CHAPTER III

ON THE WEST COAST OF AFRICA

In 1660 all the colonial powers of Europe held the west coast of

Africa in great esteem, not only because it produced gold, but also

because it was regarded as a necessary adjunct to the colonies in the

West Indies for the supply of Negro slaves. During their long war with

Spain and Portugal the Dutch acquired a large portion of the West

African coast, including the main fortress of St. George d'Elmina.

This fact led them to regard themselves as having succeeded to the

exclusive claims of the Portuguese on the Guinea coast[1]. With this

end in view the Dutch agreed in the treaty of August 6, 1661, to

return Brazil to the Portuguese as compensation for the forts and

settlements which they had seized on the coast of Guinea[2]. Although

the Dutch played the most prominent part in depriving the Portuguese

of the trade to Guinea, the English, French, Swedes, Danes, and

Courlanders, all obtained a minor commerce to Africa which they very

jealously guarded. In a country so remote from the laws and

civilization of Europe personal quarrels often arose among the

subjects of these different nations, who were inclined to obtain what

they could by fair means or foul. They magnified these petty

quarrels[3] to such an extent that they continually led to

international complication.

The European trade in Africa was confined mainly to the regions of the

Gold Coast and the Gambia Iver. Near the mouth of the Gambia River the

subjects of the duke of Courland had bought an island from the natives

in 1651. On this island they built a small fort, called St. André,

from which they traded to several factories up the river[4]. Besides

the Courlanders, the French and the Dutch carried on a very precarious

trade on the river. In the early part of 1659, as a result of the war

in the northern part of Europe, the duke of Courland became a prisoner

of the king of Sweden. Under these circumstances the Amsterdam chamber

of the Dutch West India Company[5] induced the Duke's commissioner,

Henry Momber, to enter into a contract turning over to it all the

duke's possessions in the Gambia River. The Dutch were to maintain the

factories and to enjoy the trade until the duke was able to resume

possession. The contract was of very doubtful value, since Momber

himself admitted that he had no power to make it, but notwithstanding

this fact he undertook to carry out its terms[6]. Shortly after the

Dutch took possession of the island belonging to the duke of Courland

it was surprised and plundered by a French pirate who, in return for a

consideration, handed it over to a Gröningen merchant of the Dutch

West India Company. The Gröningen chamber of this company was not

anxious to retain the island and therefore signified to Momber its

willingness to return it to Courland. Momber, who feared to have

caused the displeasure of the duke by his contract, was glad to

regain the island in June, 1660. Notwithstanding this fact, several

ships belonging to the Amsterdam chamber of the West India Company

entered the Gambia River and took possession of the island, keeping

the Courlanders prisoners for a month. The natives, however,

interfered in behalf of the Courlanders and the Dutch were finally

compelled to retire to Cape Verde, leaving Otto Steele, the duke's

commander, in possession[7].

It was during this state of affairs on the African coast that the

Company of Royal Adventurers was organized in England. It received its

charter December 18, 1660. In the same month, Captain Robert Holmes

sailed from England in command of the five royal ships which composed

the first expedition. In March, 1661, he arrived at Cape Verde where

he at once informed the Dutch commander that he had orders from

Charles II to warn all persons of whatsoever nation that the right of

trade and navigation from Cape Verde to the Cape of Good Hope belonged

exclusively to the king of England. Holmes ordered the Dutch to vacate

their forts and to abandon the coast within six or seven months[8].

Thereupon he seized the island of Boa Vista, one of the Cape Verde

group claimed by the Dutch since 1621. Later he sent a frigate into

the mouth of the Gambia. Otto Steele, the Courland commander of Fort

St. André, unable to discern whether friend or foe was approaching,

fired upon the frigate. Holmes considered this an insult[9], and two

days later sent a note to Steele requiring him to surrender the island

to the English within ten days. At first Steele refused to obey,

maintaining that the fort was the rightful possession of the duke of

Courland. Thereupon Holmes threatened to level the fort to the

ground. Steele realized that with so few men and supplies resistance

was useless, and therefore he complied with Holmes' demands.[10] The

English assumed possession of the island, but after a fire had

destroyed nearly all the fort and its magazine,[11] they chose to

abandon it, and to settle on two other islands which they named

Charles Island and James Island respectively in honor of their royal

patrons. In this way the English gained their first possessions in the

Gambia River.

When Captain Holmes left England the Dutch ambassadors in London

informed the States General that he had gone to the "reviere Guijana"

where he would build a fort, establish a trade and search for gold

mines. This announcement was immediately sent to the West India

Company which had received the more authentic advice that the English

ships were on the way to the Gambia River. The West India Company

urged that the Dutch ambassadors in London be instructed to inquire

more fully as to the purposes of the expedition, and to prevent if

possible anything being done to the prejudice of the company.[12] The

ambassadors learned that the English maintained that all nations had a

right to trade on the Gambia River, and that other nations than the

Dutch had forts there.[13] On the other hand, the West India Company

maintained that it had traded on the Gambia River ever since its

formation and that, since the contract with the duke of Courland, it

had been in complete possession of the river.[14] After receiving this

statement the States General requested their ambassadors in London to

see that the company's forts and lodges in the Gambia River were not

disturbed.[15] When the news of Holmes' exploit and his reported

warning to the Dutch commander to evacuate the entire African coast

reached the United Netherlands, the West India Company at once lodged

a complaint with the States General.[16] At their suggestion the Dutch

ambassadors obtained an audience with Charles II, who assured them

that neither he nor his officers had given any order for the injury

which had been done to the subjects of the United Netherlands, much

less to possess any of their forts. The king also assured them that,

if Holmes had committed any unjust action, he and his officers should

be exemplarily punished.[17] Sir George Downing, the English envoy

extraordinary at The Hague, further declared that Holmes had very

strict instructions not to disturb the subjects of the United

Netherlands or those of any other nation, and that, if anything to the

contrary had been done, it was without the least authority.[18]

Finally on August 14, 1661, Charles II declared to the States General

that their friendship was very dear to him and that he would under no

circumstances violate the "Droit de Gens."[19] With all this

extravagant profession of good will no definite assurance was given

the Dutch that the islands of St. André and Boa Vista would be

restored to them. On August 16, Downing wrote to the earl of Clarendon

that the island of St. André did not belong to the Dutch at all, but

to the duke of Courland, and that an answer to this effect could be

returned to the Dutch ambassadors if they objected to Holmes' actions.

Furthermore, Downing intimated that the duke could probably be induced

to resign his claims to the English.[20]

Meanwhile, Captain Holmes, who was responsible for this unpleasant

international complication, had returned from Guinea. Since he

suffered no punishment for his violent actions on the African coast

except the loss of his salary,[21] the Dutch ambassadors in London

reminded the king that on August 14, 1661, he had absolutely

disclaimed the proceedings of Holmes.[22] They requested, therefore,

that Holmes be called to account for his actions, that Fort St. André

be restored, that reparation for damages be made, and that in the

future the king's subjects observe the laws of nations more

regularly.[23] Holmes was ordered before the Privy Council to answer

to the charges of the ambassadors,[24] but no effort was made to force

him to respond. The duke of York kept him busy with the fleet where he

incurred some official displeasure, by failing to require a Swedish

ship to strike colors to his Majesty's ships in English seas, and was

therefore required to be detained until further order.[25] Having

extricated himself from this trouble Holmes finally appeared before

the Privy Council in January, 1662,[26] where he offered "many

reasons" in justification of his actions in Guinea.[27] He easily

satisfied the king and the members of the Privy Council, which is not

surprising since many of these men had helped to organize and finance

the expedition.

By this time it had become apparent that Charles II did not intend to

make immediate restitution of St. André to the Dutch. This was in

accordance with Downing's advice "to be 6 or 8 months in examining the

matter" before making a decision.[28] The longer the English retained

possession of the island the less likely the Dutch were to regain it.

Finally, the duke of Courland sent a representative, Adolph Wolfratt,

to London to insist upon the restitution of his possessions.

Originally the English had apparently supported the claims of the duke

of Courland, but it developed that they were no more inclined to

return St. André to the duke of Courland than to the Dutch. The matter

dragged on until November 17, 1664, when a contract was made between

Charles II and the duke whereby the latter surrendered all his rights

on the Gambia River. In return he received certain trading privileges

there and the island of Tobago in the West Indies.[29]

When one proceeds from the Cape Verde region to the Gold Coast one

finds that Dutch influence was especially strong. From Elmina and

other forts the Dutch commanded the largest portion of the trade along

this coast. However, the Danes, Swedes and English had long maintained

a commerce on the Gold Coast where they also had established a number

of factories. In 1658, Hendrik Carloff, an adventurer carrying a

Danish commission, attacked and made himself master of Cape Corse

which had been in the possession of the Swedes since 1651. After

entering into friendly relations with the Dutch at Elmina,[30] Carloff

returned to Europe, leaving his lieutenant, Samuel Smits, in charge of

the fort. Fearing that the Swedes and the English, who had entered

into an alliance, might endeavor to regain Cape Corse, Carloff advised

Smits to surrender the fort to Jasper van Heusden, director general of

the West India Company on the Gold Coast. The instructions were

unnecessary, as Smits had surrendered Cape Corse to the Dutch on April

15, 1659. In return for this fort Smits and one of his compatriots

received 5,000 and 4,000 gulden respectively.[31]

At the time when Hendrik Carloff seized Cape Corse the English had

there[32] a factory to which they traded from their main fort at

Kormentine.[33] On May 1, 1659, very soon after the Dutch obtained

possession of the place, the English factory with all its goods was

burned by the natives, perhaps at the instigation of the Dutch. The

Hollanders, however, were not without misfortunes of their own, for

after disavowing Smits' contract, the Danes sent a new expedition to

Guinea which seized a hill commanding Cape Corse, on which they built

the fort of Fredericksburg. Furthermore, the Swedes who had been

dispossessed of Cape Corse by the Danes with the assistance of

natives, toward the end of 1660, drove the Dutch out of Cape Corse.

Since the Swedes were insignificant in number the fort very shortly

fell into the control of the vacillating Negro inhabitants.

