The fourth section of the bill being under consideration--

Mr. JACKSON said: As this section is the corner stone on which the whole

superstructure rests, and involves the most important principle of the

bill, I will ask the indulgence of the committee to make a few remarks

upon it. It presents two important questions; first, whether it is proper

on the broad principle of political justice to adopt it? And secondly,

whether it is consistent with our treaty with France? Two questions arise

out of the first proposition; first, Is the system consonant to the

habits of a free people? And, secondly, if not, is it the best calculated

to advance the happiness of those who have never tasted the blessings of

liberty? The first question requires no discussion; it will be answered

in the negative by every section of this Union. Every section has been

engaged in forming a constitution, and both the State and Federal

constitutions have decided this point in the negative, because neither

partake of the aristocratical or monarchical features contained in this

section.

It is urged by gentlemen, that we ought to give to this people liberty

by degrees. I believe, however, there is no danger of giving them too

much of it; and I am unwilling to tarnish the national character by

sanctioning the detestable calumny that man is not fitted for freedom.

What will the world say if we sanction this principle? They will say we

possess the principle of despotism under the garb of Republicans; and

that we are insincere, with whatever solemnity we may declare it, in

pronouncing all men equal. They will tell us that we have emphatically

declared to the American people and to the world, in our first act

evincive of emancipation from the tyranny of England, that all men are

equal; and that all governments derive their rightful power from the

consent of the governed; and that notwithstanding, when the occasion

offers, we exercise despotic power, under the pretext that the people are

unable to govern themselves.

Mr. HOLLAND.--As my ideas are very different from those of the gentleman

who has preceded me, and as I do not believe that either policy or moral

obligation recommends the adoption of a system such as he has avowed to

be proper, I will, in a few words, state the sentiments I entertain.

Can gentlemen conceive the people of Louisiana, who have just thrown

off their chains, qualified to make laws? Under the late system the

people had no concern in the government, and it was even criminal for

them to concern themselves with it; they were set at a distance from

the government, and all required from their hands was, to be passive

and obedient. Can it be supposed such a people made the subject of

government their study, or can it be presumed they know any thing about

the principles of the Constitution of the United States? Would persons

thus elected be of any service to the Government? So far from being an

assistance, they would be an encumbrance. Why then impose this burden

upon them? The object of this bill is to extend the laws of the United

States over Louisiana, not to enable the people of Louisiana to make

laws. This extension, so far from being an act of despotism, will be an

important privilege. If the laws of the United States were founded in

injustice they might have some right to complain, but we only apply to

them laws by which we ourselves consent to be governed.

The provisions of this section are said to be worse than those of the

first grade of Territorial governments; but this is incorrect. This plan

is not equal to the second grade, but it is certainly superior to the

first grade. The first grade gives the Governor and judges all the powers

granted by this section; and this section, in addition to the Governor

and judges, contemplates the appointment of thirteen councillors. Is not

this preferable to giving the whole power to the Governor and judges?

Mr. BOYLE said he should not have risen on this occasion but for the

impression that some arguments of weight had been omitted, or had not

been sufficiently dwelt on. In the few remarks he purposed to make,

he should endeavor to avoid a repetition of ideas already expressed.

It was not so much to the novelty, as to the nature of the plan of

government contained in the fourth section, that he was opposed. He did

not consider the Territorial government proposed to be substituted as

perfect, but he believed it infinitely preferable to that contemplated

in the bill. Preferring, therefore, either grade to this, said Mr. B., I

shall concur in supporting the substitution of the second grade as most

fitted to the circumstances of the people of Louisiana. I feel peculiarly

hostile to the mode of appointing the Legislative Council. The power of

appointing them is unnecessarily vested in the President. Waiving all

objection arising from the distance of the President from the men to

be appointed; from the necessity of his relying on the representations

of others as to their qualifications, and his liability to be deceived

by misrepresentations; still one objection remains, which, to my mind,

is most important. I am, said Mr. B., unwilling to extend executive

patronage beyond the line of irresistible necessity. For, I believe, if

ever this country is to follow the destiny of other nations, this destiny

will be accelerated by the overwhelming torrent of executive patronage.

I feel as high a veneration for the present Chief Magistrate as any man

on this floor. Early attached to him, I have retained the full force of

my regard for him. But, were he an angel, instead of a man, I would not

clothe him with this power; because, in my estimation, the investiture

of such high powers is unnecessary. My opinion is, that they will be

more properly exercised by the people. To give them to the President

is to furnish a dangerous precedent for extending executive power and

patronage; and as he has himself said, one precedent in favor of power is

stronger than a hundred against it. I am in favor of giving to the people

all that portion of self-government and independence which is compatible

with the constitution.

WEDNESDAY, March 7.

_Georgia Claims._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill

providing for the settlement of sundry claims to public lands lying south

of the State of Tennessee; to which Committee of the Whole were also

referred, on the twentieth ultimo, a motion containing sundry resolutions

“respecting claimants to the said lands under an act of the Legislature

of the State of Georgia, passed in the year one thousand seven hundred

and ninety-five.”

Mr. J. RANDOLPH called for the reading of sundry resolutions lately

offered by him on this subject. The resolutions having been read, Mr.

R. said, when he had submitted them, it was with the view of trying

the question then before the committee as he thought fairly. It was no

part of his intention to embarrass the operations of the friends of the

bill, further than to take the sense of the committee and of the House

on each specific proposition embraced by the resolutions. His wish,

therefore, was, that the sense of the committee, in the first instance,

should be taken on the resolutions. If they should be rejected, the vote

of rejection would be a virtual admission of the claims of 1795; and

gentlemen might then modify the bill in such manner as might best please

them to do.

Mr. MITCHILL.--These resolutions tend to involve Congress in the

proceedings of the State of Georgia. I consider myself as one of those

who, by assenting to certain acts heretofore passed by Congress, have

consented to a hearing and compromise with the grantees. If this

construction be correct, the Committee are precluded from adopting these

resolutions; nor is it proper, in my opinion, for Congress to go into

a view of the proceedings of Georgia on this occasion. That State is

sovereign to a certain extent, and this Government possesses no right to

interfere with her sovereignty. Attached to this sovereignty is the right

of granting land belonging to her. But it is alleged that Georgia was,

in the year 1795, in a disorderly state, and that a certain Legislature

in that year did a certain act which a subsequent Legislature declared

to be totally unauthorized. This may be so. It is certain the second

Legislature declared the act of the first null, under circumstances of

a very extraordinary nature. I do not, however, see that it is our duty

to give an opinion whether the Legislature of Georgia acted wickedly or

uprightly. Whichever course they may have pursued, I do not believe this

body to be a constitutional board of censors. We find frequent occasions

enough on which, without going out of our way, our duty calls upon us to

give our opinions. Believing this to be an occasion on which no opinion

is required from us, and one which it is most prudent to pass by without

giving such opinion, I wish not to vote for or against the resolutions. I

am, therefore, for the committee’s rising and reporting the bill.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH.--I had hoped that when these resolutions were sent from

