CHAPTER III

THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN

“’Tis such, a tender thoughtfulness! So exquisite a care!

Not to pile on our fair shoulders what we do not wish to bear!

But, oh, most generous brother! let us look a little more—

Have we women always wanted what you gave to us before?”

CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN.

I have said that the women who are in the movement are craving two

things, knowledge and scope. Many of those who are obstructing the

movement are loud in their professions that they, too, want women to know

more—about “womanly” matters; that they, too, desire that women should be

allowed to do—what they are “fit” for. And when the inquirer asks what

is womanly, and who is to be the arbiter, the reactionary replies, with

a pitying smile, that it is surely not necessary at this period in the

world’s history to ask what is womanly, and that the inquirer is rather

perverse than honest; that human nature is the same all the world over,

and much more particularly female human nature; that wise men down all

the ages have written books showing that women are instinctive rather

than logical, governed by the emotions, devoted to the individual and

regardless of the whole, incapable of concerted action; and that these

properties of woman, at any rate of normal woman, are specially devised

by Nature for the making of good mothers and for nothing else, and that,

moreover, the burden of motherhood which Nature has imposed upon women is

so great that they have, or should have, no time or capacity for anything

outside the exercise of that function.

I wish to declare at the outset that in my opinion any speculations about

women, any schemes for their education and their life-conditions which do

not take into account the fact that they alone can be the mothers of the

race, are thereby rendered worthless and foolish. We have not to consider

one generation only; even if some philosophers desire to do so, and if

individuals here and there, as they do and always will, achieve it, the

greatest of all impulses will drive to reproduction, and the strongest

of all desires, after those for self-preservation and self-fulfilment

(and frequently even before these), will be the desire of re-living in

the children and re-living better than now. I use the word re-living not

to mean that there is any survival of the conscious personality of the

individual in successive generations, but to suggest the imaginative and

purely altruistic contemplation of future generations which shall reap

where we have sown; this, I believe, is one of the deepest and purest

of those motive forces which lie beyond explanation or justification.

And when I have said this is my opinion, I wish to add that in a large

and varied experience of the so-called feminist movement, in England and

abroad, I have found the importance of motherhood more fully understood

and more religiously proclaimed by the women in the movement than by

any other women. That they are in revolt against much that law and

custom have laid upon motherhood is undoubted; also that they understand

motherhood in a far wider sense than the vulgar one, and that they do not

regard it as a specialised or vocational affair. It has been customary to

divide female humans into women and mothers; this is altogether false.

Women should not be trained to be mothers; to do so at once introduces

all sorts of arbitrary limitations and restrictions and hampers the very

mission it is designed to serve. Women should be trained to be whole

human beings; the measure of a woman’s motherhood, like the measure of

her love, is the measure of her whole nature. Cramp her nature, limit her

activities, and you cramp and limit her love and her motherhood.

Of course the reactionary replies that we are demanding for women more

than men have. That, if women have this great burden of motherhood, which

men have not, the rest of the load must be lightened in proportion. We

may all heartily agree that the load should be lightened, but who is

to decide upon that portion of it from which women are to be exempt?

Men only? Do we not find that reactionaries describe as a burden and a

care what progressives regard as a tool or a weapon? There are people

now, who, knowing that men have thought the franchise of such supreme

importance that they have rioted and fought and died during centuries of

the world’s history for the right to choose who should be their rulers,

yet assert that to give women an equal share in that choice would be to

impose a fresh burden upon them! In effect these people claim that women

do their work better when it is left to men to decide what that work

shall be and under what conditions it shall be performed; that, although

woman is the guardian of the race, and bears the burden of motherhood, it

is still to be left to man to dictate the terms of motherhood.

