THE REASON OF ANIMALS NOT THE REASON OF MAN.

The organic kingdom seems to be little else than a system of means,

resisting for a short period only the laws which govern inanimate

matter, and then yielding to their power. Wherever the contemplative

mind turns among the innumerable tribes of animals, which have been

revealed by the scrutiny of man, it beholds them all struggling a

little while for a sentient existence, and then sinking down, to form

a part of that mingled mass, which has given them, and continues to

give their successors, sustenance. It is not however animated matter

only which thus for a moment attracts, and then passes from our

observation. In each individual of all this numberless multitude, we

behold the glimmering of intelligence, and in some species it seems

to fall but little below the uncultivated reason of man; nay more, in

their architecture, in their fabrics, in their modes of subsistence

and defence, many are known to rival the utmost stretch of human

ingenuity. This intelligence also, and this ingenuity, vanishes from

before us. The theory has indeed been formed, that this appearance of

reason, wherever found, or however feeble, is but the commencement of

an immortal existence; but it is not thus that the mass of mankind view

the subject. They are accustomed to look upon the whole animal kingdom

as progressing to a period, when, not only the sensations of their

bodies will cease, and their organs be left, without exception, to

decay, but when all their intelligence and skill also will be swallowed

up in annihilation. If then the reason of brutes is the reason of man,

how strong, how complete the analogy, and how natural the conclusion,

that the mind of man too, with the decease of his body ceases to exist!

Living therefore as the most intelligent of these animals do, in the

midst of us, and seeming to think and reason every day as really as

ourselves, reason itself seems to be constantly persuading us that

our end is the same. Indeed, if man differs from the brute only in

the degree of intellect which he possesses, it is almost demonstrably

certain, that annihilation or immortality alike await us. That animals

are immortal, however, it is impossible to believe; for if this may be

predicated of one individual, it may be predicated of every species in

which animal life can be proved to exist. From the highest intelligence

which exists among them, to the meanest insect that crawls in the dust,

or the dullest inhabitant of a shell that clings to a rock, there

is not a point where the line of separation can, with any degree of

plausibility, be drawn, and we might almost extend the chain to the

plant that shrinks from the touch, and the flower that follows the sun.

This theory therefore we reject as unnatural and absurd. Hence we are

reduced to the necessity of allowing, either that man is not immortal,

or that his reason is different, not only in degree, but in its nature,

from that of brutes. Although if the latter be true, it does not follow

that the former is false, yet one of the most powerful arguments in

support of it falls to the ground, and leaves other evidence to produce

a conviction of the truth of its opposite. It is then an object of no

little importance to discover, if possible, whether there is sufficient

difference between the faculties of men and animals, to justify the

conclusion that their destinies are so different.

In endeavoring to accomplish this object, we propose to consider

brutes, in the first place, as they exist in their natural state, and

afterwards, as they are when trained by man. Let us go, then, to the

forest where the bird sits upon her nest, and the beast rests in his

lair in undisturbed repose--or rather, if you please, where air, earth

and water, teem with countless multitudes, all alive with activity,

and all closely devoted to the peculiar employments for which Nature

has fitted them. Compare now this busy scene, with that where the

same elements groan under the burden imposed upon them by man, in his

highest state of cultivation. Mark the aerial artist as she proceeds in

the construction of her edifice, which in its execution and adaptation

to its situation, defies all imitation by man. Without a model, and

without instruction or experience, she fabricates a nest, which, in

materials and construction, as near as circumstances permit, resembles

those of all her predecessors. Where there is no possibility of a

communication, precisely the same process is followed, and the same

result is produced in every instance. Neither does age, observation

or experience, produce the least improvement, but it more frequently

happens, that the first product of this instinctive skill excels all

that succeed. The same appears to be true of every species of the

brute creation as we find them in the wilds of nature. All come into

existence endowed with a species of intellect; a practical ingenuity,

apparently far superior to any thing which man possesses, previous to

observation.

If, therefore, the mental endowments of brutes are to be estimated by

the readiness with which they arrive at certain practical results, man

sinks below them. Among the whole human race, we find not a single

instance of such instinctive knowledge. Man springs into existence

of all animals the most helpless, and the most ignorant of the means

of his support or his happiness. He is compelled to learn and direct

every step of his course by observation and experience. He is left

to deliberate and choose without any previous bias of the mind, and

hence arises that vast diversity of manners and customs, scarcely

greater between the most civilized and the most barbarous people,

than between those who are buried in an equal depth of barbarism.