the House to the committee, they would have received the respectful

attention to which every such reference is entitled; and that the

committee would at least have deemed them worthy of some expression

of opinion on them; that they would have deigned to say whether the

reasoning or facts contained in them are or are not erroneous and

unfounded. The gentleman from New York tells the committee that, by

an act passed at a previous session of Congress, a pledge has been

given to a certain description of claimants under the act of 1795, to

do something in relation to their claims. If so, is this a reason for

not acting on the resolutions? No; it is a reason for taking them up

and rejecting them. One of those resolutions says, and I am prepared

to prove it true, and I call on gentlemen to show its falsehood, “that

the claims of persons derived under the act of January first, 1795, are

recognized neither by any compact between the United States and the State

of Georgia, nor by any act of the Federal Government.” I deny that they

are so recognized. If they are, what can be easier than for the learned

gentleman to refer to the compact under which they are recognized? This

he cannot show, and hence his unwillingness to express an opinion. At an

antecedent session we passed a law on this subject. The gentleman may

have given his vote for this law under the impression he states, but it

does not follow that the Legislature acted under the same impression; on

the contrary, I know several gentlemen who voted for it, though hostile

to the claims under the act of 1795, because it contained a general

provision for claims, and did not particularly recognize those arising

under the act of 1795; and now, because Congress have passed an act of

a general nature, when it was notorious there are a variety of claims

besides those under the act of 1795, and none of which are mentioned

either in the compact or treaty with the State of Georgia, it is said

we have given a pledge, and we are called upon to fulfil it. And this

language is held by gentlemen who, in the same breath, have expressed a

disposition to reject another description of claims. Could absurdity

speak in stronger language? A general appropriation has been made by

Congress for claims; the claims preferred are of two classes--those

under the acts of 1789 and 1795. There might have been claims of a

hundred other descriptions--for all these Congress have made a general

appropriation--and yet we are told by gentlemen hostile to the claims of

1789 that we are pledged to provide for those of 1795. If we are pledged

to satisfy one description, are we not equally pledged to the other? But

the truth is, we have given no pledge. If we have, nothing is so easy

as to refer to the statute book, and to point it out. No such pledge

is recognized by our compact with Georgia. While I am up, permit me to

say, if the compact with Georgia be construed according to its letter,

the appropriation of $5,000,000 ought to be considered as not embracing

claims under the act of 1795, for the best reason in the world: the

statute book of Georgia shows the reason. But, say gentlemen, we possess

the power to satisfy these claims, though such satisfaction may not have

been contemplated by our compact with Georgia. There must, say they,

have been an understanding between the Commissioners of Georgia and our

Commissioners in favor of compromising them, and therefore it is inferred

that we ought to be governed more by the _quo animo_ with which the

compact was formed than by its strict letter; it is accordingly attempted

to be proved, that there was an understanding between our Commissioners

and those of Georgia, that relief should be extended to claimants under

the act of 1795. I am authorized by the Commissioners to say that this

was not the case. Whether, therefore, we are governed by the strict

letter of the contract, or by the _quo animo_, we cannot discover the

grounds for this opinion. I have been told, in a way which removes all

doubts, by the Commissioners on both sides, at least by a Commissioner of

the United States having a great participation in the business, and by

the Georgia Commissioners, that the stipulation in the compact was not

inserted at the instance of Georgia, but reluctantly inserted by them at

the instance of the Commissioners of the United States.

Mr. MACON (Speaker) remarked that this question, like many others

which presented themselves, had taken up a long time in discussing the

preliminary point that might have been required on the resolutions. To

rise and report the bill, without acting on the resolutions, would be

a virtual rejection of them; especially as the House had determined to

rise on the 19th. For one, Mr. M. said, he was ready to vote on the

resolutions. If it were wrong to vote on them, it was certainly proper

to vote against their reference. But why not vote on them? We may not

all agree; but have we not a right to think for ourselves? Let us then

meet them, and vote as we see best. Mr. M. said he was more desirous of

meeting the question, as he differed from those with whom he generally

coincided in opinion. It may be said the resolutions embrace an abstract

question. If so, gentlemen ought not to have allowed their reference.

In the present stage of the business, no question could be taken unless

in the committee, or on a motion to discharge the committee from their

further consideration. Mr. M. said, he thought it the right of every

member of a deliberative body to express his sentiments and record his

opinion on any subject before it. This had always been the practice. He

trusted, therefore, the committee would not rise, but proceed to the

discussion of the resolutions.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH.--I little expected to stand on this floor, in the list

of persons hostile to State rights--to be charged, as the gentleman

before me has expressed himself, with having brought forward propositions

subversive of the rights of the States. The sovereignty of the States

has ever been the cardinal principle of my political opinions, and in

the outset, I enlisted under the banner of State rights in opposition to

federal usurpation. The doctrine of exalting the General Government on

the ruin of the authority of the States, is at length exploded, and those

who have heretofore been most conspicuous in encroaching upon the rights

of the States, generally, and upon those of Georgia in particular, are

now foremost in displaying their zeal for both. I cannot but rejoice at

the acquisition which this cause has made. But to those of its friends

who are too new to it to understand its interests as yet, I would

recommend, that they would take the conduct of the Georgia delegation

as an evidence of the rights and interests of that State. They surely

are not so destitute of information or fidelity, as to misunderstand or

abandon the rights of the people whom they represent.--So long, however,

as I have the honor of concurring with them in opinion, I shall be very

easy under any clamor which the new friends of Georgia and of the rights

of States may endeavor to excite. If, however, gentlemen are unwilling

to rely on the opinions of so few, however respectable men, I refer them

to the act of the Legislature of Georgia herself, generally called the

rescinding act, passed under circumstances of unparalleled unanimity, and

confirmed by the general voice of the people, who subsequently recognized

it in, and ingrafted it upon their constitution. If still they remain

dissatisfied, I would ask them if the recognition of the claims against

Georgia, in the bill which they are so eager to pass, be not equally

a violation of the rights of that State, with the rejection of those

claims. Does not the bill before you, in pronouncing upon the validity of

the act of Georgia, equally involve the principle against which gentlemen

protest so loudly, with the resolutions themselves? They have their

choice either to pronounce the corrupt act of 1795, or the rescinding act

of 1796, invalid. Are not the rights of Georgia as much affected by the

one as by the other? and even more, by annulling the act of 1796, since

she alone recognizes that to be her own.

Here Mr. R. read the first and second resolutions:

“_Resolved_, That the State of Georgia was at no time invested

with the power of alienating the right of soil possessed by the

good people of that State in and to the vacant territory of the

same, but in a rightful manner and for the general good.”

Who will deny it? If Georgia has made a valid contract we must execute

it. If invalid, there is no obligation on us to perform it.

“That when the governors of any people shall have betrayed

the confidence reposed in them, and shall have exercised that

authority with which they have been invested for the general

welfare, to promote their own private ends, under the basest

motives, and to the public detriment, it is the inalienable

right of a people, thus circumstanced, to revoke the authority

thus abused, to resume the rights thus attempted to be

bartered, and to abrogate the act thus endeavoring to betray

them.”

I am afraid if we deny this position we have no title to show for our own

existence as a nation.

Mr. R. here read the third resolution:

“That it is in evidence to this House that the act of the

Legislature of Georgia passed on the 7th of January, 1795,

entitled an act &c., was passed by persons under the influence

of gross and palpable corruption, practised by the grantees

of the lands attempted to be alienated by the aforesaid

act, tending to enrich and aggrandize, to a degree almost

incalculable, a few individuals, and ruinous to the public

interest.”

If there be any objection in my mind to this resolution, it is that

it does not sufficiently detail what it contains in substance; that

the vendors of this iniquitous bargain being at the same time the

vendees, the contract was therefore void. On a former occasion, when

this position was advanced, we were told that, on the same principle,

the sale of our western lands might be set aside, since members of the

Legislature speculated in them to a vast amount. However indecorous

and reprehensible this may have been in persons in their situation;

there was a wide and material difference between the sales made by the

United States and a pretended sale like this--not of a few acres, but

of millions; not of sections and half sections, but of thousands of

square miles; not measured by chains and perches, but by circles of

latitude and longitude; not made in the face of day, on public notice,

for a reasonable equivalent, and with the general participation of the

citizens, but bartered away in the dark by wholesale for the emolument

of the partners in the job, for a pretended consideration too paltry to

give an air of validity to the contract; and even this sum, pitiful as

it was, had since been drawn from the treasury of Georgia by those who

had paid it, or others claiming under them by an act yet more infamous

and disgraceful if possible than that by which it was deposited there.

But it is not my intention at this time to enter into the particulars

of this transaction. In the former stages of this bill I have endeavored

to give a faithful history of it. Weak and vain, however, must be every

effort to do justice to this enormous and atrocious procedure. Some

gentlemen indeed will tell you that we have no proof of these facts. The

depositions are _ex parte_, say they, and therefore in strictness of law

cannot be considered as evidence. But when was it known that men could

not legislate on less than legal evidence? Have we not the same evidence

of the fraud that we have of the existence of the claims? Are not the

evidences of both in the same report? the same proof of the corruption

as of the claims? They both hang together. Do not gentlemen themselves

admit the existence of the corruption? On what other principle could

they justify their proposition to withhold from these harpies the whole

of their glorious booty, and put them off with a comparative pittance?

Set aside the evidence of the corruption, and it cannot be denied, that

instead of five, they are entitled to fifty millions of acres. I repeat

they are entitled to all or nothing. We at least are consistent, we deny

their title to anything, and we propose to give them nothing. Gentlemen

on the other side can support the claim to the five millions, which they

propose to give, only by arguments which justify a claim to ten times

that amount.

Mr. R. here read the fourth resolution:

“That the good people of Georgia, impressed with general

indignation at the act of atrocious perfidy and unparalleled

corruption, with a promptitude of decision highly honorable

to them, did, by the act of a subsequent Legislature, passed

on the 13th day of February, 1796, under circumstances of

peculiar solemnity, and finally sanctioned by the people, who

have subsequently ingrafted it on their constitution, declare

the preceding act and the grants made under it, in themselves

null and void; that the said act should be expunged from the

records of the State and publicly burnt--which was accordingly

done--provision at the same time being made for restoring

the pretended purchase money to the grantees, by whom, or by

persons claiming under them, the greater part of the said

purchase money has been withdrawn from the treasury of Georgia.”

