each community was distinct, jealous and self-centred. In New York
there was a large trade with the Indians; and the pious Quakers
of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island used to finance pirates who at
one time nearly swept our East Indian trade off the seas. But
for the most part they quietly tilled the soil, or in the north
went fishing; nor could any power induce even a few of them to
unite their forces against the French. They would invade each
other, for they were a most cantankerous people, but would never
make a combined effort against the common enemy. New York and New
England, being nearest to the French, made endeavours from time
to time to drive them out, but always failed owing to provincial
jealousies, want of discipline, want of organisation, want of
efficient leaders. There are two waterways, broken in places by
rapids, which, as you know, lead from New York to the St Lawrence;
the one by the Mohawk and Lake Ontario, the other by the Hudson and
Lakes George and Champlain; and these waterways were the scene of
all the fighting for the mastery of Canada. In 1690 and 1691 New
York and New England made a desperate but inefficient attempt to
take Quebec. They failed miserably, though New England alone could
pit ninety thousand settlers against the French twelve thousand.
The French, united and well commanded, took the offensive, broke
down the power of the Five Indian Nations--the principal defensive
barrier of the English settlements--and the Colonies were reduced
to shrieking to England for help.
Queen Anne sent an expedition to the St Lawrence in 1711, which
failed owing to the incompetence of the commander; but none the
less at the Peace of Utrecht France ceded to us Nova Scotia.
Thereupon the French proceeded to fortify all the commanding
points on the lakes (remember that the waterways were the only
ways by which an army could be supplied), and established a naval
station on Cape Breton to harass British shipping in future wars.
This was the celebrated fortress of Louisburg; and the building
of it was a very costly mistake. Why? Because it was situated in
a barren territory which could raise nothing and support nothing,
wherefore Louisburg could only be provisioned from without and
from the sea. Without superiority at sea therefore Louisburg must
starve; with superiority at sea it was a superfluity. The rival
settlers and their Indians continued to raid each other perpetually
along their frontiers until the War of the Austrian Succession
brought about overt hostilities; and then in 1745 the forces of
New England, commanded by a lawyer and with the help of a British
squadron, besieged and took Louisburg. This was a brilliant feat
for amateurs, though of course the most difficult part of the
work was done by British sailors; but upon the peace of 1748 the
British Government very wisely restored Louisburg, preferring to
keep Madras in the East Indies in its place. On the other hand
the British established a military settlement of old soldiers at
Halifax.
The French now began seriously to pursue their policy of
establishing themselves in rear of the British colonies, by
forcibly occupying two British settlements on the Ohio, and
building a chain of forts to maintain the communications between
these, Lake Erie and Montreal. The Governor of Virginia sent a
young officer of Militia, named George Washington, to tell them
to go, but was answered that the French had no intention of
moving. The Colonies with the greatest difficulty were brought to
vote a small sum of money for a force to drive the French out;
and Washington advanced again to Ohio, only to be surrounded by
superior numbers and forced to surrender. This might, one would
have thought, have roused the Colonies; but with the exception
of New England, which was burning to capture Canada, one and all
showed the completest apathy. The Americans had, and still have,
all the modern English indifference to national duty and military
preparations. To the enduring shame of the Colonies, therefore,
application was made to England for help; and two regiments were
sent out under General Braddock, a capable but narrow-minded
officer, who had no idea of military operations except as carried
out in a European cock-pit. His difficulties were great, for his
march lay for one hundred miles through dense forests, which
provided neither forage for animals nor food for men; and, when
animals have to carry their own food, they have little strength
to carry more. The only chance was to move lightly and rapidly;
whereas on the contrary Braddock encumbered himself with waggons
which necessitated an advanced party of three hundred axe-men to
clear away trees and obstacles. Nor did he make any effort to
train his troops to bush-fighting; and hence when caught at a
disadvantage by the enemy on the march, they were seized with panic
and cut to pieces. An advance of the local forces of New England
towards the St Lawrence was also a failure, owing to the usual
indiscipline of the Colonial levies, and the entire campaign ended
in disaster.