To us, on the other hand, it seems that no distinction of race or class

is so fundamental and ineradicable as the distinction of sex. Breeds may

be mixed, a rich man may become poor, or a poor man rich; a man may begin

life as an employed person, and end it as an employer, or _vice versa_;

alone from the cradle to the grave, man is man and woman is woman. When I

insist on this I do not overlook all the interesting and as yet unproven

speculations that are made as to the varying degrees of maleness and

femaleness that there may be in different individuals, nor do I subscribe

to the endless cocksure generalisings upon sexual variation (for until

we can separate acquired from inherited characteristics, we shall never

get very far); I am content to base the essential differences between

men and women upon the known fact that their share in reproduction is

different and produces difference of life, needs and temperament. How is

it possible then, more peculiarly in sex-relations, for men alone wisely

to prescribe to women?

For example. Because willingness to sacrifice is one of the attributes of

motherhood, it is too often assumed that the sacrifice of the woman must

be for the good of the race. Nature gives to each child two parents; man

in his wisdom makes the laws which assign one only, mother or father, as

may be most expedient for him,—never both,—and when he discusses racial

problems, he is very apt to attribute any shortcomings to the woman, who

“has only one task to perform and performs that badly.” He forgets that

the child may inherit not only personal qualities but racial poisons

from the father as from the mother, and that the liberty he denies the

woman in sexual relations (giving as his reason the sacredness of the

home and the family) has too often been used by him to the great damage

of the race. He forgets, too, that whereas fatherhood is voluntary,

motherhood by far too often is not. He adds laws to laws, dealing with

factories and workshops, and leaves the mother’s factory—the home—to take

its chance in the _sauve-qui-peut_ of industrialism. In Great Britain

he contrives a National Health Insurance Act and leaves out altogether

from its compulsory provisions the health of the mother in the home,

except for maternity benefit. In this same Insurance Act he arranges that

the maidens shall pay for the widows, and the women shall pay for the

unmarried mothers. And when death has removed the one parent whom the

law allows, public provision and private charity alike have seldom any

consolation to offer the widow who has lost her dearest, but to remove

from her motherly care all or some of the children left to her (now

undisputed) ownership. All these cruelties and absurdities are possible

because of the subjection of women.

Reactionaries on the women’s question may be divided into sentimental

and brutal reactionaries. The sentimentalists declare (very often in the

same breath) that women are not in subjection, and that they like being

in subjection, that progress lies along the lines of specialisation,

and that women should not “interfere” with men’s work. Women, they

aver, are not inferior to men, but true economy is shown by increased

division of labour: man’s to command, woman’s to obey. There is to be a

specialisation in the virtues, too. “Can we ever have,” asks Mr. Frederic

Harrison pathetically, “too much sympathy, generosity, tenderness and

purity? Can self-devotion, long-suffering and affection ever be a drug in

the market? Can our homes ever be too cheerful, too refined, too sweet

and affectionate? And is it degrading the sex of woman to dedicate her

specially to this task?”[2] (To me it seems “degrading the sex” of man

to suggest that he has no need to practise all these fine qualities,

but that he will practise them vicariously through woman, who is to be

dedicated specially to them.) The sentimentalists suggest that this

willing service women have for centuries rendered to men, and been happy

and good. The bold bad feminists have wantonly stirred up revolt, and

peace and happiness will only return when they have been routed and the

“awful rule and right supremacy” of man re-established.