This is another of the resolutions not even substantially embraced in

the proffered amendment, which has been rejected by the committee. The

evidence of the facts contained in the former part of it is to be found

in the act of Georgia, which I hold in my hand, commonly called the

rescinding act. The report of our Commissioners furnishes the proof

of the withdrawal of the money, with a detailed statement of that

nefarious business, which in the former stages of this bill has been

amply explained. In the rescinding act the Legislature of Georgia take

other objections to the usurpation of 1795, besides those founded on its

corruption. They deny the constitutional right of their predecessors to

have made such an alienation of the public domain, even with honorable

views and for a fair equivalent. They declare that their constitution

prescribes a certain mode whereby vacant lands shall be sold and granted,

and that the pretended act of 1795 is void, not only from its corruption,

but from its contravening those provisions. This is a weighty and vital

objection. The slow yet equitable method known to the Constitution of

Georgia of laying off new counties, granting out the lands, when they

were appropriated and settled, laying off and settling others, was

ill-suited to the gigantic rapacity of the Assembly of 1795, and their

ravenous accomplices, who grasped at every acre within the nominal limits

of the State, whether covered by Indian titles, or whether those claims

were extinguished.

I must beg leave, in answer to the objection of some gentlemen here, to

repeat what was advanced by me in a former discussion of the subject.

Georgia ceded this territory to us subject to certain specified claims,

arising under Great Britain, under Spain, and under her Bourbon act, as

it is commonly called, which has no relation to any of the Yazoo acts,

as they are termed. For these claims we have stipulated to provide,

moreover paying her a certain sum out of the first proceeds of the lands,

as a consideration for the grant. Besides the above-mentioned claims

there were others not recognized by, or provided for, in our compact.

In relation to these, Georgia gives a reluctant assent, (which is to

be inferred as well from the expressions which are used in the treaty,

as from the declaration of the Commissioners on both sides,) that we

may apply, not exceeding five millions of acres to quiet other claims,

generally, without specifying what they are--the appropriation not to

exceed the amount above, and to be made within six months from the

ratification of the compact, or to revert back to Georgia. Among the

claims of this vague description may be ranked those of the Virginia

and South Carolina Yazoo Companies (under the act of Georgia of 1789,

and those arising under the corrupt act of 1795.) We are at liberty,

therefore, to give these reserved five millions of acres to either, or

to both, of those descriptions of conflicting claimants, but we are

certainly not bound to bestow an acre on one of them, either by compact

with Georgia or by our own act of appropriation. When that act passed it

was at the close of our session; there was not time to investigate any of

these claims. It was then understood that some of them were equitable,

and not founded in corruption. If we had not then made the appropriation,

the term within which we were permitted to make it, would have elapsed

before the next session of Congress. We therefore made the appropriation

in the same general terms of our compact with Georgia, pledging

ourselves to none, while we thereby reserved the right of examining and

recompensing all, in case they should thereafter be found to deserve

it. The day of investigation having arrived, you are invited to decline

it altogether, and hold that the reservation of the right to give, is

converted by some political magic into a duty, and that too by those who

propose to give nothing to the companies of 1789, although their claim is

embraced by the general provision of our compact with Georgia, and by the

terms of our act of appropriation as much as the claims of the companies

of 1795.

FRIDAY, March 9.

_Government of Louisiana._

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the

government of Louisiana. The fifth section being read, as follows:

“SEC. 5. The judicial power shall be vested in a superior

court, and in such inferior courts, and justices of the peace,

as the Legislature of the Territory may, from time to time,

establish. The judges of the superior court, and the justices

of the peace, shall hold their offices for the term of four

years. The superior court shall consist of three judges,

any one of whom shall constitute a court. They shall have

jurisdiction in all criminal cases, and exclusive jurisdiction

in all those which are capital, and original and appellate

jurisdiction in all civil cases of the value of one hundred

dollars. Its sessions shall commence on the first Monday of

every month, and continue till all the business depending

before them shall be disposed of. They shall appoint their own

clerk. In all criminal prosecutions which are capital, the

trial shall be by a jury of twelve good and lawful men of the

vicinage; and in all cases, criminal and civil, in the superior

court, the trial shall be by a jury, if either of the parties

require it. The inhabitants of the said Territory shall be

entitled to the benefits of the writ of _habeas corpus_; they

shall be bailable, unless for capital offences, where the proof

shall be evident, or the presumption great; and no cruel and

unusual punishment shall be inflicted:”

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL moved to strike out “which are capital, the trial

shall be by a jury of twelve good and lawful men of the vicinage; and in

all cases, criminal and civil, in the superior court, the trial shall

be by a jury, if either of the parties require it,” and to insert “the

trial shall be by jury, and in all civil cases above the value of twenty

dollars.”

Mr. C. said he conceived that in legislating for the people of Louisiana,

they were bound by the Constitution of the United States, and that

they had not a right to establish courts in that Territory on any

other terms than they could in any of the States. Wherever courts were

established in a Territory, they must be considered as courts of the

United States, and of consequence cannot be otherwise constituted than

as courts in the States. The constitution expressly declares that, in

criminal cases the trial shall be by jury, and in all civil cases where

the sum in controversy exceeds the value of twenty dollars, the trial

shall be likewise by jury. In the ninth article of the amendments to the

constitution, we find the following words: “In suits at common law where

the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial

by jury shall be preserved.” The eighth article says: “In all criminal

prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial by an impartial jury.”

I will observe that the right of trial given by this section, to wit: “if

either of the parties require it,” is a dangerous mode of proceeding, and

may tend unwarily to entrap them. The person brought before the court for

a misdemeanor, asked if he requires a jury trial, may be ignorant of the

evidence, and may not know the benefits of a trial by jury; he must at

all events show a want of confidence in the court, or waive a jury trial.

If he does the first, he may sour the minds of the court. The party

is thus put in a situation which may be worse than if he was deprived

altogether of the right of a trial, by the necessity of making a choice

which may operate more against him. The bill therefore does not secure

the right of a jury trial, as contemplated by the constitution.

Mr. SLOAN said a few words in support of the motion, which was lost--yeas

20.

[At this stage of the business we attended the trial of impeachment

in the Senate, and cannot with perfect correctness state the further

proceedings of the House on the bill. We understand, however, that the

new section, sometime since offered by Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL, providing

for the election of a Legislature by the people of Louisiana, instead

of their being governed according to the bill from the Senate by a

council appointed by the President, was disagreed to--yeas 37, nays

43.--_Reporter._][9]

SATURDAY, March 10.

_Georgia Claims._

Mr. J. RANDOLPH moved the taking up for consideration the resolution

offered by him on the claims under the act of Georgia of 1795.

Mr. ELLIOT moved the order of the day on the bill for the compromise of

those and other claims.

Mr. GREGG moved to postpone the further consideration of the resolutions

till the first day of December next. He was, he said, perfectly prepared

to act on the bill for the settlement of the claims, and to give it his

decided negative; and should have no objections, but for the lateness

of the session, and the great mass of important business that demanded

attention.

The SPEAKER said, the motion to consider the resolutions, being first

made, must be first put.

It accordingly was put, and carried--yeas 58.

Mr. JACKSON then moved a postponement of the resolutions until the 1st

Monday in December.

Mr. STANFORD inquired whether the motion of postponement was not

susceptible of a division, so as to apply to each resolution separately.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH hoped the question would be so taken.

Mr. RODNEY expressed the same wish, and that the yeas and nays might be

taken on each division of the question. He was opposed to a postponement.

He should not have risen at this late period but for the warm opposition

the resolutions had received from various quarters, and but for his

desire to avail himself of the opportunity to state his reasons for

giving them a firm support.

It is objected to these resolutions that they are abstract propositions.

