unmixed with good, that men view them only as penal inflictions; or, when
the sufferers are unconscious of guilt, as mysterious dispensations of
evil, which need the light of another world to reconcile with infinite
benevolence. When the tornado or sirocco's hot breath sweeps over the
devoted land; when the river overflows its banks, and ingulfs the
defenceless inhabitants along its course, or the giant waves of the ocean
roll in upon the devoted shore; when the heaving earthquake overturns in a
moment vast cities, and the earth swallows them in its bosom; or when the
volcano pours out its suffocating smoke and its scorching lava, and
obliterates from earth the defenceless town, as once Herculaneum and
Pompeii were converted into petrified cities,--in the midst of such
desolating agencies, where can we discover a gleam of benevolence? Not
surely in the immediate effects. But suppose the tornado, the flood, the
earthquake, and the volcano are essential to the preservation of the earth
from a far wider ruin, so that, in fact, while they destroy some property
and life, they preserve a far greater amount, and are essential to such
preservation,--why is it not benevolence that gives a slight play to these
terrific elements, while it checks their wild war so soon as the requisite
security has been obtained? When the storm has sufficiently purified the
atmosphere, when the flood has enriched the wide alluvial fields, and the
earthquake and the volcano have given vent to the pent-up fires in the
earth, so that they no longer threaten to rend a continent asunder, then a
restraining power is put upon them, and they are allowed no more range
than is essential to the general good. We may not, indeed, see why the
good could not be secured without the evil. But this question leads to the
inquiry, whether the present system of the universe is the best possible;
and that it is so we have the guaranty of the divine perfections. Those
perfections admit the existence of evil; but at the same time they take
care that the aggregate result of the greatest evils should be beneficial.
Nor would we limit this position to evils springing out of the nature or
the changes of the inanimate world; for some of the severest evils are
dependent upon the organization or operation of animate nature. Man, for
instance, finds himself often grossly annoyed by some species of the
inferior animals, in his comfort, property, and even life. And he wonders
why infinite wisdom and benevolence should permit certain species to
exist, when they seem fitted only to annoy the rest. But he knows not what
he desires when he wishes their extinction. For such is the balance of
organic nature, that to strike out even one species, is like removing a
link from a chain. Once broken, every other link is affected, and the
whole chain lies useless upon the ground. Or, to speak without a figure,
if you blot out certain species of animals or plants, you disturb the
balance of the whole system of organic nature; nor can you tell where the
disturbance thus introduced will end. It may lead to the excessive
multiplication of species still more injurious than those you have
destroyed. At any rate, since the perfections of the Deity lead to the
conclusion that the existing proportion between different species is the
best, all things considered, and change in the balance must be injurious,
we may conclude, that though noxious animals and plants may produce
individual inconvenience and injury, the aggregate effects upon the whole
of organic nature are salutary, and, therefore, indicative of benevolence.
Similar reasoning will, I think, apply to the existence of that large
class of animals called carnivorous. These are evidently intended to prey
upon other animals; and for this purpose they are provided with weapons
for seizing and destroying their prey. It is often extremely painful to a
man of kind feelings to witness the scenes of blood and havoc which these
flesh-eating animals produce. But we forget two things. The first is, that
in order to keep the numbers of animated beings full in the different
tribes, it is necessary that there should be a great excess of numbers
created, to meet all the casualties to which they are exposed; and that
excess must in some way or other be removed from life. Secondly, all the
enjoyment of the carnivorous races is so much clear gain to the sum of
animal happiness; for the excess of numbers in the tribes of vegetable
feeders suffer no more in being destroyed by the carnivorous races, than
if they died in some other way; not so much, indeed, as if they perished
by famine. We may safely conclude, then, that even this system of mutual
slaughter, when viewed in all its relations, is the means, in such a world
as ours, of increasing the amount of enjoyment, and is, therefore, a
benevolent provision.
This course of reasoning may be extended, as I judge, to the greatest of
all mortal evils,--I mean death. In the case of the inferior animals, the
amount of physical or mental suffering from this cause is comparatively
small. And if they survive the change of death, surely there is
benevolence in so easy a translation. Or, if they do not exist hereafter,
the stroke of death is a small deduction from the happiness of a whole
life. In man's case, we must not take into the account the aggravations of
death which his own misconduct produces. And aside from these, what a
blessing it would be to be transferred to a more exalted state of being,
by an experience no more painful than that of a Christian dying what may
be called a natural death, by mere decay! Then, too, how much greater
happiness is the result of a succession of beings on earth, than one
undying race would enjoy, both because the successive races would be ever
passing through novel scenes, which would soon become monotonous to a
continuous race, and because, as we have already suggested, a succession
of races admits of the existence, at any one time, of a far greater number
of species! Then, too, we must not forget the salutary moral influence
which man experiences from the expectation of death; so great, indeed,
that without it, it seems doubtful whether the world would be any thing
better than a Pandemonium. In making indissoluble the connection between
sin and death, therefore, in such a system as the present, benevolence
presided with wisdom and justice in the councils of Jehovah.
