The Austrian Campaign
(1809)
On a certain memorable occasion, Walpole is said to have made the
remark, “They are ringing the bells now; they will be wringing their
hands soon!” with reference to a universal outcry for war on the part
of Great Britain. Had it been uttered by an Austrian statesman at the
beginning of 1809, it would have been equally apposite. Thinking men
recognised that the army was not yet prepared to meet Napoleon, despite
the fact that since the Austerlitz campaign of 1805 the improvement of
her military forces had engrossed the attention of Archduke Charles,
the Commander-in-chief. He was convinced that his troops were not ready
to take the field, and he led the peace party solely on this account.
The war party, however, headed by Count Stadion, the able and energetic
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and aided by the Empress, who had
considerable influence over her august husband, proved more powerful.
Its supporters felt confident that as the war in Spain necessarily
occupied so much of Napoleon’s attention, and had drawn off such a
large proportion of his troops, the time to strike was come. Austrian
diplomatists had vainly endeavoured to woo both Russia and Prussia
without success; the Czar had no wish at that moment to break with his
ally; Frederick William trembled for his throne.
In January 1809, war was imminent. Napoleon, deceived as to the real
state of affairs in Spain, set out on his return journey to France
on the 16th. He at once began to organise his forces, Berthier being
placed in command until the Emperor’s arrival at the seat of war.
Napoleon’s explicit instructions were as follows:--
“By the 1st April the corps of Marshal Davout, which broke up from the
Oder and Lower Elbe on the 17th March, will be established between
Nuremberg, Bamberg, and Baireuth: Masséna will be around Ulm: Oudinot
between Augsburg and Donauwörth. From the 1st to the 15th, three French
corps, 130,000 strong, besides 10,000 allies, the Bavarians in advance
on the Iser, and the Würtembergers in reserve, may be concentrated on
the Danube at Ratisbon or Ingolstadt. Strong _têtes-de-pont_ should be
thrown up at Augsburg, to secure the passage of the Lech at Ingolstadt,
in order to be able to debouch to the left bank of the Danube; and
above all at Passau, which should be able to hold out two or three
months. The Emperor’s object is to concentrate his army as soon as
possible at Ratisbon: the position on the Lech is to be assumed only
if it is attacked before the concentration at the former town is
possible. The second corps will be at Ratisbon by the 10th, and on that
day Bessières will also arrive with the reserve cavalry of the Guard:
Davout will be at Nuremberg: Masséna at Augsburg: Lefebvre at one or
two marches from Ratisbon. Headquarters then may be safely established
in that town, in the midst of 200,000 men, guarding the right bank of
the Danube from Ratisbon to Passau, by means of which stream provisions
and supplies of every sort will be procured in abundance. Should the
Austrians debouch from Bohemia or Ratisbon, Davout and Lefebvre should
fall back on Ingolstadt or Donauwörth.”
On the 9th April, when hostilities began, the strength of Napoleon’s
forces was as follows:--His newly-named Army of Germany, on the
Danube, numbered 174,000 troops, including some 54,000 of the Rhenish
Confederacy; the Army of Italy consisted of 68,000; in Saxony there
were about 20,000; in Poland 19,000; in Dalmatia 10,500. Consequently
the Emperor had 291,500 troops at his disposal, some 275,000 of whom
were ready to confront Austria by the middle of the month. This is an
enormous number when it is remembered that he was still at war with
Spain, where 300,000 men were engaged, but he had had recourse to his
old plan of forestalling the conscription, whereby he had obtained
80,000 recruits.
The Austrian forces were divided into three armies: that of Germany,
under Archduke Charles, consisting of 189,684 troops; of Italy, under
Archduke John, totalling 64,768, including those for action in Tyrol
under Chasteler; and of Galicia, under Archduke Ferdinand, with 35,400;
in all 289,852. The Reserves, made up of the _landwehr_ and _levées en
masse_ reached 244,247, but as Mr F. Loraine Petre points out in his
masterly study of this campaign, only some 15,000 of the _landwehr_
were used with the active army at the beginning of hostilities.