By abstract principles, I understand axioms unapplied. But when they

are applied to facts, they cease to be considered in the abstract. In

geometry there are certain elementary principles which are the basis of

all reasoning on any proposition in that department of science. So in law

there are principles in the abstract while they remain unapplied, and

which bear in every case where facts admit of their application. So in

politics certain principles are held sacred, either in the view of right,

or in relation to the constitution of a State. But when these principles

are applied to a given state of things, they cease to be abstract. In

the Declaration of Independence there are several abstract principles,

such as “that all men are free,” &c. But when applied to a certain state

of things, they are no longer abstract. I apprehend, therefore, that my

worthy friend from Pennsylvania will, on more mature reflection, perceive

that the principles contained in the resolutions bearing on facts cease

to be abstract; on facts which it is necessary for us to decide, and

against examining the consequences of which no reason can be urged. But,

says another gentleman, we have no jurisdiction in the case; we have

nothing to do with the act of Georgia of 1795; we have no authority

over it. I confess myself really surprised to be assured, over and over

again, that the act of 1795 which gives the House all this trouble, is

the corner stone of the present claims, and without which there would

not be a shadow of claim, is not to be considered as blended with our

proceedings. What! when we are called upon to compromise claims, are we

not to go to the cause, to the fountain source, and decide whether they

have, or have not, a foundation in justice? Put the act of 1795 out of

the way, and would we have ever heard of this compromise? Remove it, and

would we have a single claimant before us soliciting a compromise? I

consider the act, to Georgia, as involving the all-important point; as

intimately and indissolubly blended with the question before us. That

question is whether we will consent to give five millions to effect a

compromise of claims, directly emanating from the act of 1795; and then,

as an incidental question, we are obliged to look at the act of 1795.

If the House have authority over the main question, _ex vi termini_,

they have authority over every question incidental to it; and common

sense teaches us that it is absolutely necessary to determine on the

validity of the act of 1795, in order to decide the justice or policy of

compromising claims arising out of it.

Having settled, as I conceive, these preliminary points, I will call the

attention of the House to the great point on which their decision must

turn. Either the act of 1795 or of 1796 is in force. If that of 1795 is

in force the claimants have a legal title to unascertained millions. If

that act is not binding, they have no claim at all. If that act is of

no authority, there is an end of their title. The tree is cut up by the

roots, and all its branches fall. They have either then a title to fifty

millions, or they have no title at all. Their case cannot be compared to

a common saying, which declares half a loaf better than no bread.

Now let us compare these facts and reasonings with the resolutions. When

I rose I intended to have taken them up in order, but as I have been

diverted by the course of the argument, I shall pursue the track I have

taken. One of the resolutions states “that a subsequent legislature of an

individual State has an undoubted right to repeal any act of a preceding

legislature, provided such repeal be not forbidden by the constitution of

such State, or of the United States.”

This is, I think, a plain and clear axiom. Both legislatures flow from

the same source, and are armed with equal powers. What one legislature

can do, another may undo, if the interest of the public prescribes it. I

know an ingenious distinction is taken, as to the power of a legislative

body, between municipal acts and those constituting contracts. The

distinction holds to a certain degree as to expediency, but not as to

power. When a legislative body forms a contract, it is a solemn thing,

and it ought not to be touched, except when the private evil arising from

its being annulled should rather be endured than the public calamity

arising from its continuance. But still the position of the resolution is

perfectly tenable. What one legislature has done another may undo; what

one has enacted, a subsequent one may repeal.

Let us examine whether there is any thing in the rescinding act of

Georgia at variance with the constitution of that State, or the

Constitution of the United States. The whole course of the business

shows the previous act to have been a violation of the Constitution of

Georgia. The Constitution of the United States declares that no State

“shall pass any _ex post facto_ law, or law impairing the obligation of

contracts.” That no contract has been impaired, is evident from attending

to the sense of the word. I know of no contract formed, either in a

legal or equitable sense. Did the Constitution of Georgia authorize her

Representatives to rob the people of their property? Or did it authorize

them only to dispose of it for their welfare? If they had a right to

dispose of it in a wrongful manner, it knocks up the argument at once. If

they were vested with a right to rob and plunder their constituents, I

give up the point. But until this is shown I shall remain of opinion that

they only had the right of disposing of it for the general good. I am not

about to travel through the fruitful wilderness of inquiry disclosed in

the progress of this affair. But gentlemen say that we have no evidence

of corruption. What do they want more than we possess? The whole business

has been referred to a set of Commissioners, whose comprehensive powers

embraced an investigation of every claim. They have fully examined the

claims under the act of 1795, and they have reported that--

“A comparison of the schedule annexed to the articles, and

which is declared to be a part of the agreement, with the yeas

and nays on the passage of the act authorizing the sale, (E.)

shows that all the members, both in the Senate and House, who

voted in favor of the law, were, with one single exception,

(Robert Watkins, whose name does not appear,) interested in,

and parties to, the purchase.

“The articles of agreement, and list of associates of the

Tennessee company, which have been voluntarily furnished by

one of the trustees, show that a number of the members of the

Legislature were also interested in that company.”

This stubborn fact appears on the face of a report made by persons

duly authorized to investigate the whole transaction. The fact is

indisputable, and ought to satisfy the most reluctant and unwilling mind

of the enormity of the corruption attending this business. It is fully

satisfactory to my mind. But it is said that this statement is founded

on _ex parte_ depositions, and that no opportunity has been allowed to

cross-examine the witnesses. But where were they taken? In Georgia;

in probably the same House that witnessed the scene of disgrace; by a

tribunal competent to take them and to inquire into facts.

Upon the whole, it appears to me most evident, on referring to the acts

of Georgia, the articles of cession, and the laws of Congress, that the

claims under the acts of Georgia have no validity. If, therefore, we give

any thing, it must be from compassion, and not from the obligations of

justice. Let the House, ere it do this, reflect whether there are not

objects in the country equally worthy of their compassion. Let them

visit the straw shed of the war-worn soldier who bled in the defence

of our rights; the comfortless hut of the widow who lost her husband

in battle. With but little search we shall find a mountain of claims

that overhangs the justice of the country. If, after this view, we

shall consider any unfortunate victims of injustice in this transaction

entitled to compassion, I will agree to go as far as any man in affording

them relief. But were we as rich as Crœsus, I would first administer

relief to the Belisariuses of our country. Let us be just to these before

we are generous to other descriptions of claimants.

Mr. T. M. RANDOLPH.--Mr. Speaker: I hope the House will not consent to

postpone these resolutions. I hope it will, on the contrary, immediately

proceed to consider them, and conclude by adopting them, for, taken

generally, they meet my warm approbation as to the principles they lay

down, and I am anxious to see the last one, which is the fair corollary

of the other, incorporated into the bill now before us.

My opinion is, that it will cast a broad stain on the American character,

as it must be exhibited in future history, for this body which represents

it to grant compensation for their pretended losses, under whatever form

ingenuity may invent to disguise it, to any of those adventurers who made

the spurious contract with Georgia in the year 1795, for the purchase of

her western territory, upon the ground that the fictitious bargain gave

the least shadow of title to any part of that territory. This opinion is

a conviction irresistibly given to my mind by an impartial investigation,

that what were at that time called companies of land adventurers, were,

with the exception of one or two misled individuals, whose delusion and

consequent implication I lament, no other, in their conduct on this

occasion, than shameless bands of sharpers; what was impudently called a

contract, was, in reality, a fraud of unprecedented enormity, and what

has since been declared an unjust interposition of the primary sovereign

authority of the State, to cancel a fair bargain, was no more than the

regular and proper application of the only sufficient means which could

be used to redress a cheat upon the people of Georgia of unparalleled

audacity and magnitude. I am sorry, by entertaining this opinion, to

differ with so many on this floor, with whom it is my pride to think;

but I am not much surprised at that difference. Very rarely, indeed,

have I heard of important questions which did not divide opinions; never

have I been at a criminal trial where numbers did not doubt the reality

of the crime. Such is the difference in the impression made by the same

testimony upon different minds. Were it not for this extraordinary

circumstance in our nature, which almost precludes unanimity, and which

completely defies explanation upon any general principles of the moral

structure of man, there would be but one sentiment in this House upon the

question now before it. The information which has satisfied my mind, I

have derived from the declarations of the counties of Georgia, in their

petitions and remonstrances presented to the convention of that State,

which assembled in the month of May, 1795; from the acknowledgment made

by that convention of the dignity of those applications, and the respect

due to them, in the resolve which referred the matter they contained to

the consideration of the succeeding Legislature; from the proceedings

of the General Assembly of 1796, upon that matter, and the evidence

it collected and recorded relative thereto; and, lastly, from certain

declarations and provisions confirming those proceedings, and thereby

establishing that evidence, which were made by the convention of 1798,

and which exist now in the body of the present Constitution of Georgia.

The same means of information are within the reach of all; I ought to

say, should be possessed by all; I might say, should be satisfactory to

all; since the witnesses are the great body of the people of one of our

respectable States, and the testimony is authenticated, confirmed, and

preserved, as well by the constitutional as the ordinary code of that

State.

