CHAPTER XIV.

THE LIMITS TO THE EXPLANATION OF LAWS OF NATURE. HYPOTHESES.

The constant tendency of science, operating by the Deductive Method, is

to resolve all laws, even those which once seemed ultimate and not

derivative, into others still more general. But no process of

_resolving_ will ever reduce the number of ultimate laws below the

number of those varieties of our feelings which are distinguishable in

quality, and not merely in quantity or degree. The _ideal_ limit of the

explanation of natural phenomena is to show that each of these ultimate

facts has (since the differences in the different cases of it affect our

sensations as differences in degree only, and not in quality) only one

sort of cause or mode of production; and that all the seemingly

different modes of production or causes of it are resolvable into one.

But _practically_ this limit is never attained. Thus, though various

laws of Causes of Motion have been resolved into others (e.g. the fall

of bodies to the earth, and the motions of the planets, into the one law

of mutual attraction), many causes of it remain still unresolved and

distinct.

Hypotheses are made for the sake of this resolving and explaining of

laws. When we do not _know_ of any more general laws into which to

resolve an uniformity, we then (either on no or on insufficient

evidence) _suppose_ some, imagining either causes (as, e.g. Descartes

did the Vortices), or the laws of their operation (as did Newton

respecting the planetary central force); but we never feign both cause

and law. The use of a hypothesis is to enable us to apply the Deductive

Method before the laws of the causes have been ascertained by Induction.

In those cases where a false law could not have led to a true result (as

was the case with Newton's hypothesis as to the law of the Attractive

force) the third part of the process in the Deductive Method, viz.

Verification, which shows that the results deduced are true, amounts to

a complete induction, and one conforming to the canon of the Method of

Difference. But this is the case only when either the cause is known to

be one given agent (and only its law is unknown), or to be one of

several given agents.

An assumed cause, on the other hand, cannot be accepted as true simply

_because_ it explains the phenomena (since two conflicting hypotheses

often do this even originally, or, as Dr. Whewell himself allows, may at

any rate by modifications be made to do it); nor _because_ it moreover

leads to the prediction of other results which turn out true (since this

shows only what was indeed apparent already from its agreement with the

old facts, viz. that the phenomena are governed by laws partially

identical with the laws of other causes); nor _because_ we cannot

imagine any other hypothesis which will account for the facts (since

there may be causes unknown to our present experience which will equally

account for them). The utility of such assumptions _of causes_ depends

on their being, in their own nature, _capable_ (as Descartes' Vortices

were not, though possibly the Luminiferous Ether may be) of being, at

some time or other, proved directly by independent evidence to be the

causes. And this was, perhaps, all that Newton meant by his _verae

causae_, which alone, he said, may be assigned as causes of phenomena.

Assumptions of causes, which fulfil this condition, are, in science,

even indispensable, with a view both to experimental inquiry, and still

more to the application of the Deductive Method. They may be accepted,

not indeed, as Dr. Whewell thinks they may be, as proof, but as

suggesting a line of experiment and observation which may result in

proof. And this is actually the method used by practical men for

eliciting the truth from involved statements. They first extemporise,

from a few of the particulars, a rude theory of the mode in which the

event happened; and then keep altering it to square with the rest of the

facts, which they review one by one.

The attempting, as in Geology, to conjecture, in conformity with known

laws, in what former collocations of known agents (though _not_ known to

have been formerly present) individual existing facts may have

originated, is not Hypothesis but Induction; for then we do not

_suppose_ causes, but legitimately infer from known effects to unknown

causes. Of this nature was Laplace's theory, whether weak or not, as to

the origin of the earth and planets.

Analysis of Mr. Mill's System of Logic · 第 10 / 21 章