The Message and papers therein referred to were read and ordered to lie
for consideration.
THURSDAY, November 10.
The credentials of JOHN CONDIT, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of
the State of New Jersey, for the time limited in the Constitution of the
United States, were presented and read.
_Ordered_, That they lie on file.
FRIDAY, November 11.
The PRESIDENT communicated a letter from De Witt Clinton, late a Senator
from the State of New York, stating that he had resigned his seat in the
Senate.
MONDAY, November 14.
The PRESIDENT administered the oath required by law to Mr. CONDIT, a
Senator from the State of New Jersey.
TUESDAY, November 15.
Mr. WORTHINGTON presented the petition of a number of the inhabitants of
the Indiana Territory, praying to be set off into a separate district,
for reasons therein stated.
_Ordered_, That it be referred to Mr. BRADLEY and others, the committee
to whom were referred on the 7th instant, petitions on the same subject,
to consider and report thereon to the Senate.
WEDNESDAY, November 23.
_Amendment to the Constitution._
The Senate resumed the consideration of the report of the committee to
whom was referred the motion for an amendment to the constitution in
the mode of electing the President and the Vice President of the United
States; whereupon, the President _pro tem._ (Mr. BROWN) submitted to the
consideration of the Senate the following question of order:
“When an amendment to be proposed to the constitution is
under consideration, shall the concurrence of two-thirds of
the members present be requisite to decide any question for
amendments, or extending to the merits, being short of the
final question?”
[A debate took place on this proposition, tedious, intricate, and
desultory, which it was very difficult to follow, and often to
comprehend.]
The proposition offered by the President was then called up for decision,
whether two-thirds were necessary--ayes 13, noes 18.
Mr. BUTLER desired to know from the President if the question now decided
did not require a majority of two-thirds?
The PRESIDENT said, according to the rule of the House, the question
required only a principal majority to decide.
Mr. DAYTON’s motion for striking out what related to the Vice President
was called for, and the question taken on striking out--ayes 12, noes 19.
The report of the committee at large being then under consideration,
Mr. NICHOLAS moved to strike out all following the seventh line of the
report, to the end, for the purpose of inserting the following:
“In all future elections of President and Vice President,
the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President, and, in distinct ballots, the person voted
for as Vice President, of whom one at least shall not be an
inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person voted
for as President, having a majority of the votes of all the
Electors appointed, shall be the President; and if no person
have such majority, then from the three highest on the list
of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives
shall choose the President in the manner directed by the
constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes
as Vice President, shall be the Vice President; and in case
of an equal number of votes for two or more persons for Vice
President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall
choose the Vice President from those having such equal number,
in the manner directed by the constitution; but no person
constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall
be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.”
Mr. ADAMS objected to the number “three” instead of five, and wished five
to be restored, as the House of Representatives had already agreed to it.
He asked for a division of the question; which was not agreed to.
Upon the question for striking out being put, it was carried without
a dissenting voice, and the amendment of Mr. NICHOLAS adopted in the
report, leaving the number blank.
Mr. DAYTON moved to fill up the blank with the number five; upon the
question being put, it was lost--only eleven rose in the affirmative.
Mr. ANDERSON moved to strike out the word “two” in the nineteenth
line--ayes 6. Lost.
Mr. S. SMITH then moved to fill the blank with the word “three;” which
was carried--ayes 18, noes 13.
Mr. ADAMS suggested an objection to the amendment as it stood, which
appeared to arise out of the treaty of cession of Louisiana. His
original idea was adverse to the limitation to natural-born citizens,
as superfluous; but, as it stood, the terms upon which Louisiana was
acquired had rendered a change necessary, for it appeared to him that
there was no alternative, but to admit those born in Louisiana as well
as those born in the United States to the right of being chosen for
President and Vice President.
Mr. BUTLER said that, if there was a numerous portion of those who were
already citizens of the United States who can never aspire to, nor be
eligible for, those situations under the constitution, he did not see
how this supposed alternative could be upheld. The people of Louisiana,
under the treaty and under the constitution, will clearly come under the
description of naturalized citizens. While he was up, he would take the
opportunity of speaking to the question at large, and to examine the
motives which produced this amendment; the principal cause of solicitude,
on this subject, he understood to be the base intrigues which were said
to have been carried on at the Presidential election.
Mr. WRIGHT called to order; and a short altercation on the point of order
took place.
