often find several causes, essential to produce an effect, connected
together, as it were, in a chain; so that each link depends upon that
which precedes it. Thus the power of vision depends upon the optic nerve,
in the bottom of the eye. But this would be useless, were not the coats
and humors of the eye of a certain consistence and curvature, in order to
bring the rays together to form an image on the retina. Again, these coats
and humors depend upon light, and light depends for its transmission,
probably, upon that exceedingly elastic medium called the _luminiferous
ether_. This is as far back as we can trace the series of causes concerned
in producing vision. And yet this elastic ether may depend upon something
else, and this cause of the movement of the ether upon another cause; and
we know not how long the chain may be before we reach the great First
Cause. Now, if any one of this series of second causes be modified, the
effect will be a modification of the final result. This supposed
modification may take place in that part of the chain of causes within our
view, or in that part concealed from us. If it took place within sight, it
would constitute a miracle; because the regular sequence of cause and
effect would be broken off, or an unnatural power be imparted to the cause
producing the ultimate effect. If the modification took place in that part
of the chain of second causes out of our sight, the final effect would be
no miracle; because it would be brought about by natural laws, and these
would perfectly explain it. Nevertheless, this ultimate effect would be
different from what it would be if God had not touched and modified that
link of causation which lies out of our sight, back among the secret
agencies of his will. And I see not but in this way he might modify the
ultimate effect as much as he pleased, and still preserve the unvarying
constancy of nature. For in all these cases we should see only the links
of the chain of causes nearest to us; and, provided they operated in their
usual order, how could we know that any change had taken place in the
region beyond our knowledge? If the whole chain of causation were open to
our inspection, then, indeed, would the transaction be an obvious miracle;
but now we see nothing but the unchanging operation of natural laws.
To illustrate this principle, let us imagine a few examples. Suppose the
land visited by drought, and its pious inhabitants assemble to pray for
rain. We know very well that the causes on which a storm of rain depend
are very complicated. How easy for the divine Being, in answer to those
prayers, to modify one or more of these secret agencies of meteorological
change, that are concealed from our sight, so as to bring together the
vapors over the land and condense them into rain! And yet that storm shall
have nothing about it unusual, and it results from the same laws which we
have before seen to be in operation. Still, it may have been the result of
a special agency exerted by Jehovah in answer to prayer, yet in such a
manner that no known law of nature is infringed upon, or even rendered
more powerful in its action.
Equally intricate and complicated are the causes of disease, and
especially of those pestilences that sometimes march over a whole
continent, with the angel of death in their train; and alike easy is it
for God, in answer to earnest prayer, to avert their progress, or to
cripple their power, or turn them aside from a particular district,
without the least interference with the visible connection of cause and
effect.
The beloved father of a family lies upon a bed of sickness, and disease is
fast gaining upon the powers of life. His numerous and desolate family, in
spite of the cold suggestion that it will be of no avail, will earnestly
beseech the Being in whose hands is the power of disease, to arrest the
fatal malady. And could not their Father in heaven, in the way I have
pointed out, give them their request, and yet their parent's recovery be
the natural result of careful nursing and medical skill? imposing,
however, upon that family as great an obligation as if a manifest miracle
had been wrought to save him.
The widow's only son, in spite of her counsels and entreaties, becomes a
vagabond upon the seas, and, at length, one of the crew of the battle
ship. The perils of the deep and of vicious companions are enough to make
that widow a daily and most earnest suppliant at the mercy-seat of her
heavenly Father, for his protection and salvation. But, at length, war
breaks out, and the perils of battle render his fate more doubtful. Still,
faith in God buoys up her heart, and she cannot abandon the hope of yet
seeing her son returned, reformed, and becoming a useful man. And at
length, rescued from the storm and shipwreck, and the carnage of battle,
and the yet more dangerous snares of sin, that youth returns, a renovated
man, and cheers that mother's setting sun by an eminently useful life.
Now, all this may have happened simply by the operation of natural laws.
But it may also have been the result of divine interference in answer to
prayer; and hard will you find it to convince that rejoicing mother that
the hand of God's extraordinary providence was not in it.