It has not been my object in making this inquiry, to learn in what

deep sharper’s brain this scheme was first engendered, which of the

associates stood most prominent in the development and execution of

it, how the price paid for the flagrant treason against posterity was

apportioned, or how the spoil obtained by such a stupendous larceny,

committed upon the inheritance of the unborn, was divided. I have not

desired to know, and it would be unimportant to the House to be informed,

which of the associates had no moral sense at all, whose conscience was

subdued by his avarice, or who, unthinkingly, gave the control of it

into the hands of his friend. I desire not to see any name consigned

to infamy; of those which have come to my knowledge, one or two I yet

respect; the remainder have not more distinct images annexed to them,

in my mind, than those of the men who conceived and executed the South

Sea cheat in England, or the Mississippi fraud in France. But, from the

investigation I have made, I have learned, as certainly as the actions

of men can be known to others than the actual beholders of them, that

the Legislature of Georgia, which commenced its session in the autumn of

1794, was assailed by every possible artifice of seduction, to procure

from it the act of 7th January, 1795, which constituted what has since

been impudently called the Yazoo contract. That it yielded to those

artifices, and a considerable majority of its members became treacherous

to their constituents, and deaf to the voice of their honor. That bribes

were daringly offered and unblushingly received for votes in favor of

the land. That the property of the State of Georgia, to the amount of

forty millions of dollars, at the most reasonable estimate, was sold

by those trustees of the people of Georgia for one half million, and

purchased by the sellers themselves in combination with certain abject

worshippers of gold, who had artfully infused into them their blind

fanaticism. That another offer of four-fifths of a million, made by other

men at the same time, was rejected, because the Legislature itself was

concerned in the first. That the Chief Magistrate of the State, after

one feeble effort of resistance, and a declaration which ought to have

bound him to an obstinate opposition, with a conduct which, to my mind,

manifests a thorough knowledge of the corrupt views of the Legislature,

as well as a want of energy to defeat them, yielded to the impulse, and

ratified the fraudulent sale. That the moment his irresolute hand gave

the illusive sanction to the vain and ineffectual deed, this ravenous

pack of speculators, keen with the hunger of avarice, unkennelled and

scoured the whole peopled territory of the Union in quest of their

appropriate game--the simple, the credulous, and those who are hoodwinked

by the excess of their own cupidity. The most voracious of them sought

the great cities, where numbers of the thirsty sons of gain became their

prey, while numbers more joined in the promising chase, led the way

to the victims, and fattened on their spoil. Many, more fell in their

nature, though less keen in their appetites for gold, traversed the

tranquil country of New England, scenting the homely purses which hung

in the smoky corner of peaceful cottages, into which the solitary dollar

had been dropped with religious punctuality every week, perhaps every

month only, by the hand of the provident father, from the time when the

first birth under his roof gladdened his heart. Great numbers of these

receptacles of hard-earned gain, with all their rusty treasure, the fruit

of long continued industry and frugality, destined to ensure to many of

the rising race the innocent joys of a life of wholesome exertion in

their own fields, were devoured by them, and that happy destiny in a

moment changed for a short period of certain pain, and, too probable,

vice, in the moving prisons of the ocean.

The promulgation of the law produced one general murmur of indignation

throughout the State of Georgia. The crime committed by the

Representatives of the people was strongly denounced by the grand juries

of all the succeeding courts. An assembly of special Representatives,

which had been summoned for constitutional purposes, meeting in the

succeeding spring, was addressed by all the counties of the State, and

by nearly the whole people of it, with memorials, remonstrances, and

petitions, according to the different degrees of excitement, all setting

forth in strong terms the nefarious act; complaining with bitterness

of the perfidy of the Legislature, requiring, urging, and imploring

the convention to proclaim the fact, and annul the fraudulent sale. No

laborious investigation into the huge and naked scheme of speculation,

no troublesome search after testimony to expose the framer of it was

necessary. Nothing was requisite but to receive, condense, and record

the decisive evidence voluntarily offered from all quarters. But this

legitimate and easy task the convention, naturally enough, thought fit

to decline, as many of its members were themselves openly concerned, and

many more secretly interested in the purchase. The pack of speculators

were then in full cry, the game were falling abundantly into their

jaws; it could scarcely be expected that those who had contributed so

much to set this chase on foot, who expected to share so largely in its

profits, should sound the horn of alarm to the objects of it. It quickly

occurred to a majority of this body, that a reference of these addresses

to the Legislature of the next year, would not only give time for the

continuance of the chase, but might be productive of something like

safety in the after possession of the spoils of it; while it promised

to afford some shield against the popular discontent and indignation

which a total neglect, so desirable to themselves, must inevitably have

brought on them. Notwithstanding, before midsummer of the same year,

the fraudulency and consequently invalidity of the sale must have been

unequivocally known throughout the Union, by the ferment in the State of

Georgia. Early in the succeeding year all the records of State relative

to this transaction were burned, and all recorded evidences of private

contracts which had arisen out of the land were cancelled, destroyed,

and forbidden to be renewed or afterwards admitted in the courts by the

Legislature acting under the authority to consider the matter, and of

course the power to redress the complaint of the petitions, which had

been given to it by the convention, and also under the express injunction

of the people themselves, laid on the individual members of that body at

the elections. But the speed of the sharpers had outstripped the slow

step of the State. They had, in a great measure, executed their swindling

scheme; a number of their dupes were already, instead of amusing their

own credulity, insincerely, and I will say, insolently, accusing the

perfidy of Georgia.

The question was then taken by yeas and nays on the postponement, until

the first Monday of December, of the following resolution:

“_Resolved_, That the Legislature of the State of Georgia were,

at no time, invested with the power of alienating the right of

soil possessed by the good people of that State, in and to the

vacant territory of the same, but in a rightful manner, and for

the public good:”

And passed in the negative--yeas 51, nays 52.

So much of the said original motion as is contained in the second clause

thereof, being again read, in the words following, to wit:

“That, when the Governors of any people shall have betrayed the

confidence reposed in them, and shall have exercised that authority with

which they have been clothed for the general welfare, to promote their

own private ends, under the basest motives, and to the public detriment,

it is the inalienable right of a people, so circumstanced, to revoke

the authority thus abused, to resume the rights thus attempted to be

bartered, and to abrogate the act thus endeavoring to betray them:”

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for

postponement of the said second clause of the original motion; and

resolved in the affirmative--yeas 52, nays 50.

So much of the said original motion as is contained in the third clause

thereof, being twice read, in the words following, to wit:

“That it is in evidence to this House, that the act of the

Legislature of Georgia, passed on the seventh of January, 1795,

entitled ‘An act for appropriating a part of the unlocated

territory of this State, for the payment of the State troops,

and for other purposes,’ was passed by persons under the

influence of gross and palpable corruption practised by

the grantees of the lands attempted to be alienated by the

aforesaid act, tending to enrich and aggrandize, to a degree

almost incalculable, a few individuals, and ruinous to the

public interest:”

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for

postponement of the said third clause of the original motion; and

resolved in the affirmative--yeas 54, nays 49.

So much of the said original motion as is contained in the fourth, fifth,

sixth, and seventh clauses thereof, being again read, in the words

following, to wit:

“That the good people of Georgia, impressed with general

indignation at this act of atrocious perfidy and of

unparalleled corruption, with a promptitude of decision highly

honorable to their character, did, by the act of a subsequent

Legislature, passed on the thirteenth of February, 1796, under

circumstances of peculiar solemnity, and finally sanctioned

by the people, who have subsequently ingrafted it on their

constitution, declare the preceding act, and the grants made

under it, in themselves null and void; that the said act should

be expunged from the records of the State, and be publicly

burnt, which was accordingly done; provision at the same time

being made for restoring the pretended purchase-money to the

grantees, by whom, or by persons claiming under them, the

greater part of the said purchase-money has been withdrawn from

the treasury of Georgia.”

“That a subsequent Legislature of an individual State has an

undoubted right to repeal any act of a preceding Legislature;

provided such repeal be not forbidden by the constitution of

such State, or of the United States.”

“That the aforesaid act of the State of Georgia, passed on the thirteenth

of February, 1796, was forbidden neither by the constitution of that

State, nor by that of the United States.”

“That the claims of persons derived under the aforesaid act of the

seventh of January, 1795, are recognized neither by any compact between

the United States and the State of Georgia, nor any act of the Federal

Government.”

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for

postponement of the said fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh clauses of the

original motion; and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 53, nays 50.

