another on the globe, in a passage which we have already quoted, he says,
"Passing on to the revealed record, we learn that the dynasty of man in
the mixed state and character is not the final one; but that there is to
be yet another creation, or, more properly, re-creation, known
theologically as the resurrection, which shall be connected in its
physical components, by bonds of mysterious paternity, with the dynasty
which now reigns, and be bound to it mentally by the chain of identity,
conscious and actual; but which, in all that constitutes superiority,
shall be as vastly its superior as the dynasty of responsible man is
superior to even the lowest of the preliminary dynasties. We are further
taught that, at the commencement of this last of the dynasties, there will
be a re-creation of not only elevated, but also of degraded beings--a
re-creation of the lost. We are taught yet further that, though the
present dynasty be that of a lapsed race, which at their first
introduction were placed on higher ground than that on which they now
stand, and sank by their own act, it was yet part of the original design,
from the beginning of all things, that they should occupy the existing
platform; and that redemption is thus no afterthought, rendered necessary
by the fall, but, on the contrary, part of a general scheme, for which
provision had been made from the beginning; so that the divine Man,
through whom the work of restoration has been effected, was in reality, in
reference to the purposes of the Eternal, what he is designated in the
remarkable text, _the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world_. Slain
from the foundation of the world! Could the assertors of the stony science
ask for language more express? By piecing the two records together,--that
revealed in Scripture and that revealed in the rocks,--records which,
however widely geologists may mistake the one, or commentators
misunderstand the other, have emanated from the same great Author,--we
learn that in slow and solemn majesty has period succeeded period, each in
succession, ushering in a higher and yet higher scene of existence; that
fish, reptiles, mammiferous quadrupeds, have reigned in turn; that
responsible man, 'made in the image of God,' and with dominion over all
creatures, ultimately entered into a world ripened for his reception; but,
further, that this passing scene, in which he forms the prominent figure,
is not the final one in the long series, but merely the last of the
_preliminary_ scenes; and that that period to which the by-gone ages,
incalculable in amount, with all their well-proportioned gradations of
being, form the imposing vestibule, shall have perfection for its occupant
and eternity for its duration. I know not how it may appear to others, but
for my own part I cannot avoid thinking that there would be a lack of
proportion in the series of being, were the period of perfect and
glorified humanity abruptly connected, without the introduction of an
intermediate creation of _responsible_ imperfection with that of the
dying, irresponsible brute. That scene of things in which God became man,
and suffered, _seems_, as it no doubt _is_, a necessary link in the
chain."
A single concluding thought forces itself upon my mind. It is this: How
ingenious and persevering men are in deluding themselves on the subject of
religion! Since the time of Christ, what countless devices have they
framed to escape from the lofty truths and spiritual piety of his gospel!
Nor are they satisfied with this; for the gospel has shed so much light
upon the religion of nature, that even this is more than men like; and,
therefore, every science is ransacked for facts to neutralize all
religion. Men's consciences do not permit them to throw off all the forms
of religion; and, therefore, they are satisfied if they can only tear out
its heart. They like to preserve and to embalm its external covering, as
the naturalist does the skin of an animal for his cabinet. And as the
latter fills his specimen with straw and arsenic, and fits glass eyes into
it, so do men fill up their religious specimen with error and vain
speculation, and fit into its head the eyes of false philosophy, and then
claim for it intellectual worship. It is the business of educated men to
show that such caricatures are neither science nor religion. May you,
gentlemen, have your full share in this most useful and noble work.[19]
LECTURE X.
SPECIAL AND MIRACULOUS PROVIDENCE.
Next in importance to the question whether the Deity exists, is the
inquiry whether he exerts any direct agency in upholding the universe and
in controlling its events. This point has been discussed in all ages in
which there have been philosophers or theologians, and the current of
opinion has fallen principally into three channels.
In the first place, some have removed the Deity entirely from his works
into a fancied extra-mundane sphere, where in solitude he might enjoy the
blessedness of his own infinite nature, without the trouble of directing
the events of the universe, or watching over the works of his hand.
Forgetful of the great principle, that the intellectual powers produce
happiness only when called into exercise, they have fancied that the care
of the universe must be a burden to its Creator, and that it would
derogate from his dignity. It is supposed, therefore, that the world has
been given up to the rule of fate or chance.
