CHAPTER XXII

The Genesis of the Peninsular War

(1808)

Although the crown of Spain was not yet worn by a nominee of Napoleon

its present holder, or rather Manuel Godoy, an adventurer who in five

years had risen from private in the Guards to chief Minister, was

careful not to offend the Emperor. Portugal, on the other hand, was a

friend of England, with whom she did a very large trade. Unfortunately

her means of resistance were so weak and unorganised that when the

Emperor of the French called upon the Prince Regent to close the

harbours to British ships and declare war against England he had no

alternative but to obey. A constant menace in the form of 28,000

troops had been stationed at Bayonne, and did not admit of argument.

This Army of the Gironde was composed for the most part of young and

inexperienced conscripts, but they were French, and therefore held to

be invincible. The confiscation of British property was also demanded

by Napoleon, but on this point the Prince Regent temporised, thus

giving the majority of the British residents time to leave the country,

to the wrath of the Emperor. Sufficient of the story of Napoleon has

been told to show that he was no believer in half measures; when a

State hesitated to do his will, swift retribution usually followed.

Orders were immediately issued for Junot to proceed to Spain, where he

would be joined by troops of that nationality, and enter Portugal. On

the other side of the French frontiers the march was only accomplished

with much difficulty, the trackless mountains, swollen rivers, and

almost incessant rain making progress extremely slow and hazardous.

Stricken with panic, the Queen, the Regent, the Royal Family, the Court

and many members of the nobility sailed for Brazil under the protection

of a British fleet commanded by Sir Sidney Smith, the brilliant young

officer who had already crossed Napoleon’s path in Syria. So great was

the fear of the French that no fewer than fourteen cartloads of plate

were left on the quay at Belem. But for the impassable state of the

river Zezere, which prevented Junot from making rapid progress, the

royal fugitives would have been prevented from escaping to Rio Janeiro.

Lisbon was occupied by Junot’s ragged regiments without much trouble. A

strong resistance could scarcely have been expected, seeing what a poor

example had been given to the people by those who ruled them. For a

time it appeared as if everything connected with the French occupation

would be settled satisfactorily. The proclamation issued by Junot, now

Duke of Abrantès and Governor of Portugal, on the 1st February 1808,

made no secret of Napoleon’s intentions.

“The House of Braganza,” it runs, “has ceased to reign in Portugal; and

the Emperor Napoleon, having taken under his protection the beautiful

kingdom of Portugal, wishes that it should be administered and

governed over its whole extent in the name of his Majesty, and by the

General-in-Chief of his army.”

This must have been bitter reading to Godoy. In a secret treaty signed

at Fontainebleau on the 27th October 1807, he had been promised the

southern Portuguese provinces of Alemtejo and Algarve as a Principality

for his connivance and assistance in the downfall of Portugal. Napoleon

was paying him back in his own coin. During the Prussian campaign

Godoy had cherished hostile designs against France, hoping for the

co-operation of either England or Russia. In a proclamation dated the

5th October 1806, he had summoned the Portuguese nation to arms and

but thinly disguised the name of the prospective enemy. The brilliant

field of Jena, however, so radically changed the political aspect that

it was necessary to make other plans, and Godoy put forth every effort

possible to placate Napoleon. The Emperor had not forgotten, however;

he never did, and he returned evil for evil. Having had the assistance

of Spanish troops and the use of Spanish territory for the passage of

his own soldiers, the Emperor found it inconvenient to complete his

part of the bargain, and so the Prince of the Peace, to give Godoy his

official title, went empty away.

Things were far from well with the Royal house of Spain. Charles IV.

and his son Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, had quarrelled, the King

going so far as to have his heir arrested on the charge of plotting

against the throne. The main cause of disagreement was the Prince’s

detestation of Godoy, who at every turn came between him and his

father, and might conceivably rob him of his succession to the throne.