And then the residue of the said original motion, contained in the eighth

and last clause thereof, being twice read, in the following words, to

wit:

“_Therefore, Resolved._ That no part of the five millions

of acres reserved for satisfying and quieting claims to

lands ceded by the State of Georgia to the United States,

and appropriated by the act of Congress passed at their last

session, shall be appropriated to quiet or compensate any

claims derived under any act, or pretended act of the State of

Georgia, passed, or alleged to be passed, during the year 1795:”

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for

postponement of the said residue of the original motion; and resolved in

the affirmative--yeas 54, nays 51, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jun., Simeon Baldwin, Silas Betton, Phanuel Bishop,

John Campbell, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett,

Jacob Crowninshield, Manasseh Cutler, Richard Cutts, Samuel W. Dana, John

Davenport, John Dawson, William Dickson, Thomas Dwight, James Elliot,

Ebenezer Elmer, William Eustis, William Findlay, John Fowler, Andrew

Gregg, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, William Helms,

David Hough, Benjamin Huger, Nehemiah Knight, Henry W. Livingston, Thomas

Lowndes, Matthew Lyon, Nahum Mitchell, Samuel L. Mitchill, Jeremiah

Morrow, Joseph H. Nicholson, Thomas Plater, Erastus Root, Tompson J.

Skinner, John Smilie, John Cotton Smith, Joseph Stanton, William Stedman,

James Stephenson, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, David

Thomas, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Joseph B. Varnum, Daniel C. Verplanck,

Peleg Wadsworth, Lemuel Williams, and Marmaduke Williams.

NAYS.--Isaac Anderson, David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, William

Blackledge, Adam Boyd, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, Levi

Casey, Joseph Clay, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Frederick Conrad, John B.

Earle, James Gillespie, Peterson Goodwyn, Thomas Griffin, Samuel Hammond,

John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, James Holland, William Kennedy, Michael

Leib, Joseph Lewis, jun., Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Andrew Moore,

Nicholas R. Moore, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Gideon Olin, Beriah

Palmer, John Randolph, Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania,

Jacob Richards, Cæsar A. Rodney, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer

Seaver, James Sloan, John Smith of Virginia, Henry Southard, Richard

Stanford, John Stewart, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, Isaac Van Horne,

Matthew Walton, Richard Wynn, and Joseph Winston.[10]

WEDNESDAY, March 14.

_Government of Louisiana._

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill from the Senate,

providing for the government of Louisiana.

Mr. SLOAN moved an amendment, inhibiting the admission of slaves into

Louisiana, as well from the United States as from foreign places.

Mr. S. concisely stated his reasons in favor of this provision, when the

question was taken, and the amendment agreed to--ayes 40, noes 36. Mr.

G. W. CAMPBELL proposed an amendment, withholding from the parties to a

civil suit the right of waiving a jury trial. The bill provides a jury

trial in all cases in which either party shall require it.

This amendment, after being supported by Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL, and opposed

by Messrs. HOLLAND, SOUTHARD, and DANA, was negatived--ayes 12.

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL moved to strike out that part of the bill which

renders every person settling on lands of the United States liable to a

fine of one thousand dollars, and to one year’s imprisonment.

This produced a debate of some length and more animation, in which the

motion to strike out was urged by Messrs. G. W. CAMPBELL, LYON, and

CLAIBORNE; and opposed by Messrs. GREGG, NICHOLSON, BOYD, SMILIE, MACON,

SLOAN, and HOLLAND.

The question was taken, and the amendment was negatived--ayes 23.

SATURDAY, March 17.

_Government of Louisiana._

The bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the

temporary government thereof, was read the third time.

Mr. DAWSON moved a recommitment of the bill for amendment.

Mr. ALSTON was against a general recommitment of the bill, but friendly

to a recommitment for the purpose of limiting its duration.

Messrs. NICHOLSON, SMILIE, EARLY, and S. N. MITCHILL, opposed the

recommitment.

Mr. BEDINGER advocated the recommitment.

The motion to recommit was then negatived--ayes 39, noes 43.

Mr. ALSTON said, if there was no objection, he would move the insertion

of a clause to limit the period of the bill, on account principally of

the great powers conferred on the Executive.

This motion being objected to, by Mr. LYON, was declared out of order.

The question was then put on the passage of the bill.

Messrs. LYON, SLOAN, JACKSON, and BEDINGER opposed, and Mr. SMILIE

supported its passage.

Mr. VARNUM moved to recommit, for amendment, that part of the bill that

vests equity powers in the courts of Louisiana.

Motion negatived--ayes 39, noes 44.

A motion was made to recommit the fourth section, which was lost--ayes 15.

Mr. BEDINGER moved to recommit the last section for the purpose of

obtaining a limitation to the act.

Motion carried--ayes 52.

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the last section,

When Mr. NICHOLSON moved an amendment limiting the act to two years, and

to the end of the next session thereafter.

Mr. BEDINGER said, he would like its limitation to one year better, but

would, if it were the sense of the House, be satisfied with two years.

Mr. NICHOLSON’s motion was agreed to without a division.

The House agreed to the amendment; when the final question was put on

the passage of the bill, and carried in the affirmative by yeas and

nays--yeas 66, nays 21, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, junior, Isaac Anderson, David Bard,

George Michael Bedinger, Walter Bowie, Adam Boyd, John Boyle,

Robert Brown, Levi Casey, Thomas Claiborne, Joseph Clay,

Frederick Conrad, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, William

Dickson, John B. Earle, Peter Early, Ebenezer Elmer, William

Eustis, William Findlay, James Gillespie, John A. Hanna,

Josiah Hasbrouck, Joseph Heister, William Hoge, James Holland,

Benjamin Huger, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah

Knight, Michael Leib, Andrew McCord, William McCreery, David

Meriwether, Samuel L. Mitchill, Andrew Moore, Nicholas R.

Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas

Newton, junior, Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah

Palmer, Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea

of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons,

Thomas Sandford, Ebenezer Seaver, Tompson J. Skinner, John

Smilie, John Smith of Virginia, Richard Stanford, John Stewart,

David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg,

Philip Van Cortlandt, Isaac Van Horne, Marmaduke Williams,

Richard Wynn, and Joseph Winston.

NAYS.--John Archer, Silas Betton, Martin Chittenden, Clifton

Claggett, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Samuel W. Dana, John

Davenport, John Dawson, James Elliot, Gaylord Griswold, Roger

Griswold, Seth Hastings, John G. Jackson, Henry W. Livingston,

Matthew Lyon, Thomas Plater, James Sloan, John C. Smith, Samuel

Tenney, and Lemuel Williams.[11]

WEDNESDAY, March 21.

_Tripolitan War and Mediterranean Fund._

Mr. NICHOLSON, from the Committee of Ways and Means, presented a bill

further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States against

the Barbary Powers.

[The bill provides that an additional duty of two and a half per centum

be laid upon all imported goods at present charged with a duty ad

valorem, and an additional duty of ten per cent. on all such duties

payable on goods imported in foreign vessels. The proceeds of these

duties are to constitute a fund to be called the Mediterranean fund. The

duties to cease within three months after a peace with Tripoli, in case

the United States are not engaged in war with some other of the Barbary

Powers, in which case they are to cease within three months after a peace

with such powers. The President is authorized to cause to be purchased

or built two vessels of war, to carry sixteen guns each, and as many

gunboats as he may think proper. One million of dollars, additional to

the sum heretofore appropriated, is placed under the direction of the

President for the naval service, which sum he is authorized to borrow at

a rate of interest not exceeding six per cent.]

Mr. NICHOLSON moved that this bill should be made the order for this day.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD moved to-morrow.

The question on “to-morrow” was lost--yeas 33, nays 50, when Mr.

NICHOLSON’s motion prevailed.

_Duties on Imports._

The bill laying more specific duties on certain articles, and imposing

light-money on foreign vessels entering the ports of the United States,

was read the third time.

Mr. HUGER moved its postponement to the first Monday of December, under

the impression that its merits, and the principles it contained, had not

received that full and deliberate examination to which they were entitled.

Mr. J. CLAY observed that a postponement would be virtually a rejection

of the bill.

Mr. MITCHILL concisely advocated the principles of the bill.

Mr. BLACKLEDGE also defended it.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD opposed it, principally on the ground that it increased

the existing rate of duties.

Mr. J. CLAY replied, and allowed that the duties imposed by the bill

would produce more revenue than that heretofore received, but contended

that this would arise from the fraudulent practice heretofore in use

of making out invoices of articles subject at present to ad valorem

duties. In removing this evil, the necessary effect would be an increase

of revenue, not exceeding, however, the probable receipt in case the

invoices were fairly made out.