The devoted missionary, at the promptings of a voice within, quits a land
of safety and peace, and finds himself in the midst of dangers and
sufferings of almost every name; _in perils of waters, in perils of
robbers, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in weariness,
in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and
nakedness_. The furnace of persecution is heated, and he performs his
duties with his life constantly in his hand. But he uses no weapon save
faith and prayer. He feels that "he is immortal till his work is done."
And, in fact, he outlives all his dangers, and, in venerable old age,
surrounded by the fruits of his labor,--a reformed and affectionate
people,--he passes quietly into the abodes of the blessed. Here, again,
why should we hesitate to refer his protection and deliverance to the
special interposition of his heavenly Father, in the manner I have pointed
out?
On the other hand, the history of dreadfully wicked men is full of
terrible examples of calamity and suffering, as the consequence of their
sins. True, the evil came upon them apparently by the operation of natural
laws; but shall we hence infer that God in no case has so modified these
laws, by an agency among the hidden causes of events, as to make the
result certain? He certainly could do this; and to say that he never has
done it, is to remove one of the most powerful restraints that operate
upon the wicked.
In several examples recorded in the Bible, both of deliverance for the
virtuous and of punishment for the wicked, so many natural agencies are
concerned, that we are left in doubt whether the events are to be regarded
as miraculous or not. Let the deluge, the destruction of Sodom, and the
passage of the Israelites through the Red Sea, serve as examples. In the
first, we find the flood imputed to a forty days' rain and the overflowing
of the ocean; and its reduction to a wind. In the destruction of the
cities of the plain, the phenomena described correspond very well with the
effects of volcanic agency; and we find accordingly that the region where
those cities stood shows marks of that agency. In the passage of the Red
Sea, the removal of the waters, to allow the Israelites to pass, is
imputed to a strong east wind all night. Nevertheless, the pillar of a
cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night were a manifest and standing
miracle in this transaction.
Now, may it not be that, in all these cases, so far as natural agencies
were concerned, they were made to conspire with the miraculous in the
manner which I have described, viz., by such a modification of some of the
remote causes by which they were brought into action, as exactly to answer
the divine purpose in the catastrophe of the deluge, of Sodom, and in the
passage of the Red Sea?
_A third mode by which the purposes of special providence can be brought
about without miracles is by such an adjustment of the direct and lateral
influences on which events depend, that the time and manner of their
occurrence shall exactly meet every exigency._
Although it expresses a truth to represent the second causes of events as
constituting the links of a chain, it is not the whole truth. For, in
fact, those causes are connected together in the form of a network, or,
more exactly still, by a sphere filled with interlocked meshes; or, to
speak more mathematically, the forces by which events are produced are
both direct and indirect. It would be easy to calculate the effect of a
single direct force; but if, in its progress, it meets with a multitude of
oblique impulses, striking it at every possible angle, what human
mathematics can make out the final resultant? Yet, in fact, such is the
history of almost every event. The lateral influences, which meet and
modify the direct force, are so numerous, and unexpected often, that men
are amazed at the result, sometimes as unexpected as a miracle. "When an
individual," says Isaac Taylor, "receives an answer to his prayer, the
interposition may be made, not in the line which he himself is describing,
but in one of those which are to meet him on his path; and at a point,
therefore, where, even though the visible constancy of nature should be
violated, yet, as being at the time beyond the sphere of his observation,
it is a violation not visible to him." "And herein is especially
manifested the perfection of divine wisdom, that the most surprising
conjunctions of events are brought about by the simplest means, and in a
manner that is perfectly in harmony with the ordinary course of human
affairs. This is, in fact, the great miracle of providence, that no
miracles are needed to accomplish its purposes."--_Nat. History of
Enthusiasm_, p. 128.