I think we may dismiss without much argument the assertion that women are

not in subjection, and indeed, sooner or later, the reactionary always

gets tripped up on this ground. It is not possible to study our social

institutions without coming to the conclusion that they are the result

of the subjection of women and that many of them tend to perpetuate

that subjection. It is inconceivable that women, of their free and

enlightened will, would have chosen this position. That some women are

found to maintain that it is not subjection and they like it, is only a

proof of the mental and moral effects of subjection upon them. There is

a brave spirit which declares that “Stone walls do not a prison make,

Nor iron bars a cage,” and much of women’s work has been done in that

spirit. Exceptional women have triumphed over their prison (at what

cost the life of the Brontës may show), but the world is not composed

of exceptional women, and the mass of women have been degraded by the

narrowness and irresponsibility of their lives. One is familiar with the

idealistic assertion that no one can injure you except you yourself. It

is a fine thing to hold to your sovereign will and force it to command

your life, but who can look round on the world as it is and not see

everywhere signs of how men and women degrade their fellows by cruelty,

carelessness and greed? It sounds like cant to tell the girl and boy who

have been reared in a slum and have never known decency that they need

not have allowed themselves to be degraded. It sounds like cant to tell

a woman she is not in subjection to men’s law when this law does not

allow that she is the parent of the child she has borne, and when men can

at any time, and do, deprive her of the inviolability of her own body

and of the right to earn an honest livelihood. No, it is not arguable

whether women nearly all over the world (and certainly in England) are in

subjection, and I do not intend to argue it. The only questions are, How

came they so? Are the causes eternal and irremovable? Would it be well if

they were removed?

I confess to a much higher regard for the honest brutalitarian than for

the sentimentalist; for the man or woman who says candidly that women

are subject to men because they are inferior to men, either physically,

or intellectually, or both. Even among these there is a tendency to

allow, with a shrug, the moral superiority of women, and one is left

wondering whether this admission shows the greater contempt for women or

for morality. But a few thinkers, more robust and far more logical (for

a fine morality is not separable from intellectual force) go the whole

way and assert that women as a whole are morally inferior to men as a

whole. They say women are notoriously less brave and less truthful than

men; their unselfishness is weakness or slavishness, their continence

is due to coldness or compulsion. I propose to deal with the physical

superiority of men in the next chapter. With regard to their mental and

moral superiority, it is an interminable discussion, which is mostly

conducted entirely by the light of one’s predispositions, and which leads

nowhere. There does not seem much that can be profitably said about it

except this: that until the incubus of brute force is removed from those

who have a smaller share of it, we shall never know what other force

they may have. Some of the faults attributed to women are manifestly

the faults encouraged by subjection. Men’s standards have been applied

to women, and it may be that they do not suit women. As barriers have

been removed, so many of the old confident assertions about women have

evaporated that the scientific mind will suspend judgment for a while.

It is quite true that in music, painting, sculpture, poetry, no woman

has ever yet attained to the highest that men have attained. It may be

that women’s lack of genius in the arts is due to some inferiority of

mind, or it may be due to an essential incapacity for or an artificial

prohibition of the passionate, concentrated egoism, which alone can

produce the greatest works of imagination. The special pleader against

women will declare that if they had any capacity at all, it would have

shown itself in music and painting, for young ladies have always been

encouraged to sing and to play and to sketch. And as for poetry, it is

only necessary to have pencil and paper and—genius. As if the kind of

parlour tricks that used to be expected of marriageable young ladies had

any relation at all to creative art! The eighteenth century or early

Victorian parent had a short way with any daughter who wished to take any

art seriously. We know how Maria Edgworth humbly submitted to have her

work blue-pencilled by her affectionate but inferior father, how Harriet

Martineau suffered from the endless task of shirt-making, how Jane Austen

hid her compositions under fancy work, lest visitors should suspect she

was that unsexed thing, an artist.

But the whole discussion whether women are mentally inferior to men is

indeed impertinent to the practical issue whether or no women should

have their lives and work controlled by men. Only by liberty of action

and scope for our powers can we develop healthily and harmoniously, and

the fact that so much of a woman’s life and experience lies altogether

outside what a man can experience should surely make men a little

diffident about dictating conditions. The opportunity to develop is not

a reward of virtue nor a prize for genius. Women, as well as men, should

have the fullest possible opportunities for development, not because

they are “equal” to men (a most unfortunate phrase), but because it is

good business, socially speaking, to develop all your human as well as

your material resources. The developed person will be more useful, more

companionable, more reasonable, more happy and more amusing than the

undeveloped. And if man be really the intellectual superior of woman, why

should he fear her competition?

The Future of the Women's Movement · 第 3 / 16 章