To THOMAS POWER.
THURSDAY, January 28.
Mr. SOUTHARD, one of the members for the State of New Jersey, informed
the House of the death of his colleague, Mr. EZRA DARBY, late one of
the members of this House: Whereupon, the House came to the following
resolutions:
_Resolved_, That a committee be appointed to take order
for superintending the funeral of EZRA DARBY, Esq., late a
Representative from the State of New Jersey.
_Resolved, unanimously_, That the members of this House will
testify their respect for the memory of EZRA DARBY, Esq., late
one of their body, by wearing crape on the left arm for one
month.
_Resolved, unanimously_, That the members of this House will
attend the funeral of EZRA DARBY, Esq., on to-morrow at twelve
o’clock.
_Resolved, unanimously_, That a message be sent to the Senate,
to notify them of the death of EZRA DARBY, late a member of
this House, and that his funeral will take place on to-morrow,
at twelve o’clock; and that the Clerk of this House do go with
the said message.
_Ordered_, That Mr. SOUTHARD, Mr. MASTERS, Mr. PORTER, Mr. HELMS, Mr.
NEWBOLD, and Mr. LAMBERT, be appointed a committee, pursuant to the first
resolution.
SATURDAY, January 30.
_Removal of Federal Judges on the Address of Congress._
Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL.--It has always been my opinion that in a free
Government like ours, every department ought to be responsible for its
conduct. The Constitution of the United States was evidently framed on
this principle, and the preservation and security of the rights and
liberties of the citizens and the due execution of the laws will be found
to rest, in a great degree, on rendering public agents sufficiently and
practically responsible for their conduct to the nation. That this is
not the case with the Judiciary of the United States has been proved by
experience. Your judges once appointed are independent of the Executive,
the Legislature, and the people, and may be said to hold their offices
for life. They are removable only on conviction by impeachment of high
crimes and misdemeanors, and this mode of proceeding has been found in
practice totally inefficient, and not to answer the purpose for which it
was intended--that of rendering your judges duly responsible for their
conduct. They may therefore be considered as independent of the rest of
the nation, (and they seem to think so themselves,) as if this provision
in the constitution, relative to impeachment, did not exist. No matter
how erroneous their opinions--how dangerous to the public weal--how
subversive of the interest of the people--how directly opposed to the
laws of your country; yet, as it is neither a high crime nor misdemeanor
to hold erroneous opinions, which they seem conscientiously to believe,
they cannot be removed by impeachment--they are independent of the rest
of the nation.
This subject has attracted the attention of the people in most of the
States. The Legislatures of several States have passed resolutions
declaring the necessity of amending the Federal Constitution, so as to
render the judges, in practice as well as in theory, responsible for
their conduct. The most numerous branch of the Legislature of the State
which I have the honor to represent in part, have declared their opinion
in favor of such amendment. In order, therefore, to bring this subject
before the House, that the sense of the National Legislature may be
ascertained thereon, I submit the following resolution:
_Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, in Congress assembled, two-thirds of
both Houses concurring therein_, That the following amendment
to the Constitution of the United States be proposed to the
Legislatures of the several States, which, when ratified by
the Legislatures of three-fourths of the said States, shall
be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the said
constitution: The Judges of both the Supreme and Superior
Courts of the United States shall, after the ---- day of ----,
be removed from office by the President of the United States,
on the joint address of both Houses of Congress requesting the
same, three-fifths of each House concurring in such address.
This resolution was referred to a Committee of the Whole on the state of
the Union.
MONDAY, February 1.
Another member, to wit, GEORGE CLINTON, junior, from New York, appeared,
produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.
MONDAY, February 22.
_Captain Pike._
Mr. J. MONTGOMERY observed, that to Captains Lewis and Clarke, who had
explored the Western country, a compensation had been made; he held in
his hand a similar resolution for remunerating Captain Pike for the
important services he had rendered on an almost similar expedition, which
he proposed, as follows:
_Resolved_, That a committee be appointed to inquire what
compensation ought to be made to Captain Pike and his
companions for their services in exploring the Mississippi
River, and in their late expedition to the sources of the
Osage, Arkansas, and La Platte Rivers, together with their tour
through New Spain; and that they have leave to report by bill
or otherwise.
Mr. MARION objected to the phraseology of the resolution, as sanctioning
a general principle, to which he was not prepared to assent. The
resolution did not go to inquire if any compensation, but what
compensation, should be given; thus taking it for granted that some
remuneration should be made. Mr. M. wished it to be so modified as to
inquire “if any, and, if any, what,” compensation should be granted.
Mr. MONTGOMERY acceding to this alteration, the resolution was adopted.
WEDNESDAY, February 24.
_Removal of Judges upon Address from Congress._
Mr. WHITEHILL presented the resolutions of the Legislature of
Pennsylvania, requesting their members in Congress to use their endeavors
to procure an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, so
that the Judges of the United States should hold their offices for a
term of years, and be liable to removal by the President, on the joint
address of a majority of both Houses of Congress; and that, on trials by
impeachment, a majority of the Senate should be competent to conviction.
Mr. BARD moved to refer the resolutions to the Committee of the Whole on
the state of the Union.
Mr. DANA opposed the motion. The resolutions were only instructions to
the Pennsylvania delegation. This House had nothing to do with them.
After a debate of about two hours, the question was taken and
carried--yeas 82, nays 27.
MONDAY, April 4.
A new member, to wit, ADAM BOYD, returned to serve in this House as a
Representative for the State of New Jersey, in the room of EZRA DARBY,
deceased, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his
seat in the House.
TUESDAY, April 12.
_Frauds in Land Warrants._
Mr. RANDOLPH rose to give notice that he meant to bring forward a motion
on a subject of considerable public interest, and in which in his
opinion the honor of the Government of the United States was materially
implicated. He held in his hand an application from a veteran soldier on
the subject of his bounty land, and who had sent him a power of attorney
to act for him--a man of unimpeachable character, and who had not been at
the seat of Government since it was established--his name William Bryan.
I found, said Mr. R., that his warrant, No. 9--, has been drawn and
fraudulently located; I say fraudulently, because I am well assured that
the party has not received any advantage from the warrant, and there is
the strongest evidence of fraud. His warrant has been drawn and located,
by whom I cannot discover; my researches were completely baffled by the
memorable fire, which it is presumable owed its origin to a desire to
cover frauds of this nature. I was referred from the War Office to the
Treasury Office; for the only chance of finding out who had acted as
attorney in fact for this old man, was, that the warrant ought to have
been returned and on file there. On going there I found that the space on
the record which the warrant ought to have occupied, was blank; and that
no such warrant exists on the Treasury files. I believe this is far from
being a solitary case, but that the cases are numerous, and many of those
who have honestly earned a title to public land have been in this way
defrauded, and the land sold to speculators who have reaped the benefit
of it. I therefore give notice that I shall at a future day move for an
inquiry into this subject.
_Suspension of the Embargo._
The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, 55 to
20, on the resolution offered by Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL, declaring that
the President of the United States ought, in the event of certain
contingencies occurring during the recess of Congress, to be authorized
to suspend the operation of the embargo.
Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL said he would state to the House, in a very brief
manner, some of the reasons which induced him to bring forward this
resolution.
It will be recollected, said he, that the causes which induced the
passage of the law, imposing an embargo, were the orders of council by
Great Britain, and the decrees by France, which went in a great degree
to cut off and destroy the whole commerce of the United States. In case
those causes should be removed, I presume it will be thought necessary
that there should be a power vested somewhere to withdraw the embargo
occasioned by those orders and decrees. As therefore it is believed that
we shall not be much longer in session, and it is at least possible that
these orders and decrees may be removed, that Great Britain may revoke
her orders of council or change them so as not to affect our commerce,
and that France may revoke her decrees or change them so as to render
our commerce secure, it is all-important that a power should be vested
somewhere to give the people such relief as would be justified by this
state of things. Suppose it were the case that any alteration should
take place when Congress were not in session, some weeks, nay, some
months must pass before Congress could be in session and a law pass for
removing the embargo; the consequence of which would be that the country
would suffer the pressure of the embargo for weeks or months longer than
would be necessary; and I presume no member of the House will say that it
would be proper to continue longer than necessary the pressure which the
embargo must make upon them. There is I presume at least some reason to
believe that the belligerent powers themselves are beginning to see their
own interests injured. We see, by the latest accounts from Great Britain,
that propositions are made in Parliament for revoking her orders.
Should this take place, it is presumable that we also should revoke
our regulations. This measure would also have a good effect in turning
the attention of the people to the real source whence their present
inconveniences flow; they will be taught to look to those circumstances
which produced the embargo, a change of which would justify its removal.
This would be a consideration of some importance. The mind of the public
would be kept alive by the expectation that every day may bring the news
which would induce Government to revoke the embargo, which no doubt bears
hard upon the agricultural as well as commercial interests of the country.
The resolution as it now stands seems to me to embrace the principal
grounds upon which we ought to authorize the Executive to suspend the
operation of the law in question. If a general peace or suspension of
hostilities take place in Europe, it would seem that there would be
no danger from a suspension of the interdiction of our own vessels
from sailing; but if no such event takes place, in the event of such
alterations as shall exclude American commerce from the operation of
the orders and decrees of the belligerents, it will be proper that the
embargo should be suspended, they being the grounds on which the measure
was adopted. You must vest a power somewhere to ascertain whether such
change take place or not. You cannot precisely determine the fact which
shall authorize suspension; for were you to say that in case of a
revocation of the decrees of France or England the embargo shall cease,
you give a vast advantage to those nations--for they may revoke them
to-day and reinstate them to-morrow, as their interests may dictate. It
is therefore necessary to vest a power somewhere to ascertain not only
the revocation, but a reasonable assurance that they will not be renewed.
For this purpose it is essentially necessary that the President should
be authorized to determine the changes which shall render our commerce
safe, by the assurances which may be given that they will not again
resort to similar measures. This I mention only as my general object;
as to the expressions in the resolution I am not tenacious of them; and
in any modification of them which shall promote the public good I shall
certainly acquiesce. I have no object but one; that the public may see
that we have not left our posts till we had done every thing in our power
to relieve them from the distress of measures adopted by us and rendered
necessary by the conduct of other nations.
I conceive this to be more important to the people on the seacoasts than
to the people in the Western country. To the Western country a few weeks
or months protraction of the interdiction, in the fall of the year, could
not be of much importance; yet it would seem to me that in the commercial
cities and towns, in the Atlantic States, a few days or weeks, much more
so a few months’ which might occur before Congress could convene, would
be very important; and they would feel much uneasiness if, knowing such
changes had taken place as would warrant the removal of the embargo, they
were compelled to lie under its pressure until Congress could meet to
revoke it. It cannot be expected, after the President shall determine to
call Congress, that they can be convened here in less than three months.
Such a resolution as this therefore would be beneficial to the commercial
interest.
WEDNESDAY, April 13.
_Suspension of the Embargo._
The House then went into a Committee of the Whole on the resolution.