But in the third lecture I have treated this whole subject so much more
fully, that I need not add any thing further in this connection.
I base my fifth and last argument, to prove the predominance of
benevolence in the present system of nature, on the fact that good so
often results from evil as a natural consequence. Or, to state the
argument in another form, good seems generally to be the object or final
cause of evil, whereas evil flows only incidentally from good.
This argument scarcely differs from the last, except in the more general
form of its statement. That brings forward certain prominent and appalling
evils, and endeavors to show that, in striking the balance of their
effects, the preponderance is on the side of benevolence. This advances a
step farther, and attempts to show that the direct object of evil is to
produce good.
It follows, hence, that the examples adduced and elucidated under the last
argument are not inappropriate to sustain and illustrate the present. Yet
others should be added.
Almost the entire history of medicine and surgery illustrates the manner
in which physical evils result in physical good. Indeed, men never resort
to the physician, or the surgeon, because their remedies and operations
are desirable, but only because they are the necessary means of health and
comfort. These means are, indeed, for the most part, of human invention,
but not, therefore, the less indicative of the divine intention; for they
are founded upon such a constitution in nature as makes it possible to
discover remedies for disease and accidents. And the characteristics of
nature's constitution are an index of the intentions of its Author.
The severe mental discipline through which the youth must pass, who would
attain distinction in learning, affords us an example of intellectual evil
resulting in intellectual wealth and happiness. The trial is too severe
for many irresolute minds, and they give over the effort, and sink down
into a state of indolence and neglect. But he who bears manfully the
discipline will at length gather the golden fruit. And he will be
satisfied, too, of the wisdom and benevolence of that law of mental
progress, which makes it impossible ever to find a royal road to the
temple of learning, and which shuts out from that temple all who shrink
from the preparatory discipline.
Still more strikingly illustrative of this argument are the evils which
men suffer as necessary precursors of moral good. These may be physical or
mental; embracing all those experiences that take the name of trials,
afflictions, and disappointments. These are often intensely bitter, and
they constitute, indeed, the master evils of life. We shudder when we see
them coming; and we often writhe in agony when in the furnace. But how
many have come out of that furnace purified from base alloy, and ready for
the service of God and the world! To do good is henceforth their delight;
and they thank God for the severe discipline. When his heavy blows fell
upon them, one after another, they felt as if they were the strokes of an
incensed Deity. But now they see that they were only the necessary
inflictions of infinite love. And they admire the wisdom that could thus
educe so much good out of so great evil.
I do not contend that good is always educed from evil in this world, or
could be; but only that, in a plurality of cases, if men improve the evils
they suffer as they might, such would be the effect. And if this be
admitted, it is sufficient to establish the general principle, that one of
the direct objects of evil in this world is to produce individual benefit.
But the converse of this proposition cannot be maintained. We cannot,
indeed, deny that evil sometimes results from good; but never as the
direct object of the latter. The effect is only incidental; that is, not
as the main object; and so a few cases of this sort cannot invalidate the
proposition which I defend.
I might multiply much more the arguments furnished by nature to prove a
predominance of benevolence in the arrangements and operations of the
present system of things. But I see no way of escaping the force of those
presented, and cannot doubt that all will admit the conclusion. I advance,
therefore to a second proposition, and maintain that _the benevolence
exhibited in the present system of nature is not unmixed_.
I mean, by this statement, that the divine benevolence exhibited in this
world is modified by other perfections. While there is a predominance of
benevolence, there are also indications of God's displeasure; or, at
least, his dealings seem to be adapted to restrain and amend a wicked
race, rather than to make an innocent and holy race happy; so that the
condition of the human family is far less happy than unmixed benevolence
would confer.
In proof of this assertion, I maintain, first, that evil is incidental to
every process and event in nature.
This is preeminently true of all those actions which we call vicious.
Indeed, they are in themselves evils of the worst kind; and not only so,
but they are connected incidentally with scarcely any thing but evil,
though sometimes, as theologians say, overruled for good.