Mr. HUGER followed, in a speech of considerable length, in which he

contended that the operation of the bill would be to promote the

manufactures of the Eastern and Middle States, to the great detriment of

the Southern States. Principally, though not entirely on this ground, he

declared himself hostile to the bill.

After a few remarks from Mr. BOYD in defence, and of Mr. CLAIBORNE

against the bill, the question of postponement was taken by yeas and

nays, and lost--yeas 40, nays 68.

Mr. KENNEDY moved a recommitment of the motion imposing a specific duty

on printed calicoes and lime.

Motion rejected--yeas 34.

The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and carried in

the affirmative by yeas and nays--yeas 65, nays 41.[12]

THURSDAY, March 22.

_Protection against the Barbary Powers._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill

further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States against

the Barbary Powers.

Mr. GRISWOLD moved to strike out the first section, which is as follows:

“_Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled_, That, for

the purpose of defraying the expenses of equipping, officering,

manning, and employing such of the armed vessels of the United

States, as may be deemed requisite by the President of the

United States, for protecting the commerce and seamen thereof,

and for carrying on warlike operations against the Regency of

Tripoli, or any other of the Barbary Powers, which may commit

hostilities against the United States, and for the purpose also

of defraying any other expenses incidental to the intercourse

with the Barbary Powers, or which are authorized by this act,

a duty of two and a half per centum ad valorem, in addition

to the duties now imposed by law, shall be laid, levied, and

collected upon all goods, wares, and merchandise, paying a

duty ad valorem, which shall, after the thirtieth day of June

next, be imported into the United States from any foreign port

or place; and an addition of ten per centum shall be made to

the said additional duty in respect to all goods, wares, and

merchandise, imported in ships or vessels not of the United

States, and the duties imposed by this act shall be levied and

collected in the same manner, and under the same regulations

and allowances, as to drawbacks, mode of security, and time of

payment, respectively, as are already prescribed by law, in

relation to the duties now in force on the articles on which

the said additional duty is laid by this act.”

Mr. G. said, that it was much to be regretted that gentlemen had thought

proper, upon this occasion, to connect with the great and ostensible

object of the bill, any provisions which should produce a disunion in

the House. The unfortunate event in the Mediterranean called loudly for

vigorous and decisive measures, and he trusted there would not exist on

the floor a difference of opinion on that point. For himself, he was

disposed to clothe the President with all the power, and to furnish him

with all the means which were necessary to bring the war with Tripoli to

a successful and speedy termination. And when this was done, to make him,

as he ought to be, responsible for the event.

It is always improper, said Mr. G., to connect in the same bill two

subjects which are in their natures distinct; and much more improper upon

this occasion, to tack to the provisions for the Mediterranean service,

upon which there could be no difference of opinion, a new tax, in respect

to which gentlemen could not agree.

The first section of the bill, which he had moved to strike out, imposed

a new tax of two and a half per centum ad valorem on all goods now liable

by law to an ad valorem duty. Goods paying at this time an ad valorem

duty were divided into three classes--the first class was liable to a

duty of twelve and a half per cent.; the second, to a duty of fifteen per

cent.; and the third, to a duty of twenty per cent.

The addition of two and a half per cent. now proposed, would increase

the duties to fifteen, seventeen and a half, and twenty-two and a half

per cent., when the goods were imported in American bottoms; and if they

were imported in foreign bottoms, the duties would be further increased

by the addition of ten per cent.

This view of the import, said Mr. G., will satisfy gentlemen that the

duties are already high, and that the proposed addition will render them

enormous. This step, therefore, ought not to be hazarded, unless the

necessities of the Government are absolutely imperious, and no other

means can be resorted to for obtaining the money.

The proposed tax, if fairly collected, would produce at least $750,000

per annum. This result might be seen from a view of the imports into

the United States of goods now liable to an ad valorem duty. From the

last official report, it appeared that the importation of goods of

that description, amounted in that year to about forty millions of

dollars--the two and a half per cent. on the whole sum would, of course,

produce one million, but, allowing for the drawback of duties on goods

exported, the net revenue could not be less than $750,000. Why, then,

impose a tax of seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars to meet an

expenditure which will not probably exceed four or five hundred thousand

dollars?

Mr. NICHOLSON.--We are now about to authorize a greater expense than

usual, and the Legislature are called upon to provide means for its

discharge. For one, said Mr. N., I can never consent to add to the public

debt, while the resources of the country are adequate to its wants.

These are my ideas; and I feel somewhat surprised at the calculation of

the gentleman from Connecticut, on the expense about to be incurred. He

estimates this expense at $388,000; though yesterday when this subject

was laid before the Committee of Ways and Means, and it was contemplated

to provide $750,000, he moved to strike out $750,000, and insert

$1,000,000. And yet he now tells us that only $388,000 are required.

As to the specie in the Treasury, the gentleman states that on the 1st

of October there were $5,000,000. But with what disbursements is this

chargeable? Out of it there are to be paid American citizens for French

spoliations the sum of $3,750,000 in cash, which must remain in the

Treasury, that just claims may be paid as soon as presented. Under the

British Convention there is to be paid $800,000; and there is likewise

to be paid the interest on Louisiana stock, amounting to $685,000; the

aggregate of which sums is $5,235,000. Not having made this calculation

until the gentleman made his observation, it is possible it may not be

perfectly correct.

When the loss of the Philadelphia was announced, my first inquiry of

the Secretary of the Treasury was what money could be spared from the

Treasury for the prosecution of vigorous measures. His answer was, that

the greatest sum which could be spared would not exceed $150,000. I did

not, like the gentleman, go to the clerks or to the navy yard; but I got

the best information I could.

The gentleman from Connecticut, who appears willing to incur an expense

of a million of dollars, while he is unwilling to provide the means

of meeting it, objects to the mode of raising revenue proposed by the

Committee of Ways and Means, without proposing any other. He objects to

the laying additional duties on imported goods. In his remarks he has

made an erroneous statement of the quantity of goods on which ad valorem

duties are paid. His error has arisen from not deducting the amount of

drawbacks. By an official statement made this session, it will be found

that during the year 1802, goods paying ad valorem duties were as follows:

_Rate._ _Amount._ _Duty._

12½ per cent. $23,377,717 $2,922,214

15 ” 7,888,614 1,183,292

20 ” 439,830 87,966

----------- ----------

Amounting to $34,706,161 $4,193,472

The average duty on goods charged ad valorem is about thirteen and a

half per cent. Let us consider the duties paid by other articles. The

gentleman says in laying duties there is a point beyond which we cannot

go in safety on account of the temptation to smuggling. This is true.

But of all goods imported those chargeable with ad valorem duties are

the most difficult to smuggle. The invoices are made out in the country

from which they are imported. These must be authenticated, and presented

at the custom-house and sworn to. If the collector has any reason to

suspect that there are goods on board of a vessel, not in the entry, he

is to make a thorough examination of the vessel. If he sees a bale in

which he suspects there are goods not stated in the invoice, it is in

his power to have it examined. I believe there is but little smuggling

at this time; but that the articles on which there is most smuggling are

rum and coffee. If the gentleman allows that the duty on articles charged

specifically is not so high as to encourage smuggling to any great or

dangerous extent, he will allow the same in the case of articles charged

ad valorem. The great articles from which revenue is obtained, are

Spirits, which pay an average duty of twenty-nine and two-tenth cents,

and which produce $2,253,496, and cost the importer from twenty-five to

fifty cents per gallon. Spirits which pay twenty-five cents a gallon do

not cost the importer more than fifty cents, and consequently pay a duty

of fifty per cent. on the price of the article. Spirits of the third

proof pay twenty-eight cents, and do not cost more than fifty-six cents

a gallon, which is equal to a duty of fifty per cent. So with spirits

of higher proof. From this article is derived more than a fifth of our

revenue, and yet I never heard the amount of the duty complained of,

until a few days since a petition was presented from the merchants of

Connecticut. It is certain that Congress have never considered it so high

as to encourage smuggling.

Of imported sugars 39,443,814 lbs. are consumed within the United States,

which pay, on an average, a duty of two and a half cents per pound. The

price of brown sugar to the importer is about five or six dollars the

hundred. The duty is therefore between forty-five and fifty per cent. Is

this duty considered so high as to encourage smuggling? If not, shall

gentlemen complain when we are about to lay an additional duty of two and

a half per cent. upon articles now chargeable with duties of from twelve

and a half to twenty per cent.?

Of salt there is consumed 3,244,309 bushels in the United States. It pays

a duty of twenty cents a bushel. In many instances this is equal to the

first cost; and amounts therefore to one hundred per cent.