This complication of causes does not merely give variety to the works and
operations of nature, but it enables God to produce effects which could
never have resulted from each law acting singly; nor is there a scarcely
conceivable limit to these modifications. Indeed, in this way can
Providence accomplish all his beneficent purposes, and meet every
individual case, just as infinite wisdom would have it met. "By this
agency," says M'Cosh, "God can at one time increase, and at another time
lessen, or completely nullify, the spontaneous efforts of the fixed
properties of matter. Now he can make the most powerful agents in
nature--such as wind, fire, and disease--coincide and cooperate to produce
effects of such a tremendous magnitude as none of them separately could
accomplish; and again, he can arrest their influence by counteracting
agencies, or, rather, by making them counteract each other. He can, for
instance, by a concurrence of natural laws, bring a person, who is in the
enjoyment of health at present, to the very borders of death, an hour or
an instant hence; and he can, by a like means, suddenly restore the same
or another individual to health, after he has been on the very verge of
the grave. By the confluence of two or more streams, he can bring agencies
of tremendous potency to bear upon the production of a given effect, such
as a war, a pestilence, or a revolution; and, on the other hand, by
drawing aside the stream into another channel, he can arrest, at any given
instant, the awful effects that would otherwise follow from these
agencies, and save an individual, a family, or a nation, from the evils
which seem ready to burst upon them.
"Guided by these principles and guarded by sound sense, the inquiring mind
will discover many and wonderful designed connections between the various
events of divine providence. Read in the spirit of faith, striking
coincidences will every where manifest themselves. What singular unions of
two streams at the proper place to help on the exertions of the great and
good! What curious intersections of cords to catch the wicked as in a
net, when they are prowling as wild beasts! By strange but most apposite
correspondences, human strength, when set against the will of God, is made
to waste away under God's indignation burning against it, as, in heathen
story, Meleager wasted away as the stick burned which his mother held in
the fire."--_Method of the Divine Government_, pp. 176, 203.
In many cases, the lateral streams of influence that flow in and bring
unexpected relief to the pious man, and unexpected punishment to the
wicked, or a marked answer to prayer, seem to the individuals little short
of miraculous. Yet, after all, they can see no violation of the natural
order of cause and effect. But the wonder is, how the modifying influence
should come in just at the right moment. It may, indeed, have received a
commission to do this very thing from the immediate impulse of Jehovah;
yet, being unperceived by us, it is no miracle. Or the whole plan may have
been so arranged at the beginning that its development will meet every
case of special providence exactly. Which of these views may be most
accordant with truth, may admit of discussion. Yet we think that all the
modes that have been pointed out, by which miraculous and special
providences are brought about, may be referred to one general proposition,
which we now proceed to state.
_In the fourth place, the plan of the universe in the divine mind, at the
beginning, must have embraced every case of miracles and of special
providence._
From the nature of the divine attributes we infer with certainty that
every event occurring in the universe must have entered into the original
plan of creation in the mind of God. Surely no one will deny that he must
have foreseen the operation of every law which he established, and,
consequently, every event which it would produce. But there must be some
ground for foreknowledge to rest upon; otherwise it is conjecture, not
knowledge. And what could that basis be but the divine plan?
Equally clear is it that, whatever plans existed in the mind of God, when
he brought the universe into existence, must always have been there. For
to suppose that there was a point of duration when the plan was first
conceived, would imply new knowledge in one confessedly omniscient; and
that destroys the idea of omniscience.
Similar reasoning from the nature of the divine attributes leads us to the
conclusion that God always acts according to law. That he does this in the
ordinary operations of nature, all admit. But even when he introduces a
miracle,--perhaps by a counteraction of ordinary laws,--he may still act
by some rule; so that, were precisely the same circumstances to occur
again, the same miracle would be repeated. Beforehand, we could not say
whether God would conduct the affairs of the universe by one unvarying
system of natural laws, or occasionally interfere with the regular
sequence of cause and effect by miracle. But though the latter course
should be adopted, as we have reason to think it is, even the special
interference must be according to law; so that, in fact, there is a law of
miracles as well as of common events. Again, if God sometimes alters one
or more of the links out of sight, in a chain of second causes, in order
to meet a providential exigency, or if he modifies for the same purpose
some of the oblique influences by which events are affected, all this must
be done by rule; that is, by law. Indeed, to suppose him ever to act
without law, is to represent him as less wise than men, who, if
judicious, are always governed by settled principles, which produce the
same conduct in the same circumstances.