A few more troops were sent from England in the following year,
1756, together with a new general; but he could accomplish little,
having inadequate forces and being unable to persuade the Colonists
to provide more. The conduct of campaigns by New England lawyers
was in fact most wasteful and inefficient. In 1757, as we have
seen, Pitt came to the head of affairs; but he had not time to make
provision for a more effective management of the war in America;
and all the successes of the year were on the side of the French.
At last in 1758 a new commander-in-chief, General Jeffery Amherst,
was appointed; the regular soldiers were increased to the number
of twenty-six thousand; and Pitt undertook to clothe, equip, feed
and arm twenty-five thousand Colonial troops, leaving to the
Colonies only the expense of paying them. Louisburg was besieged
and taken by Amherst, and the French were driven from the Ohio;
but an advance of sixteen thousand men towards the St Lawrence was
checked by a disgraceful reverse, owing to the incapacity of the
British commander. Amherst took personal command on this side in
the following year, leaving Wolfe to attack Quebec; and in 1760 the
resistance of the French entirely collapsed. It needed only careful
organisation and endless pains in the troublesome work of bringing
forward food for the troops to render success certain; and yet the
Americans could not do it. Beyond all question there were brains in
America fully equal to the business of divining exactly what would
be wanted; indeed Benjamin Franklin had to do with the organisation
of Braddock's expedition; but there were no disciplined men who
could be trusted to do exactly what they were told. The British
soldiers were no doubt, to the Colonial mind, helpless and unhandy
beyond expression; but they knew how to obey. If told to do a
thing to-day at ten o'clock, they did not wait till to-morrow at
three--which is the Colonial way--and it is only by punctuality
that a campaign can be even begun. Selfishness, jealousy and
indiscipline were the causes why the Americans, notwithstanding
their huge superiority in number of population, were unable to
conquer the French in Canada without a British army to help them.
Had the position of the two nations been reversed, the French would
have driven us from Canada in twelve months.
The result of our exertions in behalf of the Colonies is well
known. Having delivered them from a dangerous neighbour, we
asked them to share with us the burden of Imperial defence. They
admitted the justice of the claim, but declined to satisfy it.
When we endeavoured to solve the problem by means of the Imperial
Parliament, they resented it with furious violence. English
politicians, too many of them from factious spite, but a few from
higher motives, supported and encouraged them. The question of
Imperial defence was lost sight of. There was mismanagement on
our side, gross provocation on the side of the Colonists; and the
quarrel finally issued in war. The Americans took the offensive
and made a dash upon Canada, whence they were with some difficulty
repulsed. We recaptured New York; and then, by extraordinary
blundering at home, General Burgoyne was ordered to advance south
from Canada upon the supposition that General Howe would advance
northward to meet him from New York; instead of which Howe sailed
to the Delaware and captured Philadelphia. Burgoyne meanwhile
endeavoured to do as he was bidden; but from want of land-transport
found that continued progress through the forest was impossible.
His only chance was, if he could, to capture one of the enemy's
magazines by surprise; and it was the miscarriage of an attempt to
do this which first entangled him in serious danger. He plunged
deeper and deeper into a circle of enemies, and was surrounded and
compelled to surrender; but his campaign was in reality wrecked
by the difficulty of transport and supply in a wild country. In
one space of twenty miles, for instance, he was obliged to fell
trees and build forty bridges over rivers and creeks, with the
result that he took precisely twenty days to traverse the distance.
Invasion on such terms, when the whole population of a country is
hostile, is almost impossible of success. Yet strangely enough the
whole object of the movement from north and south along the line
of the Hudson was to secure the line of the river, and cut off the
colonies to the east from the colonies on the west of it. For the
cereal supplies of the American army were on the west bank, and
the meat supplies on the east; and to deprive them of either would
force them to fight or to disband themselves. Thus, you see, the
question of subsistence was at the root of the whole matter.