Mr. LOVE said, to a proposition having for its object the removal of the
embargo, at the first moment the public interests would permit, he had
presumed there would have been no objection made either on that floor
or by any man in the nation. In this presumption, said Mr. L., I am
extremely sorry to be disappointed, and more especially so as the mode of
opposition calls for a reply from those who have been the advocates of
the system of policy pursued by the Government, during the embarrassing
crisis it has been compelled to encounter.
The proposition before the committee is so familiar to those who have
been long in the habits of legislation, from the frequent exercise of the
general principle on which it rests, that nothing not already obvious to
the minds of the greater part of this honorable body, I am sure, can be
said in support of it. In the observations therefore, sir, which I shall
trouble the committee with, it will not be necessary to say more than
shall be proper in answer, only, to the objections which have been made
at this time, to the exercise of the power contemplated by the resolution.
I have heard no argument yet urged against the right of delegating in any
situation, or under any circumstances, the exercise of special powers
which are acknowledged to be vested in a more general view essentially
in the Legislature. The argument, if urged to such an extent, would
evidently defeat itself, and go to destroy the operations of this
or any other Government deriving the source of its authority from a
Legislature. Our constitution has enjoined many duties on Congress, which
without a delegation of the powers thus vested in it, could never be
effected. An objection to the resolution under discussion on so broad
a ground, would have been too obviously untenable. The question has
not been thus directly met; but in opposition to the constitutionality
of the delegation of power contemplated, a distinction has been taken
between the authority which should be given to suspend a law, already in
operation, and one which has not yet commenced its operation.
I listened, sir, with every possible attention to the argument made on
this distinction. I am obliged to say there was no reason intelligible to
my mind, offered in support of it. I will content myself therefore with
expressing the opinion that the circumstance of a postponed or present
operation, cannot make a difference in the principle. In both cases the
authority which delegates the agency is the same, it is the act of every
branch of the Legislature, and there can be no distinction which would
not apply to one equally with the other. It may in the manner of its
exercise be assimilated to the powers of a Legislature to repeal a law
already in existence, in contradistinction to the power of repealing one,
the operation of which had been suspended. If such a position could be
sustained (as a proper inference from our constitution) it would be vain;
for if the Legislature have the right of repealing a law, they might in
the same breath that they would repeal this, enact another which should
provide in a manner so far in conformity with the practice acknowledged
to be correct, as to be entirely exempt from the objection urged on the
ground of this distinction.
When I compare the limited nature of the power now proposed to be
delegated, with those almost unbounded trusts which it has been the
constant practice of the Legislature to confide in the Executive
Department, I cannot help feeling at a loss to account for the present
opposition on any grounds of consistency. Those delegations of authority
have not been confined in practice to either of the political parties
which have at different times given a tone to the Government. The
gentleman from Tennessee, who has introduced the resolution, has
mentioned several instances in which this has been done; permit me to add
others, in which it appears to me the principle has been carried further
than in the present case.
By the constitution, the power of borrowing money is in express terms
_exclusively_ vested in Congress. Yet this has been only exercised by a
delegation of it, from the commencement of the Government till the time
has ceased when it was necessary to exercise it. I hope, sir, it may
never be necessary to do it again; but if it should, I ask gentlemen how
it will be effected but by the intervention of an agency, although the
words of the constitution permit _Congress only_ “to borrow money on the
credit of the United States.”
Other powers of great importance, solely confided to Congress, have been
delegated, and not as now contemplated, in a restricted and limited
degree, but in terms of the broadest and most absolute discretion;
many instances have occurred of this in constant succession ever since
the revolution, in political opinion, which has taken place in the
Legislature of the Union; for scarcely were the Republicans warm in
their seats before they made a delegation of the power to the President,
more unlimited in principle and more dangerous in practice than that
now advocated, for suspending the operation of the embargo law. In 1802
he was authorized to organize a military corps. In February, 1803, he
was authorized to cause to be built several vessels of war, if the
exigencies of the service should require it. In 1804 the same powers were
repeated, and many others, equally dangerous and equally necessary, were
delegated both these years. In March, 1805, he was authorized to permit
or interdict at pleasure foreign vessels from coming into our ports.
Compare the discretion either in extent or importance vested by those
laws, with that now contemplated, and on the ground of precedent we are
more than justified; even in the present session we have delegated the
power of suspending or continuing a law, now certainly in operation, by
authorizing the President to build and equip, or not, at his discretion,
a number of gunboats, or he may, under the influence of the like
discretion, for ever desist from the execution of it.
If this body is supposed to act under the regular impulse of any
political principles, it appears to me, sir, that the numerous precedents
to be found in our statutory code ought to have an effect. In those which
I have mentioned, and many others which have been enumerated by the
gentleman from Tennessee, the President was vested with the right, _ad
libitum_, to continue, suspend, or terminate the operation of a law. In
the present one the discretion is limited to the contingencies of peace
in Europe, a suspension of hostilities, or such conduct and assurances on
the part of the belligerents who have invaded our commercial rights, as
will enable our vessels to pass with our produce in safety to a foreign
market.
Let us now examine, sir, the other constitutional objection made by
the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) that Congress have not
the power to lay an embargo. If indeed this novel position be correct,
the question is at an end, and the people of the United States would
be justified in the resistance the argument invites. I had indeed
understood the gentleman, as others near me did, to found his idea of
the unconstitutionality of this embargo, on the circumstance of the laws
imposing it being unlimited as to time. He defined an embargo to mean an
inhibition for a limited time, and this unlimited nature of the present
embargo was dwelt on by him with peculiar emphasis; but when a gentleman
from Kentucky, (Mr. JOHNSON,) who followed him, had ably exposed the
fallacy of this distinction, and completely sent the argument home to its
author, the distinction was abandoned by explanation. I understand the
explanation of the gentleman; but as the object in pressing the unlimited
quality of this embargo on the sensibility of the nation, cannot be
mistaken, I have too, sir, for reasons alike obvious, thought it proper
to mention it.
But, sir, as to the power to lay an embargo. The first motives for a
union of the States, imply this as indispensable. It would be enough
to show it to be a measure of general defence and protection, to give
Congress a right to act on the subject; as such, sir, it expressly ranks
among the provisions assigned as the great causes for the adoption of the
Federal Constitution; for in the preamble to this instrument, the people
say, they have adopted it in order “to provide for the common defence and
general welfare.”
In the first paragraph of the eighth section of the first article, the
same words are repeated; common defence and common protection to the
external interest of the United States, are then the peculiar objects
of its Government. An embargo under some circumstances is not only a
proper but a necessary and indispensable means of common defence and
protection; I might say that the present crisis is a strong illustration
of such necessity. But if the right to lay an embargo is controverted,
I would ask by what means is the Government in time of war, or expected
war, under the authority of law to secure the property of its citizens,
which it is the business of all Governments to do, towards all who claim
under it the protection of their rights? Where is the power lodged, if
not in the National Legislature, which shall prohibit your own, or even
your enemies’ vessels from leaving your ports, after a declaration of
war? Are the States vested with, or do they generally retain the right to
lay an embargo? No, sir, they cannot so far enter into the collisions of
interests which would follow among each other by preventing the vessels
from sailing from the ports of any of them. The effect of doing so
would be too obviously an invasion of the general powers of commercial
regulation solely intrusted to Congress. Can any man of rational mind
suppose, then, that the Government of this country is really so defective
in what is not only to common sense an obvious reason, but one of the
express objects of its institution?
But to lay an embargo is unconstitutional, because Congress cannot lay an
export duty! And it is argued by the same gentleman that the lesser power
being thus provided against, the exercise of the greater must of course
be included in the prohibition; the minor forming an objection, the major
is, _a fortiori_, inadmissible. How easily, sir, is this argument of
inference retorted on the gentleman; for, according to a familiar and
certainly plain course of reasoning, it would seem, that if the subjects
are the same as is said, when the framers of our constitution made an
exception of the lesser power, if they had intended also to except the
greater, they would not have forgotten it.
The reasons which influenced the framers of that instrument to provide
against the power of laying an export duty, were obvious; the provision
was adopted in that spirit of mutual accommodation, which was so
necessary to the harmony of the whole. It would be difficult, it was
easily foreseen, to devise an export duty, which would not bear harder
on some of the States than others; it was better therefore not to resort
at all to a mode of taxation which would afford so fruitless a source
of contention. The policy too of taxing exports was perhaps radically
inadmissible; yet I cannot, for my life, discern how an export duty has
been drawn into analogy with an embargo.
That the embargo was a curse, and continues to be a most calamitous one
to us all, I have heard no one deny; but until now, I have not heard the
assertion advanced that our Government, by its conduct, was the author of
that curse. Yes, sir, many evils which the injustice of other nations has
inflicted on the peace and honor of the United States are acknowledged to
be curses of the most irritating and affecting nature; but the gentleman
has said more for England and France, than either of them has before said
for itself, when he attributes to his own Government the misconduct which
has produced those evils. It was scarcely to be expected that any state
of internal division or any views of whatever description would have
produced on this floor an assertion which has thus put a new argument
in the hands of our enemies in justification of their aggressions on
us; it is more than our enemies have asserted. We have heard indeed
from France and England that their decrees and orders, which make the
present voluntary retirement from the seas necessary on our part, were
the effect of an unjustifiable attack, which each has attributed in the
first instance to the other. Each criminates the other, and not America,
with being the author of the peculiar mode of warfare which has proved so
destructive to the rights of neutrals. The very language of their orders
and decrees assumes this position, and they are all prefaced with the
declaration, that their orders are enacted in the spirit of retaliation
on each other, and not, sir, for any offence which our Government has
been the author of, as the gentleman now tells the American people; for
what purpose let the nation judge.
I may surely be permitted to express my surprise and astonishment at this
assertion, sir, as it has never before been insinuated, on this floor at
least; and as it forms so strong a contrast with the declarations which
have been before made by the same gentleman, permit me to recall the
gentleman’s attention to his arguments in conclave, and to notice, if it
will not be out of order, (which I presume it will not, as all which then
took place has since been directed to be published,) the grounds of his
opposition to the embargo at that time.
