By the First Consul,
H. B. MARET, _Secretary_.
A true copy,
LE CLERC, _Captain General_.
This, sir, is proof irresistible; after which it can never be said
that the liberation of those people has been the rash act, or the mere
ebullition, of the heat and convulsion of a revolution. We have here
their liberty solemnly recognized and proclaimed to the world eight
years afterwards by the man who was then and still is at the head of the
French Government; or rather, who is now the Government itself. I cite
these papers to show that the French have now no claim, either in right,
in justice, or in law, to any portion of the people of St. Domingo as
slaves; that they are individually free, if the highest authorities in
France could constitute them so, which will surely not be questioned; and
in order to rebut a fallacious idea that has been taken up, and urged by
some, that our merchants are conducting this commerce with slaves, the
property of freemen, and not with freemen themselves, thus ingeniously
endeavoring to draw a distinction between the situation of St. Domingo
and that of any other colony that has ever heretofore attempted to
separate itself from the mother country; to make theirs, according to
the language of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. MOORE,) a totally new,
unprecedented case, and in this manner to take them out of the humane
provisions of the laws of nations. I grant, sir, their case does form
a distinction from any other, and in this it consists: the people of
St. Domingo are fighting to preserve not only their independence as a
community, but their liberty as individuals; to prevent a degradation
from the exalted state of freemen to the debased condition of slaves,
struggling against the manacles that have been forged for them by the
lawless ambition of power. We are told, however, they are at least not
free as a people, as a body politic; but in such a state of rebellion
that no nation has a right to trade with them.
Let us now, Mr. President, attend to the present state of St. Domingo;
but first to the circumstances that have led to it, and see how far
this doctrine will apply. After the bands of the political society that
had connected France and her colonies together were broken asunder;
when the old Government of that country was completely dissolved, and
one usurpation succeeded day after day to the places and to the vices
of another; when the axe of the guillotine had extinguished the magic
lustre of royalty, and even that grace and beauty, [a very superb
likeness of the late Queen of France was hanging directly before him,]
that had reigned so long unrivalled, the pride and idol of the nation,
had to yield herself to the rudeness of a common executioner, and was
humbled in death before a scoffing multitude; when the constitution that
had been recently established by the voice of the nation, and under
which it was hoped they would flourish and be happy, had fallen into
the ruthless fangs of the Jacobins, and the patriots who supported it
had found refuge in exile, or mingled their blood upon the scaffold;
when all rightful, civil, and legal authority was at an end, and the
Revolutionary sabre alone gave law, the people of St. Domingo, as did the
people of these States under other circumstances, declared themselves
free and independent, determined to take their stand among the nations
of the world, and now refuse allegiance to any foreign power. They have
organized a Government for themselves; they are _de facto_ the governors
of the country, and in every respect act as an independent people. They
have waged, and carried on with France, for many years, a most serious
war, in defence of what they say are their rights; and the French, by
force of arms, have been endeavoring to subjugate them. And now let me
ask if the United States, or any other power upon earth, is competent to
decide this great controversy between them? They each claim to be free
and independent, and therefore acknowledge no superior; the struggle
is between themselves, and no other nation has a right to interfere by
direct acts of hostility, or by any commercial restrictions that can go
to effect injuriously either of the parties, and to do so is a departure
from neutral ground, and an infraction of the laws of nations, as I think
will be within my power to show from the most incontestable authorities.
For this purpose I will advert again to _Vattel_.
_Vattel_, b. 2, ch. 4, sec. 56, says: “When the bands of the political
society are broken, or at least suspended between the sovereign and his
people, the contending parties may then be considered as two distinct
powers; and since they are both equally independent of all foreign
authority, nobody has a right to judge between them. Either may be in the
right.” B. 3, ch. 15, sec. 295, says: “When a nation becomes divided into
two parties absolutely independent, and no longer acknowledging a common
superior, the State is dissolved, and the war between the two parties
stands on the same ground in every respect as a public war between two
different nations.” Again, sir, section 293 of the same book and chapter
says: “A civil war breaks the bands of society and Government, or at
least suspends their force and effect. It produces in the nation two
independent parties, who consider each other as enemies, and acknowledge
no common judge. Those two parties, therefore, must necessarily be
considered as thenceforward constituting, at least for a time, two
separate bodies, two distinct societies. Though one of the parties may
have been to blame in breaking the unity of the State, and resisting
the lawful authority, they are not the less divided in fact. Besides,
who shall judge them? Who shall pronounce on which side the right or
the wrong belongs? On earth they have no common superior. They stand,
therefore, in precisely the same predicament as two nations who engage in
a contest, and, being unable to come to an agreement, have recourse to
arms.”
We have been exultingly told by Mr. Talleyrand, and it has been echoed
from this Chamber by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. MITCHILL,) that
even the British consider St. Domingo a colony of France, and upon
this principle condemn our vessels for trading there. I grant that
such a pretext, among many others, has been resorted to in order to
destroy our commerce; I grant that such an infringement of our neutral
rights has been committed, and the reasons that have induced it must be
obvious to the most superficial observer. The British, with a monopoly
of this commerce themselves, and those same Englishmen who now condemn
our vessels for trading to St. Domingo, upon the ground of its being
a French colony, heretofore, when it suited their purposes, so far
acknowledged the independence of those very people as to enter into
a Commercial Treaty with them, and are now not only in the constant
practice of trading there themselves, but of granting licenses to others
to do so. I hope, however, the day has not come when our commerce is
to be under the control of the Lords of the Admiralty, or our national
rights dependent upon the judicial opinions of Sir William Scott; and
the learned gentleman from New York must indeed have been pressed with
the barrenness of his case when he had to resort to such an argument,
derived from such a source. The gentleman from New Jersey, (Mr. KITCHEL,)
I must in candor say, has, in support of the present measure, assumed
premises totally new and different. His reasons, like most of those we
have been accustomed lately to hear, were in the true style of modern
legislation, enveloped in all the mysteries of secrecy. He tells us
that we had better give up this commerce, because it is not valuable.
Where the gentleman obtained this piece of information is utterly beyond
the comprehension of my understanding: none such, certainly, has ever
been laid before us; nor did he condescend to give us a clue to its
source; but as if sufficient to urge it upon our faith with all the
confidence of apostolic inspiration--to us who doubted, he refused even
an opportunity of acquiring knowledge through any other channel; voted
against the propositions of my friend and colleague, which went to ask
of the Executive the actual state of this commerce, and to ascertain
its real value. To do strict justice to the gentleman’s argument, it is
simply this, that whenever any foreign power may please to demand of us
the surrender of a right, however just and honest it may be; however it
may comport with the dignity of the Government to preserve it; if, in a
pecuniary point of view, if upon a cool peddling calculation of risk,
profit, and loss, it cannot be deemed of high value, we are at once to
give it up. This argument, I will confess, is worthy of the bill. So
striking, and of such a kind is their affinity, that they seem peculiarly
calculated to expose each other, and to excite in every mind valuing the
honor, the dignity, and the character of the nation, like sentiments of
disgust. The case cited by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. MACLAY,)
of the Indians, I think in 1755, under the avowed authority, direction,
and support of the French Government, ravaging our frontiers, surely can
have no relation to the question before us. Has this Government ever
furnished arms and ammunition, or done any other act in order to assist
and encourage the people of St. Domingo in attacking the countries of
their neighbors? I cannot conceive what subject that might have been
before Congress during our present session, the gentleman must have had
in his mind, to which he supposed this case could apply; certainly not
the present; it is infinitely more distant in point of analogy than
of date. I have been exerting my imagination to discern any object or
bearing it can have, that I might endeavor to meet it, but the total
impossibility of the one, will save me the trouble of the other.
I rejoice that the President has expressed, in his late Message, a
disposition to take into the protection of the Government the commerce
of the United States, though little has yet been done, or attempted.