In the second place, a more numerous class have maintained that the
Supreme Being, after creating the world, committed its preservation and
government either to a subordinate agent, or to the laws which he
impressed upon matter and mind, which possess an inherent power to execute
themselves; so that, in fact, God exercises no direct and immediate agency
in natural operations. The learned and usually profound Cudworth adopted
the hypothesis of a _plastic nature_, as he terms it, by which he means a
vital, spiritual, and unintelligent, yet subordinate agent, by whose
agency the world is governed and its operations carried on. At first view,
this hypothesis would seem to lead inevitably to atheism; but such was not
the intention of its author. Still, it is obviously so clumsy, that had it
not been the product of a great mind, it never would have received so much
notice, or called forth such mighty efforts for its refutation, as have
been bestowed upon it.
Two varieties of opinion exist among those who believe the world governed
and sustained by natural laws, established by the Deity. Some maintain
that these laws are general, not particular; not extending to minor
events, but only the more important; not providing for species, but only
for families. Hence they suppose that these general cases may interfere
with one another, and produce results apparently repugnant to the
intention of their Author. Others, shocked at the absurdity of such
conclusions, believe the laws of nature to extend to every event, and
never to interfere with one another, and always to act in accordance with
the divine will and appointment, but without any direct agency exerted by
the Deity. They suppose these laws--in other words, secondary agencies--to
have the power of producing all natural phenomena.
In the third place, there are others who believe that a law can have no
efficiency without the presence and agency of the lawgiver. They,
therefore, suppose every event in the natural world to be the result of
the direct and immediate agency of God. What we call laws are only the
uniform mode of his operation. They agree with the advocates of the
last-named theory in supposing the laws of nature to extend to every
event, and to be in accordance with the ordination of the Deity; but they
differ in maintaining that the presence and direct efficiency of a
lawgiver are essential to the operation of natural laws.
I should then define a Special Providence to be an event brought about
apparently by natural laws, yet, in fact, the result of a special agency,
on the part of the Deity, to meet a particular exigency, either by an
original arrangement of natural laws, or by a modification of second
causes, out of sight at the time.
The doctrine, which supposes the Deity to exercise a superintendence and
direction over all the affairs of the universe, in any of the modes that
have been mentioned, whether by a subordinate agent, or by laws, general
or particular, with inherent self-executing power, or by the direct
efficiency of the divine will, is called the doctrine of divine
providence. If the superintendence extend only to general laws, it is
called a general providence. If those laws reach every possible case, it
is called a particular or universal providence.
By a _Miraculous Providence_ is meant a superintendence over the world
that interferes, when desirable, with the regular operations of nature,
and brings about events, either in opposition to natural laws, or by
giving them a less or greater power than usual. In either of these cases,
the events cannot be explained by natural laws; they are above, or
contrary to, nature, and, therefore, are called miracles, or prodigies.
There may be, and, as I believe, there is, another class of occurrences,
intermediate between miracles and events strictly natural. These take
place in perfect accordance with the natural laws within human view, and
appear to us to be perfectly accounted for by those laws; and yet, in some
way or other, we learn that they required some special exercise of divine
power, out of human view, for their production. Thus, according to the
views of most Christian denominations, conversion takes place in the human
heart in perfect accordance with the laws of mind, and could be
philosophically explained by them; yet revelation assures that it _is not
of blood,_ [natural descent,] _nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the
will of man, but of God_. Divine power, therefore, is essential to the
change, although we see only the operation of natural causes. So a storm
may appear to us to be perfectly accounted for by natural laws; and yet
divine efficiency might have produced a change in some of those laws out
of our sight, and thus meet a particular exigency. Such events I call
_special providence_; and I maintain that we cannot tell how frequently
they may occur.
It is chiefly the bearings of science, especially of geology, upon the
doctrine of miraculous and special providence, which I wish to consider.
But it may form a useful introduction, to state the evidence, which goes
to show that the agency of the Deity, in the ordinary operations of
nature, is a direct efficiency; or, in other words, that the laws of
nature are only the modes in which divine agency operates.
In the first place, if we suppose ever so many secondary causes to be
concerned in natural events, the efficiency must, after all, be referred
to God.
What is a secondary cause? or, in other words, what is a law of nature
considered as a cause? It is simply a uniform mode of operation. We find
that heavy bodies uniformly tend towards the earth's centre, and that we
call the law of gravity; but if those bodies sometimes ascended, and
sometimes moved horizontally, under the same circumstances, we could not
infer the existence of such a law.