Napoleon, ever eager and willing to make an advantage out of another’s

disadvantage, surmised that the quarrel would enable him to settle the

affairs of the eastern portion of the Peninsula to his liking. Hence

another army of 25,000 men was concentrated at Bayonne which, without

warning, crossed into Spanish territory towards the end of November

1807. Further corps followed until more than 100,000 French soldiers

had traversed the Pyrenees. Citadels and fortresses were seized, often

by bribery or cunning, that of Pampeluna by over-eagerness on the part

of the garrison to secure the French soldiers as contestants in a

snowball-fight. The opportunity was not allowed to slip, and while the

Spaniards were off their guard the new arrivals took possession of the

fort, and remained there till 1813.

The nation correctly associated Godoy with the indignities it was

suffering. His palace at Aranjuez was sacked, and the Favourite was

fortunate in not being lynched by the mob. Finally the King abdicated

in favour of his son, an act which caused more rejoicing than had been

accorded any other event during his reign.

Murat and his troops entered Madrid the day previous to the state entry

of the young monarch. Little interest was shown in the arrival of the

French soldiers, but Ferdinand received an astounding ovation, women in

their enthusiasm scattering flowers before him as he rode. Forty-eight

hours after the event Napoleon offered the Crown of Spain to his

brother Louis, King of Holland.

On one pretext and another Ferdinand, whom Napoleon called “the enemy

of France,” was persuaded to meet the Emperor at Bayonne. During the

interview he was informed that he could have the choice of two evils.

If he would resign his throne the Emperor would give him Etruria as

some kind of compensation, if not he would be deposed. To complicate

the difficulty, Charles IV., at Napoleon’s instigation, withdrew his

abdication, which he declared had been wrung from him by fear, and

did everything in his power to induce his son to accept Napoleon’s

offer. At last the Emperor lost patience, and Ferdinand was given a

few hours to make up his mind whether he would submit or be tried for

high treason. Accordingly, on the 6th May 1808, the King, who had

reigned less than two months, surrendered his throne, as he believed,

to its former occupant, totally unaware that Napoleon had exacted the

resignation of Charles IV. on the previous day. Few more despicable

acts are recorded in history, certainly no better example could be

found of Napoleon’s lack of a sense of honour in political matters.

Spain was now at the Emperor’s disposal. Louis had refused the kingdom,

and so it was handed over to Joseph, Naples being given to Murat, his

brother-in-law. The Emperor lived to repent the day, as did Joseph, who

had endeared himself to the Neapolitans but could never persuade his

Spanish subjects that he was anything but a vulgar upstart trading on

the reputation of his brilliant brother.

Baptiste Capefigue, the eminent French historian, has tersely summed

up the cause of Napoleon’s ultimate failure, and the passages quoted

here have special reference to the events we are now studying.

“Napoleon,” he says, “did not fail through the governments opposed to

him, but through the people; it was when he attacked national feelings

that he met with a stubborn resistance; he had strangely abused his

dictatorial power over Europe; he crushed down nations by his treaties,

and he gave up the populations to kings of his own creation; he broke

territories into fractions, separating that which was before united,

and joining together those parts which were separated; he transformed

a republic into a kingdom; of a free town he made a district of one

of his prefectships; he united the high lands to the plain; simple,

primitive populations to old and corrupt ones, without regard to

diversities of language, or manners, or to religious antipathies. In

Germany, above all, his policy appears most tyrannical; he takes away a

province from one monarchy and gives it to another; he plays with the

masses as if they were chessmen; he creates a kingdom of Westphalia

out of more than twenty States or fragments of States; he detaches

Tyrol from Austria, heedless of traditional customs, institutions, and

manners; Holland, a mercantile republic, he changes into a kingdom;

to Naples, at the extremity of Italy, he sends one of his brothers.