“There was little of the spirit of war in the _landwehr_,” he adds,
“and discipline was very bad. One battalion attacked and wounded its
chief with the bayonet. Two others refused to march. Eleven Bohemian
battalions could only be got to march when regular troops were added
to them. Even then they only averaged about 500 men each, and those
badly equipped and armed.” But while this organisation was of little
practical service at the moment, it was creating a healthy public
opinion which could not fail to be beneficial in the years to come.
Already Napoleon’s military glory was beginning to decline. In some of
his principles he “became false to himself,” he omitted to make his
orders to his subordinates sufficiently clear, and on one occasion,
in the early stage of the campaign, threw away “chances of a decisive
battle which would then probably have made an end of the war.” He also
exhibited the utmost contempt for a country which “had profited by the
lessons he had taught her,” with the result that “her armies, and her
commander-in-chief, were very different from the troops and leaders of
1796 and 1805,” when he had crossed swords with Austria.
Yet another failing is pointed out by Mr Petre. “Napoleon’s wonderful
successes in every previous campaign,” he notes, “and the height to
which his power had risen, by the practical subjugation of all Europe
to his dominion, tended to fan the flame of his pride, to make him deem
himself invincible and infallible, to cause him to assume that what he
desired was certain to happen. The wish now began to be father to the
thought. Of this we shall find numerous instances in this campaign, the
most notable, perhaps, being when, notwithstanding Davout’s positive
assertions that the greater part of the Austrian army was in front
of himself, the Emperor persisted in believing that Charles was in
full retreat on Vienna by the right bank of the Danube. His constant
over-estimates of his own forces, not in bulletins but in letters to
his generals and ministers, are other examples of this failing.”
The campaign opened in Bavaria, where 176,000 Austrians assembled early
in April 1809. Berthier, doubtless acting for the best as he conceived
it, instead of concentrating at Ratisbon, Ingolstadt or Donauwörth
according to orders, had seen fit to scatter his forces, “in the
dangerous view,” as Alison puts it, “of stopping the advance of the
Austrians at all points.” As a result of Berthier’s blunder Davout at
Ratisbon and Masséna at Augsburg were thirty-five leagues from each
other, and Archduke Charles with 100,000 troops were interposed between
them. About Ingolstadt were the Bavarians under Wrede, Lefebvre, and
the reserve under Oudinot, the only forces available to oppose the
Austrians, whose march, fortunately for the French, was extremely slow.
The Emperor arrived at Donauwörth on the 17th April, and at once saw
the danger. “What you have done appears so strange,” he wrote to
Berthier, “that if I was not aware of your friendship I should think
you were betraying me; Davout is at this moment more completely at the
disposal of the Archduke than of myself.”
It was Napoleon’s task to bring the two armies in touch with each other
so that a combined movement might become possible. “One word will
explain to you the urgency of affairs,” the Emperor wrote to Masséna
on the 18th. “Archduke Charles, with 80,000 men, debouched yesterday
from Landshut on Ratisbon; the Bavarians contended the whole day with
the advanced guard. Orders have been dispatched to Davout to move
with 60,000 troops in the direction of Neustadt, where he will form
a junction with the Bavarians. To-morrow (19th) all your troops who
can be mustered at Pfaffenhofen, with the Würtembergers, a division of
cuirassiers, and every man you can collect, should be in a condition
to fall on the rear of Archduke Charles. A single glance must show
you that never was more pressing occasion for diligence and activity
than at present. With 60,000 good troops, Davout may indeed make head
against the Archduke; but I consider him ruined without resource, if
Oudinot and your three divisions are on his rear before daybreak on
the 19th, and you inspire the soldiers with all they should feel on so
momentous an occasion. Everything leads us to the belief that between
the 18th, 19th, and 20th, all the affairs of Germany will be decided.”