It is recollected by us all that the honor of presenting a resolution in
conformity to the policy recommended by the President, in his Message
of the 18th of December last, was an object of emulation between the
gentleman from Virginia and one from Massachusetts, (Mr. CROWNINSHIELD,)
whose absence from the House the nation has so much cause to deplore,
and we all so sensibly feel. I thought it then, and still think it
an honorable emulation, arising from a patriotic sense of duty. The
gentleman from Virginia finally succeeded, and became the author of
the resolution in this House for laying the embargo; scarcely had he,
however, presented the resolution, the necessity of which he at the same
time took occasion to observe he had long foreseen, and, for two years
at least, before the period when it was recommended, (and, of course,
sir, prior to the rejection of this noted London Treaty of December,
1806, now so much eulogized,) scarcely had he thus expressed his
approbation of the embargo, till he again doubted its policy, and soon
after denounced its justice, not yet, indeed, for any of the reasons we
now hear, respecting the rejection of the treaty, but because it was a
measure said, or insinuated, to be dictated by France; and that it was to
have an injurious operation solely on England. It was in vain that the
friends of the embargo urged the probable existence of the very grounds
that measure now more strongly rests on; that the hostile determination
of France to enforce her decree of November 21, 1806, would probably
be followed by orders as harsh on the part of Great Britain; that this
was the course of policy the adoption of which England had already
announced, and its execution might, therefore, be fairly anticipated;
that the King’s proclamation of the 16th of October, 1807, a copy of
which accompanied the President’s Message, was an evidence of the
determination of that Government to offer no satisfactory accommodation
of our differences, and of its determined usurpation of our maritime
rights; to these arguments nothing was replied, but the repetitions in
lengthened speeches of the same charges. The opinions then avowed, sir,
by the advocates of the embargo, have met with support from the events
which have since been developed, while the unjustifiable grounds of
opposition are abandoned, even by their authors. But, sir, if there is
any gentleman, who, with his eyes open to the situation of the commerce
of the world, will say that the embargo ought to be removed, and that the
policy is unsound, let me ask him to tell us what, in the embarrassing
state in which we are placed by the efforts of France and England to
involve us in their conflicts, we are to do? The gentleman from Virginia
has hinted at arming our merchantmen! War, then, is the substitute; it
is, indeed, the only one, I agree. To arm our merchantmen, leads to
war--nay, sir, it is war, according to the interpretation nations have a
right to put on such an act of a Government; it will be opposed by open
war and undisguised hostility. If we are to have war, let it be in the
direct tone and unequivocal language of a nation indignant at the insults
it has received, not in the indirect manner of arming a few trading
vessels, the masters of whom would choose for the nation its enemy,
or involve us with both the belligerents at once, as their particular
animosities might dictate; if we are to go to war, it might be well to
fight one at a time at least. But, sir, I cannot but hope if our strong,
but pacific policy is adhered to, cursed as it is said to be, it may yet
preserve us from the conflicts of Europe. It is a curse, indeed, sir,
under which we are compelled to labor, but what is the alternative? I
have thought much, sir, on the subject; it has been my duty as well as
that of every other gentleman to weigh it well. We hear its effects are
severely felt, and we hear, too, what are the exertions of our opponents
to seize the favorite opportunity which it is so well calculated to
produce, to excite the sensibility of the people through the medium of
their immediate interests. But remove the embargo, and we must arm our
vessels, and war is at once declared. I have heard no one deny that
this must be the alternative. Compare the evils, both of great extent.
I admit, by the embargo, we lose half the value of the products of our
country, or the receipt of it is suspended; by war, to admit the effect
in this particular, no worse, at least it could be no better; but have
we counted the costs of the armies we are to raise, and to pay, of the
supplies we are to furnish, of the loss of our blood, and the diminution
of our strength, of the reduction of the profits of agriculture itself,
by calling men from their domestic occupations, and lessening the number
of hands for tillage--have we calculated the thousand other evils which
follow in the train of war? To plunge into war, sir, to escape the
curse of the embargo, would be truly fulfilling the adage of old--“out
of the frying-pan into the fire.” I do not hesitate to say that, if we
have patriotism enough to pursue our own interests, better would it
be for this country to remain under the truly calamitous curse of the
embargo for years, than at once to launch itself into war. But if we
must at length, after all our efforts to prevent it, have war, let it
be a war dependent on national sentiment, and arising from no doubtful
necessity, which must be produced by the conflicts of our vessels at
sea. We all know, and have felt that it has required the exertion of an
unparalleled fortitude, to resist the emotions which have impelled us
to acts of vengeance and redress for our injuries; let us not, then,
seek for new causes, of doubtful necessity, to place us at once at war,
as would be the case by arming our vessels. No, sir, let it be a cause
which, in spite of our divisions, so earnestly of late fomented, must
unite us in one spirit of opposition, in one sentiment of indignation
against the enemy who shall attack us, with the spirit of unanimity with
which a sense of injury will inspire us. I do not too highly estimate
our strength, or, I trust, our patriotism, when I say, that no army
which Europe combined could transport across the Atlantic, could long
withstand the American arms. That we have had ample cause, of war,
wanton, unprovoked cause, I had not, till now, supposed had been doubted;
we are now, indeed, informed that our Government is to blame, and that
the insults and injuries to which we have been subjected, are, in a great
measure, attributable to its misconduct. What the object is, in making
these assertions, let the nation judge; believing them groundless, I
do not fear to be able to prove them so. The non-importation law has
been mentioned as one of the subjects of just umbrage to England, and
as having had an embarrassing effect on the state of our negotiations
there. The gentleman has certainly but little attended to the documents
which have lately been read in this House; if he had, he would there have
found, under the sanction of authority which he is not presumed to doubt,
that it was a measure one of our Ministers in London has given his most
unequivocal approbation to.
It was said that our Ministers were suppliants at a foreign Court--our
Government must place an efficient instrument in their hands; and a
coercive system of policy is recommended, with a direct allusion to the
enaction of the non-importation law before the rising of the Congress
then in session.
We are told, too, that a principal cause of our embarrassments is the
rejection of the treaty concluded by our Ministers in London on the 31st
of December, 1806. This assertion has been made here, sir, with such
earnestness that it requires examination. The treaty which has been
rejected by our Government has been eulogized, and a month’s discussion
of it has been challenged; not, it is true, wholly on its intrinsic
worth, or positive merits, but because the circumstances, also, under
which it was concluded, made its provisions proper, and its adoption
necessary. The Treaty of 1794, commonly called Jay’s Treaty, I understood
the gentleman also to say, would under the existing circumstances of
December, 1806, have been proper for our adoption. This was, indeed, sir,
a necessary preface to his defence of the rejected treaty, for it is
certainly susceptible of easy demonstration, that it is, in its features
and provisions, far more objectionable and defective than the Treaty
of 1794; and, whether we take it on the ground of peculiarity in the
circumstances of the contracting parties, or on its intrinsic merits, it
has less claim to our assent.
In the first place, let us examine the circumstances under which those
two treaties were made, and then compare their respective provisions.
From the retrospect I am at this time able to take of our situations
at those different periods, I cannot hesitate to believe that the
circumstances under which the Treaty of 1794 was made, were more
unfavorable for negotiation on the part of the United States at that
time, both as they respected England and America, than they were in
December, 1806. As they respected England, her situation was at the
former period infinitely more commanding. By her combinations with the
great powers of Europe, as early as 1792, or perhaps antecedent to that
year, she was perfectly secure against any annoyance from France, her
only enemy in 1794. The Treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz, to which, it is
believed, England early in 1792 acceded, and which certainly laid the
groundwork of the conventions and coalitions of the spring of 1793, had
produced the effect of uniting in concert with her against France, the
powers of Russia, Germany, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, and many of the
minor States of Europe. England, then, felt no apprehensions for her own
safety, none for the abridgment of her commerce, and seemed to be but
little sensible to her interests in cultivating a good understanding
with America: her single enemy was confined to his own territories, and
threatened even with famine. The United States, in 1794, had not long
commenced their existence as a nation, and their new Government might
be said to be scarcely more than in a state of experiment. The debts
which had been created by the Revolutionary war, we had undertaken the
honorable discharge of, and we were then laboring under the immense
load; our resources were comparatively small, our embarrassments great,
our burdens by no means in a course of alleviation, and our situation
totally defenceless; the savages who bordered on our frontiers were
numerous, strong, and fierce, and our armies had but recently suffered a
dreadful carnage and terrible defeat; we were destitute of manufactories
which could supply us with arms, or the means of filling our arsenals;
a civilized nation of Europe, then great and powerful, bordered her
colonies on our Southern frontier, and disputed with us the navigation
of our rivers. Sir, if circumstances could ever sanction a dereliction
of right, and a compromitment of interest, those circumstances, then,
might be said to exist. Then, indeed, there might have been a semblance
of apology, in our infant and crippled state, for leaning, in some
measure, on the strength of a nation which was supposed to stand firm.
I confess, sir, I would rather, even at that time, have had no treaty,
than such a one as was then made; it has set a bad example. But what
was our situation in December, 1806--adverting again to circumstances,
which are made the test in this case, when the treaty, since rejected,
was signed in London? Our strength and population increased to a most
envious and flattering degree; our foreign debts discharged, and our
domestic one, which we had honorably assumed the payment of, reduced--our
credit established abroad, our Treasury overflowing, and our resources
flourishing; manufactories of arms were every where reared, and had
furnished the nation with the best means of defence; the savages on
our frontiers were subdued, or civilized; our Southern frontier was
extended and had grown strong: England, instead of her prosperity and
powerful combinations of 1793, was left almost single-handed; the
subordinate powers of Europe had become a part of France, the great
nations were either under her control, or struggling in their last
efforts of disastrous conflict: France, instead of being confined to
the defence of her own dominion, was carrying on offensive war, and
England had been made to tremble for her own existence. What then are
the circumstances alleged, to palliate the evils of such a treaty as was
offered us? Was England about to be suddenly relieved in an instant from
her embarrassments and burdens? How? We are told, indeed, that France had
pushed her conquests too far, that her Emperor had so far stretched his
arm of conquest, as to leave himself exposed to the most imminent danger
at home; was it therefore that England elevated her hopes, and carried
her demands? Stuff, sir, fit only for the cook-shops and coffee-houses
of London; I should never have expected it to find its way into the
semi-official letter which has been read to us, from a character who has
deservedly stood high in the rank of politicians. But our own internal
situation, threatened with conspiracy, the extent and magnitude of which
was unknown, was another reason it has been suggested for hastening the
execution of this treaty. How, in December, 1806, accounts so alarming
could have reached England of the extent of Burr’s conspiracy, I cannot
but be at a loss to conjecture. The alarm at that time here, was not I
believe very serious; not such, at least, as would have been a reason
with any man in this country to have thrown ourselves into the lap of a
foreign nation, or to have made a treaty which compromitted our rights,
and left our interests unprovided for. I must say I think too much
alarm was felt on this subject, and that it would at least have been as
honorable a sentiment towards the people and Government of America, to
have entertained an entire confidence in them, that without any great or
dangerous effort they were capable of quelling the conspiracies which
might be engendered against their peace. I assert that independent of
circumstances which I have endeavored to show were more unfavorable as
they regarded the United States, and far more favorable as they regarded
England in 1794, than in December, 1806, the treaty of the latter
date is worse than that of the former. The former did provide redress
in some sort for previous injuries. That of the latter date contains
no provisions for any kind of redress or compensation, which was due
to us, for the very many spoliations which had been committed on our
commerce--it offers no alleviation to the evils of the former--is silent
as to the injuries and insults which we had sustained in our waters;
totally, sir, although these were subjects of special instruction from
our Government, and although we were told by our embassy that a treaty
was concluded on the different points of commercial interest. Was it
forgotten, sir, to what an immense amount America had suffered under the
different orders of the King in council, even from the very date of the
former agreement for reparation? Were not our losses under the orders
particularly of 1798, which gave rise to so much of the havoc our neutral
commerce had groaned under, and which placed the nations of Europe in a
better situation than the United States in the conveyance of colonial
produce, known to our Ministers? It must have been recollected, for it
was enforced in their instructions, how our vessels had been incessantly
sent into the ports of Britain and her colonies for adjudication, and
the unjust condemnations which had taken place, under the construction
of those orders. It must have been recollected how far in the first
instance the orders themselves had gone towards the subversion of
the laws of nations. The time was, indeed, when a great jurist, Lord
Mansfield, had declared, that neither the orders of the King in council
nor even an act of Parliament which contravened the law of nations was
binding on any one; this was said in the case of the Silesia loan, but
those days were past. Sir William Scott has since told us, that the text
of the instructions are his guide, and King George the Third is thus,
by his single voice, to make and expound the law, which is adjudged to
be paramount in modern times to the laws of nations. The adjudications,
it is a well-known fact, have been in conformity to the Royal will,
stimulated alone by the shipping interests of England; principles of
adjudication have been established in the British Courts of Admiralty,
which had on the most unjust pretensions wrested from our citizens many
millions of their property. Why by this treaty give up our claims to
reparation, as they were most emphatically, by signing a treaty which
yielded no redress for them while the claims were still unsatisfied; by
making a compact which wholly pretermitted them? It is said, sir, that
the disputes respecting the colonial trade are adjusted by this treaty.