His is an unparalleled despotism, without reason or excuse. The people

are for him like a mute herd of cattle; he pens them up, or drives

them before him with his terrible sword. Add to this the French

spirit, the French character, which, in his pride of a founder of a

great empire, he wished to force upon all Europe, together with his

own code of laws. God has imparted to each of the various nations a

character which is its own; for good or for evil, it is unwise to run

counter to it. Germany has its own morals and manners; Spain has its

inveterate habits--perhaps they dispose to indolence--but what is that

to strangers? Uniformity may be a plausible idea in mathematics; but

in the moral organization of the human kind, harmony is the result of

diversities.”

What is probably a typical summing up of the case from the distinctly

British point of view is afforded us in a letter written by Francis

Horner on the 13th June 1808, in which he says: “I cannot but rejoice

that a people who bear such a name as the Spaniards should make

a struggle at least for their independence; the example cannot be

otherwise than beneficial, even if they should entirely fail, to their

posterity at some future day, and to all the rest of mankind. It is

the most detestable of all the enormities into which Bonaparte’s love

of dominion has plunged him, and more completely devoid than any other

of all the pretence of provocation or security. If I were a Spaniard,

I should consider resistance, however desperate in its chances

of success, and however bloody in its immediate operation, as an

indispensable duty of discretion and expediency; to put the proposition

in its most frigid form of expression.... What a moment for a Spaniard

of political and military genius!”

Pending the arrival of the new monarch, Murat was assigned the

important post of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom. He was a good

cavalry leader beyond question, but as a statesman he did not shine

during the period in which he was dictator of Spain. He let it be

seen that he regarded the nation as already conquered, and it is

not surprising that his tactless rule should have roused bitter

resentment. On the 2nd May there was a riot in Madrid, short and

furious, but indicating the passionate nature of the citizens. Eight

hundred insurgents fell in the streets, perhaps half that number of

soldiers were laid low, and two hundred Spaniards were afterwards shot

by Murat’s orders for having taken part in the rebellion. Many of

the populace had been armed with sticks and stones only, others with

muskets which they used to good effect, both in the squares and from

the housetops. It was only when additional soldiers, including the

Mamelukes, the chasseurs, and dragoons, were brought up that the crowd

realised the hopelessness of the task they had undertaken. If “the

blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church,” the blood of those

who fell in Madrid on that May day in 1808 was the seed from which

the harvest of disaster for Napoleonic statesmanship was reaped. The

despot did not realise the possibility at first, but at St Helena, when

frankness was not always a despised virtue, he told Las Cases that the

Spanish war “was the first cause of the calamities of France.” The

self-confidence of Murat, who said, “My victory over the insurgents in

the capital assures us the peaceable possession of Spain,” a sentiment

in which the Emperor agreed, was speedily dispelled. “Bah!” exclaimed

Napoleon when he was told by an eye-witness of the revolution at Madrid

and the sullen courage of the people, “they will calm down and will

bless me as soon as they see their country freed from the discredit and

disorder into which it has been thrown by the weakest and most corrupt

administration that ever existed.”

While the officials in Madrid were bowing to Joseph, the people in the

provinces were showing by open rebellion that they neither desired

him as king nor wished for Napoleon’s assistance in the ruling of

their country. The priests told the people of the Emperor’s ungenerous

treatment of the Pope, how a French force had entered Rome in the

previous February, and that his Holiness had lost almost every vestige

of his civil power. Every little township began to take measures of

offence and defence. Innumerable miniature armies roamed among the

mountains like bandits, awaiting an opportunity to annihilate a French

outpost, to interrupt communications, or to fall on a division as it

marched along to join one of the army corps now being poured into

Spain. General actions were not encouraged, and usually ended in

disaster. Assassinations and massacres became the order of the day on

both sides, forcing the French commanders to realise that they had to

face a novel kind of warfare--a nation in arms. At the end of May 1808,

when the people were actively organising, there were nearly 120,000

French troops in Spain and Portugal. In the first few engagements the

Spaniards, who possibly numbered 100,000, including the regulars, were

routed. When towns were besieged the French met with less success,

and the defence of Saragossa under young Joseph Palafox, whose daring

soon raised him to the dignity of a national hero, is a most thrilling

episode. A name which must be coupled with his is that of Augustina (or

Manuela) Sanchez. A battery had been abandoned by the Spaniards, and

this brave girl, one of the many inhabitants who helped to defend their

city, found that the hand of a dead gunner still grasped a lighted

match, whereupon she seized it and fired the gun, thereby attracting

the attention of the fugitives, who returned to the fight. The first

siege of Saragossa lasted for nearly eight weeks, but the place

eventually surrendered to Lannes.