As soon as the natives obtained possession of Cape Corse they

permitted the English to rebuild their factory at that place. An

agreement was also made by which, upon the payment of a certain sum of

money, the fort was to be surrendered to the English.[34] Since the

Dutch maintained that Cape Corse belonged exclusively to them by

reason of their contract with the Danes, they determined to prevent

the English from obtaining possession of it. Furthermore, in order to

exclude other Europeans from trading to any part of the Gold Coast,

the Dutch declared a blockade on the whole coast, in which Komenda and

other villages as well as Cape Corse were situated. To carry out this

policy they kept several ships plying up and down the coast.

The Dutch then proceeded to capture the following English ships for

endeavoring to trade on the Gold Coast: the "Blackboy," April, 1661;

the "Daniel," May, 1661; the "Merchant's Delight,"[35] August, 1661;

the "Charles," August, 1661; the "Paragon," October, 1661; the

"Ethiopian," January, 1662. In addition to these injuries the Dutch

forbade the English at Kormentine to trade with the factory at Cape

Corse, which warning was no sooner given than the factory was

mysteriously destroyed by fire a second time, May 22, 1661. The

English bitterly complained that this misfortune was due to the

instigation of the Dutch.[36]

In like manner the Dutch captured a Swedish ship and interfered with

the trade of the Danes to their fort of Fredericksburg,[37] which

action greatly incensed the Danish African Company. Since voluntary

satisfaction for these injuries could not be expected, Simon de

Petkum, the Danish resident in London, caused the arrest of a Dutch

West India ship, the "Graf Enno," which was one of the main offenders

in seizing Danish as well as English ships on the Guinea coast.[38]

The case was brought before the Admiralty Court, and judgment of

condemnation was rendered in favor of the Danes.[39]

At The Hague, Sir George Downing now had a great opportunity to vent

his remarkable store of epithets on the Dutch for their violent

actions against English vessels in Guinea. He complained to the States

General "that the people of this contry doe everywhere as oppertunity

offers sett upon, rob and spoyle" the English subjects; and that these

things were being done not only by the West India Company but even by

ships of war belonging to the Dutch government. Downing threatened

that the king would "give order for the seizing of a proportionable

number and value of ships and merchandises belonginge to this contrey

and distribute them amongst them accordinge ... to their respective

losses, and will take care that noe ships bee seized but such as

belong to those provinces, and to such townes in those provinces, to

which the ships belonged that did commit these violences and

robberies."[40] In this way Downing hoped to set the non-maritime

towns and provinces of the Netherlands against those which were

interested in commerce, and thus to secure a cessation of the

seizures. Upon one occasion in the time of Cromwell he had used this

method successfully. Downing declared too that, to obtain justice in

the United Provinces, it was necessary for the Dutch to realize that

his Majesty would have satisfaction for injuries done "if not by faire

means, by force."[41]

The Dutch ignored Downing's demands, even though on June 6, 1662, he

reminded them of their unjust actions on the Gold Coast.[42] In all

probability they were trusting to obviate all difficulties in the

commercial treaty then being negotiated at London. In August, a new

complaint was made to the States General[43] concerning the seizure of

the English ship, "Content," off the Cape Verde Islands.[44] Shortly

thereafter, the States General declared with respect to the English

ship, "Daniel," seized in 1661, that it was a gross misrepresentation

for the owner to maintain that the master and crew of the ship were

English. Furthermore, the Dutch advanced proof that the ship had been

fitted out with a cargo in Amsterdam, and had afterwards attempted to

pass as an English ship, in order to escape being seized as an

interloper by the West India Company.[45]

Further consideration regarding these seizures was postponed

indefinitely by the 15th article of the commercial treaty entered into

between the United Provinces and England in September, 1662.[46] In

accordance with its provisions the ships which the Dutch had seized on

the African coast were included in the lists of damages which the

English submitted against the United Provinces. Thereafter the ships

formed no important part in the negotiations between the two nations.

Thus far the Company of Royal Adventurers which had sent out the

expedition under Captain Robert Holmes had not been more active on the

Gold Coast than numerous private traders of England. The seizure of

ships by the Dutch had been a matter of much apprehension to all the

traders on the coast, but from now on it mainly concerned the Royal

Adventurers. The company was anxious to establish new forts and

factories in Africa in order to build up a lucrative trade. Its agents

therefore began to erect a lodge at Tacorary, a village not far from

Cape Corse. The Dutch, although they had not succeeded in recovering

Cape Corse from the natives, considered that the fort and the

surrounding territory belonged to them. On May 24, 1662, they bade the

English to desist from further invasion of their rights at Tacorary or

any other place under Dutch obedience.[47] The English, however,

disregarded the Dutch protest and notwithstanding their opposition the

factory was completed.[48] In less than a month from this time the

natives drove the Dutch out of their factory in Comany.[49] Thereupon

the Dutch determined to continue even more vigorously their policy of

blockading the whole coast and, by cutting off the trade of the

natives with the English, to force the Negroes into subjection and to

recover Comany and the fort at Cape Corse.

In October, 1662, two ships of the Royal Adventurers, the "Charles"

and the "James," were prevented from trading to Komenda by the "Golden

Lyon" and two other Dutch men-of-war.[50] When asked as to the reason

for this interruption of trade the Dutch general, Dirck Wilree,

replied that he had caused the ports of Comany and Cape Corse to be

blockaded until the natives rendered satisfaction for the injuries

which they had committed against the Dutch.[51] When the two English

ships continued their effort to trade at Cape Corse and other

villages, the "Golden Lyon" followed them from place to place, and on

one occasion seized a small skiff which was attempting to land some

goods. Discouraged at the treatment accorded to them the English

officers finally gave up the attempt to trade on the Gold Coast, and

returned home with their ships, after delivering to the Dutch a solemn

protest against the injuries which they had suffered.[52]

When Secretary Williamson informed Sir George Downing of the

misfortunes of the two ships, "Charles" and "James," and asked him to

interfere in behalf of the Royal Company at The Hague, Downing

promised to do what he could, but since he was so well acquainted with

the Dutch method of treating such complaints he did not anticipate

favorable results. "God help them," he declared, "if they (the Royal

Company) depend upon paper relief." With the duke of York at the head

of the Company and the king as well as many of his courtiers greatly

concerned in its welfare, he considered that it would be well cared

for. "Whatever injuries the Dutch do them," he exclaimed, "let them be

sure to do the Dutch greater, & then let me alone to mediate between

them, but without this all other wayes will signify not a rush."[53]

Downing demanded of the States General whether Dirck Wilree had been

given any authority to blockade the entire coasts of Comany and to

forbid all English trade with the natives.[54] In this way he hoped

either to have the States General disavow Wilree's action or to raise

the question whether the West India Company had a right to institute

such a blockade. In letters to Clarendon and Bennet, Downing

maintained that the Dutch were accustomed both in West Africa and in

the East Indies, to declare war on the natives and to cut them off

from all trade with foreigners until they agreed to sell their goods

only to the Dutch. Downing declared that the English had already lost

a great deal of trade on account of such impositions, and that if they

were continued the East India and African companies would be ruined.

"Pay them in their own kind & sett their subjects a crying as well as

his Majties, & you will have a very faire correspondence, & they will

take heed what they doe, and his Majtie shall be as much honored &

loved here as he hath been dispised, for they love nor honor none but

them that they thinck both can & dare bite them."[54a] After urging

the king to take immediate action concerning their ships the members

of the Royal Company requested Downing "to drive the States to the

most positive reply." They declared that any answer would, at least,

expedite matters, and "if those states will owne that Wilrey had their

orders to warrant his action, wee will hope, it may begett some

parelel resolution of state here. If they disclaim it, and leave

their West India Company to be responcible, they will send us to a

towne where there is noe house, unlesse wee pay ourselves, per legem

talionis."[55]

In answer to Downing's memorial concerning the "Charles" and the

"James" the West India Company confined itself to a justification of

Wilree's actions, and omitted to say anything about the authority by

which they had been committed.[56] Although Downing insisted that a

definite answer be given him on this point, the States General also

evaded the issue by maintaining that nothing had been done by the

company but what justice and necessity required. They supported the

company in its contention that Cape Corse and Comany were effectually

blockaded, and therefore the ships "Charles" and "James" had no right

to trade there.[57]

Such a justification of the West India Company's actions could

scarcely be satisfactory to Downing or to those in charge of foreign

affairs in England. The Royal Company was very much concerned also

lest the Dutch would continue to interrupt the ships which it sent to

the Gold Coast. To add to this adverse condition news arrived that,

about the first of June, 1663,[58] the Dutch had at last succeeded in

regaining possession of Cape Corse. At this there was much

satisfaction in Holland. Downing wrote that since the Dutch now had

the two important castles of Elmina and Cape Corse, commanding the

most important trade in all Guinea, they intended to prohibit all

other nations from trading to that region.[59] Over this turn of

events there was great disappointment among the members of the Royal

Company, who had confidently expected to obtain Cape Corse from the

natives. In fact, they had intended to make Cape Corse their main

stronghold and at that place establish their principal trade.[60]

Charles II decided that it was time to come to the assistance of the

Royal Company, and on September 5, 1663, he lent three of his ships to

it for a voyage to Africa.[61] Later, he also ordered several

additional royal vessels commanded by Sir Robert Holmes to accompany

these ships. The preparation and departure of the fleet was short and

remained a close secret with the officials immediately concerned.

