CHAPTER XX.

ANALOGY.

One of the many meanings of _Analogy_ is, Resemblance of Relations. The

value of an analogical argument in this sense depends on the showing

that, on the common circumstance which is the _fundamentum relationis_,

the rest of the circumstances of the case depend. But, generally, _to

argue from analogy_ signifies to infer from resemblance in some points

(not necessarily in _relations_) resemblance in others. Induction does

the same: but analogy differs from induction in not requiring the

previous proof, by comparison of instances, of the invariable

conjunction between the known and the unknown properties; though it

requires that the latter should not have been ascertained to be

_unconnected_ with the common properties.

If a fair proportion of the properties of the two cases are known, every

resemblance affords ground for expecting an indefinite number of other

resemblances, among which the property in question may perhaps be found.

On the other hand, every dissimilarity will lead us to expect that the

two cases differ in an indefinite number of properties, including,

perhaps, the one in question. These dissimilarities may even be such as

would, in regard to one of the two cases, imply the absence of that

property; and then every resemblance, as showing that the two cases have

a similar nature, is even a reason for presuming against the presence of

that property. Hence, the value of an analogical argument depends on

the extent of ascertained resemblance as compared, first, with the

amount of ascertained difference, and next, with the extent of the

unexplored region of unascertained properties.

The conclusions of analogy are not of direct use, unless when the case

to which we reason is a case _adjacent_, not, as before, in time or

place, but in _circumstances_. Even then a complete induction should be

sought after. But the great value of analogy, even when faint, in

science, is that it may suggest observations and experiments, with a

view to establishing positive scientific truths, for which, however, the

hypotheses based on analogies must never be mistaken.

Analysis of Mr. Mill's System of Logic · 第 16 / 21 章