On the 19th Davout withdrew from Ratisbon, leaving only the 65th French
infantry to guard the bridge over the Danube, and after a severe but
indecisive action at Haussen, reached Abensberg in the evening, thereby
effecting his junction with Lefebvre. At Pfaffenhofen Masséna defeated
a body of the enemy and remained there. Archduke Charles had foolishly
divided his army, and while he was marching on Ratisbon, Archduke
Louis and Hiller, with 42,000 troops forming the Austrian left wing,
were brought to action at Abensberg by Napoleon on the 20th. The day
remained with the French, who numbered 55,000, their enemies losing
over 2700 killed and wounded, and some 4000 prisoners. According to
Mr Petre, about 25,000 soldiers only on either side came into action.
The defeated Austrians retreated in the direction of Landshut, several
of the energetic Bavarian battalions following them. After a spirited
fight, during which ammunition ran out and many men were killed and
wounded, the solitary regiment which held Ratisbon was forced to
surrender on the same day, half the troops of the 65th being taken
prisoners.
On the morning of the 21st Napoleon renewed the battle against the
Austrian left. About 9000 men were added to the enemy’s already
extensive losses, and it had the desired effect of preventing them from
joining the main army. Davout and Lefebvre also engaged the Austrian
centre, which retreated, leaving many wounded and dead on the field.
The Emperor was now ready to give attention to Archduke Charles who,
with 74,000 troops, was bent on destroying Davout. The French Marshal
was in a tight corner, the Austrian main army being opposed to him,
and not to Napoleon, as the Emperor had supposed on the morning of
Abensberg. As we have seen, it was only the left wing which he had
defeated on the 20th.
When the Archduke heard that Napoleon was on his track he abandoned
the idea of attacking Davout and made his dispositions to meet the
Emperor. Immediately they came up, the bridge, village, and château of
Eckmühl were captured by the French. The heights were stormed in truly
magnificent style, and a brave attempt was made by the Bavarian cavalry
to capture the enemy’s battery on the Bettelberg, which was doing
considerable execution. They were driven back, but an hour later a
French cuirassier regiment captured the greater part of the guns, with
the result that Rosenberg, the commander of the fourth Austrian army
corps, was forced to retreat. The Emperor then ordered the cavalry and
infantry to pursue the unfortunate Imperialists, who broke away almost
in a panic.
It now became evident that a general retreat was necessary, the
Austrian left wing making in the direction of the river Isar, the main
army, after a further sharp conflict with the enemy, reaching the
Danube, the idea being to retire into the forests of Bohemia. It is
calculated that nearly 10,000 Austrians were killed, wounded, or taken
prisoners on this terrible day.
At St Helena, where, like the old soldiers in Chelsea Hospital,
Napoleon so often “fought his battles o’er again,” he frequently
referred to the battle of Eckmühl. On one occasion he called it “that
superb manœuvre, the finest that I ever executed,” attributing its
indecisiveness to his lack of sleep on the previous night.
Under cover of night, and during the early hours of the morning of the
23rd, the cumbersome baggage of the Imperialists was hurried across the
bridge which spans the Danube at Ratisbon. This was followed by the
retreat of part of the army over a pontoon bridge hastily put together,
the Austrian rear-guard protecting the necessarily slow and somewhat
difficult passage. Nine battalions only remained on the right bank of
the river when Napoleon was making his final preparations to take the
walled town of Ratisbon by assault. Fighting had already begun near the
town. Ladders were secured, and the intrepid Lannes was soon within the
old-time fortress, which speedily capitulated.
In his “Incident of the French Camp” Browning has sung of a lad who
took part in the storming. He depicts Napoleon standing on a little
mound
“With neck out-thrust, you fancy how,
Legs wide, arms locked behind,
As if to balance the prone brow
Oppressive with its mind.”
The Emperor soliloquises that if Lannes “waver at yonder wall” his
plans may miscarry, when--
“Out ’twixt the battery-smokes there flew
A rider, bound on bound
Full-galloping; nor bridle drew
Until he reached the mound.