This project of the gentleman from Pennsylvania I hope forms no part of
the new system, and he would have acted wisely before he submitted it to
have examined better its consequences, and to have looked for a moment at
the present condition of our commerce. What is it? Plundered upon every
coast and in every sea, your flag, instead of being a protection against
insult, seems to have become an invitation to injury. The British, the
French, and the Spaniards, in the ratio of their force, treat us with
like indignities; this is the only point in which they can agree. The
former have adopted, and openly avow a system of measures that, if not
counteracted, must go to deprive us of the most important of our neutral
rights; while the two latter are anxiously rivalling each other in the
most lawless and piratical depredations upon our defenceless trade;
even the commissioned vessels of our Government have not been suffered
to pass the high seas without insult and violence. The British and the
French, whenever it suits their views, blockade our very ports; the
British take their position off New York, so as to be convenient to the
courts of Halifax; and our friends, the French, to whom the gentleman
from Pennsylvania has told us we should be so particularly civil, take
occasionally into their holy keeping, the commerce of Charleston and
New Orleans, so as to be at a convenient distance from the British. Our
trade with St. Domingo, indeed, the French have not been able to stop,
nor have even the British yet assumed to themselves this maritime right;
but the gentleman from Pennsylvania, in his great good faith and abundant
charity, will now anticipate their wishes, and do it for them. This,
indeed, surpasses even Christian meekness; it is not only, when smitten
upon one cheek, turning the other also, but chastening ourselves with
more than monkish severity, in the most vulnerable part.
On motion, by one of the majority, to reconsider the fourth section which
restricts the operation of the law to one year, it passed in the negative.
On motion, to agree to the final passage of the bill, it was determined
in the affirmative--yeas 21, nays 8, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Condit, Fenner,
Gaillard, Gilman, Howland, Kitchel, Logan, Maclay, Mitchill,
Moore, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Ohio,
Smith of Tennessee, Sumter, Turner, Worthington, and Wright.
NAYS.--Messrs. Adams, Bayard, Hillhouse, Pickering, Plumer,
Stone, Tracy, and White.
So it was _Resolved_, That this bill pass, that it be engrossed, and
that the title thereof be “An act to suspend the commercial intercourse
between the United States and certain parts of the island of St. Domingo.”
MONDAY, March 3.
_Privileges of Foreign Ministers._
The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the amendment reported
by the select committee to the bill to prevent the abuse of the
privileges and immunities enjoyed by foreign Ministers within the United
States.
Mr. ADAMS.--There are two points of view, Mr. President, in which it
appears to me to be important that the provisions of this bill should be
considered--the one as they relate to the laws of nations, and the other
as they regard the Constitution of the United States. From both these
sources have arisen inducements combining to produce conviction upon my
mind of the propriety, and indeed the necessity of some measure similar
in principle to that which I have had the honor to propose. I shall take
the liberty to state them in their turns, endeavoring to keep them as
distinct from each other as the great and obvious difference of their
character requires, and that their combination on this occasion may
appear in the striking light which may render it the most effectual.
By the laws of nations, a foreign Minister is entitled, not barely to
the general security and protection which the laws of every civilized
people extend to the subjects of other nations residing among them. He
is indulged with many privileges of a high and uncommon nature--with
many exemptions from the operation of the laws of the country where he
resides, and among others, with a general exemption from the jurisdiction
of the judicial courts, both civil and criminal. This immunity is,
in respect to the criminal jurisdiction, without limitation; and an
Ambassador, though guilty of the most aggravated crimes of which the
heart of man can conceive or his hand commit, cannot be punished for
them by the tribunals of the Sovereign with whom he resides. Should he
conspire the destruction of the constitution or government of the State,
no jury of his peers can there convict him of treason. Should he point
the dagger of assassination to the heart of a citizen, he cannot be put
to plead for the crime of murder. In these respects he is considered as
the subject, not of the State to which he is sent, but of the State which
sent him, and the only punishment which can be inflicted on his crimes is
left to the justice of his master.
In a republican government, like that under which we have the happiness
to live, this exemption is not enjoyed by any individual of the nation
itself, however exalted in rank or station. It is our pride and glory,
that all are equal in the eyes of the law; that, however adorned with
dignity, or armed with power, no man owing allegiance to the majesty of
the nation can screen himself from the vindictive arm of her justice;
yet even the nations whose internal constitutions are founded upon this
virtuous and honorable principle of equal and universal rights, have,
like all the rest, submitted to this great and extraordinary exception.
In order to account for so singular a deviation from principles in every
other respect deemed of the highest moment and of the most universal
application, we must inquire into the reasons which have induced all
the nations of the civilized world to this broad departure from the
fundamental maxims of their government.
The most eminent writers on the laws of nations have at different times
assigned various reasons for this phenomenon in politics and morals. It
has sometimes been said to rest upon _fictions_ of law. The reasoning
has been thus: every Sovereign Prince is independent of all others, and
as such cannot, even when personally within the territories of another,
be amenable to his jurisdiction. An ambassador represents the person
of his master, and therefore must enjoy the same immunities. But this
reasoning cannot be satisfactory; for, in the first place, a foreign
Minister does not necessarily represent the person of his master--he
represents him only in his affairs; and besides representing him he
has a personal existence of his own, altogether distinct from his
representative character, and for which, on the principles of common
sense, he ought, like every other individual, to be responsible. At other
times, another fiction of law has been alleged, in this manner; the
foreign Minister is not the subject of the State to which he is sent, but
of his own Sovereign: he is therefore to be considered as still residing
within the territories of his master, and not in those of the Prince to
whom he is accredited. But this fiction, like the other, forgets the
personal existence of the Minister. It is dangerous, at all times, to
derive important practical consequences from fictions of law, in direct
opposition to the fact. If the principle of personal representation,
or that of _exterritoriality_ annexed to the character of a foreign
Minister be admitted at all, it can in sound argument apply only to his
official conduct--to his acts in the capacity of a Minister, and not to
his private and individual affairs. The Minister can represent the person
of the Prince, no otherwise than as any agent or factor represents the
person of his principal; and it would be an ill compliment to a Sovereign
Prince to consider him as personally represented by his Minister in
the commission of an atrocious crime. Another objection against this
wide-encroaching inference from the doctrine of personal representation,
is, that it is suitable only to Monarchies. The Minister of a King may
be feigned to represent in all respects the person of his master, but
what person can be represented by the Ambassador of a Republic? If I am
answered, the _moral person_ of the nation, then I reply, _that_ can be
represented by no individual, being itself a fiction in law, incapable
of committing any act, and having no corporeal existence susceptible of
representation. I have said thus much on this subject, because I have
heard in conversation these legal fictions alleged against the adoption
of the bill on your table, and because they may perhaps be urged against
it here.
But it is neither in the fiction of _exterritoriality_, nor in that of
personal representation, that we are to seek for the substantial reason
upon which the customary law of nations has founded the extraordinary
privileges of ambassadors; it is in the nature of their office, of their
duties, and of their situation.
By their office, they are intended to be the mediators of peace, of
commerce, and of friendship, between nations; by their duties they are
bound to maintain with firmness, though in the spirit of conciliation,
the rights, the honor, and the interests of their nation, even in the
midst of those who have opposing interests, who assert conflicting
rights, and who are guided by an equal and adverse sense of honor; by
their situation they would, without some extraordinary provision in their
favor, be at the mercy of the very Prince against whom they are thus to
maintain the rights, the honor, and the interest of their own. As the
ministers of peace and friendship, their functions are not only of the
highest and most beneficial utility, but of indispensable necessity to
all nations having any mutual intercourse with each other. They are the
only instruments by which the miseries of war can be averted when it
approaches, or terminated when it exists. It is by their agency that the
prejudices of contending nations are to be dissipated--that the violent
and destructive passions of nations are to be appeased--that men, as far
as their nature will admit, are to be converted from butchers of their
kind, into a band of friends and brothers. It is this consideration, sir,
which, by the common consent of mankind, has surrounded with sanctity the
official character of Ambassadors; it is this which has enlarged their
independency to such an immeasurable extent; it is this which has loosed
them from all the customary ties which bind together the social compact
of common rights and common obligations.