Duhesme and his French soldiers met with even worse fortune, being

forced to take refuge in Barcelona, where the Spaniards kept them

secure for nearly four months. At Medina de Rio Seco the insurgents

under La Cuesta and Blake, an Irishman, were completely routed by

Bessières. This event might have weakened the national cause very

considerably had not Dupont’s army been entrapped among the Sierra

Morena mountains by Castaños. In the fighting that took place 3,000

French were either killed or wounded, and 18,000 troops were forced

to lay down their arms at the subsequent capitulation of Baylen.

When Napoleon heard of the victory at Medina de Rio Seco, he wrote:

“Bessières has put the crown on Joseph’s head. The Spaniards have now

perhaps 15,000 men left, with some old blockhead at their head; the

resistance of the Peninsula is ended!” His reception of the news of

Dupont’s surrender was very different. “That an army should be beaten

is nothing,” he burst forth after reading the fatal despatch, “it is

the daily fate of war, and is easily repaired, but that an army should

submit to a dishonourable capitulation is a stain on the glory of

our arms which can never be effaced. Wounds inflicted on honour are

incurable. The moral effect of this catastrophe will be terrible.” The

luckless Dupont was promptly imprisoned on his return to France, and

remained so until 1814.

This trouble did not come singly. It was followed shortly afterwards

by the news that Joseph, feeling that Madrid was no longer secure, had

deemed it advisable to retire in haste to Burgos, behind the Ebro, and

within comparatively easy distance of the frontier. Some three weeks

later Castaños at the head of his troops marched into the capital. The

position of Ferdinand’s successor was speedily becoming untenable.

“I have not a single Spaniard left who is attached to my cause,” he

tells his brother. “As a General, my part would be endurable--nay,

easy; for, with a detachment of your veteran troops, I could conquer

the Spaniards, but as a King my position is insupportable, for I must

kill one portion of my subjects to make the other submit. I decline,

therefore, to reign over a people who will not have me.” He adds that

he does not wish to retire conquered, but pleads for an experienced

army that he may return to Madrid and come to terms with his

rebellious subjects ere seeking the quiet of Naples.

In Portugal Junot, by dint of extreme severity, had succeeded in

disarming the populace and securing the principal fortresses, his

troops being dispersed about the country. His success made him feel so

self-satisfied that he entertained the hope that Napoleon would confer

the crown of Portugal upon him. As a preliminary step he endeavoured to

win over the nobles and clergy. The Emperor had different views, and

while recognising Junot’s unquestionable ability he was not blind to

his shortcomings.

At the same time as King Joseph was retreating from Madrid, 9000

British soldiers under Sir Arthur Wellesley had reached the mouth of

the Mondego River, and, in spite of many difficulties, had effected

a landing. The future Duke of Wellington was not to retain supreme

command, although he had started out with that expectation. After

leaving England he learned that three other officers, namely, Sir Hew

Dalrymple, then Governor of Gibraltar; Sir Harry Burrard, a Guardsman

of some experience; and Sir John Moore, who had previously taken part

in Paoli’s descent on Corsica and seen much honourable service in the

West Indies and Ireland, were to join the expedition. Wellesley was

not pleased at being superseded, but he was too good a soldier to

show resentment. “Whether I am to command the army or not,” he told

the home authorities, “or am to quit it, I shall do my best to secure

its success, and you may depend upon it that I shall not hurry the

operations or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be

commenced, in order that I may reap the credit of success.” Nothing

that he ever wrote or said reveals more truly the unswerving honour

and loyalty of the Iron Duke.