Mr. BUTLER proceeded. He had on a former day asked if he might, in this
stage of the discussion, take a view of the whole subject; the House
had decided in the affirmative. When the proposition was first laid
before the House, he had felt a disposition in favor of it; his mind had
been shocked by those base intrigues, which had taken place at the late
Presidential election, and he was hurried by indignation into a temper
which a little cool reflection and some observation on a particular
mode of action in that House, had checked and corrected, and finally
convinced him that much caution was required in a proceeding of that
nature, and that, in all human probability, such a scene of intrigue may
never occur again; that it became questionable whether any steps whatever
were necessary. Upon a careful review of the subject, it appeared to him
that an alteration might make matters worse; for though at present there
has been afforded, by a course of accidents and oversights, room for
intrigue, it would be preferable to leave it to the care and discretion
of the States at large to prevent the recurrence of the danger, than
put into the hands of four of the large States the perpetual choice
of President, to the exclusion of the other thirteen States. It was a
reasonable principle that every State should, in turn, have the choice
of the Chief Magistrate made from among its citizens. The jealousy
of the small States was natural; and he would not tire the House by
bringing to their ears arguments from the history of Greece, because the
subject must be familiar to every member of that House, and, indeed, to
every school-boy. He would not weary them with the painful history of
the conflicts of Athens and Sparta, for the supremacy of Greece, and
the fatal effects of their quarrels and ambition on the smaller States
of that inveterate confederacy of Republics. Their history is that of
all nations in similar circumstances; for man is man in every clime,
and passion mingles in all his actions. If the smaller States were to
agree to this amendment, it would fix for ever the combination of the
larger States, and they would not only choose the President but the Vice
President also in spite of the smaller States. It would ill become him
who had been a member of that convention which had the honor of forming
the present constitution to let a measure such as the present pass
without the most deliberate investigation of its effects. Before the
present constitution was adopted all the States held an equal vote on all
national questions; by the constitution their sovereignty was guarantied,
and the instrument of guarantee and right, he had subscribed his name
to as a Representative from South Carolina, and had used all the zeal
and influence of which he was possessed to promote its adoption. To give
his assent to any violation of it, or any unnecessary innovation on its
principles, would be a deviation from morality.
The question was immediately taken on the report and carried--yeas 20,
nays 11.
Mr. ADAMS said, that though he had voted for the amendment, he
disapproved of the alteration from five to three. He felt, however,
though a representative of a large State, a deep interest in this
question. Was there no champion of the small States to stand up in that
House and vindicate their rights?
Mr. DAYTON was not here as champion of the small States; but, as the
representative of one of them, he was ready to enter his protest against
being delivered over bound hand and foot to four or five of the large
States. The gentleman from South Carolina had offered arguments on the
subject irrefutable. The little portion of influence left us he has
demonstrated to be now about to be taken away, and the gentleman from
Massachusetts, (Mr. ADAMS,) after aiding the effort with his vote, has
taken mercy upon us, and after he has helped to knock us down, asks us
why we do not stand up for ourselves.
Mr. S. SMITH was not surprised to find those who were members of the old
Congress, in which the subject of large and small States was frequently
agitated, familiar with the subject of those days. Under the present
constitution he had been ten years in Congress and had never heard the
subject agitated, nor the least ground given for any apprehension on this
subject; he had seen the small States possess all the advantages secured
to them without even a moment’s jealousy. The State he represented was
once considered a large State; the increase of others in population,
however, had rendered it properly belonging to neither class; it was
an intermediate State; but from the natural progression of the Union
it must be ranked among the small States. In this view then he could
speak dispassionately, and the small States could not with reason be
apprehensive that a State, which must speedily take rank among them,
could be indifferent to their rights if there were the least cause for
apprehension.
He had moved for the insertion of three instead of five, with this
precise and special intention, that the people themselves should have the
power of electing the President and Vice President; and that intrigues
should be thereby for ever frustrated. The intention of the convention
was that the election of the chief officers of the Government should
come as immediately from the people as was practicable, and that the
Legislature should possess the power only in such an exigency as accident
might give birth to, but which they had considered as likely to occur.
Had it not been for these considerations, the large States never would
have given up the advantages which they held in point of numbers. If the
number five were to be continued, and the House of Representatives made
the last resort, he would undertake to say, that four times out of five
the choice would devolve upon them.