But immunities of a nature so extraordinary cannot, from the nature of
mankind, be frequently conferred, without becoming liable to frequent
abuse. Ambassadors are still beings subject to the passions, the vices,
and infirmities of man. However exempted from the danger of punishment,
they are not exempt from the commission of crimes. Besides their
participation in the imperfections of humanity, they have temptations
and opportunities peculiar to themselves, to transgressions of a very
dangerous description, and a very aggravated character. While the
functions of their office place in their hands the management of those
great controversies, upon which whole nations are wont to stake their
existence; while their situations afford them the means, and stimulate
them to the employment of the base but powerful weapons of faction, of
corruption, and of treachery, their very privileges and immunities concur
in assailing their integrity by the promise of security, even in case of
defeat--of impunity, even after detection.
The experience of all ages and of every nation has therefore pointed
to the necessity of erecting some barrier against the abuse of those
immunities and privileges, with which foreign Ministers have at all
times and every where been indulged. In some aggravated instances the
rulers of the State where the crime was committed have boldly broken down
the wall of privilege under which the guilty stranger would fain have
sheltered himself, and in defiance of the laws of nations have delivered
up the criminal to the tribunals of the country for trial, sentence, and
execution; at other times the popular indignation, by a process still
more irregular, has, without the forms of law, wreaked its vengeance upon
the perpetrators of those crimes, which otherwise must have remained
unwhipped of justice. Cases have sometimes occurred when the principles
of self-preservation and defence have justified the injured Government,
endangered in its vital parts, in arresting the person of such a Minister
during the crisis of danger, and confining him under guard until he could
with safety be removed. But the practice which the reason of the case
and the usage of nations has prescribed and recognized, is, (according
to the aggravation of the offence,) to order the criminal to depart
from the territories whose laws he has violated, or to send him home,
sometimes under custody, to his Sovereign; demanding of him that justice,
reparation, and punishment, which the nature of the case requires, and
which he alone is entitled to dispense. This power is admitted by the
concurrent testimony of all the writers on the laws of nations, and
has the sanction of practice equally universal. It results, indeed, as
a consequence absolutely necessary from the independence of foreign
Ministers on the judicial authority, and is perfectly reconcilable with
it. As respects the offended nation, it is a measure of self-defence,
justified by the acknowledged destitution of every other remedy. As
respects the offending Minister, it is the only means of remitting him
for trial and punishment to the tribunals whose jurisdiction he cannot
recuse; and as respects his Sovereign, it preserves inviolate his rights,
and at the same time manifests that confidence in his justice which
civilized nations living in amity are bound to place in each other.
On these principles, thus equitable and moderate in themselves, and thus
universally established, is founded every provision of the bill before
you, so far as it implicates the law of nations. I have been fully aware
that, although by the Constitution of the United States Congress are
authorized to define and punish offences against the law of nations, yet
this did not imply a power to innovate upon those laws. I could not be
ignorant that the Legislature of one individual in the great community of
nations has no right to prescribe rules of conduct which can be binding
upon all; and therefore, in the provisions of this bill, it was my
primary object not to deviate one step from the worn and beaten path--not
to vary one jot or one tittle from the prescriptions of immemorial usage
and unquestioned authority.
In consulting for this purpose the writers, characterized by one of
our own statesmen in a pamphlet recently laid on our tables, as “the
luminaries and oracles to whom the appeal is generally made by nations
who prefer an appeal to law rather than to power,” I found that they
distinguished the offences which may be committed by foreign Ministers
into two kinds--the one against the municipal laws of the country where
they reside, and the other against the Government or State to which they
are accredited; and that they recommended a correspondent modification
of the manner in which they are to be treated by the offended Sovereign.
The first section of the bill therefore directs the mode of treatment
towards foreign Ministers guilty of heinous offences against the
municipal laws; for, as to those minor transgressions which are usually
left unnoticed by other States, I have thought no provision necessary
for them. The section points out the mode by which the insulted State
or injured individual may apply to the Chief Magistrate of the Union for
redress, and by what process the President may obtain reparation from the
offender’s Sovereign, or, in case of refusal, dismiss the offender from
the territories of the United States.
The second section provides for the case of offences against the
Government of the nation. If the insult is direct upon the President
of the United States himself, it authorizes him at once to discard the
offender; if the injury be against the nation, by any conspiracy or other
act of hostility, it offers the means of removing at once so dangerous
a disturber of the public tranquillity. This also will be found exactly
conformable to the directions in _Vattel_.
The third section brings me to the consideration of the relation
which the bill bears to the Constitution of the United States. It
contains a regulation, the object of which is at once to prevent all
misunderstanding by the offending Minister’s Sovereign of the grounds
upon which he should be ordered to depart or sent home, and to mark by
a strong line of discrimination the cases when a foreign Minister is
dismissed for misconduct, from those when he is expelled on account of
national differences. In this latter case, by the general understanding
and usage of nations, an order to depart given to a foreign Minister is
equivalent to a declaration of war. In the European Governments, where
the power of declaring war and that of negotiating with foreign States
are committed to the same hands, this nice discrimination of the specific
reasons for which a Minister may be dismissed is far less important than
with us. The power of declaring war is with us exclusively vested in
Congress; and as the order to depart, when founded on national disputes,
amounts to such a declaration, it appears to me, by fair inference, that
for such cause the President of the United States cannot issue such an
order without the express request or concurrence of Congress to that
effect. It was from this view of the subject that, in the present bill,
the power vested in the President to send home a culpable Minister is
so precisely limited to the cases when the Minister shall have deserved
that treatment by his personal misconduct. This distinction between the
causes for which a foreign Minister may be sent home has been solemnly
recognized in a remarkable manner by this Government in the treaty with
Great Britain of the 19th November, 1794, in the twenty-sixth article.
Here, sir, the sending home a Minister for national causes is recognized
to be the very test of a rupture, and exactly tantamount to a declaration
of war. But the same act, done for the Minister’s personal misconduct,
is acknowledged to be a right of both parties, which they agree to
retain; and it is stipulated that it shall not in that case be deemed
equivalent to a rupture. The expressions used imply that the parties did
not consider themselves as introducing in this part of the article a new
law, but as explaining the old. It is merely declaratory, “for greater
certainty,” and the previous existence of the right is recognized by
the stipulation that both parties shall retain it. This is one of the
articles of the treaty which have expired; but as expressing the sense
both of our own nation and of Great Britain upon the subject to which it
relates, it is as effectual as it ever could be. Its provisions are still
binding upon both parties as part of the law of nations, though they have
ceased to be obligatory as positive stipulations.
It may now perhaps be expected, sir, that I should give some explanation
of the more immediate circumstances in which the bill originated. And
here I am sensible that I tread upon delicate ground. So highly honorable
and respectable is the office of a foreign Minister, that to treat him
with disrespect in common discourse, and still more in legislative
deliberation, would be without excuse, were his own conduct altogether
unexceptionable. Should the occasion ever happen that a foreign Minister
by his own violation of all the common decencies of social intercourse
towards the Government to which he was accredited, should forfeit every
right to personal respect or esteem, still I hope, sir, I should not
forget the consideration due to the credentials of his Sovereign; still
I should think myself bound to observe all that moderation of expression
which can be consistent with the sentiments of indignation involuntarily
excited in my breast by an insult upon the Government of my country.