Junot was not particularly perturbed by the news of Wellesley’s

arrival. Small British expeditionary forces had landed again and again

in various parts of the continent since 1793, and usually had been only

too glad to return to England. The French commander noted with pleasure

that the Portuguese showed little sympathy with their allies, so much

so that Sir Arthur had the utmost difficulty to persuade them to lend

assistance. Lisbon was still too disturbed to warrant Junot leaving

it, and he accordingly directed Loison and Laborde to concentrate near

Leiria. Wellesley, however, outmarched them, and prevented them from

combining their forces immediately. On the 15th August he had a smart

skirmish with Laborde, and two days later was victorious at Roleia,

where a stiff battle was fought with the same commander. Unfortunately

Wellesley’s forces were not sufficiently strong to make the victory

decisive or to stop the two forces of the enemy from uniting later.

Junot now found it necessary to assume personal command. Leaving Madrid

with a garrison of 7000 soldiers, he gathered his available forces,

including those of Loison and Laborde, and came up with the British at

Vimiero on the 21st August. Wellesley’s strength was some 18,000 troops

in all, and although Sir Harry Burrard was the senior officer, he did

not exercise his authority until the battle was almost concluded. In

infantry Sir Arthur had the advantage, but Junot, while having but

13,000 men for the task he had undertaken, was considerably better off

in cavalry. One incident in particular relieves the sordid story of

the fight. In a charge made by the 71st and 92nd British regiments a

piper, who was wounded in the thigh, fell to the ground. He continued

to blow his pibroch, declaring that “the lads should nae want music

to their wark.” The day remained with the British, and had Wellesley

been allowed to pursue the French, probably Lisbon would have fallen.

It is said that when Wellesley heard Burrard’s order to abstain from

following the enemy, he remarked to his staff: “There is nothing left

for us, gentlemen, but to hunt red-legged partridges!”

On the suggestion of Junot an armistice was agreed upon. This ended

in the ill-considered Convention of Cintra, signed on the 30th August

1808, whereby Portugal was relieved of 25,000 French invaders. The

troops were conveyed back to France by British ships. Junot was

disgraced in the eyes of the Emperor and received no further command

until the Russian campaign of 1812. His wife, when reviewing this

campaign, says with justice, “Everything which was not a triumph he

(Napoleon) regarded as a defeat.” As no clause was inserted in the

Convention to the effect that the troops should not serve again, it

is not difficult to understand why a popular outcry was raised in

Great Britain against the three generals. It soon became evident that

Wellesley did not merit the attacks made upon Dalrymple, Burrard, and

himself in the Press and elsewhere. An inquiry into the affair was

instituted by command of George III., and its finding was favourable to

the decision of the signatories of the Convention, but only Wellesley

saw active service again. The command in Portugal was given to Sir John

Moore, and meantime Sir Arthur took his seat in the House of Commons

and resumed his work as Irish Secretary, little thinking that in a few

months he would return to the South as Commander-in-Chief.

A caricature by Woodward, published in February 1809, very ably sums up

British opinion of the affair. It can be understood by the following

humorous lines, in imitation of “The House that Jack Built”:--

These are the French who took the Gold

that lay in the City of Lisbon.

This is Sir Arthur (whose Valour and skill

began so well but ended so ill) who

beat the French who took the Gold that

lay in the City of Lisbon.

This is the _Convention_ that Nobody owns,

that saved old Junot’s Baggage and Bones,

altho’ Sir Arthur (whose Valour and skill

began so well but ended so ill,) had beaten

the French who took the Gold that lay in the

City of Lisbon.

This is John Bull, in great dismay, at the

sight of the Ships which carried away the

gold and silver and all the spoil the French

had plundered with so much toil after the

Convention which nobody owns, which saved

old Junot’s Baggage and Bones, altho’ Sir Arthur

(whose Valour and skill began so well but ended so ill)

had beaten the French who took the Gold

that lay in the City of Lisbon.

The Story of Napoleon · 第 22 / 32 章