The disaster at Saratoga brought the French as allies to the
Americans; and it was the supremacy of the French fleet on the
coast at a critical moment which decided the issue of the war.
There was fighting, and hard fighting, in the southern colonies;
but the Americans would never have beaten us without the help of
the French. Had they been really in earnest they could have driven
us from the country in twelve months, but they were not in earnest.
They wanted other people to do their fighting for them, whether
they were contending against France in 1757 or England in 1780; and
by great good fortune they found such other people ready to their
hand. A few noble and patriotic men did indeed their utmost duty
to their country; but they were very few. The rest were unwilling
to make the sacrifice demanded of them by service in the field and
submission to discipline. Hence their Government was driven to
cruelty and double-dealing of every kind to force their British
prisoners to enter the American ranks, so as to save selfish
citizens from risking their worthless skins. In fact when one
compares the resistance of the three million Americans in 1776-1781
with that of the few hundred thousand Boers in 1899-1902, it is
impossible to regard the American rebellion with any great respect.
In 1812 we were again embroiled with America chiefly owing to
the intrigues of Napoleon, but in great measure also through the
hostility of two of the Presidents. As usual, these two officials
and their supporters counted upon Napoleon to fight their battles
for them, and made no preparations for war, thinking that they
would be able to take Canada with ease from us, who had the great
Emperor and all his forces upon our hands. They were egregiously
undeceived. Their naval officers and sailors acquitted themselves
admirably, though their ships were too few to make head against us
in the open sea. Their troops were for long beneath contempt, owing
to want of training and discipline. We had so much upon our hands
that we could spare few soldiers to meet them; but the Americans
never succeeded, in spite of greatly superior numbers, in taking
Canada; and at last they were glad to make peace without gaining
any of the objects for which they had fought, being absolutely
exhausted and ruined by our naval blockade. But it is to be noticed
that, as usual, transport and supply were the great difficulties
on both sides and that, setting aside some raids on our part which
were not always successful, the main fighting took place on the
waterway of the great lakes, simply because that was the only
quarter in which either side could feed even a small army. In fact
it was impossible, for want of decent roads, to bring forward
supplies except by water; and success or failure to either party
depended wholly upon naval supremacy on the lakes. When we held it
we beat the Americans, when the Americans held it they beat us; so
that practically this was a naval war albeit fought inland.
Let us pass next to the West Indies. Where islands are concerned,
of course naval superiority is essential to every successful
campaign, otherwise you cannot bring either troops or stores to the
scene of action. The Antilles are for the most part of volcanic
formation, mountainous, if a height of three to four thousand feet
may be said to make a mountain, rugged, and in the majority of
cases covered with forest, cultivation generally being confined to
the lower hills and valleys. Situated between the 10th and 23rd
degrees of North latitude, they lie well within the Tropic of
Cancer; and the climate is consequently such that white men cannot
breed and thrive there. Roads in the great majority of the islands
are few, and such as there are frequently traverse ground so steep
that they are paved and not macadamised, lest the surface should be
washed away by the heavy tropical rains. By far the greater number
of such roads (I except the island of Barbados) are mere tracks,
narrow, rough and unfit for vehicles. Bridges are even fewer than
roads, though the islands with which we are chiefly concerned are
furrowed by torrents, which have cut deep ravines and valleys in
their rush from the mountains down to the sea. Hence what with
forests, streams, hills and valleys as steep as those of the
Highlands, it is not easy to move about most of the islands. All
labour was formerly done by negro slaves imported from West Africa,
whose descendants--now for three generations free--still form the
mass of the population. These negroes to a certain extent cultivate
provision-grounds for themselves; but the islands are none of them
self-supporting in the matter of food; and for full two centuries
they have been supplied with flour, maize, salt fish and salt
pork from America. Strategically they fall into two groups: the
Windward, comprising the chain of islets which runs for some six
hundred miles north and westward from Trinidad to St Thomas; and
the Leeward, consisting of the far larger islands of Porto Rico,
St Domingo, Jamaica and Cuba, which run nearly due west from St
Thomas. Everything in the West Indies is windward or leeward, that
is to say is considered in respect of its situation towards the
south-easterly trade-wind, which in the days of sailing ships was
a very important matter. Say, for instance, that the General in
Jamaica asked for reinforcements from the General at Barbados,
the most leewardly from the most windwardly of our possessions;
the General in Barbados had to think twice before sending them
because, though they would probably reach Jamaica in a week, they
could not be sure of beating back in three months. In fact no
captain in old days would have attempted such a thing, for it would
have been quite as speedy and far Less exhausting to sail back to
England by a circuitous course and make a fresh start for Barbados
from thence. So too between any two islands the same question of
windward and Leeward was equally cogent. Martinique, the French
head-quarters in the Windward group, is little over one hundred
miles from Barbados, the English head-quarters; but while you may
sail from Barbados to Martinique in twelve hours, you will not beat
back in less than three or four days.