How--by agreeing to a duty on exports? Where was our constitution, now
so strongly pressed in discussion, when this stipulation was made;
when it was solemnly covenanted, that we should directly invade one of
its provisions by laying an export duty? And that, in addition to the
deduction on drawbacks allowed by law, an export duty of one, two, or
three per cent. should be imposed on colonial articles? Why make the
extraordinary and vain stipulation too, contained in the fifth article,
that we should have a right to lay the same export duty which England
should have a right to impose, if we could lay none by our constitution?
The subject of blockades also, sir, was one on which some stipulation
was made absolutely necessary, by the novel doctrines lately asserted,
and insisted on by the nations of Europe; it was important that their
extent should in some way have been defined, their nature described,
when a blockade should be said to exist, and that it should not be a
question left entirely to the discretion or interest of a belligerent,
or the caprice of her officers. This single question had already led
us at different times to the very brink of war with England. In June,
1793, she asserted all France to be in a state of blockade, and ordered
our vessels to be captured which should attempt to enter any of her
ports with our produce. France had in May of the same year issued an
inhibitory order against our trade, of a nature but little less hostile,
in consequence, as it was said, of the Russian convention made in London,
I think in March of the same year. In the fall of 1793, the British had
issued secret orders on the same principle of blockade, which entrapped
our West India commerce, to an immense amount, before they were known
by us to be in existence; this it was said was a principal reason for
the proposition contained in a bill for prohibiting all intercourse with
England, which had in the early part of 1794 received the sanction of
the House of Representatives, and was rejected in the Senate but by the
majority of one vote, and which was succeeded by Mr. Jay’s mission. To
the same class, too, may be assigned the British orders of May 1795,
against our vessels laden with provisions, which brought President
WASHINGTON to a stand on the British Treaty, and caused him, it is said,
to demand a previous explanation, which was at that time I presume,
satisfactorily made, but which has been since in innumerable instances
violated, and the same vague and undefined principles of blockade
enforced; at one time by declaring a blockade to exist from Brest to the
river Elbe, at others by proclamations of blockade equally extravagant,
and more than once by the declaration of the British naval commanders,
that a whole kingdom should be cut off, at a stroke of the pen, from all
the trade of neutral nations. But, sir, if the general and extensive
evils which the new doctrine of blockades had superinduced, were not of
sufficient importance to claim a stipulation against their exercise in
future, there was one species of injury which seemed really to merit,
and to claim indispensably, some notice either by redress or stipulation
against its future practice. I know not how to class it; it may be
assimilated to a modern blockade, inasmuch as it assumes a jurisdiction
wholly ideal; I mean that which was a particular subject of complaint,
from the assumption made of a right by a British naval officer in the
port of New York, in claiming jurisdiction and the exercise of the right
of impressment, and of course every one less inimical to natural right,
within the distance of the buoys from his ship. To this assertion of
authority I see no disclaimer in this applauded treaty, or any hint at
redress for the injury inflicted by the particular occasion on which it
was exercised. If this new claim of naval sovereignty is insisted on, or
thus tacitly permitted, it is time it should be so understood; for with
the same propriety with which the British commander in New York claimed
jurisdiction within his buoys, another might claim British jurisdiction
from Boston to Charleston, if he could so far stretch a cable.
I come now, sir, to say something on the question of impressment, wholly
omitted in the treaty, and which the gentleman from Virginia has said
was informally and satisfactorily arranged by the note of the British
Commissioners on that subject. He has said that their note contained a
stipulation, “that they would order their naval commanders to abstain
from the practice of impressments on board American vessels.” I confess
I was astonished at the declaration. It is true the printed document
has not been furnished till just now. I presume the note of the 8th of
November, 1806, to have been alluded to, because something like the
same defence on this subject has been used by one of the American
Commissioners in his late letter to the Secretary of State, (although,
indeed, until I heard that defence read, I had not understood that any
improper dereliction of the American interests had been imputed to our
Ministers; I had always understood, and, except in the letter alluded
to, and the arguments of the gentleman, I have yet understood from
every source of information open to me, that it was not expected by our
Ministers that the treaty could be ratified by the American Government,
but that it was the best they could obtain;) I could not think the
quotation of the gentleman correct as to the language of that note. I
mentioned then, sir, to those who sat near me, that I had understood it
to convey no promise to abstain from the practice of impressment, but a
vague and unsatisfactory declaration that the British naval commanders
should be instructed to use caution in the impressments they made; as
it was said they had been always before instructed; by that means, sir,
placing ourselves, if we choose to recognize this informal stipulation,
in a worse situation than before, inasmuch as it was an unequivocal
acknowledgment of the right of impressment, when exercised under the
caution of a British officer. And what, sir, is the language of this same
note of November 8th--we have it now before us: “His Majesty’s Ministers
give to Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney the most positive assurances, that
instructions have been given and shall be repeated and enforced for
the observance of the greatest caution in the impressing of British
seamen, and that the strictest care shall be taken to preserve the
citizens of the United States from any molestation or injury; and that
immediate and prompt redress shall be afforded upon any representation
of injury sustained by them.” How, sir, let me ask, have those officers
conducted themselves under these repeated instructions? To say nothing
of the continued violations committed on our merchant vessels, we have
indeed had a most notable example of the extreme caution which her naval
officers had no doubt been instructed, and were determined to observe,
in the mode of impressments, in that excessively cautious plan adopted
by Admiral Berkeley, to effect his honorable and loyal purposes, in
the memorable attack upon the Chesapeake. Then, sir, I must admit,
that in pursuance of what I now believe were his orders, the most cool
and deliberate caution was used. Our frigate, on an outward voyage, on
the very day she left her port, in the usual unprepared state in which
I am told vessels of war sail in time of peace, is with the utmost
caution pursued by the British ship of superior force, in sight of
several others. The American frigate is overtaken; her men, proved to be
American citizens, are demanded of her, as of right being the subjects
of the King. They are refused, and indeed, sir, I must acknowledge, with
peculiar caution, before it was possible for our frigate to prepare for
action and the defence of the honor of her flag, the British commander
fires three broadsides into her, and commits the murder of fifteen or
twenty other American citizens, and no doubt most cautiously compels the
United States frigate to strike her colors, goes on board, and takes off
three of the native citizens of our country, none of whom have to this
day been returned!
But, sir, if this treaty, with its appendages, had contained in it
provisions and stipulations which were responsive to our injuries, and
which comported with our rights, is there a man in this nation, who
consults the dignity and honor of his country, who could have wished its
assent to it, subject to the condition dictated by the King of England,
and transmitted by a note of the British commissioners annexed to it? The
gentleman from Virginia has spoken of the insult conveyed by the letter
of Champagny of the 15th of January, 1808, to our Minister in Paris;
its terms have been grammatically scanned. Sir, there was no need for
this; we are at no loss for subjects of humiliation and insult, whether
we look to France or to England. As early as 1793, attempts of the most
unjustifiable nature were made to involve us in war by both these powers.
Lord Grenville, so early as that time, expressly told our Minister,
without disguise, that the British orders of November in that year were
intended to have an internal effect upon the affairs of this country.
Such has ever since been the conduct of the belligerents, constantly
and undeviatingly pursued in the most disrespectful manner, towards us;
such was certainly the object of the British Cabinet, in annexing the
note of the 31st of December, 1806, to the treaty of that date; and
certainly, sir, if a direct attempt to force us into war, is considered
an insult to our independence, and an encroachment upon our rights of
self-government, such was the language of that note, which, in open and
unreserved terms, made it an indispensable condition to the ratification
of the treaty, “that the Government of the United States, by its conduct
or assurances, will have given security to his Majesty, that it will
not submit to such innovations in the established system of maritime
law,” as the French decree therein alluded to contained--his Majesty
thus most graciously taking upon himself the right of determining for us
what course of conduct we should pursue towards his enemy! I do not say,
sir, that the letter of Champagny, which has been repeatedly mentioned
with such asperity by the gentleman, is such a one as consists with the
respect due to us; by some gentlemen its language has been construed
to mean a proposition originating in a disposition of friendship, and
to convey nothing more than an offer, founded on a supposition of the
actual existence of war between Great Britain and the United States,
and in that event, to take care of such of our property as should be
exposed to capture, until there should be an opportunity of restoration;
but to me, sir, I confess the language is not satisfactory. We have a
right to expect from all nations something more, or something less than
equivocal language. Our Government speaks in terms of friendship, and in
the plain language which neither conveys a doubt as to its hostility or
friendship; we have a right to expect the same frankness in others. But
why, sir, should gentlemen who profess to feel, and I hope do feel only
as Americans, suffer their sensibilities to transport them to battle
with the Gallic Cock, while under heavier insults they seem disposed to
succumb to the British Lion? Why is the letter of the British Minister
of the 23d of February wholly forgotten, when we are undergoing the
humiliating revival of insults and threats? Is it less awakening to our
national sensibility, and to the alarms of honor or interest, to be
told, as we are by that letter, that his Majesty the King of England is
disappointed in his just expectation that we should have gone to war
with France, than to be told through our Minister at the Court of France
that the Emperor of that nation expected we were at war with England?
If insult was intended by either, it seems to have been measured by the
same equal standard with which they have by their hostile orders measured
their injuries to our commerce; perfectly in the spirit of retaliation,
sir.
My astonishment, sir, has indeed been excited more than on any former
occasion, when I have heard a gentleman condemn our Government for the
rejection of a treaty, which provided no redress for former injuries, no
security against future ones, and which, by the conditions annexed to it,
would have infallibly, by stipulating resistance against a belligerent,
directly have involved us in war; and that not a war of self-defence, but
a war of alliance with one of the powers, for the purpose of resistance
and offence against the other. War, sir, I hope will be avoided,
notwithstanding the bold attempts to involve us in it, and which have
been so steadily pursued by the contending nations. It will I hope be
avoided, unless our self-defence shall render it indispensably necessary.
