which is, that when States lying north of 36 deg. 30' apply for
admission, slavery shall be prohibited in their constitutions. I
presume no one pretends that Congress could have power thus to
fetter a State applying for admission into this Union; but it was
necessary to preserve the principle of the Missouri Compromise
line, in order that it might afterward be extended, and it was
supposed that while Congress had no power to impose any such
limitation, yet, as that was a compact with the State of Texas,
that State could consent for herself, that, when any portion of
her own territory, subject to her own jurisdiction and control,
applied for a constitution, it should be in a particular form; but
that provision would not be binding on the new State one day after
it was admitted into the Union. The other provision was, that such
States as should lie south of 36 deg. 30' min. should come into the
Union with or without slavery, as each should decide, in its
constitution. Then, by that act, the Missouri Compromise was
extended indefinitely westward, so far as the State of Texas went,
that is, to the Rio del Norte; for our Government at the time
recognized the Rio del Norte as its boundary. We recognized it, in
many ways, and among them by even paying Texas for it, in order
that it might be included in and form a portion of the territory
of New Mexico.
"Then, sir, in 1848, we acquired from Mexico the country between
the Rio del Norte and the Pacific Ocean. Immediately after that
acquisition, the Senate, on my own motion, voted into a bill a
provision to extend the Missouri Compromise indefinitely westward
to the Pacific Ocean, in the same sense and with the same
understanding with which it was originally adopted. That provision
passed this body by a decided majority, I think by ten at least,
and went to the House of Representatives, and was defeated there
by northern votes.
"Now, sir, let us pause and consider for a moment. The first time
that the principles of the Missouri Compromise were ever
abandoned, the first time they were ever rejected by Congress, was
by the defeat of that provision in the House of Representatives in
1848. By whom was that defeat effected? By northern votes with
free soil proclivities. It was the defeat of that Missouri
Compromise that reopened the slavery agitation with all its fury.
It was the defeat of that Missouri Compromise that created the
tremendous struggle of 1850. It was the defeat of that Missouri
Compromise that created the necessity for making a new compromise
in 1850. Had we been faithful to the principles of the Missouri
Compromise in 1848, this question would not have arisen. Who was
it that was faithless? I undertake to say it was the very men who
now insist that the Missouri Compromise was a solemn compact, and
should never be violated or departed from. Every man who is now
assailing the principle of the bill under consideration, so far as
I am advised, was opposed to the Missouri Compromise in 1848. The
very men who now arraign me for a departure from the Missouri
Compromise are the men who successfully violated it, repudiated
it, and caused it to be superseded by the compromise measures of
1850. Sir, it is with rather bad grace that the men who proved
false themselves should charge upon me and others, who were over
faithful, the responsibilities and consequences of their own
treachery.
"Then, sir, as I before remarked, the defeat of the Missouri
Compromise in 1848 having created the necessity for the
establishment of a new one in 1850, let us see what that
Compromise was.
* * * * *
"Mr. President, I repeat that so far as the question of slavery is
concerned, there is nothing in the bill under consideration which
does not carry out the principle of the compromise measures of
1850, by leaving the people to do as they please, subject only to
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. If that
principle is wrong, the bill is wrong. If that principle is right,
the bill is right. It is unnecessary to quibble about phraseology
or words; it is not the mere words, the mere phraseology, that our
constituents wish to judge by. They wish to know the legal effect
of our legislation.
"The legal effect of this bill, if it be passed as reported by the
Committee on Territories, is neither to legislate slavery into
these territories, nor out of them; but to leave the people to do
as they please, under the provisions and subject to the
limitations of the Constitution of the United States. Why should
not this principle prevail? Why should any man, North or South,
object to it? I will especially address the argument to my own
section of country, and ask why should any northern man object to
this principle? If you will review the history of the slavery
question in the United States, you will see that all the great
results in behalf of free institutions which have been worked out,
have been accomplished by the operation of this principle and by
it alone.
"When these States were colonies of Great Britain, every one of
them was a slaveholding province. When the Constitution of the
United States was formed, twelve out of the thirteen were
slaveholding States. Since that time six of those States have
become free. How has this been effected? Was it by virtue of
abolition agitation in Congress? Was it in obedience to the
dictates of the Federal Government? Not at all; but they have
become free States under the silent but sure and irresistible
working of that great principle of self-government, which teaches
every people to do that which the interests of themselves and
their posterity, morally and pecuniarily, may require.