The king instructed Holmes to protect the company's agents, ships,

goods, and factories from all injury; and to secure a free trade with

the natives. Also, he declared, "If (upon consultacon with such

commandrs as are there present) you judge yourself strong enough to

maintaine the right of his Matie's subjects by force, you are to do

it, and to kill, sink, take, or destroy such as oppose you, & to send

home such ships as you shall so take." If the two ships "Golden Lyon"

and "Christiana," the first of which was the chief assailant of the

company's ships "Charles" and "James" in November, 1662, were

encountered. Holmes was instructed to seize them. All other ships

which had committed such injuries on the vessels of the Royal

Company[62] were likewise to be seized and taken to England. On his

arrival at the mouth of the Gambia River in January, 1664, Holmes

discovered that since his visit in 1661 the relations of the Dutch and

English had been anything but friendly. The English commander on

Charles Island had given Petro Justobaque and other Dutch factors from

Cape Verde permission to trade up and down the river. Holmes heard

that they had endeavored to stir up the native king of Barra against

the English in December, 1661.[63] On the 21st of June, 1662,

Justobaque with a ship again appeared on the Gambia. In order to

compel him to recognize the English rights on the river, the English

commander at James Island fired at the ship. The Dutch ship paid no

heed to the demand of the English and returned the fire until it was a

safe distance away. A few days later when returning to Cape Verde the

English shot away the main mast of the Dutch ship, but Justobaque

managed to escape.[64]

Although these incidents had happened more than a year and a half

before Holmes' arrival at James Island, he was incensed at the actions

of the Dutch. When it was reported to him that a large Dutch vessel

had arrived at Cape Verde, he assumed that it was the "Golden Lyon"

which had sailed from Holland about the same time as he had departed

from England. Several English ships were expected on the Gambia and

for fear of their capture by the "Golden Lyon," Holmes sailed at once

for Cape Verde where, according to his statement, without any

provocation he was fired upon by the Dutch. Holmes returned the fire,

and after suffering some damage withdrew from the attack. On the

following morning he was surprised, he declared, to see that the Dutch

had hung out a white flag and were sending a boat to him offering to

surrender the fort. He called a council which, after considering the

former hazards of the English trade on the Gambia, decided "that the

better to protect our trade for a tyme and sooner to bring in

Hollander's West India Compa to adjust our nation's damages sustained

by them, and to that end we accepted the surrender of that place."[65]

Holmes' explanation of the taking of Cape Verde, although simple and

direct, is probably incomplete. His whole career shows him to have

been a man who was likely to take the initiative, so that it is not

surprising to learn from the depositions of various Dutchmen that,

previous to the battle of Cape Verde, Holmes had seized two Dutch

vessels, and that after receiving an unfavorable reply to his demand

to surrender, Holmes attacked the fort at Cape Verde, which

capitulated together with several Dutch vessels.[66]

From the conflicting statements made by the Dutch and the English it

is difficult to ascertain the truth regarding the events immediately

preceding the attack on Cape Verde, but the fact remains that Holmes

had obtained a number of Dutch vessels and was master of one of their

most important forts on the west coast of Africa. Since he had

discovered the ease with which the Dutch possessions could be seized,

Holmes next set out down the coast toward Elmina. On the way he

despoiled the Dutch factory at Sestos, on the pretext that at that

place the Dutch had stirred up the natives against the English.[67]

Shortly afterwards, he encountered and captured the "Golden Lyon"

which had added to its notorious career by preventing the "Mary," a

ship belonging to the Royal Adventurers, from trading on the Gold

Coast in March, 1663.[68] Finally he seized the Dutch factory at Anta,

on the ground that it was commanded by the former captain of the

"Christiana," one of the Dutch ships designated for seizure in the

king's instructions.[69]

Before leaving the Gambia, Holmes had been apprised of what had taken

place on the Gold Coast since the Dutch had captured Cape Corse in

June, 1663. After the Dutch had taken possession of this fortress

General Valckenburg despatched a very strong protest to the chief

English factory at Kormentine, in which he maintained that the Dutch

had a right to the exclusive possession of the whole Gold Coast by

reason of their conquest of the Portuguese. He required the English to

leave the lodge which they had recently built at Tacorary and demanded

that they refrain from all trade on the Gold Coast. He even had the

temerity to claim that the English had injured the Dutch trade at Cape

Corse and Tacorary to the extent of sixty marks of gold per month, and

that the Dutch had lost one thousand marks on account of the

interference of English ships such as the "Charles" and the

"James."[70]

In answer to Valckenburg's sweeping assertions Francis Selwin, the

English chief at Kormentine, and John Stoakes, commander of one of the

English ships, replied that the English had more right to Cape Corse

and other places on the Gold Coast than the Dutch, because they had

first settled and fortified Cape Corse with the consent of the natives

in 1649.[71] As a further indication that they were not intimidated by

the hostile attitude of Valckenburg the English commenced to build

another factory at Anashan in the Fantin region. In September, 1663,

this brought forth another vigorous protest from Valckenburg, who

declared that he would not tolerate the continuance of this

factory.[72] By way of enforcing these threats the Dutch prevented the

"Sampson," another ship belonging to the Royal Adventurers, from

engaging in any trade at the factory of Komenda.[73] Thereupon Stoakes

declared that, although the English greatly desired to live in peace

with the Dutch, they would not under any circumstances abandon their

factory at Anashan.[74]

At this time the English had factories and settlements at Kormentine,

Komenda, Tacorary, Anto, Anashan, Ardra, and Wiamba. The forts and

lodges of the two companies were all located within a few miles of one

another and for either company to increase the number of its

settlements only made the instances of friction between them more

numerous.[75] It seemed that whichever company was able to overcome

the other would be sure to do so. It was under these circumstances

that Sir Robert Holmes made his appearance on the Gold Coast. The fact

that the Dutch had laid claim to the whole Gold Coast was sufficient

excuse for his interference, although, if we may believe the Dutch

version, Holmes exceeded their claims by reasserting the English right

to the whole of the west coast of Africa, as he had done at Cape Verde

in 1661.[76]

Be this as it may, according to Holmes' account, Captain Cubitt of the

Royal Company endeavored to induce Valckenburg to come to an amicable

adjustment of the troubles on the Gold Coast. Holmes expected that his

previous seizures would induce such a settlement, but Valckenburg

obstinately refused Holmes' demand to evacuate Cape Corse.[77] Since

he had failed to intimidate the Dutch, Holmes sailed to Cape Corse

where he visited the Danish fort of Fredericksburg. The Dutch fired at

him from Cape Corse, an act which Holmes regarded as the beginning of

war.[78] He called a council of officers and factors of the Royal

Company on May 7, 1664, where, after considering "theire (the Dutch)

unjust possessing of that very castle of Cape Coast indubitably ours,

... wee then resolved att that councell ... for the better securitye

of that trade, our interest in that countrye, and to regaine our

nacion's rights, to reduce that castle of Cape Coast wch accordingly

succeeded."[79] On pretexts of much the same character Holmes seized

the Dutch factories of Agga and Anamabo, together with several ships.

By this time the Dutch were stripped of all their settlements on the

African coast except the main fortress of Elmina. In finishing his

account of the expedition Holmes blandly remarked, "I hope I have nott

exceeded my instructions, they being to concerve our comerce."

Since it is not essential to follow Holmes across the Atlantic to New

Amsterdam one may return to the negotiations which were proceeding in

Europe subsequent to his departure from England. So closely had the

secret of Holmes' expedition to Africa been guarded that it is even

doubtful if Sir George Downing at The Hague was aware of it.[80] As

far as the purpose of the voyage was concerned nothing could have been

nearer the advice which he had been urging for months. Moreover,

Downing was not alone in his opinion that negotiation regarding

affairs in Africa would be fruitless. The Danish resident at The

Hague, Carisius, who was pressing the Danish claims for the possession

of Cape Corse, confessed to Downing that nothing could be obtained

from the Dutch unless it was "attended with some thing that was reall

& did bite."[81] Since this was the case Downing pointed out that the

Danish fort at Fredericksburg would probably fall into the hands of

the Dutch. To avoid this misfortune he advised the Royal Company to

induce the Danes to transfer Fredericksburg to it, granting them in

return a free commerce at that place. As the Royal Company did not see

fit to follow this suggestion[82] Downing began to form other plans.

In order that Carisius might continue to worry the Dutch with his

claims Downing submitted a memorial to the States General protesting

against the Dutch treatment of the Danes in Guinea.[83] Indeed he was

so friendly toward the Danish pretensions that the king of Denmark

sent him a special letter thanking him for his services.[84]

In the main, however, Downing was persistently urging the Dutch to

make a settlement of the cases of the Royal Company's two ships, the

"Charles" and the "James," and of the right of the Dutch to blockade

the Gold Coast on the pretext of war with the natives. In December,

1663, at the instigation of the West India Company, the States General

maintained that only a few ships were necessary to blockade the small

native states on the Gold Coast, since in each case there were but one

or two outlets to the sea.[85] On February 1, 1664, Downing obtained a

conference with DeWitt and the representatives of the States General

and the West India Company. The company's representatives boldly

admitted that they had hindered the English ships from trading at

Komenda and Cape Corse, because the natives had burned their factory

at the former place and had seized their fortress at Cape Corse. This

irritating assumption of their ownership of Cape Corse aroused

Downing. So far, he had contented himself in supporting the Danish and

even the Swedish claims to Cape Corse. Now, notwithstanding the

inconsistency of his position, he remarked that, if it was a question

of the ownership of Cape Corse, the English could show more rights to

the place than any one, since they had been the first to settle it

and to trade there; and that even if the Dutch were in possession of

it, the English still had a right to trade to the Danish fort of

Fredericksburg which was located in the same harbor.[86]

When the discussion turned on the requirements of an effective

blockade the Dutch advocate stoutly maintained that "it is nott for

any other to prescribe how and in what manner the company shall

proceed to retake their places, that if they think that the riding

with a few shipps before a place and that att certaine times onely

whereby to hinder other nations from trading with it, be a sufficient

meanes for the retaking thereof, they have no reason to be att further

charge or trouble." He further declared that a certain sickness in

that region, known as "Serenes," caused by the falling dew, made it

impossible for Europeans to engage in a blockade by land, and

therefore "in this case itt was to be counted sufficient and to be

called a besieging, though the place were onely blocked up by

sea."[87] Downing scoffed at this as an unheard of theory and asked

what would happen if the Royal Company instituted blockades of this

character and pretended "Serenes" whenever it seemed convenient. With

such a display of feeling it is no wonder little could be done toward

adjusting the difficulties. DeWitt suggested a new treaty for the

regulation of such affairs both in Europe and abroad. Downing flatly

refused to consider such a proposition if it was meant thereby to

dispose of the cases of the "Charles" and the "James." He remained

firm in his demand for reparation for these two ships.[88] A few days

after this conference Downing learned of the misfortunes which had

befallen the Royal Company's ship, the "Mary," during the previous

year. On February 16, he apprised the States General of this

additional cause for complaint and demanded satisfaction as in the

case of the other two vessels[89].