Attack or invasion from France cannot be rationally contemplated. War
with England, we must all agree, rests on more uncertain grounds; if
any thing will prevent it, I believe it to be the course pursued by our
Government. The resolution under discussion explicitly avows the terms
on which we will consent again to renew our intercourse with Europe.
If Great Britain is induced to relax, France must and will pursue the
same policy. I think, sir, we have a right to believe, from the best
information from England, that this relaxation will take place. I am
aware of that disposition in the ruling party in England to go to war
with us. I have no right to doubt the truth of the declaration of Mr.
Monroe, that there is a party in that country strong and active indeed,
as he has described it to be, who are disposed to hostility with us,
and who are at all hazards determined to support the maritime supremacy
of Great Britain; they are described to be the navy interest, the East
India chartered companies, the West India traders, and the shipping
interest--strong and active indeed, sir; they sit at the elbow of
Majesty, and influence his ready will; but their temptations to war are
removed by the embargo, and I hope will continue to be so, until they
rescind those orders which have cut us off from the commerce of the world.
But the power contemplated by the resolution, of meeting any friendly
disposition on the part of the European powers, is to be withheld,
because it would add too much to the already overgrown popularity of
the President, who, like Julius Cæsar, has been offered the honor of a
Crown! It is true, sir, the demonstrations of confidence in the present
Chief Magistrate are general and sincere in many parts of the Union.
At the time the only address of this kind was proposed, which I have
ever understood originated in Virginia, I had the honor of a seat in
her Legislature. It was introduced and supported by the description of
politicians there denominated the _Republican minority_; in what spirit
of sincerity I leave others to judge at this day. But, thank God, it was
not permitted to progress; and thus the person to whom it was intended
to be presented was saved the suffusion of a blush, which the evidence
of such adulation from his own State would for its sake have infallibly
produced.
On this occasion an attempt is made to alarm us, by the assertion that
the administration of the Government is assimilating itself to that
of a monarchy; and it is said that the power of the President is more
dangerous than that of a British King. Has the gentleman weighed the
extent of this assertion, or contemplated the powers of a British King?
In power, unrestrained as he is by their constitution, (if constitution
that can be called, which consists of unsettled and undefined practices,
most of them originating, no one knows where, and founded on principles
which cannot be traced to any rational ground--a constitution which,
notwithstanding their declarations of rights, is perfectly incapable
of restraint upon the Executive arm; which subjects the Parliament to
the King; which makes it completely _his_ Parliament, and deludes the
people with the show of liberty, while they are governed by the single
voice of a monarch--yes, sir, it is _his_ Parliament,) has he committed
any great act of outrage on the nations of the earth? He feels the
pulse of _his_ Parliament before he permits them to convene. _His_
Parliament, I may again emphatically call it; for it is he who orders
it into existence, and he who suspends its functions or dissolves it at
will. If its pulse does not beat responsively to his wishes, he either
dissolves it or postpones its meeting from time to time, as has been
the policy with the present Parliament, which, if it had met at the
time first appointed, scarcely less than a revolution might have been
apprehended, from the general ferment the execrable conduct of England
towards Denmark had excited, and the head of our old master might have
atoned for that unprecedented act of criminality; for, as such, it had
been contemplated with abhorrence by a magnanimous people--a people who
felt for the character of Englishmen in the commission of it. There are
men there, sir, I acknowledge, who do honor to human nature. When we read
the speeches of Erskine, and other great men in the present opposition,
we may yet hope that there may be found enough of integrity in the nation
to redeem its character from the stains of murder and robbery, which the
conduct of its monarch has marked it with. Yet this is the King to whose
power that of a President of the United States is said to be assimilating
itself. By what instance, let me ask, does it appear that we are verging
to the practice of a corrupt monarchy? Is it in the proposition involved
in this resolution? No, certainly; for I have before proved that the same
powers, and much more extensive and unqualified, have been delegated at
every period of our Government, from its commencement to the present
session. Is it from any other general assumption of power? No; for it is
acknowledged by all that the present Administration has acted in perfect
consonance with the powers of the constitution, and I will add, (what its
enemies have before allowed,) with the most strict and unceasing regard
to the interests and happiness of the people.
Why are we warned, sir, on this floor, against authorizing the
President to do an act which may enhance his popularity so much as the
removal of the embargo, and that it is another mode of adding to that
influence already so overbearing? If, indeed, the embargo operates most
distressingly, (as we all know it does, on every part of the community,)
it is he who in the first instance, from the strong sense of duty,
assumed on himself the responsibility (the _odium_, the gentleman would
call it) of the measure. It is but fair, then, however ludicrous the
charge in itself, that he should be left to regain the popular favor he
is supposed to have lost. It will only leave him where he was.
But, sir, seriously, let me ask gentlemen to tell the nation, before
we separate, what they will do. Is there any one so desperate,
inconsiderate, or so wild in his opinion, as to say the embargo ought at
the present time to be removed, while the hostile Orders of France and
England are both enforced with the utmost rigor against us, and when they
have multiplied, and been extended in their effects since the expediency
of the embargo was fully decided on? What is the obvious alternative?
Either authorize its removal, when our safety will permit, or continue
in session to wait that event. But why, sir, sit here, at the daily
expense of many hundred dollars to the community, when we shall have
transacted the business of the nation, merely because some gentlemen are
now doubtful of the right or the policy of delegating to the President
a power which has, in much stronger and more general terms, been before
intrusted to him, and all who have preceded him? But, if any thing
better than this can be devised, let it be submitted. For my own part,
I promise to give it the attention its importance may merit. But, at the
least, let us unite in the adoption of some measures for the safety and
interest of our country, at this time so imminently jeopardized by the
powers of Europe.
Mr. MASTERS.--Mr. Chairman, I shall not undertake to say that the
rejected treaty is so advantageous as we had a right to expect. I do not
hesitate to declare that, or even Jay’s Treaty, is preferable to the
present state of our affairs. If we take into our view all the relative
circumstances of the British nation with France, Russia, and the other
belligerent powers, and pay proper attention to the unprotected and
defenceless situation of our country and our commerce, in forming our
ideas of what we ought to expect from that nation whose navy commands
the seas, can we then expect she will sacrifice that navy, or any part
of her power, by conceding the point of search for her seamen on board
of neutral vessels? It is inconsistent with their interest, and it is
inconsistent with their superiority. This right of search for her own
subjects, Mr. M. considered as the main block in the way of negotiation,
which sound policy and interest require we should clear away. The British
and American Commissioners had informally put this point on as good
footing as he expected. Although the resolution under consideration is
not properly limited and defined, he should not vote against it. His wish
was to raise the embargo and arm our vessels. The nation could not bear
the pressure. The embargo virtually inhibits all intercourse with foreign
nations; the effects are and will be pernicious to the agricultural
productions of this country, and produce will fall to the lowest ebb,
and enforce the most unparalleled distress on the community. Commerce
ought always to be left to the merchant, unshackled and unembarrassed, as
much as possible. Our commercial intercourse is the principal resource,
both of revenue and commercial opulence. The embargo will tear up by the
roots and annihilate the commerce of this country. And the effects will
be heavy taxes, an exhausted Treasury, a diminished and ruined revenue.
It weakens your own power, fetters your operations, and deludes your
citizens; it devours not only the fruits but the seeds of industry. It
will sink down and depress the nation to an absence of hope and a want of
resources; it will be felt by the nation as a calamity, without deciding
the general question of dispute. Prove to me the embargo is consistent
with common sense, and will be the means of adjusting our differences
with the belligerent powers, and I will then be an advocate for it.
Though we have the constitutional right to lay an embargo, it is a matter
which requires great consideration, whether the measure will have the
effect to which it was seemingly intended. It may be good in theory;
he esteemed it chimerical in practice, a mere speculative proposition.
Wisdom is to be gained in politics, not by one rigid principle, but by
looking attentively at causes and the effects they have or will produce;
not by adopting that false philosophy, which seeks perfection out of that
which, in its nature, is imperfect; which refers every thing to theory,
and nothing to practice; which substitutes visionary schemes for solid
tests of experiment, and bewilders the human mind in a chaos of opinions.
Search all the histories of the world, and you will not find eleven
hundred thousand tons of shipping, of one of the greatest commercial
nations, embargoed for an unlimited time.
Mr. Chairman, the season of our severe trial is not at an end, nor are
we yet relieved from the dejection and gloom which hangs over our heads;
doubts and uncertainty mingle with the hopes and expectations of the
people. If you bring our commerce into the situation of the Chinese, you
will end in the wild state of nature, that mocks the name of liberty, and
the human character will be degraded, instead of being free.
If you entertain a sense of the many blessings which you have enjoyed; if
you value a continuance of that commerce which is the source of so much
opulence; if you wish to preserve that high state of prosperity by which
the country has, for some years past, been so eminently blessed, you lose
all these advantages by continuing the embargo and neglecting to arm your
vessels. Restore, then, confidence and vigor to commerce. You are at war
with your own interest and every idea of policy; instead of protecting
commerce you destroy it.
In whatever view the embargo presents itself, it appears to me to be
fraught with impolicy; it was laid at midnight; that miserable scene
was closed under the darkness which suits with it, and under the secret
shelter of our own walls. If we are to go to war, you have, instead of
warlike preparations and exerting every sinew of national ability, laid
an embargo, and obtained just nothing.
The policy of France, as regards Great Britain, is to make a warlike
non-intercourse, and we have, by a side-wind, fallen into the measure,
adopted and sanctified it; we have abandoned the great highway of
nations: our dispute with Great Britain is about commercial rights; we
have given them up.
Is this country at that crisis when we shall surrender all those rights
her citizens hold most dear? God forbid! I have contemplated upon the
embargo, which is hazardous and impolitic, with great pain and anxiety,
and I turn my face from it with horror. If there are any who improperly
foster and countenance the threatening storm, whatever consequences may
follow, they are answerable to their country and their God.
All the advocates of the embargo on this floor have admitted that it was
oppressive and a curse. Take away this _curse_ and arm your vessels. It
does not follow, as the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. LOVE) supposes, that
arming will involve us in a war. When Great Britain finds we resist the
French decrees, she will revoke her orders of council. When France sees
she cannot bring us into her views, she will revoke her decrees.
Mr. FISK wished to say a few words on this subject. I am very much
surprised, said he, at the expressions of the gentleman last up, and
the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) yesterday. They expressed
sentiments which, if they once take root in this nation, will prostrate
your liberties and rights at the feet of foreign Governments. The
gentleman who just took his seat has observed, that the subject of
impressment was the main block in the way of negotiation. Very true, it
was, sir; it goes to the personal liberty and security of your citizens;
and if you surrender that right, what do you expect those citizens
will say to you? Do you expect they will greet you with, “well done,
thou good and faithful servant?” What can the gentleman think when he
recollects the sensation displayed at New York on the death of Pierce, in
consequence of the exercise by Britain of the right of impressment? Were
those tears and lamentations feigned, or were they the sincere effusions
of citizens feeling the injury done them, and burning with indignation
at seeing their fellow-citizens murdered almost before their face? If
we could believe what the gentleman now suggests, we should suppose
that the liberties and lives of our citizens were of no value compared
with commerce. Why do gentlemen tell us these things? Are they sincere?