"Under the operation of this principle, New Hampshire became free,
while South Carolina continued to hold slaves; Connecticut
abolished slavery, while Georgia held on to it; Rhode Island
abandoned the institution, while Maryland preserved it; New York,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania abolished slavery, while Virginia,
North Carolina, and Kentucky, retained it. Did they do it at your
bidding! Did they do it at the dictation of the Federal
Government? Did they do it in obedience to any of your Wilmot
Provisoes or Ordinances of '87? Not at all; they did it by virtue
of their rights as freemen under the Constitution of the United
States, to establish and abolish such institutions as they thought
their own good required.
"The leading feature of the Compromise of 1850 was Congressional
non-intervention as to slavery in the territories; that the people
of the territories and of all the States, were to be allowed to do
as they pleased upon the subject of slavery, subject only to the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
"That, sir, was the leading feature of the compromise measures of
1850. Those measures, therefore, abandoned the idea of a
geographical line as a boundary between free States and slave
States--abandoned it because compelled to do it from an inability
to maintain it--and in lieu of that substituted a great principle
of self-government, which would allow the people to do as they
thought proper. Now the question is, when that new compromise,
resting upon that great fundamental principle of freedom, was
established, was it not an abandonment of the old one--the
geographical line? Was it not a supersedure of the old one, within
the very language of the substitute for the bill which is now
under consideration? I say it did supersede it, because it applied
its provisions as well to the north as to the south of 36 deg. 30'. It
established a principle which was equally applicable to the
country north as well as south of the parallel of 36 deg. 30'--a
principle of universal application."
Mr. Douglas's bill passed both branches of Congress and became a law,
after passing through a severe ordeal both in Congress and before the
people. Its passage gave the popular branch of the next Congress into
the control of Mr. Douglas's political enemies, for the bill in a
majority of the free States was very unpopular.
On the first Monday in December, 1857, Mr. Douglas took his seat in
the Senate with many anxious eyes upon him, for it had already been
rumored that he would differ with the administration upon its conduct
of Kansas affairs, and would take issue with the President in his
forthcoming message. Rumor was right--the message was read--it did in
effect recommend the indorsement of the Lecompton Constitution--and
Mr. Douglas had the courage and boldness to stand up in defence of his
peculiar doctrines of popular sovereignty, which he thought had been
violated by the Lecompton Constitution. His great opening speech was
delivered on the ninth of December, 1857. The President's message had
been read the day previous and Mr. Douglas had indicated his purpose
on the next day to speak upon it. Accordingly when the Senate
assembled on Tuesday, the old Senate-hall was crowded to its utmost
capacity and hundreds were unable to effect an entrance. The curiosity
of the public to learn the position which the Illinois senator would
take upon this important question was intense, and many of the members
of the house were present. Mr. D. rose, apparently as cool as he ever
was in his life, although, in the opinion of some of his Democratic
friends, his decision, which after careful thought he had reached, to
oppose the Lecompton Constitution, would ruin all his political
prospects. He began by quoting the peculiar language of the
President's message, and, perhaps in a vein of irony, contended that
the President was opposed to this Lecompton Constitution, which,
though under the circumstances he was for accepting, he did not like.
It was evident that the President, in his absence at a foreign court,
had fallen into an error in reference to the principle of the Nebraska
bill. We now quote Mr. Douglas:
"Now, sir, what was the principle enunciated by the authors and
supporters of that bill, when it was brought forward? Did we not
come before the country and say that we repealed the Missouri
restriction for the purpose of substituting and carrying out as a
general rule the great principle of self-government, which left
the people of each State and each Territory free to form and
regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject
only to the Constitution of the United States? In support of that
proposition, it was argued here, and I have argued it wherever I
have spoken in various States of the Union, at home and abroad,
everywhere I have endeavored to prove that there was no reason why
an exception should be made in regard to the slavery question. I
have appealed to the people, if we did not all agree, men of all
parties, that all other local and domestic questions should be
submitted to the people. I said to them, 'We agree that the people
shall decide for themselves what kind of a judiciary system they
will have; we agree that the people shall decide what kind of a
school system they will establish; we agree that the people shall
determine for themselves what kind of a banking system they will
have, or whether they will have any banks at all; we agree that
the people may decide for themselves what shall be the elective
franchise in their respective States; they shall decide for
themselves what shall be the rule of taxation and the principles
upon which their finance shall be regulated; we agree that they
may decide for themselves the relations between husband and wife,
parent and child, guardian and ward; and why should we not then
allow them to decide for themselves the relations between master
and servant? Why make an exception of the slavery question, by
taking it out of that great rule of self-government which applies
to all the other relations of life? The very first proposition in
the Nebraska bill was to show that the Missouri restriction,
prohibiting the people from deciding the slavery question for
themselves, constituted an exception to a general rule, in
violation of the principle of self-government; and hence that that
exception should be repealed, and the slavery question, like all
other questions, submitted to the people, to be decided for
themselves.