Within a few days after the Message of the President at the commencement
of the present session of Congress was made public, the Spanish
Minister[30] addressed to the Secretary of State a letter couched
in terms which it cannot be necessary for me to particularize, and
containing, not only strictures of the most extraordinary nature upon
all the parts of that Message respecting Spain, but complaints no less
extraordinary at what it did not contain. Consider this procedure in
its real light, sir, and what is it? A foreign Minister takes to task
the President of the United States for the manner in which he has
executed one of the most important functions enjoined upon him by the
constitution. He not only charges him with misrepresentation in what he
did say, but he presumes to dictate to him what he should have said. I
forbear all comment upon this conduct as it relates to the present Chief
Magistrate. I ask you, sir, and I entreat every member of this Senate
to ask himself, What is its tendency as it relates to our country? The
Constitution of the United States makes it one of the President’s most
solemn duties to communicate to Congress correct information relating
to the state of our public affairs. In every possible case of disputes
and controversies of right between the United States and any foreign
nation, the Minister of that nation must have an interest--and the
strongest interest, to give a gloss and coloring to the objects in
litigation--opposite to the interest of our country. If, whenever the
President of the United States, upon the high and solemn responsibility
which weighs upon every act of his official duty, gives to Congress that
account of our foreign relations which is necessary to enable them to
adapt their measures to the circumstances for the general welfare of the
Union, a foreign Minister, under color of his official privileges, is
to contradict every part of his statements, to impeach the correctness
of his facts, and to chide him even for his omissions, to what an abyss
of abasement is the Chief Magistrate of this Union to be degraded! The
freedom which a Spanish Minister, unreproved, can take to-day, a French
Minister would claim as a right to-morrow, and a British Minister would
exercise without ceremony the next day. A diplomatic censorship would be
established over the Supreme Executive of this nation, and the President
would not dare to exhibit to Congress the statement of our national
concerns, without previously submitting his Message for approbation to
a Cabinet Counsel of foreign Ministers. Under the British Constitution,
the speeches of the Sovereign to his Parliament are all settled in his
Privy Council, and the Royal lips are understood to give utterance only
to the words of the Minister. The reason of this is, that by the forms of
their constitution the Sovereign himself is above all responsibility, and
the Minister is the person accountable to the nation for the substance
of the discourse delivered by his master. In their practice, therefore,
the speech is made by him on whom the responsibility rests. But if this
new assumption of the Spanish Minister is submitted to, our practice will
be an improvement on the British theory of a singular cast indeed; for,
while the responsibility will rest upon the President who delivers the
Message, its contents will be dictated by persons not only loosed from
all responsibility to our country, but bound in allegiance, in zeal, in
duty, to the very Princes with whom we have to contend. The same control
which by this measure is attempted to be usurped over the acts of the
President, will at the next step, and by an easy transition, be extended
to the Legislature; and, instead of parcelling out the Message among
several committees for their consideration, we shall have to appoint
committees upon every part of the Message relating to any foreign Power
to wait upon the Minister of that Power, and inquire what it is the
pleasure of his master that we should do.
That such is the inevitable tendency and the real intention of the
proceeding will appear, not only from a due consideration of the act
itself, but from a proper estimate of its avowed motive, and from the
subsequent conduct of the same Minister. He addressed this letter to the
Secretary of State, not for the purpose of asking any explanation--not
for the purpose of giving any satisfaction--not for any of the usual
and proper purposes of a diplomatic communication--but (as he himself
declares) for our Government to publish, with a view to counteract
the statements of the President’s Message. It was a challenge to the
President to enter the lists of a pamphleteering war against him, for
the instruction of the American people and the amusement of foreign
Courts; and having failed in this laudable project, he addresses, after
the expiration of forty days, a circular letter to the other foreign
Ministers residing in the United States, with copies of his letter to
the Secretary of State, as if these foreign Ministers were the regular
umpires between him and our Government. Not content however with this
appeal, he authorizes them to give copies of his letters to ensure that
publication with which our Government had not gratified him, and calls
at once upon the American people, and upon the European Courts, to
decide between the President and him. Here, too, sir, I beg gentlemen
to abstract the particular instance from the general principle of this
transaction. The same act which under one set of circumstances can only
excite contempt, under another becomes formidable in the extreme. Of the
newspaper appeal to the people I say nothing. The people of this country
are not so dull of understanding or so depraved in vice as to credit the
assertions of a foreigner, bound by no tie of duty to them--the creature
and agent of their adversary--in contradiction to those of their own
officer, answerable to them for his every word, and stationed at the
post of their highest confidence. But the circular to the other foreign
Ministers is a species of appeal hitherto unprecedented in the United
States. And what is its object? The information of their Courts; that the
Governments of France and Great Britain may learn from him the justice
and generosity of his master.
It is probable that both those nations--the ally and the enemy of
Spain--have much better materials for estimating the justice and
generosity of His Catholic Majesty; but what have they to do in the case?
By an anonymous newspaper publication, the idiom of which discovers its
origin, a precedent is alleged in justification of this extraordinary
step, and the reciprocal communication of diplomatic memorials concerning
the affair of Holland in the years 1786 and 1787, between the Ministers
of Great Britain, France, and Prussia, at the Hague, is gravely adduced
as warranting this innovation of the Spanish Minister here. The very
reference to that time, place, and occasion, would of itself be a
sufficient indication of the intent at this time. In the years 1786 and
1787, the three Powers I have just mentioned undertook, between them, not
only to interfere in the internal government of Holland, but to regulate
and control it according to a plan upon which they were endeavoring to
agree. Their Ministers, therefore, very naturally communicated to each
other the memorials which they presented to the Dutch Government. And
what was the result? Two of those three Powers fixed between themselves
the doom of Holland--raised a tyrannical faction upon the ruins of that
country’s freedom, and marched the Duke of Brunswick, at the head of
thirty thousand men, into Amsterdam, to convince the Hollanders of the
King of Prussia’s _justice_ and _generosity_.
This, sir, is the precedent called to our recollection for the purpose
of reconciling us to the humiliation of our condition. We are patiently
to behold a Spanish Minister insulting the President of the United
States--dictating to him _his_ construction of our constitution--calling
upon other foreign Ministers to countenance his presumption--and
intrenching himself behind the example of another nation, once made the
victim of a like usurpation! The resemblance is but too strong, and
will, I hope, not be forgotten by us. If the constitutional powers of a
Dutch Stadtholder were prescribed and moulded according to the pleasure
and by the interference of foreign Powers, (as undoubtedly they were,)
let us remember the fact with a determination never to be so controlled
ourselves. It is held up to us as an example: let us take it as warning.
The subsequent proceedings of the Spanish Minister have been all in
the same spirit with that under which he presumed to call upon the
President to enter the lists of altercation with him before the people
of this country. They manifest pretensions to which we ought not to
submit--which we ought vigorously to resist. In his last letter to the
Secretary of State, he tells him that he will receive no orders but
from his own master. Now, if this has any meaning, it must be to deny
the United States the right of ordering him away: that is one of the
most indisputable rights of every Sovereign Power. When pretensions so
destitute of all foundation are advanced, it becomes us immediately
to show our sense of them: not to resist them might be construed into
acquiescence. It is a virtual dereliction of our rights not to defend
them when they are assailed.
I am indeed fully sensible that the operation of the bill I have
proposed, should it meet the sanction of Congress, will not be
retrospective--that to what has passed no remedy which can now be
provided will apply--but we may prevent in future occurrences of a like
character, and much more dangerous consequence. We may prevent the
spreading of an evil which threatens the dearest interests of the nation;
we may prevent even the repetition of insults and injuries, which, but
for the want of the regulations now proposed, in all probability never
would have been offered. In my own opinion, the necessity for some
legislative provision upon this subject will force itself upon this
Government with additional pressure, from year to year, until it can no
longer be resisted. If foreign Ministers are to possess in the United
States an unbounded independence of all the tribunals of justice, while
the United States on their part are to be deprived of the ordinary means
of self-defence, enjoyed and exercised by all other Sovereigns, to check
the abuse of those formidable privileges, the course of events will, in
my belief, at no very distant day, bring us into that unhappy dilemma
which will leave no other alternative than to infringe the laws of
nations or to sacrifice our constitution--to commit violent outrage upon
the rights of others, or to make a dastardly surrender of our own.
The amendment was adopted, and the bill ordered to a third reading.
FRIDAY, March 7.
_Privileges of Foreign Ministers._
The Senate resumed the third reading of the bill to prevent the abuse of
the privileges and immunities enjoyed by foreign Ministers within the
United States.