The Spaniards, as you know, were the first in the West Indies,
but they troubled themselves little about the Windward islets,
occupying by preference the great islands of Porto Rico, St
Domingo, Cuba and Jamaica. We and the French, however, began at
much the same time to occupy the islets to windward, which are
all of about the size of the Isle of Wight, and we did a good
deal of petty squabbling over them. These little places very soon
became enormously rich. Sugar, indigo and spices, produced by
servile labour, brought in enormous profits; while incidentally
the contract for providing the Spanish islands with slaves--known
as the Assiento--which we held for a great many years, was highly
lucrative. Even in the reign of Charles II a Jamaican planter with
an income of £12,000 a year--worth say £50,000 in these days--was
not considered extraordinarily wealthy; and for nearly two
centuries the West Indian was the most powerful mercantile interest
in the British islands.
With aboriginal inhabitants, or Caribs, we never had any very
serious trouble, for they were few in the islands which we
occupied; and in fact though, when incited by our European enemies,
they gave occasional annoyance, they were never the subject of any
serious military expedition until 1772, when a hybrid race, bred
of yellow Carib and African negro, both brave and vigorous, became
rebellious in St Vincent. There were only fifteen hundred of them,
men, women, and children; but it took three thousand soldiers and
marines, backed by two or three ships of war, five entire months
to force them to submission, so formidable were the difficulties
of feeding the troops in the thick forest and deep ravines of the
interior. Few horses and mules were bred in the Windward islands,
so that all the supplies were carried on the heads of negroes. Had
the Caribs, therefore, been a really formidable fighting race, it
would have taken us long to conquer the West Indies. As things
were, we imported the negroes, who bred fast and soon outnumbered
the aborigines; and thus we either compelled the Caribs to move,
or agreed to let them have some patch of territory for their own.
Of course the slaves were not quite an element of safety, and the
whole of the West Indies lived in constant dread of a servile war.
Hence a little garrison was generally kept by every nation in every
island; and at least one fort was erected, as a rule, for defence
of the capital and its harbour against both foreign and domestic
enemies, while smaller works covered less important towns.
An expedition to the West Indies therefore meant almost certainly
something in the nature of a siege until the fort and town were
captured; and, when that was accomplished, the conquest, so far
as white men were concerned, was complete. For in a small island
it was inevitable that the capital should be situated by the best
harbour; and, when this harbour was in an invader's hands, he could
land as many troops as he wished with ease, while he was also
master of all supplies of food, which naturally were stored in the
town. The operations, however, though short were sure to be arduous
owing to the heat of the climate and the ruggedness of the ground;
and therefore it was important that they should be undertaken in
the cool season, that is to say between November and May, in which
latter month the heat and the rains begin to increase and the
climate becomes, or at any rate became, unhealthy. The confinement
of operations to this season is the more imperative, since between
May and October there is always the danger of hurricanes, and the
harbours in which a ship can lie with safety during a hurricane in
the West Indies are not many. You must remember that a hurricane
is not a mere storm--it is a devouring devastation before which
no tree and none but the stoutest houses, carefully equipped for
resistance, can hope to stand.