If Downing was becoming exasperated, the people in England were

scarcely less so when they heard of the troubles of the "Mary" and

other similar occurrences. Secretary Cunaeus declared that the

animosity in England towards Holland was growing exceedingly among the

common people. Led by the duke of York, governor of the Royal Company,

the courtiers had also become exceedingly indignant at the treatment

accorded the company's ships and factories in Africa[90]. One of

Valckenburg's statements regarding the Dutch ownership of the Gold

Coast had been circulated on the Royal Exchange, where it became the

chief topic of conversation. Indeed so great was the sensation it

stirred up that Samuel Pepys declared on April 7, 1664, that everybody

was expecting a war[91]. On the 21st of April the members of the House

of Commons resolved that the damages inflicted by the Dutch in India,

Africa, and elsewhere constituted a very great obstruction to English

trade. They, therefore, petitioned the king for redress for these

various injuries, and promised to support any action he took with

their lives and fortunes.

At last the Dutch realized that the African situation was becoming

serious, and Downing therefore found it somewhat easier to bring them

to a discussion of the subject. DeWitt proposed that the case of the

three Royal Company's ships as well as that of two East India ships,

the "Bona Esperanza" and the "Henry Bonaventure," should be included

in the list of damages provided for by the treaty of September, 1662.

Downing absolutely refused to consider such a makeshift on the ground

that the ships of the Royal Company had been injured after the treaty

had been signed, and therefore in accordance with its provisions

these losses should be submitted to the Netherlands for

compensation.[92]

Since he had failed to induce Downing to permit the three ships to be

included in the list of damages, DeWitt had exhausted the last means

of delay. On May 6, 1664, Downing announced in letters to Bennet and

Clarendon that DeWitt had at last consented to accommodate the matter

of the three ships. He was willing, moreover, to enter into an

agreement, for the prevention of all such future troubles, along the

lines which Downing had laid down. Regarding the two East India ships,

however, whose case was quite different from those of the Royal

Company, DeWitt would not alter his stubborn refusal of compensation.

Downing was intent on gaining a complete victory and at once rejoined

that no new commercial regulations could be considered until entire

satisfaction had been rendered for the damages which the Dutch had

committed.[93]

Although an attempt was made to suppress the first tidings of Holmes'

actions on the Gambia, the rumor of them soon spread. It was not long

until it was well known in London and Amsterdam that he had taken Cape

Verde and captured several Dutch vessels.[94] The West India Company

bitterly accused the English of having covered their designs in Africa

with a cloak of complaints regarding the Royal Company's ships. The

company reminded the States General that this was the same Holmes who,

in 1661, had set up a claim to the whole coast and who was to have

been exemplarily punished on his return by the king of England. Since

it was evident that all the Dutch factories and forts in Guinea were

in danger of capture from Holmes, the company asked the States General

for some vessels of war which should be sent to the African coast for

the protection of its property[95].

It was now the turn of the Dutch to seek compensation and restitution

of their property. Since Downing was a very exasperating man with whom

to deal they were undoubtedly pleased when toward the end of May,

1664, he suddenly returned to England[96]. The Dutch, therefore,

decided to send VanGogh to London, with the hope that he could obtain

more satisfactory results there than had ever been possible with

Downing at The Hague. VanGogh was instructed to seek for the

restitution of the West India Company's property; to remind the king

of the unfulfilled promises which he had made regarding Holmes and the

voyage of 1661;[97] and to seek for new commercial regulations which

would prevent future trouble on the African coast[98].

Very soon after his arrival in England VanGogh gained an audience with

the king who, in reply to his demands, answered that as yet his

knowledge of the Holmes' affair was very imperfect; that he had not

given Holmes orders to seize Cape Verde; and that in case he had

exceeded his instructions he would be punished upon his return,

according to the exigency of the case[99]. Such a reply sounded too

much like the king's former promise of August 14, 1661, to satisfy

DeWitt. He instructed VanGogh to insist that his Majesty make these

promises in writing[100]. VanGogh answered DeWitt that it was hopeless

to think of inducing the English to return Cape Verde, in view of the

preparations then in progress for carrying on trade to the west coast

of Africa. He declared that already they were boasting in London that

a contract was to be made with the Spanish for the delivery of 4,000

slaves per annum[101]. As early as the middle of June the Royal

Company had eight ships loading in London with goods worth 50,000

pounds destined for the Guinea coast[102].

In midsummer, 1664, Andries C. Vertholen and other Dutchmen, whom

Holmes had carried from Cape Verde to the Gold Coast, returned to

Holland, where they reported at length Holmes' actions at Cape Verde

and on the way to the Gold Coast[103]. These details did not tend to

DeWitt's peace of mind. Hence it is no wonder, upon Downing's return

to Holland, that the two men "fell very hard upon the busines of Cabo

Verde" in their very first conversation. As he had instructed VanGogh

to do, so DeWitt demanded of Downing that the English king make a

written promise that no more hostilities would be committed on the

Guinea Coast, or the Dutch would be in duty bound to assist their

company. Downing, who now felt the advantage which the success of

Holmes' expedition gave him, replied to DeWitt as follows: "I must

say," that the West India Company has "ever since his Majtye's return

played the devills & pirats, worse thn Argiers, taken 20 English

ships, hindered others, putt out a declaration whereby they claymed al

the coast to thmselves; & was it lawfull for thm so to demean

thmselves & only lawfull for the English to suffer, tht yet his Majty

did not intermeddle, but only the one company against the other, & no

wonder if at last the English did stirr a little; & tht Holms was the

companye's servt & tht should his Majty have given or lent thm an old

ship or two, yet he had nothing to doe in the ordering their designe."

Furthermore, he declared that if the Dutch took it upon themselves to

assist the West India Company "his Majty would find himself equally

obliged to assist his company."[104]

To every one it now seemed as if an open conflict must come. Toward

the last of July, Pepys declared that all the talk was of a Dutch

war,[105] although even Coventry, a director of the Royal Company,

admitted that there was little real cause for it and that the damage

done to the company, which had brought on Holmes' expedition, did not

exceed the paltry sum of two or three hundred pounds.[106] In Holland,

also, the disposition toward war was increased by the realization that

the next report from Holmes might bring news of the total loss of the

Gold Coast, including the main fortress of Elmina. Under these

circumstances the king's promise to punish Holmes according to the

exigency of the case meant little or nothing. The maritime provinces,

especially Holland, were determined to assist the West India Company

against English aggression in Africa.

When Downing discussed the situation with DeWitt, however, he was

surprised to hear him still express the possibility of giving

satisfaction for the seizure of the Royal Company's ships, and not "so

hott" for sending a fleet immediately to Guinea as he had been at

first.[107] Even Downing was for the time being deceived. His spy, who

was well within DeWitt's immediate circle, for once was not on duty to

give his usual faithful report to his benefactor. DeWitt was

accustomed to resort to the same trickery and deceitful diplomacy that

was so characteristic of Downing. Indeed it would be difficult to

decide which of these two men was the greater master of this

questionable art. The English had sent Holmes to Africa totally

unknown to the Dutch and had taken half the coast from them before

they were even aware of the expedition. It is little wonder then that

the idea occurred to DeWitt to retaliate in kind on the English and to

keep his plans a profound secret.

In 1661 the Dutch had sent a fleet under Admiral DeRuyter to the

Mediterranean Sea in conjunction with an English squadron commanded by

Sir John Lawson, for the purpose of punishing the Algerian and other

pirates who had been infesting Dutch and English commerce. DeRuyter

and Lawson had succeeded in making a number of favorable treaties with

the pirates, though the task of quelling them was by no means

complete. DeWitt realized that a fleet could scarcely be dispatched to

Guinea from Holland without being discovered. Therefore, he together

with six of his councillors decided to send secret orders to DeRuyter

to sail at once for the coast of Guinea. On account of a peculiarity

of the Dutch government, however, it was impossible to dispatch these

orders without first securing a resolution of the States General.

DeWitt was well aware that somehow these resolutions of the States

General usually became known to Downing and the English. He therefore

determined that, while the States General should pass the order, he

would arrange the matter so that no one would know of it, except those

who were already in the plan. On August 11, 1664, the secretary of the

States General read the resolution very quickly, during which time

DeWitt and his six cohorts raised so much disturbance by loud

conversation that no one in the room heard what was being read.[108]

The trick succeeded admirably. DeWitt was now in possession of the

necessary authority, and orders were dispatched at once to DeRuyter to

leave his post in the Mediterranean and to sail for the west coast of

Africa without revealing his destination to Lawson, the English

commander. He was instructed to recover for the West India Company

those places which Holmes had seized and to deliver to Valckenburg,

the Dutch general on the Gold Coast, all the effects of the English

which were not necessary for the different factories of the

company.[109]

In order not to arouse Downing's suspicions by apparent apathy, the

Dutch began to prepare several ships ostensibly for Africa. For the

purpose of misleading Downing still further the Dutch agreed to accept

an offer made by the French for mediation of the difficulties. DeWitt

still insisted, however, that a written promise be given him that the

forts and factories which Holmes had seized on the African coast would

be restored to the West India Company.[110] Later, in the same month

of August, 1664, Downing submitted to the States General the draft of

a proposed agreement for the settling of future disputes in the East

Indies and in Africa.[111] Downing was of the opinion that, although

the Dutch could never be depended on to keep such an agreement, it

would be a good thing in the East Indies because "ye (the English) are

the weaker ther." In Africa the situation appeared different to

Downing, for there the English had the advantage. "I hope in the

meantime," he declared, "while we are (negotiating) Holmes will doe

the work ther," because there "never will be such a opportunity as

this to make clear work in Affrica."[112] A few days later he advised

that everything on the African coast should be done "so as (the) king

of England may not appeare in it, but only (the) Rll Company, & they

takeing occasion from our affront."[113] Still later he asserted that

even in Holland everyone believed that since the king and the Royal

Company had gone so far, they would seize the entire African coast so

that the whole affair might be worth while.[114]

Although DeWitt had been successful in sending the secret orders to

DeRuyter concerning his voyage to Guinea, he could not long hope to

deceive the ever-watchful Downing. Indeed with all due respect to his

crafty rival one is almost surprised that Downing's suspicions were

not aroused for more than a month after the commands were despatched.