They cannot weigh life or liberty in the scales with sordid pelf; it is
impossible.
It has been observed by the gentleman from Virginia, and it seems to have
been intimated by the gentleman from New York to-day, that the question
of impressment was by the rejected treaty placed on better ground than
ever was expected; that something like security was afforded to the
United States; something on which we could rely: and this assertion is
brought in with no other view than as a defence of British measures
and a crimination of our own. Let us see the language of the British
Minister, in order to ascertain the fact. In the letter from Mr. Canning,
dated October 22, he says, in answer to our Minister’s pressing this
same question for some security, “no engagements were entered into on
the part of His Majesty, as connected with the treaty, except such as
appear upon the face of it. Whatever encouragement may have been given by
His Majesty’s Commissioners to the hope expressed by the Commissioners
of the United States, that discussions might hereafter be entertained,
with respect to the impressment of British seamen from merchant vessels,
must be understood to have had in view the renewal of such discussions,
not as forming any part of the treaty then signed, (as the American
Commissioners appear to have been instructed to assume,) but separately,
and at some subsequent period more favorable to their successful
termination.” It would seem, however, from what was observed yesterday,
that this was left, though informal, on such a settled basis, that it
might have been satisfactory.
If my memory serves me, the Secretary of State says these vexations are
greater than ever. The British Government was never serious in making any
settlement against this practice. We find, in the first place, that the
British Ministers never yielded that right. We find that Mr. Canning,
in answer to our Ministers, tells them they were not to consider the
late proclamation respecting impressments as any new regulation on the
subject; that the proclamation was not considered in that light, but
merely as conveying instructions to the British commanders who might
be at a loss how to act; that the proclamation had been framed for
nearly three months, but never issued until that time. If it had been
in existence for three months, it must have been framed at the very
time that the attack on the Chesapeake was in view; that was to try the
sentiments of this country, and they meant to steer their course by them.
Therefore, it is not an instruction given to naval commanders, lest they
should mistake their duty from the late incidents, because it was framed
before the attack on the Chesapeake took place. It unfortunately happens
that the British Government has not, in this case, covered its object.
I am a little surprised to hear gentlemen telling us that arming our
merchant vessels would not produce war. Why arm, if they are not to
defend themselves? If the belligerents defend their proceedings, will
they not resist our vessels arming against their orders? Could it be
done without being met by a declaration of war? But the gentleman from
New York has told us that if we suffer our merchants to arm, the British
would consider it a sufficient token of our resistance to the French
decrees, and remove their orders of council. You have seen all the
decrees and orders which make innovations on the law of nations, and
subject our commerce to plunder. Are those of France the most hostile?
Is the aspect of that nation the most hostile? Compare the letter of
Champagny, which declares that our vessels shall be held in sequestration
depending the measures of this Government, with the note of Canning, as
well as the communications from Mr. Erskine, and what was the result?
Look at the treaty which our Government is on this floor condemned for
not signing, with the note annexed, declaring that if we submit to the
decrees of France, His Britannic Majesty would consider himself bound not
to observe the treaty. This note contained a threat; but it was nothing
to what Mr. Canning, in observing to our Ministers on this subject, says:
“His Majesty cannot profess himself to be satisfied that the American
Government has taken any such effectual steps with respect to the decree
of France, by which the whole of His Majesty’s dominions are declared in
a state of blockade, as to do away the ground of that reservation which
was contained in the note delivered His Majesty’s Commissioners at the
time of the signature of the treaty; but that, reserving to himself the
right of taking, in consequence of that decree and of the omission on
the part of neutral nations to obtain its revocation, such measures of
retaliation as His Majesty might judge expedient, it was, nevertheless,
the desire and determination of His Majesty, if the treaty had been
sanctioned by the ratification of the President of the United States, to
have ratified it on His Majesty’s part, and to have given the fullest
extent to all its stipulations.”
With regard to this treaty, I have no idea of entering into its merits.
The gentleman from Virginia, yesterday, seemed to be extremely anxious
to justify the treaty. He might have postponed its defence until it
was before us, or at least until it was assailed. I will observe that,
whatever might have been the intention of our Ministers, they placed the
United States in a very disagreeable situation, obliging them to declare
that they had no right to negotiate such a treaty. It has given occasion
to Mr. Canning to say, “some of the considerations upon which the refusal
of the President of the United States to ratify the treaty is founded,
are such as can be matter of discussion only between the American
Government and its Commissioners; since it is not for His Majesty to
inquire whether, in the conduct of this negotiation, the Commissioners of
the United States have failed to conform themselves in any respect to the
instructions of their Government.” He then goes on to animadvert on the
conduct of the American Ministers. Had they kept within the real limits
of their own instructions, they never would have given occasion for this
reflection on them.
On the score of informal negotiation it will be recollected that from
the earliest days of the Government to the present time, the subject
of impressment has been pressed upon the British Government, not only
in times of war, but in times of peace. If there were in reality any
foundation for the charge on our Government, of having sacrificed
the interest of, or lost a security to, our seamen, by a rejection
of this informal article, it will be only necessary to recur to the
correspondence between our Ministers and the British Commissioners, and
it will be found that not only formal, but informal articles were such as
we ought not to have accepted; that reasonable concessions on our part
were offered for the sake of accommodation and refused; that the Treaty
of 1794 was, in some measure, proposed as the basis, but was not accepted
by the British Ministry. Let me ask the gentleman for a single moment
what were the terms offered in this treaty, which he regrets that the
Government did not accept? Independent of its exceptionable provisions,
it was accompanied by a note which contains a reservation to the British
Government to regulate its own proceedings, and leaves us but two
alternatives--either to declare war against France, or suffer the British
Ministers to rule us. What do they offer us now? If we will trade as
they please, and pay them a duty on all our exports, we may carry on our
commerce. Is it possible that any man who professes himself an American
could accede to this? The spirit of 1776, refusing to pay a duty of two
per cent. on tea, would certainly not now yield that for which they then
contended, and become again tributary to the British Government. This is
not all. Even this admired treaty, which the gentleman from Virginia so
much regrets, allows us to trade to the colonies if we will pay tribute.
Was it not easily discoverable that two, three, four, or five per cent.
would be laid upon the trade, and virtually prohibit us from carrying on
this commerce altogether? It was better than prohibition: but if we would
not tax it, they would prohibit it altogether. What right had they to
demand this? Certainly none, and yet gentlemen wish to raise the embargo,
to embrace these regulations, open all our ports to this fettered
commerce, and will not place it in the power of the Executive to suspend
the embargo. I am a little astonished that gentlemen who consider the
embargo as the heaviest curse which could befall this nation, should be
against any measure for removing its pressure. But so it is. Here permit
me to say that I admire the flexibility of the gentleman’s sentiments.
It must be well known to every gentleman in the House, that a gentleman
from Virginia, in combating measures which were then carried into effect,
as the non-importation law, said, that if we take measures at all, they
should be strong measures; none of your milk-and-water measures, but an
_embargo_; which would be an efficient measure. This same gentleman,
at the present session, exclaims against the Executive influence which
produced the embargo. At this very session we cannot forget the scramble
between him and another gentleman in this House, (Mr. CROWNINSHIELD,)
as to who should have the honor first to propose the measure; he even
urged expedition in the measure, as he had a bill ready prepared. In the
course of deliberation on the subject, he urged it as the only thing
which could promote the national interests; and persisted in this, till
one of his colleagues informed us of the effect which it would have upon
Britain. He then rose and told us that he had done with the measure;
that the measure was partial--not unconstitutional--that it was a new
invention; that it was expressly aimed at Great Britain, and this was
the great objection. But _now_ we are told that the British Government
will ask nothing better of us than giving up the carrying trade. But,
unless the gentleman can prove that they are the carriers for their enemy
and for us, he will find it difficult to prove that it favors England.
Really I am at a loss to see the difference between the proposed measure
and that which the gentleman so long since supported for authorizing
the President of the United States to suspend the non-importation law.
But the gentleman disclaims the influence of precedents. The gentleman
has another objection--that it proceeds from a recommendation from
the Executive. The gentleman took the liberty to pay a compliment to
the President of the United States for declining a re-election; but he
expressed great resentment against those States which solicited him to
retain his station. I consider this as the highest mark of respect for
the course pursued by the present Administration. But it seems, although
totally irrelevant to the subject under discussion, the gentleman from
Virginia has undertaken to question the motives of all who have joined
in the request. The man who has the vanity and arrogance to suppose that
he is superior to all mankind, may boast of his republicanism, but he
possesses none. I envy him not his sensations. It will be recollected
that the constitution has not denied the right of a President, for two
successive terms, again to be elected. The legislatures, then, did not
travel out of their constitutional course, and it would have been as
modest in the gentleman from Virginia--to say no more of it--to have let
the subject alone.
In regard to the constitutionality of this measure, which has been
questioned, the bill supported by the gentleman from Virginia two years
ago, was to enable the President to do a thing at a distant day, if he
should think it expedient. What is the object of the present resolution?
To put the whole commercial interest at the discretion of the President?
Certainly not. If certain events take place, the President is to be
authorized to suspend the operation of the embargo law. We command;
he obeys. He is the agent, we the principal. The law, giving power to
suspend the non-importation law, was more vague than this resolution. In
that he had a perfect discretion, there was no landmark laid down in the
law. Here there is. The distinction taken by the gentleman from Virginia
is a distinction without a difference. The principles of both are the
same. The powers given, and the consequences of the exercise of those
powers, are the same.
But it seems that the gentleman from Virginia has undertaken to arraign
all the measures of Government taken for some time past. A few days
ago he was violently opposed to the raising a military force. At the
present moment he draws consolation from the circumstance that both Great
Britain and France are hostile to us. If he really feels a satisfaction
in the hostile attitude of both powers, he ought certainly not to
complain of the acts which he says have placed us in that situation.
I cannot conceive how a man can with propriety arraign the conduct of
an Administration, when he says their measures have produced the very
effect for which he is so gratified. We learned from his observations
the other day, and it was insinuated again yesterday, that the raising
of an army was against the interest of the country. In 1805 and 1806, he
was in favor of strong measures against Spain, for he said in the same
proportion as we took measures against Spain, Great Britain would respect
our rights; because France and Spain being one and the same, measures
taken against one were also against the other. But the effects of strong
measures seem now to be viewed in a different light. If it was just then
to raise an army against France or Spain to make them respect our rights,
it is certainly proper now to take strong measures against both France
and England, except the gentleman show that the dispositions of nations
as well as of men have changed since that time. At the present time the
military spirit is a horrid thing; at that time, it was a very pleasant
thing.