“Then off there flung in smiling joy,
And held himself erect
By just his horse’s mane, a boy:
You hardly could suspect--
(So tight he kept his lips compressed,
Scarce any blood came through)
You looked twice ere you saw his breast
Was all but shot in two.
“‘Well,’ cried he, ‘Emperor, by God’s grace
We’ve got you Ratisbon!
The Marshal’s in the market-place,
And you’ll be there anon
To see your flag-bird flap his vans
Where I, to heart’s desire,
Perched him!’”
Napoleon’s eye flashed with the pride of victory, but presently:
“Softened itself, as sheathes
A film the mother-eagle’s eye
When her bruised eaglet breathes;
‘You’re wounded!’ ‘Nay,’ the soldier’s pride
Touched to the quick, he said:
‘I’m killed, Sire!’ And his chief beside
Smiling the boy fell dead.”
The Emperor himself was slightly wounded while directing operations.
A spent musket-ball struck his right foot and caused him considerable
pain. “Ah! I am hit,” he remarked quietly, adding with grim humour,
“It must have been a Tyrolese marksman to have struck me at such a
distance. Those fellows fire with wonderful precision.” The matter
soon got noised abroad; the news was passed from rank to rank that the
“little Corporal” was wounded. Anxiety was evident in almost every
face. Men who had seen many a comrade struck down and had not so much
as moved a muscle of their features took on a look of care and of pain
until reassured that the Emperor’s injury was a mere contusion. A
louder cheer was never raised during the whole of his career, than when
Napoleon rode along the lines a little later. Not till then were “his
children” convinced of his safety.
Thus ended what has been called the Campaign of Ratisbon, during
the five days of which, according to Major-General August Keim,
the Imperialists lost nearly 40,000 troops in killed, wounded, and
prisoners. Truly a prodigious number and eloquent proof of the valour
and energy of their opponents.
There was now nothing to prevent Napoleon from presenting himself
before Vienna, but while his troops, flushed with success, were
marching towards that picturesque city, their leader heard grave and
disquieting news. The Bavarians under Wrede had been defeated on
the 24th April by the retreating Austrians+ under Hiller, who was
endeavouring to come up with Archduke Charles. Bessières had also been
forced to retire. In addition Prince Eugène and the army of Italy had
met with disaster at the hands of Archduke John at Sacile eight days
before, and had not an immediate concentration of the various Austrian
armies become essential for the defence of Vienna the consequences must
have been serious.
Marshal Macdonald points out in his “Recollections” that a defeat in
Italy was of secondary importance; the decisive point was Germany.
There is, however, a moral point of view to be taken into consideration
in warfare, to which he also draws attention. “It might have a bad
effect,” he says, “upon the Italian mind, already prejudiced against
us, kept under as they were, but not conquered; and upon that of the
Germans and their armies, although they had been so often beaten, and
their territory so often invaded by us. But they were like the teeth of
Cadmus; no sooner was one army destroyed than another came to take its
place. They seemed to rise out of the ground.” Napoleon was aware that
the Tyrolese had broken out in revolt, and that similar movements were
expected in other places.