Take next the common operations of nature, which, of course, have no moral
character. Their leading design, as we have already seen, is to produce
good to sentient beings; but incidentally they bring much evil. Food is
intended for gustatory enjoyment and for nourishment; but it is often the
occasion of severe suffering, and becomes an active poison. Gravity is
intended to hold the material universe in a proper balance, and to attach
every moving thing on earth to the surface; but it occasions a vast number
of accidents, and a vast amount of suffering. Water and fire are of
immense direct benefit; yet the first buries a vast amount of property and
life in its bosom, and the latter is scarcely less injurious in its
incidental effects. Indeed, what natural agency can be named, that is not
armed with the power to do evil?
But the same principle extends also to benevolent actions. With our views
of divine benevolence, we might expect that virtuous conduct would never
be coupled with evil. But this notion does not accord with facts; for the
incidental evils connected with benevolent action are often the most
painful in life. Indeed, in how many instances has doing good been
rewarded by the loss of life, and under all the aggravations of suffering
which malignant ingenuity could invent! And the fact has been, that those
whose motives in doing good were the purest have suffered the most.
Witness the life and the death of Him who knew no sin, and yet was led as
a lamb to the slaughter. Since wickedness in this world is sometimes
allowed to have the power of annoying goodness we might expect that the
more disinterested the latter, the more malignant and persecuting would be
the former, because its own deformity is made more manifest.
But the incidental evils connected with benevolent action are not limited
to those resulting from the malice of the wicked. If, for instance, some
huge system of iniquity has become incorporated into the very texture of
society, benevolence cannot root it out without producing many a severe
laceration of individuals, who are incidentally connected with the system,
but to whom no blame attaches. The history of the efforts that have been
made to substitute Christianity for heathenism and other false religions,
is full of examples illustrative of this principle, in conformity with the
remarkable declaration of Christ, _Think not that I am come to send peace
on earth; I came not to send peace, but a sword._ Alike prolific of
illustrations are all the great attempted reforms which the world has
witnessed, whether for delivering religion from human corruptions, or
eradicating slavery, or intemperance, or breaking the political yoke of
the oppressor. In fine, no reasonable man ought to expect to do much good
in this world, without suffering much himself and bringing some incidental
suffering upon others.
Now, although the evils that have been described are incidental, they
belong to the constitution of this world, and, therefore, show the
feelings and intentions of its Author, as much as those effects of his
works which appear to be their final causes. But do not such evils,
incidental to every event, indicate a feeling in the divine mind different
from unmixed benevolence? Strictly speaking, these evils are not penal
inflictions. But they certainly do not show in the Creator a simple desire
to promote the happiness of men, by directly conferring it. They rather
indicate a necessity, on account of some peculiarity in the character of
man, of mingling severity with goodness in the divine conduct towards him.
In thus representing incidental effects as indicative of the feelings of
the Deity, I may seem to contradict my reasoning under the first head,
where I gave, as proof of God's benevolence, the fact that the direct
object of every contrivance is beneficial, and evil only incidental. But I
did not mean to intimate that the incidental effects of a contrivance are
no index of the feelings of its author, but only that the direct effects
show more clearly than the incidental what are his wishes and intentions,
especially if the former are the most numerous, important, and striking.
Still, incidental effects are never without an object; and where they are
evil, as in the case supposed, they indicate other feelings towards men,
in the divine mind, than unmixed benevolence. For it is a strange
limitation of God's wisdom and power to say, as some do, that the evils
could not be prevented.
It may be said, however, that if men only conform to the laws of nature,
they will escape all the evils they suffer. On the other hand, I
maintain,--and this constitutes my second argument to show that the divine
benevolence is not unmixed,--I maintain that the highest virtue and the
most consummate prudence cannot avoid all the evils of life.
Such prudence and virtue will not secure any one against many destructive
natural agencies and operations to which he is exposed. Miasms productive
of fatal disease may contaminate the atmosphere we breathe, unperceived by
us; poison may exist in the food which we take as our necessary
sustenance; the mechanical violence of the elements, or of gravity, may
crush us; the lightning may smite us to the earth; the wild beast may rush
from his unnoticed lair as we pass; or the deadly insect, or serpent, may
inject its poison into our blood at an unexpected moment; or the floods
may overwhelm, or the fire consume us.
Now, although prudence and virtue may defend us against many evils, they
afford no security against such as I have named, in very many instances.