When the possibility of DeRuyter's having been ordered to Africa

dawned on Downing, he at once demanded of DeWitt where DeRuyter was

going when he left Cadiz. Without hesitation DeWitt replied that he

had returned to Algiers and Tunis to ransom some Dutch people.[115]

The bald falsehood disarmed Downing's suspicions and, although he

advised that Sir John Lawson keep a watchful eye on DeRuyter, he

assured Bennet that the report that the latter had gone to Guinea was

without foundation.[116] The report continued to be whispered

about,[117] however, and although two weeks later DeWitt repeated his

falsehood, Downing began to fear that he was being deceived. He

declared that although he was certain that the States General had

given no orders in the usual way for DeRuyter's departure to Guinea,

he was very well aware that the Dutch could find means to do those

things which they deemed necessary. The more he considered the matter,

the likelihood of secret orders having been given to DeRuyter seemed

to him more and more probable. "I am sure if I were in their case, I

would do it," he finally declared, and therefore he again advised

Bennet to have Sir John Lawson watch DeRuyter closely.[118]

The news of Holmes' success at Cape Verde had stirred up extraordinary

activity in the Royal Company. In September, 1664, the company was

busily enlisting factors and soldiers for the Guinea coast. A number

of ships, several of which belonged to the king, and some of which the

company hired, were being prepared for the voyage to Guinea.[119] To

add to the company's bright prospects, a vessel from the Gold Coast

arrived in England at the end of September,[120] bringing the account

of Holmes' capture of Cape Corse and other factories on the African

coast. The Royal Company now saw itself master of West Africa. Pepys

declared that the news from Holmes would certainly make the Dutch

quite "mad."[121] It did indeed create a very great impression in

Holland, where many had believed that Cape Corse was impregnable.

Downing, of course, rejoiced exceedingly. Oftentimes in the past he

had supported the Danish and Swedish claims to Cape Corse, but now he

found no difficulty in showing Carisius and Appleborne, the Danish and

Swedish representatives at The Hague, that their claims were as

before, against the Dutch. Omitting to say anything of the English

claim to Cape Corse, Downing explained to them that since the Dutch

had been in possession of Cape Corse, Holmes had seized it together

with other places on account of the numerous injuries done to the

Royal Company. "They both replied that they took it so."[122]

In London, VanGogh lost no time in obtaining an interview with Charles

II concerning Holmes' latest activities. Again the king asserted that

Holmes' violent actions on the African coast were without his

knowledge, especially the affair at Cape Verde, which place he

declared was of no importance and not worth one hundred pounds.[123]

Regarding his responsibility for the capture of Cape Corse he

refrained from committing himself so definitely, but he assured the

Dutch ambassador that Cape Corse belonged to the English; that their

claim to it would be satisfactorily established; and that he intended

to preserve these new acquisitions by sending Prince Rupert with a

fleet to the coast of Africa.[124] On the 28th of October, after

learning of Holmes' capture of New Amsterdam, Charles II boldly threw

aside his reserve and declared that the taking of Cape Corse, as well

as of New Amsterdam, "was done with his knowledge & by his order as

being a business wch properly belonged to the English, that the ground

was theirs & that they had also built upon the same, that the same was

afterwards taken from the English by the Netherlands West India Compa,

& ... that the English will justify & demonstrate their right to all

this."[125] If Holmes' actions in Guinea have so far seemed very

extraordinary, they can hardly be so regarded any longer in view of

the light which the king himself threw over the whole situation in

this remarkable statement. To be sure he had not as yet assumed

responsibility for the capture of Cape Verde. However, his direct

responsibility for the other actions of Holmes, which were much more

important, makes it a matter of little consequence whether the capture

of Cape Verde is to be attributed to him or not.

It may have seemed to Downing that there was less excuse for the

seizure of Cape Verde than for the other places. At any rate he held

out some hope to DeWitt that it would be restored to the Dutch. This

must have been a bitter sop to DeWitt, who was well aware that as for

Cape Corse he need entertain no such hope.[126] There was one feature

of the situation, however, which somewhat pleased DeWitt,[127] Downing

could no longer maintain that the troubles in Guinea were merely

quarrels between two commercial companies in which the king had no

direct interest or connection. DeWitt would not therefore be at a loss

to find numerous reasons why DeRuyter had been sent to Africa when the

time came for defending that action.

By this time every one in London and Amsterdam was in a state of

extreme suspense as to whether or not DeRuyter was on the Guinea

coast. On the 14th of October, 1664, news was received both in Holland

and in England from Cadiz to the effect that DeRuyter intended to sail

to Guinea upon his departure from that port.[128] In Amsterdam,

encouraged by this vigorous rumor, the stocks of the West India

Company began to rise from the low point where they had been for some

time.[129] When Downing chided DeWitt about DeRuyter, the latter

replied in a bantering fashion that if he believed the report,

notwithstanding what had been said to the contrary, to continue in the

belief; it could do no harm.[130] In London, the apprehension of

DeRuyter's expedition greatly checked the enthusiasm of the Royal

Company, and caused the king to postpone Prince Rupert's departure to

the African coast. VanGogh reported the cry that was heard everywhere

in London, "Guinea is lost. What now is it possible to do with the

Dutch."[131] The Dutch ambassador, who did not cease to haunt the

king's chambers over Holmes' seizures, found Charles II irritable and

greatly displeased with affairs. When questioned as to whether he

would punish Holmes, the king declared that Holmes did not need to

fear punishment at home since the Dutch had evidently sent forces to

do it themselves.[132]

The news concerning DeRuyter's successful expedition to the African

coast, which arrived in England just before Christmas, 1664, showed,

as Pepys expressed it, that the English had been "beaten to dirt at

Guinea."[133] Indeed DeRuyter's conquest of the coast in the end was

as complete as that of Holmes.[134] With one exception DeRuyter

captured all the English factories and forts, including Kormentine,

which he delivered with their goods to the agents of the West India

Company. The English retained only Cape Corse, which, because of its

strong position and the loyalty of the natives, DeRuyter decided would

offer a successful resistance.[135]

Up to the time that DeRuyter departed for the African coast it is

conceivable that by mutual concessions the troublesome questions

existing between England and the United Provinces might have been

amicably settled. The Dutch, however, had decided that this could not

be done with honor and advantage to themselves, and therefore they

chose to answer the warlike actions of Holmes in kind. When the

English learned of DeRuyter's activities on the African coast the

growing animosity between the two countries was so greatly intensified

that war was inevitable. The members of the Royal Company who realized

the gravity of the situation begged the king to come to the company's

assistance.[136] The king, who considered the company to be of great

importance to the colonial trade, and who realized his own intimate

connection with its formation, declared on January 2, 1665, that he

was resolved "to assist, protect & preserve the said company in the

prosecution of their said trade,"[137] a declaration which was

tantamount to war.

The Anglo-Dutch war of 1665-7 was, therefore, as has long been known,

a war over trade privileges. Furthermore, in the popular mind, it was

the dispute over trading privileges on the West African coast which

"became the Occasion, at least the Popular Pretence of the war with

Holland."[138] In international disputes some facts, although of minor

importance, are often seized upon with great vigor by the contending

parties. It is very probable that both England and the United

Provinces greatly overestimated the value of the African forts and

factories, but, at that time, the possession of them seemed very

important. To many of these places plausible claims were advanced by

both the English and the Dutch. There was plenty of opportunity

therefore for disputes, and the representatives of the two great

commercial companies did not fail to utilize it.

If the factors of the two companies in Guinea found it impossible to

reconcile their differences, the same observation may be made

concerning Downing and DeWitt at The Hague. One is not inclined to

excuse the deceit of the latter nor to sympathize with the apathetic

neglect with which he met all English claims. On the other hand,

Downing was perhaps the match for DeWitt in cunning and his master in

argument. His contempt for the Dutch made it impossible for him to

deal with them without gaining a complete victory. Compromise is the

basis of most diplomacy, but such a word was scarcely in Downing's

vocabulary. There were men in England who realized that Downing was

slowly but surely leading the two countries into war. Clarendon

reproved him for overzealousness; and Lord Hollis, the English

ambassador in France, informed him that he saw no "causam belli, onely

litigandi," and asked him if he could not temper his speech "by

pouring in oyle & not vinegar," and thus prevent a war if

possible.[139] In Downing's behalf it may be said, however, that his

attitude was the same as that of the mercantile interests in England

which he so well represented. The increasing importance of the

mercantile element, both in England and Holland, and their desire to

encroach on the trade of one another in all parts of the world,

especially in Guinea, was responsible for the war.[140] When the war

was inevitable, representatives of the English commercial interests

assured the government of their loyal support and assistance.[141] As

for the Dutch they, too, entered the conflict with high hopes for they

did not fear Charles II as they had feared Cromwell.

Sir Robert Holmes who had been so largely responsible for the

difficulties which resulted in the Anglo-Dutch war arrived in England

early in January, 1665. He was ordered to surrender the ships which he

had taken from the Dutch in Guinea to the Royal Company.[142] On the

9th of January, by way of appeasing VanGogh, he was thrown into the

Tower of London,[143] where he was to remain, the king declared, until

he gave a satisfactory account of his actions at Cape Verde. Once more

it appeared as if proceedings were to be taken against him "according

to the exigency of the case."[144] It is interesting to note that his

imprisonment resulted from the capture of the one place, mention of

which was omitted in his instructions. However, Holmes was not long

detained in confinement. Probably on account of the influence of the

duke of York and of Prince Rupert he was again set at liberty toward

the last of January,[145] and VanGogh reported that he was even

enjoying royal favor.[146] Apparently Holmes was unable to render a

satisfactory account of his prizes to the Royal Company, however, and

he was therefore reconfined in the Tower about the 24th of

February.[147] On the third of March he was examined before the Privy

Council in regard to his expedition. His explanation of the various

events was found satisfactory and he was forthwith ordered to be

discharged from the Tower.[148] This order was not executed at once

because he had not even yet rendered a satisfactory account to the

Company.[149] Royal clemency was invoked and a warrant was issued

March 23, 1665, releasing him from all criminal and pecuniary charges

which might be brought against him.[150] The king's intervention in

his behalf brought to an end the connection of Sir Robert Holmes with

the company's affairs on the African coast.