It is unnecessary to follow all the Emperor’s movements on his march
to the Imperial city. Bessières, with comparatively few troops at his
disposal, came in conflict with a much larger force under Hiller, and
was repulsed. The Marshal somewhat retrieved this mishap by crossing
the Inn at Passau, where he took several hundred prisoners. These
“affairs” were but skirmishes to the battle of Ebelsberg (sometimes
spelt Ebersberg) on the 3rd May 1809 between General Hiller and the
French vanguard under the impetuous Masséna, at which Napoleon was
not present. Hiller had taken up his position at Ebelsberg, crossing
the long wooden bridge over the turbulent Traun, a tributary of the
Danube, to which admittance was only gained by an extremely narrow
gateway beneath a tower, while the whole structure was at the mercy
of the guns in and near the castle on the heights above. For purposes
of defence the situation approached the ideal, the only thing needed
being a skilful commander. The day proved that the Austrian general
was lacking in nearly all the qualities possessed by the French
officers who opposed him, and was unworthy the men who fought in the
ranks. A desperate struggle led by the fearless Coehorn took place on
the bridge; men were flung into the surging waters below, while the
Austrian artillerymen, perhaps not knowing that many Austrians were
on the frail structure, fired at the combatants on the bridge with
disastrous results to their own side. To make matters worse several
ammunition waggons blew up. It was a repetition of the scene on the
Bridge of Lodi, only the carnage was more terrible. Once across, the
castle became the next objective of the French, but it was not captured
until many a gallant soldier had lost his life in a hand-to-hand
struggle in the town below. Hitherto only a comparatively small number
of Masséna’s troops had maintained the fight, but the Marshal now
hurried fresh men across the bridge to support those engaged with the
enemy. Gradually the men fought their way to the castle, and Mr Petre
tells us that of one regiment which appeared before it, Colonel Pouget,
who commanded, alone escaped without a wound.
“The entrance to the castle,” Mr Petre writes, “was by a vaulted
archway open at the outer end, but closed by a strong wooden gate at
the inner end. Above was a window, closely barred with iron and with
loopholes on either side. From all of these there poured a heavy fire,
especially from the grated window. The losses of the besiegers, as they
stood and returned the fire from the exposed space between the archway
and the mouth of the hollow road, were fearful. Men crowded up to take
part in the fight, which was directed by Pouget from the angle of the
archway, whence he could both see his own men and the grated window.
The French infantry fired as quickly as they could; some even used the
dead bodies of their comrades to raise them more on to a level with the
window. Then Pouget sent for a well-known sportsman, Lieutenant Guyot,
who, taking post within five yards of the window, poured in shots as
fast as loaded muskets could be handed to him by the soldiers. Other
picked marksmen joined him, and, at last, the Austrian fire began to
fail. Sappers had now arrived and were at work breaking in the thick
gate.
“In the enthusiasm of the fight Colonel Baudinot and Sub-Lieutenant
Gérard of the 2nd battalion had managed to get forward, though most
of their battalion was blocked in the narrow road behind. These two
intrepid men, followed by a few others as brave as themselves, managed
to find a way by the cellar ventilators, whence they got into the
castle. Between Gérard and a grenadier of the garrison, who entered
a room on the first floor simultaneously, there was a desperate
encounter, which was not interfered with by the entrance of a third
visitor in the shape of an Austrian round shot. Just at this moment the
gate was broken in, and the garrison, including, presumably, Gérard’s
grenadier, very soon surrendered as prisoners of war.”
Surely no more thrilling adventure than this is to be found in any
story book? And yet it is but one of many that might be related of this
campaign alone, could this volume be extended beyond the present limits.
But the storming of the castle of Ebelsberg was not yet over. The
burning town had been cleared of the Imperialists, who were now pouring
a veritable hail of shot on the besiegers from the surrounding
heights, and their situation was perilous in the extreme, cut off as
they were from their friends and surrounded only by their foes. Why the
Austrians should have begun to retreat when such an opportunity was
offered them to annihilate the enemy is beyond comprehension. Such was
the case, and they hastened towards Enns, leaving two thousand killed
and wounded, and over that number of prisoners. The French also lost
very heavily. Late in the afternoon Napoleon came up, and in company
with Savary, entered the town. He was by no means pleased with the
terrible sights which met him on all sides, and bitterly lamented the
heavy losses which his troops had suffered. Savary states that the
Emperor remarked: “It were well if all promoters of wars could behold
such an appalling picture. They would then discover how much evil
humanity has to suffer from their projects.” If he did thus speak, it
shows how blinded he had become by his own egotism; for Napoleon had
certainly forced the war on unhappy Austria, now sorely discomfited by
the turn events had taken.