Now, there must be some cause for uniformity of operation in nature. There
must be some foreign power, which gives the uniformity, since it is
certain that the law itself can possess no efficiency. We may, indeed,
find one law dependent upon a second law, and this upon a third, and so
on. But the inquiry still arises, What gives the efficiency to this second
and third law? and still the answer must be, Something out of itself. So
that if we run back on the chain of causes ever so far, we must still
resort to the power of the Deity to find any efficiency that will produce
the final result. In most cases, we can trace back only one or two links
on the chain. For instance, we account for the falling of all bodies by
the law of gravity. But philosophers have wearied themselves in vain to
find any cause for gravity, except in the will of God. The failure of
every other hypothesis, though invented by such men as Newton and Le Sage,
has been signal. Sound philosophy, then, requires us to infer that gravity
owes its efficiency to the direct exertion of divine power. And so in all
cases, when we can no longer discover second causes for any phenomenon,
why should we imagine their existence, rather than refer it to the agency
of God? For go back as far as we may, and discover a thousand intervening
causes, the efficiency resides alone in God. We have no evidence that even
infinite power can communicate that efficiency to the laws of nature, so
that they can act without the presence and agency of God. The common idea,
which endows those laws with independent power, will not bear examination.
In the second place, if natural operations do not depend upon the exercise
of divine power, no other efficient cause can be assigned for their
production.
We have seen that in the laws of nature, independently of the Deity, there
is no efficiency; and I know not where else we can resort for any agency
to carry forward the operations of nature, except to the same infinite
Being. The fate and chance of the ancients, the plastic nature of
Cudworth, the delegated nature of Lamarck, are indeed names invented by
men to designate a certain imaginary efficiency residing somewhere,
independent of the Deity, by which the phenomena of nature have been
supposed to be produced. But the moment they are described, they are found
to be mere imaginary agencies, meaning nothing more than the course of
nature, or the laws of nature, which we have seen possess no independent
efficiency. To a divine agency, therefore, we must resort, or be left
without any adequate cause for the complicated and wonderful processes of
nature.
In the third place, this view of the subject is strongly confirmed by the
Christian Scriptures.
How universal is the divine agency represented in the well-known
passage--_for of him, and through him, and to him, are all things_.
Equally vivid is Paul's statement on Mars Hill--_In him we live, and move,
and have our being._ How graphic a description is the 147th Psalm of God's
agency in the natural world! Not only is all good ascribed to God, but
evil also. By the mouth of Isaiah he says, _I form light and create
darkness; I make peace and create evil; I the Lord do all these things._
In short, no event in the material or spiritual world is by the sacred
writers ascribed to chance, or to nature, or the laws of nature, as it is
among men; but to the direct efficiency of God. Nor is there any
difference in this respect between miracles and common events. The one
class is represented as originating in the agency of God, just as much as
the other.
Finally. It will hardly be thought strange, in view of the preceding
considerations, that a large proportion of the most acute and
philosophical minds in modern times have preferred this view of divine
providence to any other.
Sir Isaac Newton declares that the various parts of the world, organic and
inorganic, "can be the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and skill of
a powerful, ever-living Agent, who, being in all places, is more able by
his will to move the bodies within his boundless, uniform _sensorium_,
thereby to form and reform the parts of the universe, than we are by our
will to move the parts of our own bodies."
Says Dr. Clarke, the friend and disciple of Newton, "All things which we
commonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter, and laws of
motion, are, indeed, if we will speak strictly and properly, the effects
of God's action upon matter continually, and at every moment, either
immediately by himself, or mediately by some created, intelligent being.
Consequently there is no such thing as the course of nature, or the power
of nature, independent of the effects produced by the will of God."
In speaking of the principle of vegetable life, Sir James Edward Smith,
the eminent botanist, says, "I humbly conceive that, if the human
understanding can in any case flatter itself with obtaining, in the
natural world, a glimpse of the _immediate agency_ of the Deity, it is in
the contemplation of this _vital principle_, which seems independent of
material organization, and an impulse, of his own divine
energy."--_Introduction to Botany_, p. 26, (Boston edition.)
"We would no way be understood," says Sir John Herschel, "to deny the
constant exercise of this [God's] direct power in maintaining the system
of nature, or the ultimate emanation of every energy, which material
agents exert, from his immediate will, acting in conformity with his own
laws."--_Discourse on Nat. Philosophy._
"A law," says Professor Whewell, "supposes an agent and a power; for it is
the mode according to which the agent proceeds, the order according to
which the power acts. Without the presence of such an agent, of such a
power, conscious of the relations on which the law depends, producing the
effects which the law prescribes, the law can have no efficiency, no
existence. Hence we infer that the intelligence by which the law is
ordained, the power by which it is put in action, must be present at all
times and in all places where the effects of the law occur; that thus the
knowledge and the agency of the divine Being pervades every portion of the
universe, producing all action and passion, all permanence and change. The
laws of nature are the laws which He, in his wisdom, prescribes to his own
acts; his universal presence is the necessary condition of any course of
events; his universal agency the only origin of any efficient
force."--_Bridgewater Treatise_, p. 270.