On the other hand, throughout each particular species of the brute

creation, all appear to be guided by one mind, and urged on by some

irresistible power to the same definite ends. In the state in which we

are now considering them, there is no variation in their habitudes,

and seems to be no possibility of their choosing a different course

from that so universally pursued. It is as natural to them as to live;

as involuntary as their breath. This is instinct--a faculty to man

denied--a pilot whose absence leaves him to the winds and waves of

circumstances, while its presence impels as well as guides the animal

creation in all their intricate manœvres.

There are traits, however, in which man and the most intelligent of

other animals closely resemble each other. Present, for instance,

a pleasing object to the eye of man, and the countenance will

involuntarily kindle into a smile. Present to the half-famished

wanderer an article of food, and the flowing saliva and the beseeching

look, will testify, in spite of him, his eagerness to receive it.

Tear from the fond mother her darling offspring, and plunge into its

unprotected breast the glittering steel, and an agony unutterable will

give her wings to fly to its rescue, and a thousand tongues to call for

aid, or drive her to madness with despair.

This is a species of action, exhibited to an actual extent, perhaps,

though in different ways, by both animals and men. It evinces a power

which it is not in the nature of man wholly to resist, and under the

full operation of which we use neither deliberation nor judgment. Such

seems to be the power which gives rise to a large part of the actions

of the most intelligent animals. It differs little in its nature from

that instinct which guides them in their mechanical labors, and, in

connection with it, is sufficient to account for all the phenomena

which, as sentient beings, in their natural state, they exhibit to

us. It is the influence of the passions--the feelings--the heart. In

brutes, apart from instinct, (if this be not considered instinct,) it

holds universal sway. The objects which excite the passions, and give

rise to action, may not, indeed, in all cases be present. They may be

called up by circumstances in all the vividness of reality, through

the powerful memory with which brutes are endowed, yet the motives of

the action are the same as if the real object supplied the place of

the imaginary one. The principle is the same, and the result is still

produced by the influence of the animal feelings, excited by sensible

objects. But in man there is displayed a moving power which exists

independently of instinct, of love, or hate, or hope, or fear, and

which is capable of exercising a control over all, unless it be the

very strongest of human passions. In the exercise of it, the passions

are, as it were for the moment annihilated, and the intellect rises

into a sphere where all tangible, sensible objects, vanish, and the

mind converses with objects beyond the reach of mere animal perception.

The question may now arise, how are we to account for all that variety

of movement and action, which animals acquire under the instruction

of man? If instinct and passion are the only influences to which

they are subject, we should reasonably suppose that their actions

would be as invariable as the motives from which they originate. Had

they never been subject to a higher order of beings, this would be

found universally true. But that class of animals which we denominate

domestic, and indeed almost all upon which the hand of man has laid its

controlling influence, exhibit a species of action, which indicates

a capability of improvement, and for which it would be impossible

to account upon the principles which have been considered. There is

another principle which is seen alike in animals and man, and might

with propriety be denominated an artificial instinct. It is habit--a

state in which we are led to act with reference to definite ends, and

yet act involuntarily. By a frequent repetition of some motion of the

hand, the foot or the whole person, we come at last to do the same

unconsciously, and it is by this means that we perform so readily

many of the intricate processes which the arts require. It is this

which explains the secret of attachment to places and things. Even the

prisoner, after a long-continued confinement to a gloomy cell, finds,

at his departure, a magic charm binding him to the dreary habitation.

The tender threads of affection have become entwined around the objects

so constantly before him, and he is obliged to summon his reason,

to break through the silvery web that is formed around his heart.

Observation teaches us that animals are subject to the same influence.

After a period of confinement and familiarity with man, the door of

their enclosure may be opened, and almost without exception, they will

leave it, only to return again of their own accord--not because a

judgment teaches them that such a condition is preferable, but because

a new influence is thrown over them which they cannot shake off. It is

obviously upon this principle that they perform all the manœvres, and

answer all the purposes, which they are made to do by man.

These three causes--instinct, passion, and habit, are believed to be

sufficient to account for all the varieties of action exhibited by

animals. We no where discover any of that power of origination, that

freedom of thought and action, which renders man capable of endless

improvement, and worthy of presiding over the brute creation. Nor any

where do we find that power of abstraction, by which, from evidences of

design which are displayed among terrestrial and celestial objects, we

are able to reason our way up to an Infinite Being whom we have neither

seen nor heard. These are the characteristics of man, which render him

an accountable being--give him a conscience, and stamp him with the

impress of immortality.

The Yale Literary Magazine (Vol. I, No. 6, August 1836) · 第 24 / 39 题