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens," vol. i., p. 138.]

[Footnote 184: "Nap. Corresp." of October 17th and 31st, November

13th, December 23rd, 1807, and February 20th, 1808; also Napier,

"Peninsular War," bk. i., ch. ii.]

[Footnote 185: Letter of January 10th, 1808.]

[Footnote 186: Letter of Charles IV. to Napoleon of October 29th,

1807, published in "Murat, Lieutenant de l'Empereur en Espagne,"

Appendix viii.]

[Footnote 187: "New Letters of Napoleon."]

[Footnote 188: "Corresp.," letter of February 25th.]

[Footnote 189: Murat in 1814 told Lord Holland ("Foreign

Reminiscences," p. 131) he had had no instructions from Napoleon.]

[Footnote 190: Thiers, notes to bk. xxix.]

[Footnote 191: "Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la Révolution

d'Espagne, par Nellerto"; also "The Journey of Ferdinand VII. to

Bayonne," by Escoiquiz.]

[Footnote 192: "Corresp.," No. 13696. A careful comparison of this

laboured, halting effusion, with the curt military syle*style of the

genuine letters--and especially with Nos. 93, 94, and 100 of the "New

Letters"--must demonstrate its non-authenticity. Thiers' argument to

the contrary effect is rambling and weak. Count Murat in his recent

monograph on his father pronounces the letter a fabrication of St.

Helena or later. It was first published in the "Mémorial de St.

Hélène," an untrustworthy compilation made by Las Cases after

Napoleon's death from notes taken at St. Helena.]

[Footnote 193: Napoleon had at first intended the Spanish crown for

Louis, to whom he wrote on March 27th: "The climate of Holland does

not suit you. Besides, Holland can never rise from her ruins." Louis

declined, on the ground that his call to Holland had been from heaven,

and not from Napoleon!]

[Footnote 194: Memoirs of Thiébault and De Broglie; so, too, De Rocca,

"La Guerre en Espagne."]

[Footnote 195: See the letter of an Englishman from Buenos Ayres of

September 27th, 1809, in "Cobbett's Register" for 1810 (p. 256),

stating that the new popular Government there was driven by want of

funds, "not from their good wishes to England," to open their ports to

all foreign commerce on moderate duties.]

[Footnote 196: Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," ch. vii. It is not

published in the "Correspondence" or in the "New Letters."]

[Footnote 197: Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. i., ch. iv., and

App. II.]

[Footnote 198: In the conversations which Metternich had with Napoleon

and Talleyrand on and after January 22nd, 1808, he was convinced that

the French Emperor intended to partition Turkey as soon as it suited

him to do so, which would be after he had subjected Spain. Napoleon

said to him: "When the Russians are at Constantinople you will need

France to help you against them."--"Metternich Memoirs," vol. ii., p.

188.]

[Footnote 199: So Soult told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences," p.

171).]

[Footnote 200: Vandal, vol. i., p. 384.]

[Footnote 201: Metternich, "Mems.," vol. ii. p. 298 (Eng. edit.).]

[Footnote 202: I think that Beer (pp. 330-340) errs somewhat in

ranking Talleyrand's work at Erfurt at that statesman's own very high

valuation, which he enhanced in later years: see Greville's "Mems.,"

Second Part, vol. ii., p. 193.]

[Footnote 203: Vandal, vol. i., p. 307.]

[Footnote 204: Sklower, "L'Entrevue de Napoléon avec Goethe"; Mrs.

Austin's "Germany from 1760 to 1814"; Oncken, bk. vii., ch. i. For

Napoleon's dispute with Wieland about Tacitus see Talleyrand, "Mems.,"

vol. i., pt. 5. When the Emperors' carriages were ready for departure,

Talleyrand whispered to Alexander: "Ah! si Votre Majesté pouvait se

tromper de voiture."]

[Footnote 205: "F.O.," Russia, No. 74, despatch of December 9th, 1808.

On January 14th, 1809, Canning signed a treaty of alliance with the

Spanish people, both sides agreeing never to make peace with Napoleon

except by common consent. It was signed when the Spanish cause seemed

desperate; but it was religiously observed.]

[Footnote 206: Madelin's "Fouché," vol. ii., p. 80; Pasquier, vol. i.,

pp. 353-360.]

[Footnote 207: Seeley, "Life and Times of Stein," vol. ii., p. 316;

Hausser, vol. iii., p. 219 (4th edition).]

[Footnote 208: Our F.O. Records show that we wanted to help Austria;

but a long delay was caused by George III.'s insisting that she should

make peace with us first. Canning meanwhile sent £250,000 in silver

bars to Trieste. But in his note of April 20th he assured the Court of

Vienna that our treasury had been "nearly exhausted" by the drain of

the Peninsular War. (Austria, No. 90.)]

[Footnote 209: For the campaign see the memoirs of Macdonald, Marbot,

Lejeune, Pelet and Marmont. The last (vol. iii., p. 216) says that,

had the Austrians pressed home their final attacks at Aspern, a

disaster was inevitable; or had Charles later on cut the French

communications near Vienna, the same result must have followed. But

the investigations of military historians leave no doubt that the

Austrian troops were too exhausted by their heroic exertions, and

their supplies of ammunition too much depleted, to warrant any risky

moves for several days; and by that time reinforcements had reached

Napoleon. See too Angelis' "Der Erz-Herzog Karl."]

[Footnote 210: Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," pp. 205, 323 _et seq._

Desvernois ("Mems.," ch. xii.) notes that after Austerlitz none of

Napoleon's wars had the approval of France.]

[Footnote 211: For the Walcheren expedition see Alison, vol. viii.;

James, vol. iv.; as also for Gambier's failure at Rochefort. The

letters of Sir Byam Martin, then cruising off Danzig, show how our

officers wished to give timely aid to Schill ("Navy Records," vol.

xii.).]

[Footnote 212: Captain Boothby's "A Prisoner of France," ch. iii.]

[Footnote 213: For Charles's desire to sue for peace after the first

battles on the Upper Danube, see Häusser, vol. iii., p. 341; also,

after Wagram, _ib._, pp. 412-413.]

[Footnote 214: Napier, bk. viii., chs. ii. and iii. In the App. of

vol. iii. of "Wellington's Despatches" is Napoleon's criticism on the

movements of Joseph and the French marshals. He blames them for their

want of _ensemble_, and for the precipitate attack which Victor

advised at Talavera. He concluded: "As long as you attack good troops

like the English in good positions, without reconnoitring them, you

will lead men to death _en pure perte_."]