"The student in natural philosophy," observes the Bishop of London, "will
find rest from all those perplexities, which are occasioned by the
obscurity of causation, in the proposition which, although it was
discredited by the patronage of Malebranche and the Cartesians, has been
adopted by Clarke and Dugald Stewart, and which is by far the most simple
and sublime account of the matter--that all events which are continually
taking place in the different parts of the material universe are the
_immediate_ effects of the divine agency."--_Whewell's Bridgewater
Treatise_, p. 273.
"Jonathan Edwards," says M'Cosh in his Method of the Divine Government,
"somewhere illustrates the manner in which God upholds the universe, by
the way in which an image is upheld in a mirror. That image is maintained
by a continual flow of rays of light, each succeeding pencil of which
does not differ from that by which the image was first produced. He
conceives that the universe is, in every part of it, supported in a
similar way by a continual succession of acts of the divine will, and
these not differing from that which at first caused the world to spring
into existence. Now, it may be safely said of this theory that it cannot
be disproved. Several considerations may be urged in support of it."
Which of the views respecting divine providence that have been stated has
the best practical tendency, seems hardly to admit of doubt. If we believe
that God has submitted the direction and government of this world to a
subordinate agent, a plastic nature; or if we suppose he has impressed
matter and mind with certain general laws, which have the power of
executing themselves without his agency, and especially if in their
operation they do sometimes actually clash with one another, or even if
those laws extend to every movement of matter and mind,--still, if they do
not require divine efficiency, men cannot but feel that God is removed
from his works, and that the laws of nature, and not his agency, are their
security. But if they believe that every movement of matter or mind
requires a direct exercise of divine power or efficiency, just as much as
if every event was a miracle, it cannot but bring God near to us, and make
us realize his presence.
If we obtain a timepiece from London or Paris, which contains all the
springs and wheels requisite to keep it in operation, by occasionally
winding it up, how little do we think of the artist who constructed it,
except, perhaps, occasionally to admire his ingenuity! But if it had been
necessary for that artist to accompany the chronometer, and actually to
put forth the strength of his own arm every moment to keep it in motion,
how much more should we think of him and realize his presence! The same
effect, in a greater or less degree, will attend the belief that God must
be not only virtually, but substantially, present every where, and be
constantly exercising his power to keep in operation the vast machine of
the universe. It cannot but deeply impress the heart, and exert a most
salutary influence upon the affections, to realize that every event around
us is brought about by the immediate agency of the supreme Being.
But notwithstanding the salutary influence of this view of Providence upon
our moral feelings, and though philosophy pronounces it decidedly the most
reasonable, still it meets with strong opposition. I need not stop to
notice the objections, that it makes God the author of evil as well as
good, and that it represents man as a mere machine in the hands of the
Deity, and therefore takes away human responsibility. I say I need not
stop to answer such objections, because they lie equally strong against
any system which makes God the original author of the universe. But a more
plausible objection is, that it makes all events miraculous. This
objection is based on the supposition that every event which takes place
through the direct and immediate agency of God is a miracle. But is this
the true meaning of a miracle? Is the term ever applied to any but
extraordinary events? It may or it may not imply a contravention of the
laws of nature. But it does always imply something which the laws of
nature cannot produce, and which, of course, they cannot explain. It is
always the result of some new force coming in to the aid of the laws of
nature, or in the place of them, or even sometimes, perhaps, in opposition
to them; as when the _sun stood still upon Gibeon, and the moon in the
valley of Ajalon_. Hence an event may take place through the direct and
immediate agency of God, and yet not be a miracle. If it be neither
above, nor independent of, nor in opposition to the laws of nature, then
it forms a part of the ordinary providence of God; it is a part of the
usual, the fixed and uniform course of nature, and can be explained by
known and unalterable laws. The nature of the event is not affected at all
by the question whether it is produced by the direct efficiency of God, or
by a power inherent in those laws. We, who believe that the direct
efficiency of God is necessary to the operation, and even to the
existence, of the laws of nature, are just as firm believers in the
constancy of those laws as he who supposes them possessed of inherent
powers. When that constancy is interrupted in any way, we call it a
miracle. Hence it appears that our views of the nature of a miracle are
the same as his, viz., an event which takes place out of the ordinary
course of nature; and, therefore, our system is no more liable to the
objection that all events are made miracles than his system.
The way is now prepared for inquiring what geology teaches respecting the
ordinary and extraordinary providence of God over this world.