A motion was made to strike out the first, second, and third sections of
the bill. Whereupon, a division of the question was called for; and on
the question to strike out the first section, it was determined in the
affirmative--yeas 23, nays 7, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Adair, Anderson, Baldwin, Bayard, Bradley,
Condit, Gaillard, Gilman, Hillhouse, Howland, Kitchel, Logan,
Maclay, Moore, Pickering, Smith of Maryland, Smith of Ohio,
Smith of Tennessee, Smith of Vermont, Stone, Sumter, Thruston,
and White.
NAYS.--Messrs. Adams, Mitchill, Plumer, Smith of New York,
Tracy, Turner, and Worthington.
And on the question to strike out the second section of the bill, it was
determined in the affirmative--yeas 21, nays 9, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bayard, Bradley, Condit,
Gaillard, Gilman, Hillhouse, Howland, Kitchel, Logan, Maclay,
Moore, Pickering, Smith of Maryland, Smith of Ohio, Smith of
Tennessee, Smith of Vermont, Stone, Sumter, and Thruston.
NAYS.--Messrs. Adair, Adams, Mitchill, Plumer, Smith of New
York, Tracy, Turner, White, and Worthington.
And on the question to strike out the third section of the bill, it was
determined in the affirmative--yeas 27, nays 3, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Adair, Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Bayard,
Bradley, Condit, Gaillard, Gilman, Hillhouse, Howland, Kitchel,
Logan, Maclay, Moore, Pickering, Plumer, Smith of Maryland,
Smith of New York, Smith of Ohio, Smith of Tennessee, Smith of
Vermont, Stone, Sumter, Thruston, Turner, and White.
NAYS.--Messrs. Mitchill, Tracy, and Worthington.
And the bill having been further amended, on the question, Shall this
bill pass? it was determined in the negative--yeas 4, nays 24, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Adams, Plumer, Smith of Ohio, and Thruston.
NAYS.--Messrs. Adair, Anderson, Baldwin, Bayard, Bradley,
Condit, Gaillard, Gilman, Hillhouse, Howland, Kitchel,
Logan, Maclay, Moore, Pickering, Smith of New York, Smith of
Tennessee, Smith of Vermont, Stone, Sumter, Tracy, Turner,
White, and Worthington.
So the bill was lost.
MONDAY, March 10.
_British Aggressions._
The Senate resumed the consideration of the third resolution reported by
the committee, on the 5th of February last, to whom was referred that
part of the Message of the President of the United States, at the opening
of the session, which relates to the spoliations of our commerce.
Mr. S. SMITH.--Mr. President: The subject now before the Senate is,
the third resolution reported by your committee on that part of the
Message which relates to British spoliations. The first resolution is a
declaration of our neutral rights, and has passed the Senate unanimously.
The second requests the President to send a special mission to Great
Britain to demand restoration of property unlawfully taken from our
merchants, and, by a peaceful arrangement, to adjust all differences
subsisting between that nation and the United States. The third is now
before us. I will take leave to read it.
3. _Resolved_, That it is expedient to prohibit, by law, the
importation into the United States of any of the following
goods, wares, or merchandise, being the growth, produce,
or manufactures of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain
and Ireland, or the dependencies thereof, that is to say:
woollens, linens, hats, nails, looking-glasses, rum, hardwares,
slate, salt, coal, boots, shoes, ribbons, silks, and plated
and glass wares. The said prohibition to commence from the
---- day of ----, unless, previously thereto, equitable
arrangements shall be made between the two Governments, on the
differences subsisting between them; and to continue until such
arrangements shall be agreed upon and settled.
This resolution is intended, Mr. President, to afford aid to the
negotiation recommended in the second. Without this aid, or something
similar, I doubt whether Great Britain would not calculate, as
heretofore, on an indecisive character in our Government--on its
indisposition to lend any aid or protection to commerce; and reasoning
thus, whether her Minister might not be induced to believe that he could
proceed in safety to the destruction of every part of our commerce
with her enemies and their dependencies. This measure, Mr. President,
is called a war measure. Is it so? If it is, then does Great Britain
maintain a constant war measure against the United States, for she, at
all times, prohibits the importation, into her ports, of every article
manufactured within our country. She even prohibits our provisions from
being consumed in her kingdoms, except when her wants compel her to
admit them. If, then, she has set us the example, and has, by her laws,
prohibited every article of our manufacture from being admitted into
her kingdoms, how can our prohibiting a part of her manufactures from
being imported into the United States, be considered as a war measure?
This measure is not intended to take effect immediately. The first of
November next is contemplated; which will give full time for negotiation,
and for Great Britain to reflect on her cruel and unprovoked conduct
towards us--a conduct that has been highly reprobated in England--a
conduct that, when examined, has but too much the appearance of a
determination to benefit by the plunder of our property, without the
authority of law, and directly contrary to the public sanction given to
our neutral trade in a correspondence held between Lord Hawkesbury and
Mr. King, in 1801.
FRIDAY, March 14.
_Captain Peter Landais._
The bill, entitled “An act for the relief of Peter Landais,” was read
the third time; and, on motion to strike out the word “six,” and in lieu
thereof to insert the word “three,” thereby to reduce the sum proposed
for his relief to three thousand dollars, it passed in the negative.
On motion, by one of the majority, it was agreed to reconsider the last
vote, and to strike out the word “six.”
On motion, to fill the blank with the word “five,” it passed in the
negative; and, on motion, it was agreed to fill the blank with the word
“four.”
On the question, shall the bill pass as amended? it was determined in the
affirmative--yeas 19, nays 10, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Adair, Adams, Anderson, Bayard, Condit, Gilman,
Howland, Kitchel, Maclay, Mitchill, Smith of Maryland, Smith of
Ohio, Smith of Tennessee, Smith of Vermont, Thruston, Turner,
White, Worthington, and Wright.
NAYS.--Messrs. Baldwin, Bradley, Gaillard, Hillhouse, Moore,
Pickering, Plumer, Smith of New York, Sumter, and Tracy.
So it was _Resolved_, That this bill pass as amended.
MONDAY, March 17.
_Ex-Bashaw of Tripoli._
Mr. BRADLEY, from the committee appointed on the 16th of January last,
to consider the Message of the President of the United States of the
13th of January, respecting the application of Hamet Caramalli, made the
following report:
The ex-Bashaw founds his claim on the justice of the United
States, from his services and suffering in their cause, and
from his having been deceived and amused with the prospect of
being placed on his throne, as legitimate Sovereign of Tripoli,
and frequently drawn from eligible situations for the purpose
of being made the dupe and instrument of policy, and finally
sacrificed to misfortune and wretchedness. The committee, from
a full investigation of the documents which have been laid
before Congress, with other evidence that has come within
their knowledge, are enabled to lay before the Senate a brief
statement of facts in relation to the ex-Bashaw, and the result
of their deliberations thereon.
This unfortunate prince, by the treason and perfidy of his
brother, the reigning Bashaw, was driven from his throne,
an exile, to the Regency of Tunis, where the agency of the
United States, in the Mediterranean, found him; and as early
as August, eighteen hundred and one, entered into a convention
to co-operate with him, the object of which was to obtain
a permanent peace with Tripoli, to place the ex-Bashaw on
his throne, and procure indemnification for all expense in
accomplishing the same. This agreement was renewed in November
following, with encouragement that the United States would
persevere, until they had effected the object; and in eighteen
hundred and two, when the reigning Bashaw had made overtures
to the ex-Bashaw to settle on him the two provinces of Derne
and Bengazi, and when the ex-Bashaw was on the point of leaving
Tunis, under an escort furnished him by the reigning Bashaw,
the agents of the United States prevailed on him to abandon the
offer, with assurance that the United States would effectually
co-operate, and place him on the throne of Tripoli.