Our first serious state-directed expedition to the West Indies was
that despatched by Cromwell to St Domingo in 1654. We were not
at war with Spain at the time, and the enterprise was simply a
piece of piracy; but it was equipped on a great scale, the fleet
numbering sixty-five sail and the troops six thousand men. It was
intended that the West Indian and American colonies should furnish
contingents of soldiers; and, when St Domingo had been taken, to
use it as a base of attack against all the Spanish possessions
in the South Atlantic. The expedition, from want of experience,
was ill-equipped; the men, hastily raised levies, were of poor
quality; and the armament did not sail until the end of December,
two months too late. The descent upon St Domingo was a disgraceful
and disastrous failure; fleet and army quarrelled violently; and
the only result of the enterprise was the bloodless capture of
Jamaica, after which fleet and army returned home, leaving a
garrison behind them. Yellow fever broke out immediately and the
garrison was almost annihilated. In October, 1655, reinforcement
arrived, and began at once to die at the rate of twenty men a
day. Fresh reinforcements followed in 1656, and in a few months
two-thirds of these were dead. At last the sickness abated. An
attempt of the Spaniards to recapture the island in 1658 was beaten
off, and Jamaica has remained under the English flag ever since.
Here was a warning for all time as to the conduct of expeditions
to the West Indies. Care must be taken for good understanding
between army and navy; and the fleet must sail from England at
latest in October. We shall see how far this warning has been
observed. The next important expedition to the West Indies was sent
by King William in 1695 to root out the French who had established
themselves at the western end of St Domingo, now called Haiti, and
who were threatening Jamaica from thence. This armament did not
sail till January, three months too late, and consequently did not
begin operations till May. In four months over a thousand out of
the thirteen hundred soldiers had died; while the quarrels between
the naval and military commanders banished all hope of solid
success.
The next great tropical expedition undertaken was that of 1740-1
against Carthagena on the Spanish main, but little outside the
beat of our West Indian squadrons. The enterprise was prompted
by sheer greed of gain; the troops were young and raw recruits
(for of course we had no old soldiers) and numbered six thousand;
American levies to the number of four thousand were sent from
Jamaica to join them; the whole were shamefully ill-equipped; and
finally the armament sailed four months too late. It was exactly
the story of St Domingo over again. The military commander died
on the voyage, and his successor, a feeble creature, was treated
with the greatest contempt by the naval officers. However, the
force reached Carthagena, and the troops were landed; but the
General, mistrusting himself and his men, was so slow and dilatory
in his movements that he delayed the decisive attack until late in
April, and was then repulsed. Sickness, lead and steel had already
reduced his force from nine thousand to little over six thousand
effectives, and on the night of the defeat the yellow fever fell
upon the unhappy army in earnest. In three days--think of this
appalling visitation--in three days the effective men had sunk from
sixty-six hundred to thirty-two hundred; and in ten days more only
a thousand were fit to be landed against an enemy. Reduced to a
mere shadow, the expedition returned to Jamaica, but the yellow
fever went with it; and, within twelve months of the arrival of
the original armament in the tropics, its numbers had shrunk from
nine thousand to fewer than three hundred fit for duty. At the
beginning of 1742 these were joined by a reinforcement of three
thousand men. Within a month a thousand of these were sick or
dead. A thousand more died before October, and at last the force
practically disappeared. Of the four thousand Americans only three
hundred lived to return home; of the nine thousand British a bare
one in ten survived. This on the whole is the most terrible story
that I know in British military history; but perhaps I am led to
think so by Smollett's vivid picture of its horrors in _Roderick
Random_. I remember that I read that book for the first time when
I was an undergraduate at Trinity, little thinking that I should
live to proclaim the fact to a Trinity audience. Every one of you
ought to read it if you have not already done so, to learn at first
hand what was meant by naval and military service in the eighteenth
century.