By concluding the account of the diplomatic relations of England and

the United Provinces with the early part of 1665, it is not intended

to convey the idea that all diplomatic intercourse between the two

countries ceased at that time. Downing remained in The Hague until

August of that year, but neither side thought seriously of attempting

to prevent the struggle in which they were already engaged on the

African coast. DeRuyter arrived at Cape Verde on October 11, 1664,

where he found nine English vessels most of which were in the service

of the Royal Company and had only recently arrived on the Guinea

coast. In response to an inquiry made by the English as to his

intentions DeRuyter replied that he had come to punish the Royal

Company for Holmes' hostile actions. He demanded the surrender of the

company's factors and goods on shore and on the several ships. Since

the English were unable to resist they surrendered the goods of the

Royal Company after which the vessels were permitted to depart. In

this way DeRuyter attempted to show plainly that he was not carrying

on hostilities against the English nation, but was only aiding the

West India Company to recover its property and goods, and to punish

the Royal Company for the actions of Sir Robert Holmes.

DeRuyter left a Dutch garrison at Cape Verde and started with his

plunder for Elmina. On the way he despoiled the English factory on the

Sierra Leone River. On December 25 he arrived on the Gold Coast and

made an attack on Tacorary where he was temporarily repulsed, but

later he succeeded in blowing up this English factory. He then

proceeded to unload at Elmina the effects which he had taken from the

English. While doing so he received orders from the States General,

dated October 21, 1664, commanding him to seize all English goods and

vessels, whether they belonged to the Royal Company or not. In

accordance with these instructions DeRuyter captured several English

vessels, but he considered his chief duty to be the taking of the

English fort at Kormentine. An agreement was made with the natives of

the neighboring region of Fetu, who acted in conjunction with the

Dutch ships and with the forces which DeRuyter landed. Although many

of the natives remained loyal to the English, Kormentine fell an easy

prey to the attacking party about the first of February, 1665. The

other English factories, with the exception of Cape Corse, were also

occupied without much difficulty. Although DeRuyter had received

special orders to reduce Cape Corse, he considered this impossible, on

account of the ease with which it could be defended and the loyalty of

the Negroes to the English cause in that territory. DeRuyter was

therefore compelled to depart from the Gold Coast on his voyage to

Barbadoes without having taken possession of Cape Corse[151].

On April 18, 1667, Lord Hollis and Sir William Coventry, who were

selected as the English envoys to treat for peace between England and

the United Provinces, were instructed to propose that each country

retain whatever places were in its possession on the 25th of the

previous December. On the other hand, the English were also directed

to induce the Dutch to give back Kormentine if possible[152]. How

vigorously the envoys urged the return of Kormentine cannot be

ascertained, but at any rate they were unsuccessful in obtaining it.

When the treaty was concluded at Breda, July 21, 1667, it provided

that each country should retain the territories which it held on the

tenth of the previous May[153]. Thus ended the war which had in so

large a measure been caused by the troubles between the Royal

Adventurers and the West India Company.

At the conclusion of peace between the two countries, the English

cannot be said to have been in a better position on the Guinea coast

than they were before the war. On the other hand, it would not be

difficult to rebuild new factories at the places which they had lost

during the war. Indeed at the time peace was made factories had

already been settled in several places occupied before DeRuyter's

expedition. Nicolas Villaut, a Frenchman who made a voyage down the

coast of Guinea in the years 1666 and 1667 mentioned an English

factory on one of the islands in the Sierra Leone River, another at

Madra Bomba just north of Cape Mount, and still another just below

Cape Miserado[154]. He also mentioned the strength of the English

fortress at Cape Corse, and declared that, although there was war in

Europe between England and Denmark, the English factors at Cape Corse

and those of the Danes at the neighboring fort of Fredericksburg made

an amicable agreement to commit no acts of hostility against one

another; and that this agreement was so punctually observed that the

soldiers of the two nations mingled freely at all times[155]. Villaut

failed to describe the condition of the company's fort in the Gambia

River, but on October 30, 1667, an attack on it by the natives was

reported to the general court of the company[156]. The Negroes

succeeded in obtaining possession of the island but were presently

dislodged by the company's factors after the loss of a number of white

men[157].

Inasmuch as there remain very scanty records of the company's trading

activities and the manner of government instituted at its forts and

factories on the African coast, it is impossible to describe fully

these aspects of the company's history. When the company first sent

agents to the head factory at Kormentine seven men each served a

month's turn as chief factor. As might have been expected trouble

resulted concerning the succession.[158] The company therefore

withdrew this order and directed that one of the factors be given

charge of affairs with the title of chief agent and with a salary of

one hundred pounds per year.[159] After the Dutch captured Kormentine

in 1665, Cape Corse became the chief English factory, under the

direction of Gilbert Beavis, who was replaced by Thomas Pearson in

1667. At the end of the Anglo-Dutch war the company's affairs on the

African coast were at a low ebb, and the uncertainties of the Guinea

trade were at once demonstrated when the former agent, Beavis, in

conjunction with the natives, assaulted Cape Corse, carrying off

Pearson and much of the company's goods. With the assistance of one of

the Royal Company's ships the factors recovered the fort and replaced

Pearson in charge of affairs, where he remained to the year 1671.[160]

In addition to these difficulties there was also a repetition of the

petty quarrels between the agents of the Royal Company and those of

the West India Company, which had so characterized the years previous

to the war. When the English began to build lodges at Komenda and

Agga, the Dutch general, Dirck Wilree, at once objected, claiming that

the possession of the adjacent fort of Kormentine gave them exclusive

rights to those places.[161] The English denied this claim[162] and

sent home for more supplies to fortify Komenda. At the same time they

advised the company that the licensed private traders who had appeared

on the coast had very greatly injured the trade of the company's

factories, because they sold their goods very much cheaper than the

company's agents could afford to.[163] The renewal of the trouble

between the two companies moved the general court on June 30, 1668, to

ask for the king's assistance.[164] The information lately received

from the company's agents was read in the Privy Council and referred

to the committee for trade.[165] This committee recommended the

appointment of some persons to treat with the Dutch regarding the

possession of the disputed places, and Secretary Morice was therefore

instructed to sound the Dutch ambassadors in London about the matter.

Instructions of a similar nature were to be given to Sir William

Temple, who was about to depart for the United Netherlands as the

English ambassador.[166]At this point the matter seems to have been

dropped without further discussion, and Komenda remained a subject of

possible contention between the English and the Dutch for many years

to come.

During the latter years of the history of the Company of Royal

Adventurers the factories including Cape Corse fell into great decay,

on account of the failure of the company to send out ships and

supplies. Nearly all the English trade was carried on in the vessels

of private traders, who in return for their licenses, agreed to take

one-tenth of their cargoes free of all freight charges, which goods

were to be used for the maintenance of the company's factories,

especially Cape Corse.[167] Even this provision was not sufficient,

and in the latter part of November, 1670, it was found necessary to

send some additional supplies for the immediate relief of Cape

Corse.[168] The king, who was still indebted to the company for his

subscription to the stock, was induced to pay a part of it, with which

money two ships were despatched for the relief of Cape Corse[169]

which had been in great distress.[170]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] John II of Portugal had assumed the title of Lord of Guinea in

1485.

[2] Dumont, _Corps Universel Diplomatique_, VI, part 2, p. 367.

[3] As for instance, in 1659, the seizure of a Dutch ship called the

Vrede by a French captain under the pretense of a Swedish commission.

Lias, West Indien, 1658 tot 1665, Zeeland chamber to the Amsterdam

chamber of W. I. C. (West India Company), March 1, 1660 (N. S.). Also,

in the same year, the Dutch confiscated a Courland ship called the

Pietas for trespassing on Dutch territory. _Ibid._, Amsterdam chamber

of W. I. C. to S. G. (States General), June 23, 1661 (N. S.). Louis

XIV also complained about the disturbance of French commerce on the

Gambia by the Dutch. _Lettres, Mémoires et Négociations de Monsieur le

Compte d'Estrades_, I, 185, Louis XIV to d'Estrades, August 13, 1661

(N. S.).

[4] Diederichs, pp. 20, 21. (Diederichs, H., _Herzog Jacobs von

Kurland Kolonien an der Westkuste von Afrika_.)

[5] The West India Company was subdivided into the chambers of

Amsterdam, Gröningen, Zeeland, North Holland and Friesland, and the

Maas. The Amsterdam chamber was much the most important; it was known

therefore as the "presidiale" chamber.

[6] C. O. 1: 16, f. 191, February 4, 1659 (N. S.). At the same time

Momber advised Steele, the Courland commander at Fort St. André, to

pay no attention to the contract if he was in a position to defend

himself, but Steele was unable to resist. Diederichs, pp. 45, 46.

[7] Diederichs, pp. 46-8; C. O. 1: 16, ff. 193, 195-7.

[8] Resolution of S. G., July 28, 1661 (N. S.); Aitzema, X, 76.

(Aitzema, Lieuwe van, _Historie of Verhael van Saken van Staet en

Oorlogh_.)

[9] See the oath taken by Holmes' men dated March 7, 1660/1, enclosed

in the letter of Nassau and others to the estates of H. and W. F.

(Holland and West Friesland), January 17/27, 1662.

[10] C. O. 1: 16, f. 193, relation of Otto Steele; Diederichs, p. 49.

Holmes afterward admitted that there were but two men and a boy in the

fort when it was taken. C. O. 1: 30, f. 74, Holmes to Sir Edward

Walker, May 20, 1673.

[11] VanGogh and others to S. G., September 6/16, 1661.

[12] Lias, West Indien, 1658 tot 1665, Amsterdam chamber of W. I. C.

to S. G., January 10, 1661 (N. S.).

[13] Resolution of S. G., January 13, 1661 (N. S.).

[14] Lias, West Indien, 1658 tot 1665, Amsterdam chamber of W. I. C.

to S. G., January 31, 1661 (N. S.).

[15] Resolution of S. G., February 5, 1661 (N. S.).

[16] _Ibid._, July 28, 1661 (N. S.).

[17] Clar. St. Paps. (Clarendon State Papers), 104, f. 211, the Dutch

ambassadors to Ruysch, August 5, 1661 (N. S.).