From this reasoning we may safely infer two things: first, that the laws
regulating miracles and special providences are as fixed and certain as
those of ordinary events; and secondly, that those laws must have formed a
part of the plan of creation originally existing in the divine mind. And
hence, thirdly, we must admit that every case of miracle and special
providence must have entered into that plan.
When he formed it, he foresaw every possible event that would result from
its operation to the end of the world. He saw distinctly the condition of
every individual of the human family, from the beginning to the close of
life; all his dangers and trials, his sufferings and his sins; and he knew
just when and where every prayer would be offered up. Nor can it be any
more doubtful that, with infinite wisdom to guide him, and infinite power
to execute his will, God could so have arranged and constituted the laws
of nature, as to meet exactly every case that should ever occur, just in
the way he would wish to have it met. Those laws might have been so framed
and disposed that, after running on in one unvarying course for ages, a
new one might come in, or the old ones be modified, and at once produce
effects quite different, and then the first laws resume again their usual
course. And the new or modified law might be made to produce its
extraordinary or peculiar effects just at the moment when some miracle or
special providence would be needed. Thus what would be to us a special or
miraculous interposition of divine power, might be the foreseen and
foreordained result of God's original purpose. And if we can conceive how
such an effect could be produced once, we cannot doubt that infinite
wisdom and power could in like manner meet every possible case in which
what we call special and miraculous providence would be needed. With our
limited powers, we are obliged, after constructing a complicated machine,
to put it into operation before we can judge certainly of its effects; and
then, if our wishes are not met, we must alter the parts, or in some other
way meet the new cases that occur; and hence we find it difficult to
conceive how it can be otherwise with God. But he saw the operation of the
vast machine of the universe just as clearly at the beginning as at any
subsequent period. He, therefore, can do at the beginning what we can do
only after experience, viz., adapt the parts to every variety of
circumstances.
If I mistake not, we are indebted to Bishop Butler for the germ of these
views; but Professor Babbage has illustrated them by reference to an
extraordinary machine of his own invention, called "The Calculating
Engine." It is adapted to perform the most extensive and complicated
numerical calculations, of course with absolute certainty, because its
parts are arranged by certain laws. And he finds that precisely such
effects, on a small scale, can be produced by this machine, as have been
imputed above to the divine agency in creation. It is moved by a weight
and a wheel which turns at a short interval around its axis, and prints a
series of natural numbers,--1, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c.,--each exceeding its
antecedent by unity. "Now, reader, let me ask you," says Professor
Babbage, "how long you will have counted before you are firmly convinced
that the engine, supposing its adjustments to remain unaltered, will
continue, whilst its motion is maintained, to produce the same series of
natural numbers. Some minds, perhaps, are so constituted that, after
passing the first hundred terms, they will be satisfied that they are
acquainted with the law. After seeing five hundred terms, few will doubt;
and after the fifty thousandth term, the propensity to believe the
succeeding term will be fifty thousand and one, will be almost
irresistible. That term will be fifty thousand and one; the same regular
succession will continue; the five millionth and the fifty millionth term
will appear in their expected order, and one unbroken chain of numbers
will pass before you, from one up to one hundred millions. True to the
vast induction which has thus been made, the next succeeding term will be
one hundred millions and one; but after that, the next number presented by
the rim of the wheel, instead of being one hundred millions and two, is
one hundred millions ten thousand and two.
"The law which seemed to govern this series fails at the one hundred
million and second term. That term is larger than we expected by ten
thousand. The next term is larger than was anticipated by thirty thousand.
If we still continue to observe the numbers presented by the wheel, we
shall find that for a hundred, or even for a thousand terms, they continue
to follow the new law relating to the triangular numbers; but after
watching them for twenty-seven hundred and sixty-one terms, we find that
this law fails in the case of the twenty-seven hundred and sixty-second
term. If we continue to observe, another law then comes into action. This
will continue through fourteen hundred and thirty terms, when a new law is
again introduced, which extends over about nine hundred and fifty terms;
and this, too, like all its predecessors, fails, and gives place to other
laws, which appear at different intervals. It is also possible so to
arrange the engine, that at any periods, however remote, the first law
shall be interrupted for one or more times, and be superseded by any
other laws, after which the original law shall be again produced, and no
other deviation shall ever take place.