For a single moment let us consider the embargo. The gentleman says it
is unconstitutional. That the constitution having prohibited the power
of laying a duty on exports, denies the power to prohibit exportation
altogether. There is no difference in this respect between the
non-importation law and the embargo. If the argument be true, you must
allow trade at all times, whether it furnish a means of annoyance against
yourselves or not. Is it not a well-known fact, that Great Britain is in
the utmost want of supplies for that navy which murders your citizens
and blocks up your ports; and, therefore, you partially disarm them.
However gentlemen please themselves and amuse the people--for that will
be its only effect--with the idea that the embargo is a pleasant thing
to Great Britain, we find that, even by the debates in their Parliament,
their orders are considered as measures so hostile, that they expect a
declaration of war. How happens it that we become their apologists? that
their conduct strikes gentlemen on this floor in a more favorable light
than it does the Britons themselves? They consider them as too strong.
These members of Parliament must be much mistaken if some gentlemen in
this House are correct.
To return to the embargo. I believe most religiously, that had it not
been for sentiments expressed in this country so favorable to Great
Britain; had it not been for insinuations that it was impossible for us
to maintain this measure, before this time we should have been treated
with respect by Great Britain. I cannot, while up, but notice what
must be obvious to all--that not only in this House, but abroad, every
attempt has been made to show that this measure is improper, unjust,
and injurious. The table of this House has been loaded with petitions
against the embargo; it is known from what source. Another circumstance
attends them, that, though they come from different quarters, they owe
their existence to one parent, and come from one land. It is very easy
to sow the seeds of discord and discontent, if persons industriously
and insidiously apply themselves to that object. Whenever a measure
has been attempted against Great Britain, we have found what rancorous
opposition it has met with. We are now asked to raise the embargo. What
encouragement have we to do it? The Treaty of 1794 sacrificed our most
important rights. Did it conciliate that Government? Did she even then
respect your rights? From that moment to the present, your flag and
citizens have been constantly violated. More than three, four, or five
thousand seamen, have been impressed into their service. Is it possible
that gentlemen can criminate the Government of the United States for not
accepting a treaty which gave no security against this? Certainly not.
The gentleman told us yesterday that we were contending with a great
commercial nation, and had very little to offer in exchange for what we
ask. Was it necessary to make this apology for Great Britain? I have
thought very differently. Was our commerce of so many millions “nothing?”
Let us now consider the other point which is taken, that the
circumstances attending the treaty alter the aspect of it--for this
treaty is, to say the best of it, no better than Jay’s, which the
gentleman says he so much abhorred. When Jay negotiated his treaty,
almost all Europe was in arms against France; Spain, and Italy, then
independent nations. When this new treaty was formed, Italy, Spain,
Holland, Switzerland, &c., were at the feet of France; and that war which
was engendered at the Court of St. James between Prussia and France was
decided. Prussia was overwhelmed, and the knowledge of it reached our
Ministers before signing this treaty. Germany was at peace. In this
situation, was the attitude of Great Britain so imposing as to justify
greater sacrifices than were made in 1794? It was not. It was believed
and said in this country, that the arms of Bonaparte would conquer the
world. Why, then, make this sacrifice? Had we any assurances, if that
treaty was ratified, it would be held sacred? On the contrary, doubts
were expressed and conditions annexed to it. Has not her conduct since
justified a refusal of more than informal stipulations? At the moment
when she attacked Copenhagen, she had a treaty with Denmark. She first
attacked the town, and then offered terms of accommodation, which were of
course refused. What can be said in justification of that outrage? There
was, as we were told the other day, some supposition that the fleet was
about to be delivered up to France. It was no such thing, sir; it was
justified on the supposition that the Treaty of Tilsit contained some
secret articles, and the British Government did not know what they were.
When she had taken the Danish fleet and burnt the city, she asked the
mediation of Russia to secure a peace between them. Can we believe her
sincere in these things? If she really believed there were such secret
articles, is it natural to believe that she would ask this mediation to
restore friendship between her and the injured nation? If we could not
see a treachery through this mist, we must be blind. But I would not have
noticed the subject, except that a disposition has been manifested to
criminate our Government, and prejudice the minds of the nation, instead
of looking to the real cause.
I should have supposed, after what has been communicated to us, no
one would have accused this Government of a want of justice in its
negotiations with foreign powers. Whoever has read the instructions
of the Secretary of State to our Ministers, must be convinced to the
contrary. Even on the subject of impressments, they were instructed to
press it in such a manner as not even to irritate the feelings of Great
Britain. A peculiar solicitude has been displayed in all our proceedings
to maintain friendship. It has been all in vain. We have been driven to
the last alternative, either to shut up our ports for a while, or to
fight. What do gentlemen now ask? That we should open our ports to Great
Britain alone; for that would be the effect of raising the embargo. Has
it been in the power of our Government to make a settlement? No. Are
gentlemen willing to put up with what has happened? The terms which Great
Britain has offered, it would have disgraced any people to accept. After
she has attacked your national ship, shed the blood of your citizens,
and obliged you to exclude ships of war from your ports, she requires
that you rescind your proclamation before she will even tell you what
satisfaction she is willing to make. She says, I have abused you; humble
yourself, succumb to me, and I will make such satisfaction as I think
fit. This is the nation for whom you are to lift the embargo, and these
the favors you are to receive in return. I had rather see this nation
again tributary to them than sacrifice so great a proportion of their
independence, than acknowledge that all we have done is wrong, and all
they have done is right. I consider that whenever this nation is reduced
to such a state of apathy as to endure these things, our independence is
not worth a straw. You have certain rights--first principles. Recede from
them, and you open yourself to perpetual violation; if persisted in, they
will prostrate your independence. With these sentiments I cannot consent
to repeal the embargo, and the opposition to this resolution seems to be
founded in a wish to do that.
Mr. KEY.--I rise on this occasion with great embarrassment, because
in no instance of my political life, has any measure called on me to
act, in which the interests of my country were more deeply involved. In
common with my fellow-citizens of Maryland, I feel a total aversion to
the continuance of the embargo, and I am confident I speak the almost
unanimous sense of my constituents in calling for its repeal. However
proper some of them might have considered it in the first instance, as
an experiment from which good might result, yet all now are satisfied
that nothing short of its immediate repeal will save them from great
distress, and that a long continuance of it will induce bankruptcy and
ruin. I am willing, sir, to admit, that those who advocated the embargo
were actuated by the purest motives, and had the best interests of their
country at heart--that they adopted it as a measure from which great
permanent good would result; but time, which tests the correctness of
political measures, has sufficiently elapsed to convince them of their
error--at least it has impressed on my mind a conviction, that we deeply
suffer, whilst those it was intended to operate on, lightly feel its
effects. I was originally opposed to the measure--I still am opposed to
it; although I anxiously wish its immediate repeal, yet I am compelled
to vote against the present resolution, because in my heart and judgment
I believe it is so worded as to violate, if adopted, the Constitution of
the United States--and that I am unwilling to let the repeal of this law
depend on contingencies, not known or designated and which are to grow
out of the acts of foreign Governments.
An honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. LOVE,) who originally voted
for the measure, has this day admitted it to be a curse. I concur
with him, as I hope he will now with me, in a vote and prayer for its
speedy removal. I believe the embargo to be partial in its operation,
oppressive, and, if persisted in, ruinous to the country. These are
strong terms, but if gentlemen will lend a patient ear, I will endeavor
to convince them of their truth, and I will use as much brevity as
is consistent with perspicuity. The view I take of this subject is
extensive, but I hope not diffusive.
The resolution proposes to vest the President with power, on the
happening of certain European events, to suspend the embargo law.
I am against it, because I want an immediate repeal, because it is
unconstitutional to vest the President with power to suspend a law, and
because it is partial in its operation, oppressive, and ruinous.
It is partial in its operation in two respects--first as it regards the
persons on whom it operates, and secondly, as it respects the product
operated on.
The district I have the honor to represent is not bounded on navigable
water. So far then as it respects my constituents, (and many other
districts of different States are in the same situation,) the law
executes itself with rigor. From their geographical position, they
are excluded the means of selling their surplus produce, while this
very law operates as a bounty in effect to the citizens of other parts
of the United States. I call the attention of the committee to the
northern parts of the State of New York. That State binds on Lake Erie
to Niagara, on the whole extent of Lake Ontario, on a great part of
the river St. Lawrence, and the Lakes Champlain and George, and has an
immediate, direct, easy communication with the British, in Upper and
Lower Canada. The whole Genessee country, and the counties lower down,
have a steady, constant market, the prices tempting, the access easy, and
few or no officers to interrupt the daily supplies given to their British
neighbors. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact of this commerce being
steadily carried on.
The embargo, so far as it restrains places from exporting their
surplus produce, goes to enhance the price of such produce in foreign
markets--the enhanced price affords the temptation, and the easy
access gives the means to that country to export it, and in fact, by
excluding others, gives them a monopoly of supply. Near four hundred
miles of northern coast, in proximity to the British settlements, gives
to New York upon the lakes a steady market. Vermont binds on lakes which
communicate with Canada. Passamaquoddy openly and publicly furnishes
supplies to New Brunswick. In this state of things, and in the mode the
law is executed, it is partial and oppressive, and my constituents and
others in similar locations so feel and experience it.
But, sir, there is another portion of our fellow-citizens, on whom this
law executes itself with peculiar severity, I mean the frugal, hardy,
laborious and valuable fishermen of the Eastern States. I see gentlemen
smile at a member of the Middle States supporting the interests of the
fishermen; but, sir, I should think myself illy entitled to a seat in
this House, if I did not know the value of that class of men to society
and the Union. I wish, sir, their numbers, character, and usefulness,
were better known and understood than I fear they are. And as on this
subject my opinions may not be orthodox, I will refer to the head of the
church.
Mr. Chairman, in the year 1791, the now President of the United States,
then Secretary of State, made an able and luminous report on our
fisheries. These are his words: first, as to the annual value of a
fisherman’s labor, secondly, as to the situation and value of the whale
fishery as carried on from a sand bar--
“About 100 natives on board 17 ships (for there were 150
Americans engaged by the voyage) came to 2,255 livres, or about
$416 66 a man.”
“The American whale fishery is principally followed by the
inhabitants of the island of Nantucket--a sand bar of about
fifteen miles long and three broad--capable of maintaining
by its agriculture about twenty families; but it employed on
the fisheries, before the war, between five and six thousand
men and boys; and in the only harbor it possesses it had one
hundred and forty vessels--one hundred and thirty-two of which
were of the large kind--as being employed in the southern
fishery. In agriculture, then, they have no resources; and
if that of their fishery cannot be pursued from their own
habitations, it is natural they should seek others from which
it can be followed, and prefer those where they will find a
sameness of language, religion, laws, habits, and kindred. A
foreign emissary has lately been among them, for the purpose
of renewing the invitations to a change of situation; but,
attached to their native country, they prefer continuing in
it, if their continuance there can be made supportable.”--_Mr.