The same engagements were renewed in eighteen hundred and
three, and the plan of co-operation so arranged, that the
ex-Bashaw, by his own exertions and force, took possession of
the province of Derne; but the American squadron, at that time
under the command of Commodore Morris, instead of improving
that favorable moment to co-operate with the ex-Bashaw, and
to put an end to the war, unfortunately abandoned the Barbary
coast, and left the ex-Bashaw to contend solely with all the
force of the reigning Bashaw, and who in consequence was
obliged, in the fore part of the year eighteen hundred and
four, to give up his conquest of Derne, and fly from the fury
of the usurper into Egypt. These transactions were, from time
to time, not only communicated by our agents to Government, but
were laid before Congress in February, eighteen hundred and
four, in the documents accompanying the report of the Committee
of Claims on the petition of Mr. Eaton, late Consul at Tunis,
which committee expressed their decided approbation of his
official conduct, and to which report the committee beg leave
to refer.
In the full possession of the knowledge of these facts, the
Government of the United States, in June, eighteen hundred and
four, despatched Commodore Barron, with a squadron, into the
Mediterranean, and in his instructions submitted to his entire
discretion the subject of availing himself of the co-operation
of the ex-Bashaw, and referring him to Mr. Eaton as an agent
sent out by Government for that purpose.
After Commodore Barron had arrived on the station, in
September, eighteen hundred and four, he despatched Mr. Eaton
and Captain Hull into Egypt, to find the ex-Bashaw, with
instructions to assure him that the Commodore would take the
most effectual measures with the forces under his command, to
co-operate with him against the usurper, his brother, and to
establish him in the Regency of Tripoli. After encountering
many difficulties and dangers, the ex-Bashaw was found in
Upper Egypt with the Mamelukes, and commanding the Arabs;
the same assurances were again made to him, and a convention
was reduced to writing, the stipulations of which had the
same objects in view; the United States to obtain a permanent
peace and their prisoners, the ex-Bashaw to obtain his throne.
Under these impressions, and with the fullest confidence in
the assurances he had received from the agents of the United
States, and even from Commodore Barron himself, by one of his
(the Bashaw’s) secretaries, whom he had sent to wait on the
Commodore for that purpose, he gave up his prospects in Egypt,
abandoned his property in that country, constituted Mr. Eaton
general and commander-in-chief of his forces, and with such
an army as he was able to raise and support, marched through
the Libyan desert, suffering every hardship incident to such a
perilous undertaking; and with his army, commanded by General
Eaton, aided by O’Bannon and Mann, three American officers,
who shared with him the dangers and hardships of the campaign,
and whose names their country will for ever record with honor,
attacked the city of Derne in the Regency of Tripoli, on the
twenty-seventh day of April, one thousand eight hundred and
five, and, after a well-fought battle, took the same; and for
the first time planted the American colors on the ramparts of
a Tripolitan fort. And in several battles afterwards, one of
which he fought without the aid of the Americans, (they having
been restrained by orders, not warranted by any policy, issued
as appears by Mr. Lear, the American Consul,) defeated the army
of the usurper with great slaughter, maintained his conquest,
and, without the hazard of a repulse, would have marched to the
throne of Tripoli, had he been supported by the co-operation
of the American squadron, which in honor and good faith he
had a right to expect. The committee would here explicitly
declare, that, in their opinion, no blame ought to attach to
Commodore Barron. A wasting sickness, and a consequent mental
as well as bodily debility, had rendered him totally unable to
exercise the duties of commanding the squadron, previously to
this momentous crisis, and from which he has never recovered;
and to this cause alone may be attributed the final failure
of the plan of co-operation which appears to have been wisely
concerted by the Government, and hitherto bravely executed by
its officers.
But, however unpleasant the task, the committee are compelled,
by the obligations of truth and duty, to state further that
Mr. Lear, to whom was intrusted the power of negotiating the
peace, appears to have gained a complete ascendency over the
Commodore, thus debilitated by sickness; or rather, having
assumed the command in the name of the Commodore, to have
dictated every measure; to have paralyzed every military
operation by sea and land; and finally, without displaying
the fleet or squadron before Tripoli, without consulting even
the safety of the ex-Bashaw or his army, against the opinion
of all the officers of the fleet, so far as the committee
have been able to obtain the same, and of Commodore Rodgers,
(as appears from Mr. Lear’s letter to the Secretary of State,
dated Syracuse harbor, July 5th, 1805,) to have entered into
a convention with the reigning Bashaw, by which, contrary to
his instructions, he stipulated to pay him sixty thousand
dollars, to abandon the ex-Bashaw, and to withdraw all aid and
assistance from his army. And although a stipulation was made
that the wife and children of the ex-Bashaw should be delivered
to him on his withdrawing from the territories of Tripoli,
yet that stipulation has not been carried into execution, and
it is highly probable was never intended to be. The committee
forbear to make any comment on the impropriety of the orders
issued to General Eaton to evacuate Derne, five days previous
to Mr. Lear’s sailing from Malta for Tripoli, to enter on his
negotiation; and the honor of the nation forbids any remarks on
the unworthy attempt to compel the ex-Bashaw and General Eaton
to give up and abandon their conquest, by withholding supplies
from the army at Derne, eight days previous to the commencement
of the negotiation; nor will the committee condescend to enter
into a consideration of pretended reasons, assigned by Mr. Lear
to palliate his management of the affairs of the negotiation;
such as, the danger of the American prisoners in Tripoli, the
unfitness of the ships for service, and the want of means to
prosecute the war; they appear to the committee to have no
foundation in fact, and are used rather as a veil to cover an
inglorious deed, than solid reasons to justify the negotiator’s
conduct. The committee are free to say, that, in their opinion,
it was in the power of the United States, with the force then
employed, and a small portion of the sixty thousand dollars,
thus improperly expended, to have placed Hamet Caramalli, the
rightful sovereign of Tripoli, on his throne; to have obtained
their prisoners in perfect safety, without the payment of a
cent, with assurance, and probable certainty, of eventual
remuneration for all expenses; and to have established a
peace with the Barbary Powers, that would have been secure
and permanent, and which would have dignified the name and
character of the American people.
Whatever Hamet, the ex-Bashaw, may have said, in his letter of
June 29th, 1805, to palliate the conduct which first abandoned
and then ruined him, the Senate cannot fail to discern that
he was then at Syracuse, in a country of strangers to his
merits, and hostile to his nation and religion, and where every
circumstance conspired to depress him, which, together with the
fear of starving, left him scarcely a moral agent.
Upon these facts, and to carry into effect the principle of
duty arising out of them, the only remuneration now left
in the power of the United States to make, the committee
herewith present a bill for the consideration of the Senate.
The committee are confident that the legislature of a free
and Christian country can never leave it in the power of a
Mahometan to say that they violate their faith, or withhold the
operations of justice from one who has fallen a victim to his
unbounded confidence in their integrity and honor.
The report was ordered to lie for consideration.
Mr. BRADLEY, from the same committee, also reported a bill “for the
relief of Hamet Caramalli, ex-Bashaw of Tripoli;” and the bill was read,
and ordered to the second reading.
TUESDAY, March 18.
_Thanks to General Eaton, and his Companions._
Mr. Bradley submitted the following resolutions for consideration, which
were read:
“_Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, in Congress assembled_, That Congress
entertain a high sense of the patriotism, intrepidity, and
valor, of William Eaton, late General-in-chief of the army
of the ex-Bashaw of Tripoli, and of Priestly N. O’Bannon,
and George Washington Mann, three American officers, who,
with a small number of American marines and the forces of the
ex-Bashaw, composed of Greeks and Arabs, courageously marched
through the Libyan desert, defeated the Tripolitan army near
Derne, and took that city on the twenty-seventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and five, and for the first time spread the
American eagle in Africa, on the ramparts of a Tripolitan fort,
and thereby contributed to release three hundred American
prisoners from bondage in Tripoli.