"Now, it must be remarked that the law that each number presented by the
engine is greater by unity than the preceding number, which law the
observer had deduced from an induction of a hundred million of instances,
was not the true law that regulated its action; and that the occurrence of
the number one hundred million ten thousand and two at the one hundred
million and second term was as necessary a consequence of the original
adjustment as was the regular succession of any one of the intermediate
numbers to its immediate antecedent. The same remark applies to the next
apparent deviation from the new law, which was founded on an induction of
two thousand seven hundred and sixty-one terms; and to all the succeeding
laws, with this limitation only, that whilst their consecutive
introduction at various definite intervals is a necessary consequence of
the mechanical structure of the engine, our knowledge of analysis does not
yet enable us to predict the periods at which the more distant laws will
be introduced."--_Ninth Bridgewater Treatise._
The application of these statements to the doctrine of special as well as
of miraculous providence is very obvious. If human ingenuity can construct
a machine which shall exhibit the introduction of new laws, after the old
ones had been established by an induction of a hundred million of
examples, and these new ones be succeeded by others, how much easier for
the infinite God to construct the vast and more complicated machine of the
universe, so that new laws, or modifications of the old ones, shall be
introduced at various periods of its history, to meet every exigency! How
easy for him so to adjust this machine at the beginning, that the new laws
and new modes of action should be introduced, precisely at those points
where a special providence would be desirable, to reward the virtuous and
to punish the wicked, and then the old law again assume its dominion! And
how easily, in this way, could the case of every individual be met, from
the beginning to the end of the world! I mean, how easy would this work be
to infinite wisdom and power!
But if all events, miraculous as well as common, may depend upon unbending
law, how does such a view differ from the one I am now opposing, viz.,
that the constancy of nature's laws precludes the idea of any special
interference on the part of God, in human affairs? The main point of
difference, I reply, is, that the advocates of the latter view will not
admit any such thing at the present day as special interference, on the
part of the Deity, with nature. They admit only uniform and ordinary laws,
which they suppose are never interrupted. This I deny; and endeavor to
show, not only that the contrary may be a fact, but that God purposed it
originally, and determined the laws by which it might be accomplished. The
fact that he did this beforehand, even from eternity, no more precludes
his agency, than the special interference of a father to help his child
through a dangerous pass is disproved, because he foresaw the danger and
provided the means of defence even before the child was born. If the
father was actually with the child, as he went through the danger, and
held out to him the requisite help, what difference could it make, though
the father purposed to do so a long time previously? And if we admit that
God's efficiency alone gives power to the ordinary laws of nature, we
shall admit that in every special law he is as really present with his
energy, as a father who should lead his child by the hand through the
dangerous path. So that, practically at least, the difference between
these two views of the subject is very great; the one removing God far
away, and putting law in his place; and the other bringing him near, and
making him the actual and constant agent in every event. The one view is
practical atheism, although often adopted by religious men; the other is
practical Christianity.
By the principles of physical science, then, the scriptural doctrines of
miraculous and special providence are proved to be in accordance with
philosophy. The miracles of revelation are shown to have been preceded by
the miracles of geology; and are, therefore, in conformity with the
principles of the divine government. The modifications which God can make
in the causes of events out of human view, or the changes which he can
produce by lateral influences upon the final result,--all, it may be, in
conformity to an eternal plan, reaching the minutest of human
affairs,--enable him to execute every purpose of special providence so as
to satisfy every exigency.
The sceptic may say, that we cannot prove by facts that God does so modify
and arrange the laws and operations of nature as to adapt his dealings to
the case of individuals. But, on the other hand, neither can he show that
God does not thus interfere with nature's uniformity. It is enough to show
that he can do it without a miracle, in order to establish the doctrine of
special providence. How often he exercises this power, we cannot know; but
we may be sure as often as is desirable.