Jefferson’s report, January 10, 1791, on the subject of the
fisheries._
I call the attention of the committee to every letter of this report, and
then let each member ask himself the situation of the fishermen under the
embargo law.
Sir, by the Treasury report laid on our desks it appears that the
exportation of dried fish alone, in the last year, amounted to
473,924 quintals; and the whole product of the fisheries amounted
to $2,300,000--a sum equal to the one-eighteenth part of the whole
agricultural produce of the United States: thus in effect, in point of
product, adding another State to the Union. Is this class of men, whose
farm is the ocean and whose crop is its fish, to have their whole or
nearly their whole interests sacrificed by the unequal operation of the
embargo? I hope not, sir. I trust gentlemen will see the oppression of
the law, and its partial operation, and remove it.
Again, sir, as, to the product, how does this law operate? The cotton
planter and the tobacco planter have their articles little deteriorated
by time. The embargo, to them, suspends the use of their capital only;
but to those who have flour or fish, the embargo, if continued for a few
months, destroys their capital--the thing itself. In this respect the
embargo works partially; and in reference to its operation on particular
portions of our country, on particular classes of people, or on the
product, it ought to be repealed at once, and without delay.
Sir, it is a very remarkable fact, and not more remarkable than true,
that if you compare the number of fishermen with the product of their
labor, and the number employed in agriculture with the product of
agriculture, that the value of the former to the latter is as ten to
one--a people whose habits and manners are in consonance with republican
institutions, and who are as valuable as the agriculturists. God has
given them a noble estate in the ocean, most bountifully stocked, and
diligently do they work it, with profit to themselves and advantage to
their country.
THURSDAY, April 14.
_Suspension of the Embargo._
Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS felt that the question which was about to be
decided was one of so much importance, every member of the House must
be specially responsible for his vote on it; and, laboring under that
responsibility, he felt it a duty to state some of the reasons for the
vote he should give. I shall vote against the resolution, said Mr. W.,
and in so doing shall not be influenced by the reasons assigned by my
friend from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) nor by those of the gentleman from
Maryland. When this resolution was first presented to us, I felt very
much inclined to vote for it; but upon considering it more maturely I
cannot. This I regret exceedingly, because I shall perhaps differ from
a large majority of the friends to the embargo. Gentlemen themselves
who advocate it, if all the consequences which certainly attach to it
are deliberately considered, will I hope give it up. What is the object
of the resolution, or rather of the embargo itself, for I presume it is
intended either to fix the day or the circumstances on which it shall
be suspended? [Mr. RANDOLPH observed that while up he had forgot to
propose an amendment to the resolution so as to declare it expedient
to repeal the embargo.] No, sir, said Mr. W., it is not expedient. This
amendment, however, has cut in upon me unexpectedly; but as the debate
has heretofore been a kind of general battle, partaking of war, army,
embargo, treaty, resolution, and amendment,--I shall be in order on any
point, it has taken so wide a range.
The resolution is pernicious, and for this reason: the embargo is not
designed to affect our own citizens, though I confess it operates hard on
them; but to make an impression on Europe; and beyond all question, the
firmer you stand, the more likely is your measure to have effect. What
is the opinion inferable from the adoption of such a resolution? Does it
not tell the belligerent powers of Europe with whom you are contending,
that you are tired of the embargo; that you are sick of it, and will
accept any modification of their general principles (I would rather say
practice, for they have no principle) so hostile to your neutral rights,
rather than submit to it any longer? I hope this consideration will have
weight with gentlemen, who, like myself, are friendly to the embargo,
for assuredly it is entitled to it. Besides, are gentlemen aware of the
embarrassment they will not be able to avoid in framing a law on such
a subject? It will be scarcely possible to define the circumstances on
which you will permit the suspension to take place, without incurring
one of two risks; either too precise to admit the President’s acting,
for being a law its letter must be fulfilled, or so general as to invest
him with a discretionary power altogether inexpedient. I cannot conceive
a situation more disagreeable than would be the President’s with such
a power. Though I subscribe to what I consider the sound part of the
declarations of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) the other
day, as to the tendency this resolution will have to throw a monstrous
and unusual power into the hands of the President, yet I do not believe
it unconstitutional; nor can I subscribe to the arguments of my friend
with respect to the constitutionality of the laws laying an embargo;
for, sir, if they prove any thing they prove quite too much; and did I
possess but a moiety of the eloquence and ability of that gentleman, I
could certainly confute them. I contend that the power to lay an embargo
is granted in the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” If you cannot
prohibit commerce with a particular port or nation, of what avail is the
power to regulate it? The law prohibiting all trade with St. Domingo
is authorized by the same clause of the constitution, and yet it never
was supposed to be unconstitutional. Will it be questioned that you
can prohibit exportation from the United States in the vessels of any
particular nation? Will it be questioned that you have a right to exclude
foreigners from trading with the Indian tribes within your jurisdictional
limits? Most assuredly you have these rights, and all derived from
the same general power to regulate commerce. The embargo is not an
annihilation, but a suspension of commerce, to regain the advantages
of which it has been robbed; it follows that it is a constitutional
regulation of commerce. The gentleman read my name among others in the
negative on the passage of the section in the bill to authorize the
President to suspend the non-importation law. I will not undertake to say
what were the reasons of the gentleman for voting against that section,
but I know that my reason was, it vested the President of the United
States with power to suspend the law at the time when we ourselves should
be in session. I thought then as I do now, that it is inexpedient, under
any circumstances, to give the President power to suspend the operation
of a law during the session of Congress.
Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL said, I will now return to the subject before the
House. The gentleman last up, (Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS,) has rendered it
unnecessary for me to enter into a discussion of a part of this subject,
which might otherwise have claimed more particular notice. With that
gentleman I agree, in almost every thing he has said, except as to the
effect which this resolution would have upon foreign nations. If I had
supposed that this measure held out to foreign powers the slightest
pretext for believing that we are so tired of the embargo as to be
induced to repeal it, under any circumstances whatever, except such as
are consistent with the honor and dignity of the nation, I would be the
last man to propose it to this House. But under a conviction that this
resolution can have no such effect, that it holds to foreign powers a
language directly opposite to this, and that they will see in it the
only object which its supporters can be fairly supposed to have, to
put it in the power of the Executive to remove, a pressure, as soon as
circumstances will render it proper, which is acknowledged to bear hard
on the American people, and must continue so to do so long as the causes
that produce it remain unchanged, I have brought it before the House,
and under this impression alone am I disposed to support it. So far,
sir, from thinking that it will induce foreign nations to believe we
are disposed to remove the embargo, before the causes that produced it
are first withdrawn, I am clearly of opinion that this resolution will
convince them that we are determined the embargo laws never shall be
repealed, until they revoke their orders and decrees, or until we shall
have determined to appeal to war, the last resort of an injured nation.
They will see, in this measure, what is believed to be the true principle
that ought to direct our conduct--a firm determination to persevere in
the embargo until they are brought to a sense of justice, or until that
crisis in our affairs has arrived, that will make it our interest and
our duty to resort to arms in vindication of those rights which have
been so grossly violated--and then the embargo may not be necessary. War
and an embargo at the same time are seldom supposed to be necessary;
an embargo frequently precedes war, but scarcely ever accompanies it.
These remarks are made, because so many misrepresentations have gone
abroad with respect to the objects, the effects, and probable duration
of the embargo, and the views of those who imposed it. Some considered
its operations directed against one nation alone, to wit, Great Britain;
while others of the same party declared it could do that power no injury.
The first of these positions is not founded on any facts to support it,
the laws imposing the embargo being general in their operation; and the
result, as far as we can judge from the best information that has yet
reached us from that nation, proves the latter to be totally incorrect.
Some pretended to state it as a measure that was to be permanent, and
forever unalterable, and on that ground opposed it; while others on
the same side pronounced it a temporary expedient, a mere chimerical
experiment, that was not designed to be persevered in for any time, and
therefore declared it useless, and likely to produce no good. In answer
to such contradictory objections, it would seem almost unnecessary to
say any thing. The one would appear to destroy the other. Those who
made them have been equally incorrect in stating the views of those who
imposed the embargo, as they have been unfortunate and inconsistent in
the grounds upon which they have opposed it. No one could reasonably
suppose the embargo was intended to remain forever, to be a permanent,
unalterable measure, or to continue longer than the existence of the
causes that produced it. Neither ought it to be supposed that it
would be removed during the existence of those causes, unless some
alternative was resorted to in its place. These representations, or
rather misrepresentations, are therefore futile, not founded in fact, and
calculated only to deceive and mislead the public mind.
The objects of the embargo have already been stated to you. These were,
among others, to take a stand previous to an expected war, to prepare
the nation to meet it; to collect and preserve at home our resources
and our seamen, from being captured by foreign powers; to produce a
pressure on those foreign powers, that might make them sensible of the
advantages they derived from our trade, and, by making them feel the
want of it, bring them to a just estimate of their own interests, and a
sense of justice toward us; and also to pause for a short time in order
to determine what system we ought to pursue. These were, it is believed,
the principal objects of the embargo. The time has not yet arrived that
puts it in the power of this nation decisively to determine with which of
the belligerent powers we must go to war, if, indeed, it be necessary to
go to war with either. The conduct of those powers has not been such as
to induce us to consider either the one or the other friendly disposed
toward us--and it might be hazarding too much to go to war with both
at the same time. It is not, therefore, the proper time, either on the
ground of peace or on that of war, to remove the embargo, as has been
insisted upon by those who have been opposed to the measure. But it
has been contended by some who are friendly to the embargo, that the
resolution before you holds out to the belligerent powers a ground for
believing that we will repeal the embargo laws, without any change being
first made in their measures relative to our commerce. I am unable to
see any thing in the resolution that justifies such an opinion, or that
presents to those powers any prospect of their removing the embargo,
until they revoke their orders and decrees, or change them in such a
manner as to render our commerce safe. What does the resolution say
to the belligerent powers? Is not its language clear and explicit? It
says to them you must act first, before the embargo shall be removed.
The Council of the Nation have solemnly so determined; your orders
and decrees have produced the embargo, and it shall continue until
you withdraw them. It is announcing to those nations in the strongest
language in our power that we are determined not to shrink from the
ground we have taken; that we will not relinquish the measures we have
adopted, until they first withdraw their measures so destructive to our
commerce, and then the embargo shall be removed--then the commercial
world will be unshackled, and trade restored to its usual channels, to
its full liberty. This resolution will turn the eyes of the American
people to the real source of their present difficulties--the conduct of
the belligerent powers, in passing their orders and decrees, by which
they have bound in chains or rather annihilated the commerce of the
civilized world; in these they will see the true cause of the embargo,
the reasons that render it essentially necessary to save our trade from
certain ruin; and to these they must look to unbind the chains and permit
trade to return to its usual channels, and pursue its natural course. On
these grounds, and with this view, this measure was brought forward, and
is now supported by me.
FRIDAY, April 15.
_Death of Mr. Crowninshield._