“_Resolved_, As a further testimony of the gratitude of their
country, that the President of the United States be requested
to cause to be surveyed, within the limits of the public lands
of the United States now open for sale, as the said William
Eaton shall elect, a township of six miles square, to be
called Derne, as a memorial of the conquest of that city, for
ever; and to cause to be laid out, surveyed, and granted, to
the said William Eaton, in one entire tract, within the said
township, ---- thousand acres; and to Priestly N. O’Bannon
and George Washington Mann, each ---- thousand acres; and to
Arthur Campbell, Bernard O’Brian, David Thomas, and James Owen,
the only surviving marines who served as volunteers in that
expedition, three hundred and twenty acres each; to be granted
to them, respectively, their heirs, and assigns, for ever.”
WEDNESDAY, March 19.
_Death of Senator Jackson._
The Senate were informed that JAMES JACKSON, one of their members, from
the State of Georgia, had deceased the last night, whereupon,
_Resolved_, That a committee be appointed to take order for
superintending the funeral of JAMES JACKSON, and that the Senate will
attend the same; and that notice of the event be given to the House of
Representatives; and,
_Ordered_, That this committee consist of Messrs. ANDERSON, SUMTER, and
WRIGHT.
_Resolved, unanimously_, That the members of the Senate, from a sincere
desire of showing every mark of respect due to the memory of JAMES
JACKSON, deceased, late a member thereof, will go into mourning for him
one month, by the usual mode of wearing a crape round the left arm.
The Senate adjourned.
THURSDAY, March 20.
A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the
House will attend the funeral of JAMES JACKSON, Esquire, late a Senator
of the United States. They have also determined to wear mourning on the
left arm, for the space of one month, in testimony of their respect for
the memory of that distinguished Revolutionary patriot.
TUESDAY, April 1.
_Ex-Bashaw of Tripoli._
The bill for the relief of Hamet Caramalli, ex-Bashaw of Tripoli, being
under consideration, on the question, Shall this bill pass? Mr. BRADLEY
having finished his remarks in support of the bill--
Mr. ADAMS said: Mr. President, when the question was yesterday stated
from the Chair, on the final passage of this bill, and I found myself
called on to record my assent to or dissent from it, I felt myself
bound in duty to call upon the committee by whom it was reported, for
the evidence upon which they had rested the claim of Hamet Bashaw to
the grant of money which is proposed by the bill to be made to him.
Together with the bill the committee had reported what they term “a
brief statement of facts;” upon which they declare the bill itself to
be founded, and wherein they consider his claim, not on the generosity,
but on the justice of the United States, from his service and sufferings
in their cause, and from his having been deceived and amused with the
prospect of being placed on his throne, as legitimate sovereign of
Tripoli, and frequently drawn from eligible situations for the purpose
of being made the dupe or instrument of policy, and finally sacrificed
to misfortune and wretchedness. The bill accordingly makes the grant,
expressly in consideration of his services and sufferings in our cause;
and, in voting for the bill as it now stands, I should consider myself
as sanctioning, as far as my vote would go, the report of the committee,
upon which the bill is founded. This I could not do without further
information. I thought, sir, and have thought, from the moment when I
first saw the report, that the statement it contained, far from being
supported by the voluminous documents which have been, in the course of
the session, communicated to the Senate, respecting all our transactions
with Tripoli, was in many respects contradictory to the whole tenor of
those documents; my recollection of the documents was, indeed, only
of their general tenor; for, amidst the pressure of the various other
important business which we have had before us, I had not found time
for a reperusal of them since I had heard them read at your table. But,
of their general complexion, my mind had received a clear and very
decided impression, with which I found it impossible to reconcile any
part of the committee’s report. I presumed, however, that the committee
were possessed of evidence, not yet communicated to the Senate, which
warranted them in those assertions, which all the papers with which I
had been made acquainted tended rather to disprove than to confirm.
The chairman of the committee has this day informed the Senate of the
grounds upon which the report was drawn up, and has communicated what he
considers as the additional evidence in its support. He has also favored
us with the arguments upon which he thinks the views of the subject,
taken in the report, are fully substantiated. I regret, sir, that neither
his arguments nor his evidence have been satisfactory to my mind; but
that, after giving them what I deem their full share of weight, I still
remain convinced that the report is founded upon a supposed state of
facts altogether erroneous, and a view of the whole subject altogether
incorrect.
The merits of Hamet Bashaw’s claim upon the United States must depend
upon the nature of the engagements contracted between the United States
and him, and upon the transactions under those engagements. With respect
to the nature of the engagements, there is a very striking difference
between the statement of the committee and the statement of the President
of the United States in his Message of the 13th of January last. The
statement of the committee is as much at variance with the ideas of Hamet
Bashaw himself as with those of the President, and equally in opposition
to those of Commodore Barron and Mr. Lear, as they appear in the printed
papers.
With regard to the facts material to constitute the peculiar character of
the ex-Bashaw’s claim, the statement of the committee is no less in flat
contradiction to the statements of the President, to the acknowledgments
of Hamet Bashaw, and to the tenor of the most substantial documents.
As to the nature of the engagements, the committee represent Hamet
Bashaw as having been inveigled, deceived, amused with promises to place
him on his throne, and finally betrayed and sacrificed. They appear
to think the United States were bound, at all events, and, by their
exclusive exertions, to restore him to his dignity, and that the mere
act of withdrawing their aid, without accomplishing that object, was a
treacherous violation of their faith plighted to him.
Let us now see what was the real nature of those magnificent offers
of the reigning Bashaw to his brother--the armed escort, and the two
provinces--upon the abandonment of which, under the influence of our
agents, the report raises such a fund of merit and sacrifice on the part
of Hamet. The committee take this circumstance from a statement made by
Mr. Eaton to the Committee of Claims, in February 7, 1804, printed among
the documents of that season. Largely as the chairman of the committee
has drawn from that statement in making his report, it is singular that
the following passage in it, page 16, has escaped his attention:
“Meantime, I had wrought upon the Bey’s Minister to countenance
and aid my project, in consideration of my promise to give
him $10,000, on condition of his fidelity, and in case of its
success. I thought it good policy to secure the Minister;
not so much for the service he would render, as to check the
mischief which seemed impending. He confessed it was the
intention of the enemy Bashaw, by this illusive overture, to
get possession of the rival brother in order to destroy him;
and he permitted my dragoman, under an injunction of secrecy,
to communicate the design to Hamet Bashaw. This determined him
to go to Malta, under a pretext to his people of evading the
Swedish and American cruisers.”
And are these the overtures? Is this the eligible situation, of such
precious value to the ex-Bashaw, that this nation, or its Government, is
to be charged with perfidy and treachery because our agents prevailed
upon him to abandon them? Even so! The reigning Bashaw sends an escort
of forty men, with offers of two provinces, to his exiled brother, for
the sole purpose of getting him into his possession to destroy him. Our
agents discover the project; apprise the destined victim of his intended
fate; rescue him from inevitable destruction--and now, we are to be told,
that by this act, we were not conferring, but receiving an obligation,
which bound us in honor and duty to restore him to his throne.
Thus much, sir, for the nature of the transactions between the agents
of the United States and the ex-Bashaw, prior to the year 1804, when
Commodore Barron with his squadron were sent into the Mediterranean,
and when he was vested with discretionary powers to avail himself of
Hamet’s co-operation, and referred to Mr. Eaton as an agent sent out by
Government for that purpose.
This discretionary power of Commodore Barron, the chairman of the
committee has this day strongly contended was altogether unlimited, and
such is the idea given of it in the report; but this I apprehend to be a
mistake of the utmost importance. It is in direct contradiction to the
statement of the President’s Message, and to the testimony of Commodore
Barron himself. The President’s Message says:
“We authorized Commodore Barron, then proceeding with his
squadron, to enter into an understanding with Hamet, if he
should deem it useful; and as it was represented that he would
need some aid of arms and ammunition, and even of money, he
was authorized to furnish them to a moderate extent, according
to the prospect of utility to be expected from it. The
instructions of June 6th, to Commodore Barron, show that a
co-operation only was intended, and by no means a union of our
object with the fortunes of the ex-Bashaw; and the Commodore’s
letters of March 22, and May 19, prove that he had the most
correct idea of our intentions.”