We are often ignorant of their existence or proximity till we become their
victims, and suffering, often intense, is the consequence. Indeed, the
greatest of all physical evils--I mean death--is as sure to visit every
son and daughter of Adam as any event can be; and nothing but insanity, or
its religious synonyme, fanaticism, has ever pretended to be proof against
disease and death. You cannot, indeed, point out any particular organ or
agency, whose direct object is to produce disease and death; but they are
nevertheless the inevitable result of organic operations and agencies in
such a world as this.
It will be said, perhaps, that the good resulting to the whole from even
the most severe of these sufferings, overbalances the evil, and therefore
they are indications of benevolence in such a world as ours. True, as
things are, this may be so. But the question is, Why is there such a
constitution given to nature as made it necessary to introduce disease,
accident, and death? Would not unmixed benevolence have conferred the
good, but have withheld the evil? Had there not been something in man's
character requiring the discipline of trials, would pure benevolence have
sent them? At least, we should suppose that they might all have been
avoided by prudence and virtue. Why should benevolence make such severe
drawbacks upon the happiness even of the virtuous, if something were not
radically wrong in the human constitution?
Thirdly. The great sterility of so large a part of the earth, and the
necessity of severe bodily labor to secure sustenance from it, show us
that the benevolence exhibited in nature and in man's condition is not
unmixed. Though some limited regions are exuberantly fertile, the larger
part of the earth yields up even a mere sustenance only after the severest
labor. And the vast majority of the race can do nothing more than to
obtain food for the body. The artificial state of most societies does,
indeed, keep the lower classes much more depressed than a better state of
the world would bring them into; but at the best, nature unites with
revelation in attesting the truth of the sentence passed upon man--_In the
sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread._
Nor is this necessity for severe labor confined to the cultivation of the
earth, but extends to all kinds of human pursuits. Success, as a general
fact, can be secured only by vigorous industry; and often, in spite of
their most honest and persevering efforts, men fail of securing even a
competence for the support of themselves and their dependants.
Some will say that all this arises from a necessity in the very nature of
the case. But does not such a view limit the divine power and wisdom?
Could not God have prepared a world more paradisiacal than the present,
where the earth should spontaneously yield her fruits, and pour out her
hidden treasures at man's feet? Who will deny this? Why, then, has he not
done it? Because obviously a race so prone to evil as man, so incapable of
maintaining his integrity in the lap of ease and indulgence, needs all
this severe discipline to keep him where he ought to be. Here, then, we
see a reason why God must mingle seeming severity with benevolence.
The same thing is seen, in the fourth place, in the confined and depressed
condition of the human mind in this world, and in the multiplied obstacles
in the way of its cultivation and enlargement.
What a clog to the intellect is a body governed by gross appetites, and
often stopping the ingress of truth, or perverting its aspect, by
disordered and imperfect senses! Nearly one third of the time must that
intellect sink into oblivion, while sleep recruits the physical powers.
And nearly another third of life must be given to the wants of the body;
and as we have seen, the great mass of men are obliged to devote nearly
their whole time to serve the necessary wants of the body. What an
incalculable waste of mind does the world exhibit! And even when all
artificial and unnecessary obstructions are taken out of the way, what an
immense waste must it always present, while in so gross a corporeal
tenement! for were it free to exhibit its true nature, we cannot doubt its
power of unwearied and incessant activity. And such might have been its
condition here, had it pleased infinite wisdom and benevolence. But what
unmixed benevolence would have prompted, perfect wisdom would not permit
to fallen man.
I feel confident that my first two propositions are established, viz.,
that there is a predominance of benevolence in the arrangements and
operations of the present world, and yet that it is not unmixed
benevolence. I advance to a third proposition, which asserts that _the
same mixed system of good and evil, which now exists, has always prevailed
since the earth was inhabited_.
Geology shows us the true succession of events since the first appearance
of organic beings on the globe, but no chronological dates are registered
on the rocks. And it is only by observing processes in existing nature,
analogous to those whose record is engraven on the solid strata, that we
can infer that the years since life first appeared on the surface must
have been very many. But however far back in the hoary past that event
occurred, we have indisputable evidence that the same laws then controlled
the operations of nature as now, and the result was the same mixture of
good and evil.
In the crystalline structure, and in the perfect crystals of the older
rocks, we learn the laws which predominated at their production. And we
find that the same chemical, electrical, and electro-magnetical influences
presided over their formation as are now exhibited in the laboratory of
the chemist or the laboratory of nature. Now, these crystals conduct us
back much farther than the dawn of terrestrial life, though similar ones,
and produced by the same laws, are found through the whole series of
rocks, from the oldest to the newest. And I might appeal to many other
facts in the earth's history, which demonstrate an identity between the
physical laws that have controlled nature's processes in every period of
past time.