[18] _Ibid._, 104, f. 217, Downing to S. G., August 8, 1661.

[19] Aitzema, X, 78, Charles II to S. G., August 14, 1661.

[20] Clar. St. Paps., 104: 237, Downing to Clarendon, August 19, 1661

(N. S.). In another letter Downing declared, "it would be very well to

accept of the Duke his transferring his interest to his Matie, and for

the Dutch ambrs you will do well to be 6 or 8 moneths in examining the

matter and then let them know his Maties mind." Egerton MSS., 2538, f.

12, Downing to Nicholas, January 27, 1661/2.

[21] He suffered this punishment only because he had taken to Guinea a

number of extra men whose wages the king felt obliged to pay.

Admiralty Papers, Navy Board, In-Letters, 5, James to the Navy Board,

September 10, 1661.

[22] This seems to be a little too much to say of the king's letter.

[23] C. O. 1: 15, f. 168, VanGogh and others to S. G., October 19/29,

1661.

[24] P. C. R., Charles II, 2: 417, October 25, 1661.

[25] _Ibid._, p. 459, November 27, 1661.

[26] _Ibid._, pp. 510, 514, January 8, 10, 1662. He may also have been

before the Council in December, as an order was made on December 21,

1661, rescinding the former order to stop his pay. Admiralty Papers,

Navy Board, In-Letters, 6, James to the Navy Board, December 21, 1661.

[27] Nassau and Hoorn to the estates of H. and W. F., January 17/27,

1662.

[28] Egerton MSS., 2538, f. 12, Downing to Nicholas, January 27,

1661/2.

[29] C. O. 1: 18, ff. 310, 311.

[30] Papieren van Johan de Witt betreffende de Oost en West Indische

compagnie, Carloff to Valckenburg, February 15, 16, 1658 (N. S.).

[31] Loketkas, Staten Generaal, Sweden, no. 38.

[32] _Remonstrantie, aen de Ho. Mo. Heeren de Staten Generael der

Veereenighde Nederlanden_, p. 18.

[33] Dammaert, _Journal_, September 19, 1652, May 18, 1653, December

7, 19, 1655, April 22, 1656 (N. S.).

[34] S. P., Holland, 178, f. 123, undated paper dealing with the

English title to Cape Corse.

[35] Afterwards retaken by the English in the West Indies, toward the

last of 1663. Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten

Generaal, Downing to S. G., February 3, 1663/4. O. S.

[36] Admiralty High Court, Libels, 114, no. 231.

[37] Aitzema, X, 277.

[38] Admiralty High Court, Libels, 115, no. 124; _ibid._,

Examinations, 74, deposition of Edward Paulstagge, March 7, 1662/3.

[39] Nassau and Hoorn to the estates of H. and W. F., January

24/February 3, 1662. In March, 1663, Bernard Sparke, owner of the

Paragon which the Dutch had seized on the Gold Coast, arrested a West

India Company ship at Ilfracombe. Sparke asked for the condemnation of

the ship, but on account of a treaty entered into between the English

and the Dutch in September, 1662, the Privy Council refused to detain

the Dutch ship. Cunaeus to the estates of H. and W. F., March 27/April

6, 1663; P. C. R., Charles II, 3: 357, 380.

[40] Egerton MSS., 2538, ff. 68, 69, Downing to S. G., May 3/13, 1662.

[41] Clar. St. Paps., 76, ff. 217, 218, Downing to Clarendon, May 9,

1662. O. S.

[42] Egerton MSS., 2538, f. 73, Downing to S. G., June 6/16, 1662.

[43] _Ibid._, f. 106, Downing to S. G., August 6/16, 1662.

[44] Add. MSS. (Additional Manuscripts), 22,919, f. 270.

[45] Resolution of S. G., August 28, 1662 (N. S.).

[46] Dumont, _Corps Universel Diplomatique_, VI, part 2, pp. 424, 425.

[47] Index op het Register en Accorden met de Naturellen, Wilree to

Edmund Young, May 24, 1662 (N. S.).

[48] S. P., Holland, 176, f. 119.

[49] Add. MSS., 22,919, f. 262.

[50] _Ibid._, 22,920, f. 24, affidavit of William Crawford and others,

before the Admiralty High Court, February 13, 1663/4.

[51] _Ibid._, 22,919, f. 262, Wilree to the officers of the ship

James, November 9, 1662 (N. S.).

[52] _Ibid._, 22,920, f. 24, affidavit of Crawford and others,

February 13, 1663/4.

[53] S. P., Holland, 167, f. 251, Downing to Williamson, September 11,

1663. O.S.

[54] Add. MSS., 22,920, ff. 13, 14, Downing to S. G., September 17/27,

1663.

[54a] Clar. St. Paps., 106, f. 192, Downing to Clarendon, September

18, 1663. O. S.; S. P., Holland, 167, ff. 271, 272, Downing to Bennet.

[55] Add. MSS., 22,920, f. 22, Royal Company to Downing, September 25,

1663.

[56] Clar. St. Paps., 106, f. 223, Downing to Clarendon, October 2,

1663 O. S.

[57] S. P., Holland, 168, ff. 41, 42.

[58] _Ibid._, 176, f. 121.

[59] _Ibid._, 167, f. 284, Downing to Bennet, September 25, 1664 (O.

S.).

[60] Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan den Raadpensionaris,

Cunaeus to DeWitt, November 2, 1663 (N. S.).

[61] C. S. P., Col., 1661-1668, p. 159, warrant to duke of York, Sept.

5, 1663.

[62] S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, f. 53. These instructions are not

preserved in their complete form.

[63] C. O. 1: 16, f. 157, oath of William Quick and others at Charles

Island, June 1, 1662.

[64] C. O. 1: 18, f. 154, deposition of Stephen Ustick, June 7, 1664;

S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, ff. 147, 148.

[65] S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, f. 148, Holmes' narrative. After

taking the island Holmes sent for as many men as could be spared by

the Royal Company's factors on the Gambia. Accordingly they took

possession of it in the name of the company. C. O. 1: 18, f. 24.

[66] Aitzema, XI, 294, deposition of Andries C. Vertholen, June 9,

1664 (N. S.); Lias, West Indien, 1658 tot 1665, depositions, June 19

and July 19, 1664 (N. S.).

[67] C. O. 1: 18, f. 90, resolution of the council of war on board the

Jersey, April 9, 1664.

[68] Loketkas, Staten Generaal, Engeland, deposition of John Denn,

commander of the ship Mary, December 3, 1663 (O. S.).

[69] S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, f. 149, Holmes' narrative.

[70] S. P., Holland, 176, ff. 118-123, June 7, 1663 (N. S.). A mark of

gold was supposed to be worth about £28. 16s.

[71] Index op het Register der Contracten, letters dated June 13, 14,

1663. 1663.

[72] S. P., Holland, 167, ff. 258-260, September 12, 1663. This

protest with that of Valckenburg of June 7, 1663, was sent to England,

where both were regarded as very important.

[73] C. O. 1: 17, ff. 153, 154, Mr. Brett to the Royal Company, August

31, 1663; Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten

Generaal, Downing to S. G., September 15, 1664 (O. S.).

[74] Index op het Register der Contracten, September 17, 1663.

[75] C. O. 1: 17, ff. 153, 154, contains a number of extracts of

letters from factors of the Royal Company to the company dated from

June to September, 1663. They mention many other conflicts with the

Dutch, including the charge that the Dutch had hired the natives to

attack the fort at Kormentine.

[76] Aitzema, XI, 295, deposition of Andries C. Vertholen, June 9,

1664 (N. S.).

[77] C. O. 1: 18, f. 39, order of the council of war held on board the

Jersey, May 7, 1664.

[78] S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, ff. 51, 52, Holmes' examination. In

his examination before the Privy Council Holmes asserted that in one

of the ships captured from the Dutch, orders had been found from the

States General commanding the Dutch factors to seize the English fort

at Kormentine. There is no evidence to support this assertion and the

States General afterwards characterized the statement as "an errand

invention & a fowle lye." S. P., Holland, 181, f. 10.

[79] S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, ff. 150, 151, Holmes' account; C.

O. 1: 18, f. 39, order of the council of war held on board the Jersey,

May 7, 1664.

[80] S. P., Holland, 174, f. 32, Downing to Bennet, January 10, 1664/5

(O. S.). This letter, written over a year later, shows that Downing

was not acquainted with Holmes' instructions.

[81] Lister, Thomas Henry, _Life and Administration of Edward, first

Earl of Clarendon_, III, 259, Downing to Clarendon, November 6, 1663

(O. S.).

[82] S. P., Holland, 168, f. 230, Downing to Bennet, December 18,

1663.

[83] Clar. St. Paps., 107, f. 101, Downing to S. G., February 8,

1663/4 (O. S.).

[84] Add. MSS., 22,920, f. 26, Schested to Downing, February 10, 1664;

S. P., Denmark, 17, f. 150, Frederick III to Schested, December 15,

1663.

[85] Loketkas, Staten Generaal, Engeland, W. I. C. to S. G., read

December 1, 1663 (N. S.); _ibid._, S. G. to Downing, December, 1663.

[86] S. P., Holland, 169, ff. 120, 121, Downing to (Bennet), February

12, 1663/4 (O. S.).

[87] _Ibid._, f. 121.

[88] _Ibid._, ff. 122, 124.

[89] S. P. Holland, 169, f. 132, Downing to S. G., February 16, 1663/4

(O. S.).

[90] _Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en

W. F._, Cunaeus to DeWitt, March 11/21, 1664.

[91] Pepys, _Diary_, IV, 103; Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland

aan de Staten van H. en W. F., Cunaeus to DeWitt, (April 8/18, 1664,

N. S.).

[92] Clar. St. Paps., 107, f. 147, Downing to Clarendon, April 1, 1664

(O. S.); Dumont, _Corps Universel Diplomatique_, VI, part 2, p. 424,

article XIV.

[93] S. P., Holland, 170, ff. 16-18, Downing to Bennet, May 6, 1664

(O. S.); Clar. St. Paps., 107, ff. 195, 196, Downing to Clarendon, May

6, 1664 (O. S.).