"Sir, that was the principle on which the Nebraska bill was
defended by its friends. Instead of making the slavery question an
exception, it removed an odious exception which before existed.
Its whole object was to abolish that odious exception, and make
the rule general, universal in its application to all matters
which were local and domestic, and not national or federal. For
this reason was the language employed which the President has
quoted; that the eighth section of the Missouri act, commonly
called the Missouri Compromise, was repealed, because it was
repugnant to the principle of non-intervention, established by the
compromise measures of 1850, 'it being the true intent and meaning
of this act, not to legislate slavery into any territory or State,
nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof
perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in
their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United
States.' We repealed the Missouri restriction because that was
confined to slavery. That was the only exception there was to the
general principle of self-government. That exception was taken
away for the avowed and express purpose of making the rule of
self-government general and universal, so that the people should
form and regulate all their domestic institutions in their own
way.
"Sir, what would this boasted principle of popular sovereignty
have been worth, if it applied only to the negro, and did not
extend to the white man? Do you think we could have aroused the
sympathies and the patriotism of this broad Republic, and have
carried the Presidential election last year, in the face of a
tremendous opposition, on the principle of extending the right of
self-government to the negro question, but denying it as to all
the relations affecting white men? No, sir. We aroused the
patriotism of the country and carried the election in defence of
that great principle, which allowed all white men to form and
regulate their domestic institutions to suit
themselves--institutions applicable to white men as well as to
black men--institutions applicable to freemen as well as to
slaves--institutions concerning all the relations of life, and not
the mere paltry exception of the slavery question.
"Sir, I have spent too much strength and breath, and health, too,
to establish this great principle in the popular heart, now to see
it frittered away by bringing it down to an exception that applies
to the negro, and does not extend to the benefit of the white man.
* * * * *
"So far as the act of the territorial Legislature of Kansas,
calling this convention, was concerned, I have always been under
the impression that it was fair and just in its provisions. I have
always thought the people should have gone together, _en masse_,
and voted for delegates, so that the voice expressed by the
convention should have been the unquestioned and united voice of
the people of Kansas. I have always thought that those who stayed
away from that election stood in their own light, and should have
gone and voted, and should have furnished their names to be put on
the registered list, so as to be voters. I have always held that
it was their own fault that they did not thus go and vote; but
yet, if they chose, they had a right to stay away. They had a
right to say that that convention, although not an unlawful
assemblage, is not a legal convention to make a government, and
hence we are under no obligation to go and express any opinion
about it. They had a right to say, if they chose, 'We will stay
away until we see the Constitution they shall frame, the petition
they shall send to Congress; and when they submit it to us for
ratification, we will vote for it if we like it, or vote it down
if we do not like it.' I say they had a right to do either, though
I thought, and think yet, as good citizens, they ought to have
gone and voted; but that was their business, and not mine.
"Having thus shown that the convention at Lecompton had no power,
no authority, to form and establish a government, but had power to
draft a petition, and that petition, if it embodied the will of
the people of Kansas, ought to be taken as such an exposition of
their will, yet, if it did not embody their will, ought to be
rejected. Having shown these facts, let me proceed and inquire
what was the understanding of the people of Kansas when the
delegates were elected? I understand, from the history of the
transaction, that the people who voted for delegates to the
Lecompton Convention, and those who refused to vote, both parties,
understood the Territorial act to mean that they were to be
elected only to frame a constitution, and submit it to the people
for their ratification or rejection. I say that both parties in
that territory, at the time of the election of delegates, so
understood the object of the convention. Those who voted for
delegates did so with the understanding that they had no power to
make a government, but only to frame one for submission; and those
who stayed away did so with the same understanding.
* * * * *
"Now, let us stop to inquire how they redeemed the pledge to
submit the constitution to the people. They first go on and make a
constitution; then they make a schedule, in which they provide
that the constitution, on the 21st of December, the present month,
shall be submitted to all the _bona fide_ inhabitants of the
territory, on that day, for their free acceptance or rejection, in
the following manner, to wit: Thus acknowledging that they were
bound to submit it to the will of the people, conceding that they
had no right to put it into operation without submitting it to the
people, providing in the instrument that they should take effect
from and after the date of its ratification, and not before;
showing that the constitution derives its vitality, in their
estimation, not from the authority of the convention, but from
that vote of the people to which it was to be submitted for their
acceptance or rejection. How is it to be submitted? It shall be
submitted in this form: 'Constitution with Slavery, or
Constitution with no Slavery.' All men must vote for the
constitution, whether they like it or not, in order to be
permitted to vote for or against slavery. Thus a constitution made
by a convention that had authority to assemble and petition for a
redress of grievances, but not to establish a government. A
constitution made under a pledge of honor that it should be
submitted to the people before it took effect; a constitution
which provides on its face, that it shall have no validity, except
what it derives from such submission, is submitted to the people
at an election where all men are at liberty to come forward
freely, without hindrance, and vote for it, but no man is
permitted to record a vote against it.