The consumption of wines amounts to 1,912,274 gallons, and the average

duty is thirty-three cents. The duty on Madeira wine is fifty-eight

cents, and it costs the importer one dollar and twenty-five cents. The

duty therefore amounts to near fifty per cent. If the cost be taken at

one dollar and fifty cents, the duty will be thirty-three and a third per

cent. And yet it is not complained that it encourages smuggling.

The greater part of goods charged ad valorem are woollens, linens,

manufactures of steel, brass, and articles of a similar kind, and

muslins. In a muslin gown the additional duty will make a difference of

about five cents. India muslins cost about fifteen cents a yard, and

English about twenty-five cents. The additional duty will therefore

be about three-eighths of a cent on India, and about three-fourths of

a cent on English muslins. This I consider a burden which no one can

feel. The additional duty on linens will be equally unfelt. In a bale of

osnaburgs, which costs twenty cents, the additional duty on a hundred

yards will not exceed fifty cents. So as to Irish linens and woollens.

The difference in a coarse suit of clothes for a common man will not be

more than twenty-five cents, and that of a better kind will not exceed

one dollar and twenty-five cents. I am surprised, after taking this view

of the operation of the proposed duty, that gentlemen should dwell upon

the great burden it will impose, when it can, in truth, scarcely be felt

by the poorest man in the country. It is indeed of no consideration but

on account of the money raised by it, which I have estimated at about

$750,000.

The gentleman from Connecticut thinks he has discovered in the second

section a design that is not avowed, to wit: to liberate the present

resources from their application to the support of the Navy. I wonder,

however, that the gentleman, before he made this unguarded remark, did

not read the section through. He would then have seen that the fund

established by this act is to exist no longer than three months after

the discontinuance of war in the Mediterranean. Nor is it true that the

whole expenses of the Navy are in the Mediterranean. It is true, that at

this time they are principally there. But there is likewise considerable

expense incurred here in the navy yard on the ships, and on the half-pay

of officers not in actual service. Whence the gentleman deduces the

inference, when the bill itself declares that the new duties shall cease

three months after the end of the war, I am altogether at a loss to

comprehend. The duties are to cease with the occasion which produced

them. When we shall no longer be at war, the war duties will be at an end.

Mr. DANA.--The gentleman from Maryland must surely have committed a

mistake, when he said that there is no measure proposed on his side

of the House which does not meet with opposition. When the President

considered vigorous measures necessary against the Emperor of Morocco,

the Journal will show that we entered into them unanimously. Nor is

the objection now urged in any way an objection to the general measure

contemplated. The only objection is to the imposition of unnecessary

taxes. If the force necessary to be sent into the Mediterranean will not

exceed an expense of $380,000, the necessity of the imposition of the

proposed taxes surely does not exist. I admit that, after the force is

raised, the President, in virtue of his authority as commander-in-chief,

is to have its whole direction; but it is perfectly novel to me to learn

that we are not previously to be informed of the extent to which it is

proposed to carry it. If to the present number of vessels in service we

add two frigates and five smaller vessels, they will require only an

additional appropriation of $354,000. This, I believe, is the full extent

of the additional force contemplated. As to raising money to that amount,

I make no objection. Though I dislike laying duties thus in gross, yet I

do not know that there can be any great objection to it. The sum proposed

to be raised will give $750,000, which is more than double the sum

necessary.

Is it proper thus to raise these duties, and hold forth to the nation

that the commerce of the Mediterranean is so expensive? The late disaster

in the Mediterranean is not of itself an adequate cause for the measure.

I object to this measure, because it goes to give an improper impression

of the causes of the bill.

Mr. NICHOLSON said, the gentleman from Connecticut seemed to consider the

object too general; he would, in case the committee refused to strike out

the first section, move to limit the application of the fund “to protect

the commerce and seamen of the United States in the Mediterranean.”

The question was then taken on striking out the first section, and passed

in the negative--ayes 26.

Mr. N. then offered the amendment just stated.

Mr. EUSTIS hoped the gentleman from Maryland would withdraw his

amendment, as in a subsequent part of the bill the object is distinctly

specified. It is altogether unnecessary; and if agreed to, it will be

necessary to add, “or adjacent seas.”

Mr. NICHOLSON said, he considered the amendment as unnecessary; but as he

had promised to make it, he could not withdraw it.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH said he would suggest one reason why it ought not

to obtain. One of the Barbary Powers possessed a coast out of the

Mediterranean. If the misfortune of the United States should dispose

this power, (Morocco,) already predisposed to hostility, to war upon

the United States, it would not be in our power to block up the port of

Sallee, and several other ports out of the Mediterranean.

The question was taken on the amendment, which was lost without a

division.

The committee then rose and reported the bill without amendment.

The House immediately took it up--when Mr. R. GRISWOLD renewed his motion

to strike out the first section.

The question on striking out the first section was taken by yeas and

nays--yeas 28, nays 77.

FRIDAY, March 23.

_District of Columbia._

Mr. DAWSON moved that the House should resolve itself into a Committee

of the Whole on the resolutions offered by him, for the recession of the

District of Columbia.

Mr. HUGER said this point had been fully and ably investigated the last

session. He did not expect, after the decision then made, that the House

would have been again called upon to discuss it. He believed the mind of

every member was made up respecting it. He hoped, therefore, the House

would not agree to go into committee.

Mr. J. LEWIS said he should vote against the House resolving itself

into a Committee of the Whole, and should that motion be negatived, he

would move to discharge the Committee of the Whole from all further

consideration of the resolutions. The question was taken on going into

committee, and lost--yeas 20.

Mr. J. LEWIS then moved to discharge the committee. This motion was

carried without debate--yeas 53, embracing a great majority of the

members present.

MONDAY, March 26.

_Impeachment of Judge Chase._

Mr. JOHN RANDOLPH, from the committee appointed on the thirteenth

instant, to prepare and report articles of impeachment against Samuel

Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United

States, made a report thereon, which was read.

_Ordered_, That the said report be printed for the use of the members of

both Houses; and that the Clerk of this House be directed to transmit

to each of the members of the two Houses of Congress, a copy of the said

report, as soon as the same shall be printed.

_Ordered_, That there be a call of the House to-morrow morning at eleven

o’clock.

The House adjourned until four o’clock, post meridian.

_Four o’clock, p. m._

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have passed

a resolution, that the resolution of the two Houses authorizing the

President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives to

adjourn their respective Houses on this day, be rescinded; and that the

said President and Speaker of the House of Representatives be authorized

to close the present session, by adjourning their respective Houses on

Tuesday, the 27th of this month; to which they desire the concurrence

of this House. The Senate adhere to their amendment, disagreed to by

this House, to the bill, entitled “An act supplementary to the act,

entitled ‘An act providing for a Naval Peace Establishment, and for other

purposes.’”

The House proceeded to consider the resolution of the Senate to rescind

the resolution of both Houses, of the thirteenth instant, for an

adjournment of the two Houses of Congress, on this day; and authorizing

the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives,

to close the present session, by adjourning their respective Houses on

Tuesday the 27th of the present month: whereupon,

_Resolved_, That this House doth agree to the said resolution of the

Senate--yeas 49, nays 44.

The House proceeded to reconsider the amendment disagreed to by this

House, and adhered to by the Senate, to the bill, entitled “An act

supplementary to the act, entitled ‘An act providing for a Naval Peace

Establishment, and for other purposes,’” whereupon,

_Resolved_, That this House doth recede from their disagreement to the

said amendment.

TUESDAY, March 27.

_Specific Duties._

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have passed

the bill, entitled “An act for imposing more specific duties on the

importation of certain articles, with amendments, and also for levying

and collecting light-money on foreign ships or vessels.”

The House proceeded to consider the amendments proposed by the Senate

to the bill, entitled “An act for imposing more specific duties on the

importation of certain articles, and also for levying and collecting

light-money on foreign ships or vessels,” whereupon,

_Resolved_, That this House doth agree to the said amendments.

_Half-past four o’clock, p. m._

Mr. JOHN RANDOLPH, from the committee appointed on the part of this

House, jointly with the committee appointed on the part of the Senate,

to wait on the President of the United States and notify him of the

proposed recess of Congress, reported that the committee had performed

that service; and that the President signified to them he had no farther

communication to make during the present session.

_Ordered_, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that

this House, having completed the business before them, are now about to

adjourn until the first Monday in November next; and that the Clerk of

this House do go with the said message.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate, having

completed the Legislative business before them, are now ready to adjourn.

Whereupon the SPEAKER adjourned the House until the first Monday in

November next.