Thus, sir, the discretionary power of Commodore Barron, to avail himself
of Hamet’s co-operation, was not unlimited--neither by the intention
of the Executive, nor in his own understanding. It was limited both
as to the nature of the engagement he was to contract, and as to the
sum appropriated for the purpose; co-operation is a term of reciprocal
import--it certainly means that there should be some operation on
both sides. The operation in this case by sea, was to be conducted
entirely and exclusively by the squadron of the United States. Hamet
Bashaw could contribute, and was expected to contribute, nothing to
that. His operation was to be by land; and, upon principles of ordinary
reciprocity, it might have been required that this also should be
exclusively at his expense. The Government, however, were willing to
furnish him some aid even there. And the sum of twenty thousand dollars
had been appropriated for that purpose. This was going as far as prudence
would warrant, or as good faith could require. Hamet himself could have
entertained no other expectation, since, in his letter to Mr. Eaton, of
3d January, he says: “Your operations should be carried on by sea; mine
by land.” And even after the peace was made, in his letter to Mr. Eaton,
of 20th June, he acknowledges, as clearly as language can express it,
that the failure of co-operation was not on our part, but his own; that
his means had not been found to answer our reasonable expectations; and
that he was “satisfied with all our nation has done concerning him.”
If Hamet, after the capture of Derne, was totally unable to command
any resources, or bear any part in co-operation with us, how can it
be said that he would, without the hazard of a repulse, have marched
to the throne of Tripoli, had he been supported by the co-operation
of our squadron? But, further, I ask what were the means, what were
the resources, of this sovereign prince, from the hour when Mr. Eaton
received his orders to withdraw from him? The event, sir, is worth a
thousand arguments. He could not support himself a day. He was compelled
to take instantaneous refuge on board our vessels, and was saved from
destruction only by being brought away. Does this look like marching to
the throne of Tripoli?
I am aware, sir, that the report has very explicitly declared that no
blame ought to attach to Commodore Barron; but it has also declared that
a wasting sickness, and consequent mental as well as bodily debility, had
rendered him totally unable to command the squadron; that to this cause
alone may be attributed the final failure of the plan of co-operation;
that Mr. Lear appears to have gained a complete ascendency over him, thus
debilitated by sickness; or rather that Lear, having assumed the command,
in the name of the Commodore, paralyzed every military operation by sea
and land; and they go so far as to impute to Mr. Lear all the letters
of Commodore Barron, subsequent to that of 21st of March, 1805. If the
gentleman from Maryland considers all this, sir, as perfectly respectful
to the Commodore, I can only say that it appears in a different light
to me, nor do I imagine it will bear that complexion to the person
immediately interested in it. But the chairman of the committee has gone
yet further. He has told you, in so many words, that the Commodore was
reduced to a state of perfect childhood; has represented him as equally
incapable of thought and of action; in a mere state of dotage. And all
this upon what evidence? Why, because, in one of his letters, Commodore
Barron says he is unable to write with his own hand; and because, from
the 19th to the 22d of May, there appear among the documents, five
letters, long letters, says the gentleman, and yet the Commodore’s
secretary had an inflammation in his eyes.
MONDAY, April 7.
The bill, entitled “An act further to alter and establish certain post
roads, and for other purposes,” was read the second time, and referred to
Messrs. ANDERSON, WHITE, and STONE, to consider and report thereon.
_Importation of Slaves._
Mr. WRIGHT communicated a resolution of the Legislature of the State of
Maryland instructing their Senators and Representatives in Congress to
use their utmost exertions to obtain an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States to prevent the further importation of slaves;
whereupon, Mr. WRIGHT submitted the following resolutions for the
consideration of the Senate:
_Resolved, &c._ That the following article be proposed to the
Legislatures of the several States, as an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by
three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid as a
part of the said constitution, to wit:
_Resolved_, That the migration or importation of slaves into
the United States, or any territory thereof, be prohibited
after the first day of January 1808.
THURSDAY, April 10.
_Non-Importation Act._
The Senate took into consideration, in Committee of the Whole, (Mr.
ANDERSON having been requested by the PRESIDENT to take the Chair,) the
amendments reported by the select committee to the bill, entitled “An act
to prohibit the importation of certain goods, wares, and merchandise.”
And, after debate, the PRESIDENT resumed the Chair, and Mr. ANDERSON,
from the Committee of the Whole, reported that they had disagreed to the
amendments of the select committee, but had agreed to an amendment to the
bill; which was read, and the bill was amended accordingly; and, on the
question, Shall the bill pass to the third reading, as amended? it passed
in the affirmative--yeas 19, nays 9, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Condit, Gaillard,
Gilman, Howland, Kitchel, Maclay, Mitchill, Moore, Smith of
Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Ohio, Smith of Tennessee,
Smith of Vermont, Thruston, Turner, and Wright.
NAYS.--Messrs. Adair, Bradley, Hillhouse, Pickering, Plumer,
Stone, Sumter, Tracy, and White.
FRIDAY, April 11.
_Potomac Bridge._
The bill, entitled “An act authorizing the erection of a bridge over the
river Potomac, within the District of Columbia,” was read the third time;
and, on motion to postpone the further consideration thereof until the
first Monday in December next, it passed in the affirmative--yeas 19,
nays 10, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Adair, Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Gilman,
Hillhouse, Howland, Kitchel, Maclay, Mitchill, Pickering, Smith
of Maryland, Smith of New York, Stone, Sumter, Thruston, Tracy,
Worthington, and Wright.
NAYS.--Messrs. Bradley, Condit, Gaillard, Moore, Plumer, Smith
of Ohio, Smith of Tennessee, Smith of Vermont, Turner, and
White.
So the bill was postponed.
SATURDAY, April 12.
_Exclusion of Army and Naval officers from civil appointments._
The bill, entitled “An act to prohibit the officers of the Army and Navy
from holding or exercising any civil office,” was read the second time;
and on motion to postpone this bill to the first Monday in December next,
it passed in the affirmative--yeas 17, nays 10, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Adair, Adams, Baldwin, Condit, Gilman, Howland,
Kitchel, Logan, Mitchill, Plumer, Smith of Maryland, Smith of
New York, Smith of Tennessee, Smith of Vermont, Tracy, White,
and Wright.
NAYS.--Messrs. Anderson, Gaillard, Hillhouse, Maclay, Moore,
Pickering, Stone, Sumter, Turner, and Worthington.
So the bill was postponed.
MONDAY, April 14.
_Tunisian Demand and Threat._
The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, which was read, and ordered to lie for consideration:
_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States_:
During the blockade of Tripoli by the squadron of the United
States, a small cruiser, under the flag of Tunis, with two
prizes (all of trifling value) attempted to enter Tripoli,
was turned back, warned, and attempting again to enter, was
taken and detained as prize by the squadron. Her restitution
was claimed by the Bey of Tunis, with a threat of war, in
terms so serious that, on withdrawing from the blockade of
Tripoli, the commanding officer of the squadron thought it his
duty to repair to Tunis with his squadron, and to require a
categorical declaration, whether peace or war was intended. The
Bey preferred explaining himself by an Ambassador to the United
States, who, on his arrival, renewed the request that the
vessel and her prizes should be restored. It was deemed proper
to give this proof of friendship to the Bey, and the Ambassador
was informed the vessels would be restored. Afterwards he made
a requisition of naval stores to be sent to the Bey, in order
to secure a peace for the term of three years, with a threat
of war, if refused. It has been refused, and the Ambassador is
about to depart without receding from his threat or demand.
Under these circumstances, and considering that the several
provisions of the act of March 25th, 1804, will cease, in
consequence of the ratification of the treaty of peace with
Tripoli, now advised and consented to by the Senate, I have
thought it my duty to communicate these facts, in order that
Congress may consider the expediency of continuing the same
provisions for a limited time, or making others equivalent.