"That would be as fair an election as some of the enemies of
Napoleon attributed to him when he was elected first consul. He is
said to have called out his troops, and had them reviewed by his
officers with a speech, patriotic and fair in its professions, in
which he said to them: 'Now, my soldiers, you are to go to the
election, and vote freely just as you please. If you vote for
Napoleon, all is well; vote against him, and you are to be
instantly shot.' That was a fair election. This election is to be
equally fair. All men in favor of the constitution may vote for
it--all men against it shall not vote at all. Why not let them
vote against it? I presume you have asked many a man this
question. I have asked a very large number of the gentlemen who
framed the constitution, quite a number of the delegates, and a
still larger number of persons who are their friends, and I have
received the same answer from every one of them. I never received
any other answer, and I presume we never shall get any other
answer. What is that? They say, if they allowed a negative vote,
the constitution would have been voted down by an overwhelming
majority, and hence the fellows shall not be allowed to vote at
all.
* * * * *
"Let me ask you, why force this constitution down the throats of
the people of Kansas, in opposition to their wishes and in
violation of our pledges. What great object is to be attained?
_Cui bono_? What are you to gain by it! Will you sustain the party
by violating its principles? Do you propose to keep the party
united by forcing a division? Stand by the doctrine that leaves
the people perfectly free to form and regulate their institutions
for themselves, in their own way, and your party will be united
and irresistible in power. Abandon that great principle, and the
party is not worth saving, and cannot be saved after it shall be
violated. I trust we are not to be rushed upon this question. Why
shall it be done? Who is to be benefited? Is the South to be the
gainer? Is the North to be the gainer? Neither the North nor the
South has the right to gain a sectional advantage by trickery or
fraud.
"But I am beseeched to wait until I hear from the election, on the
21st of December. I am told that perhaps that will put it all
right, and will save the whole difficulty. How can it? Perhaps
there may be a large vote. There may be a large vote returned. But
I deny that it is possible to have a fair vote on the slavery
clause; and I say that it is not possible to have any vote on the
constitution. Why wait for the mockery of an election, when it is
provided, unalterably, that the people cannot vote when the
majority are disfranchised?
"But I am told on all sides, 'Oh, just wait; the pro-slavery
clause will be voted down.' That does not obviate any of my
objections; it does not diminish any of them. You have no more
right to force a free-State constitution on Kansas than a
slave-State constitution. If Kansas wants a slave-State
constitution, she has a right to it; if she wants a free-State
constitution she has a right to it. It is none of my business
which way the slavery clause is decided. I care not whether it is
voted down or voted up. Do you suppose, after the pledge of my
honor that I would go for that principle, and leave the people to
vote as they chose, that I would now degrade myself by voting one
way if the slavery clause be voted down, and another way if it be
voted up? I care not how that vote may stand. I take it for
granted that it will be voted out. I think I have seen enough in
the last three days to make it certain that it will be returned
out, no matter how the vote may stand.
"Sir, I am opposed to that concern, because it looks to me like a
system of trickery and jugglery to defeat the fair expression of
the will of the people. There is no necessity for crowding this
measure, so unfair, so unjust as it is in all its aspects, upon
us. Why can we not now do what we proposed to do in the last
Congress? We then voted through the Senate an enabling act, called
'the Toombs bill,' believed to be just and fair in all its
provisions, pronounced to be almost perfect by the senator from
New Hampshire (Mr. Hale), only he did not like the man, then
President of the United States, who would have to make the
appointments. Why can we not take that bill, and, out of
compliment to the President, add to it a clause taken from the
Minnesota act, which he thinks should be a general rule, requiring
the constitution to be submitted to the people, and pass that?
That unites the party. You all voted, with me, for that bill, at
the last Congress. Why not stand by the same bill now? Ignore
Lecompton, ignore Topeka; treat both those party movements as
irregular and void; pass a fair bill--the one that we framed
ourselves when we were acting as a unit; have a fair election, and
you will have peace in the Democratic party, and peace throughout
the country, in ninety days. The people want a fair vote. They
never will be satisfied without it. They never should be satisfied
without a fair vote on their constitution.