[94] _Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en

W. F._, Cunaeus to DeWitt, May 6/16, 1664; Secretekas, Engeland, no.

123, Cunaeus to the directors of W.I.C., May 6/16, 1664.

[95] Secretekas, Engeland, no. 123, W. I. C. to S. G., May 23, 1664

(N. S.).

[96] S. P., Holland, 173, f. 129, Downing to Bennet, December 30, 1664

(O. S.).

[97] Resolution of S. G., June 13, 1664 (N. S.).

[98] _Ibid._, June 5, 1664 (N. S.).

[99] S. P., Holland, 171, f. 174, VanGogh to S. G., June 24/July 4,

1664.

[100] DeWitt, _Brieven_ (DeWitt, Johan, _Brieven, geschreven ende

gewisselt tusschen den Heer Johan de Witt_), IV, 311, DeWitt to

VanGogh, July 11, 1664 (N. S.).

[101] _Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en

W. F._, VanGogh to DeWitt, July 15/25, 1664.

[102] P. C. R., Charles II, 4: 122; S.P., Dom., Charles II, 99, f.

170, petition of the Royal Company for a convoy for its ships. It was

also reported that the duke of York was fitting out a frigate at his

own expense to send to Guinea. C. S. P., Dom., 1663-1664, p. 264,

newsletter, September 2, 1663.

[103] S. P., Holland, 171, f. 238, W. I. C. to S. G., July 21, 1664

(N. S.).

[104] Clar. St. Paps., 108, ff. 39-41, Downing to Clarendon, July 22,

1664 (O. S.).

[105] Pepys, _Diary_, IV, 202.

[106] _Ibid._, 42, 143.

[107] Clar. St. Paps., 108, ff. 48, 49, Downing to Clarendon, July 29,

1664 (O. S.).

[108] Brandt, Gerard, _La Vie de Michel de Ruiter_, pp. 212-213.

[109] Brandt, _Vie de Ruiter_, pp. 213, 214, 217.

[110] S. P., Holland, 171, ff. 23, 24, Downing to Bennet, August 4,

1664 (O. S.); _ibid._, ff. 124, 125, Downing to Bennet, August 26,

1664 (O. S.).

[111] S. P., Holland, 171, ff. 119, 120, Downing to S. G., August 25,

1664 (O. S.).

[112] _Ibid._, f. 25, Downing to Bennet, August 4, 1664 (O. S.).

[113] _Ibid._, f. 56, Downing to Bennet, August 12, 1664 (O. S.).

[114] Clar. St. Paps., 108, ff. 75, 76, Downing to Clarendon, August

26, 1664 (O. S.).

[115] Lister, _Life of Clarendon_, III, 344, Downing to Clarendon,

September 9, 1664 (O. S.).

[116] S. P., Holland, 172, f. 171, Downing to Bennet, September 9,

1664 (O. S.).

[117] Clar. St. Paps., 108, f. 82, Downing to Clarendon, September 16,

1664 (O. S.).

[118] S. P., Holland, 172, f. 241, Downing to Bennet, September 23,

1664 (O. S.).

[119] _Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten Generaal_,

VanGogh to S. G., September 23/October 3, 1664.

[120] Pepys, _Diary_, IV, 254; _Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland

aan de Staten Generaal_, VanGogh to S. G., September 30/October 10,

1664.

[121] Pepys, _Diary_, IV, 254.

[122] S. P., Holland, 172, f. 35, Downing to Bennet, October 7, 1664

(O. S.).

[123] _Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en

W. F._, VanGogh to DeWitt, October 3/13, 1664. A few days after this

VanGogh very much annoyed the king by bringing up the Cape Verde

incident again. The king burst out, "And pray, what is Cape Verde? A

stinking place (using these very words): Is this of such importance to

make so much adoe about! As much as I could ever yet learne of it, it

is of noe use at all." S. P., Holland, 172, f. 158, VanGogh to Ruysch,

October 24, 1664 (N. S.).

[124] _Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en

W. F._, VanGogh to DeWitt, October 3/13, 1664.

[125] S. P., Holland, 173, f. 178, VanGogh to Ruysch, November 7, 1664

(N. S.); DeWitt, _Brieven_, IV, 387, 390, VanGogh to DeWitt, October

28/November 7, October 31/November 10, 1664.

[126] DeWitt, _Brieven_, IV, 390, DeWitt to VanGogh, November 14, 1664

(N. S.).

[127] Clar. St. Paps., 108, f. 126, Downing to Clarendon, November 11,

1664 (O. S.).

[128] _Ibid._, f. 100, Downing to Clarendon, October 14, 1664 (O. S.);

Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten Generaal, October

14/24, 1664.

[129] Clar. St. Paps., 108, f. 108, Downing to Clarendon, October 28,

1664 (O. S.); _ibid._, f. 120, Downing to Clarendon, November 4, 1664

(O. S.).

[130] _Ibid._, f. 117, Downing to Clarendon, November 4, 1664 (O. S.).

[131] _Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan der

Raadpensionaris_, VanGogh to DeWitt, October 17/27, 1664.

[132] S. P., Holland, 173, f. 19, VanGogh to Ruysch, December 5, 1654

(N. S.). The duke of York was known to be very favorable to Holmes at

the same time. S. P., Dom., Charles II, 105, f. 176, Coventry to

Bennet, November 27, 1664.

[133] Pepys, _Diary_, IV, 312.

[134] He arrived at Cape Verde October 22, 1664, and left the Gold

Coast February 27, 1665.

[135] In this account it seems unnecessary to give the details of the

capture of these places. They may be found at length in Brandt, _Vie

de Ruiter_, pp. 223 to 265.

[136] S. P., Dom., Charles II, 110, f. 19; Condition of Co., Jan. 2

(1664/5).

[137] P. C. R., Charles II, 5: 4.

[138] _The Case of the Royal African Company of England and their

Creditors_, p. 6.

[139] Add. MSS., 22,920, f. 46, Lord Hollis to (Downing), September

2/12, 1664.

[140] On October 30, 1664 (N. S.), d'Estrades declared to the king of

France that the real cause of the war then about to begin was the

desire of the king of England to become master of Guinea. _Mémoires

d'Estrades_, II, 517.

[141] See the paper of Sir Richard Ford, one of the prominent members

of the Royal Company. Clar. St. Paps., 83, f. 374.

[142] C. S. P., Dom., 1664-5, p. 154, warrant to Holmes, January 7,

1654.

[143] S. P., Holland, 174, f. 138, VanGogh to Ruysch, January 9/19,

1665.

[144] S. P., Holland, 174, f. 138, VanGogh to Ruysch, January 13/23,

1665.

[145] _Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan den Raadpensionaris,

VanGogh to Ruysch_, January 27/February 6, 1665.

[146] _Ibid._, VanGogh to Ruysch, January 30/February 9, 1665.

[147] _Ibid._, Cunaeus to ----, February 24/March 6, 1665.

[148] P. C. R., Charles II, 5:69.

[149] _Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan den

Raadpensionaris_, (VanGogh) to Ruysch, February 27/March 9, 1665.

[150] C. S. P., Dom., 1664-5, p. 268, order to release Holmes, March

23, 1664/5.

[151] The account of DeRuyter's voyage given here is a digest of what

appears at much greater length in Brandt, _Vie de Ruiter_, pp.

223-265. A short contemporary English account may be found in C.O. 1:

19, ff. 88, 89.

[152] S. P., Holland, 182, ff. 246, 247. The Dutch had entertained

some hopes of inducing the English to surrender Cape Corse, as is

evident from negotiations which they carried on with the Swedes and

the Danes. In March, 1665, a treaty was drawn up between Sweden and

the United Provinces in which the former country agreed to renounce

her claims of damage against the West India Company and all her rights

to any places on the African coast, for which renunciation the States

General was to pay 140,000 rix dollars. The treaty failed of

approbation on account of the reluctance of the king of Sweden to

withdraw his interests from the coast of Africa. Aitzema, XI, 1102,

1103; S. P., Holland, 174, f. 148, Downing to Bennet, February 17,

1664/5 (O.S.); S. P., Holland, 179, f. 86, Downing to Bennet, March

10, 1665 (March 10, 1664/5. O. S.).

With the Danes the Dutch had more success. On February 11, 1667, a

treaty was entered into between Frederick III, of Denmark and the

United Provinces, in which it was agreed that the Danes should

surrender all their claims to Cape Corse, retaining, however, the

adjacent fort of Fredericksburg. Dumont, _Corps Universel

Diplomatique_, VI, part 3, p. 74.

[153] Dumont, _Corps Universel Diplomatique_, VI, part I, pp. 44, 45,

article 3.

[154] Villaut, _A Relation of the Coasts of Africa called Guinee_, pp.

49, 56, 75.

[155] _Ibid._, pp. 126, 131, 135. Villaut also speaks of an English

fort at Eniacham (Anashan).

[156] A. C. R., 75: 60.

[157] S. P., Dom., Charles II, 217, f. 76, John Lysle to Williamson,

September 16, 1667.

[158] C. O. 1: 17, f. 243, John Allen to (the Royal Adventurers),

December 18, 1663.

[159] A. C. R., 75: 3.

[160] S. P., Dom., Charles II, 380, f. 57; _ibid._, 381, ff. 138, 139.

[161] C. O. 1: 23, ff. 3, 4, 6, 7, Wilree to Pearson, January

23/February 2, and February 14/24, 1668.

[162] _Ibid._, 23, f. 5, Pearson to Wilree, n. d.

[163] C. O. 1: 23, f. 2, Pearson and others to the Royal Adventurers,

February 18, 1667/8.

[164] A. C. R., 75: 75.

[165] C. O. 1: 23, f. 1, petition of the Royal Adventurers (July 3),

1668; P. C. R., Charles II, 7: 374, July 3, 1668.

[166] P. C. R., 7: 378, July 8, 1668. The minutes of the general court

for November 14, 1668, mention a letter intended to be dispatched to

Sir William Temple. A. C. R., 75: 81.

[167] A. C. R., 100: 47, 48.

[168] _ibid._, 75: 96.

[169] C. O. 1: 25, f. 227, estimate of charges for supplies at Cape

Corse, December 19, 1670; A. C. R., 75: 106, 107.

[170] Foreign Entry Book, 176, minutes of the foreign committee,

January 22, 1671/2.