Mr. HILLHOUSE.--In avoiding rocks he feared we were steering for
quicksands. The evils that are past we know; those that may arrive
we know not. The object proposed is to provide against a storm, a
phenomenon not rare or unfrequent in republics. You are called upon
to act upon a calculation that all the States in the Union will vote
for the same persons, or that each of two parties opposed in politics
will have an individual candidate. Suppose the two candidates who had
the highest votes on the late election had been the champions of two
opposite parties, and that neither would recede, what then would be the
consequence; according to the gentleman from Maryland, a civil war!
When men are bent on a favorite pursuit, they are too apt to shut out
all consequences which do not bear out their object. Thus gentlemen
can very well discover the danger they have escaped, but they do not
perceive that the opposition of two powerful candidates gives, besides
the hazard of civil war, the hazard of placing one of them on a permanent
throne. The First Magistracy of this nation is an object capable of
exciting ambition; and no doubt it would one day or other be sought
after by dangerous and enterprising men. It was to place a check upon
this ambition that the constitution provided a competitor for the Chief
Magistrate, and declared that both should not be chosen from the same
State. Here also was a guard against State pride, and this guard you wish
to take away; and what will be the consequence? Instead of two or three
or five, you will have as many candidates as there are States in the
Union. By voting for two persons without designation, the States stood a
double chance of a majority, besides the chance of a majority of all the
States in the House of Representatives. For once or twice there may be
such an organization of party as will secure for a conspicuous character
the majority of votes. But that character cannot live always. The evil
of the last election will recur, and be greater, because the whole field
will be to range in.
He hoped this amendment would not be hastily adopted. The subsisting mode
was the result of much deliberation and solemn compromise, after having
long agitated the convention. It is now attacked by party, whatever
gentlemen may say to the contrary; the gentleman from South Carolina has
confessed it. If gentlemen will suffer themselves to look forward without
passion, great good may come from the present mode; men of each of the
parties may hold the two principal offices of the Government; they will
be checks upon each other; our Government is composed of checks; and let
us preserve it from party spirit, which has been tyrannical in all ages.
These checks take off the fiery edge of persecution. Would not one of a
different party placed in that chair tend to check and preserve in temper
the overheated zeal of party? he would conduct himself with firmness
because of the minor party; he would take care that the majority should
have justice, but he would also guard the minority from oppression. If
we cannot destroy party we ought to place every check upon it. If the
present amendment pass, nine out of ten times the election will go to
the other House, and then the only difference will be that you had a
comedy the last time, and you’ll have a tragedy the next. Though it
was impossible to prevent party altogether, much more when population
and luxury increase, and corruption and vice with them, it was prudent
to preserve as many checks against it as was practicable. He had been
long in Congress and saw the conflicting interests of large and small
States operate; the time may not be remote when party will adopt new
designations; federal and republican parties have had their day, their
designations will not last long, and the ground of difference between
parties will not be the same that it has been; new names and new views
will be taken; it has been the course in all nations. There has not yet
been a rotation of offices in which the small States could look for their
share, but the time may, it will come when the small will wrestle with
the large States for their rights. Each State has felt that though its
limits were not so extensive as others, its rights were not disregarded.
Suffer this confidence to be done away, and you may bid adieu to it;
three or four large States will take upon them in rotation to nominate
the Executive, and the second officer also. This will be felt. A fanciful
difference in politics is the bugbear of party now, because no other, no
real cause of difference has subsisted. But remedy will create a real
disease. States like individuals may say we will be of no party, and
whenever this shall happen blood will follow.
Mr. BRADLEY moved an adjournment. The motion was agreed to.
THURSDAY, November 24.
_Amendment to the Constitution._
The consideration of the report on the amendment to the constitution
being taken up, the amendment as directed to be printed on the preceding
day, was taken up, and read, as follows:
_Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds
of both Houses concurring_, That the following amendment be
proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an
amendment to the constitution of the United States, which,
when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall
be valid to all intents and purposes, as a part of the said
constitution, viz:
In all future elections of President and Vice President, the
Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for
as President, and, in distinct ballots, the person voted
for as Vice President, of whom one at least shall not be an
inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person voted
for as President having a majority of the votes of all the
Electors appointed, shall be the President, and if no person
have such majority, then from the three highest on the list
of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives
shall choose the President in the manner directed by the
constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes
as Vice President, shall be Vice President; and in case of an
equal number of votes for two or more persons for the Vice
President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall
choose the Vice President from those having such equal number,
in the manner directed by the constitution; but no person
constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall
be eligible to that of the President of the United States.
Mr. BRADLEY did not approve of the amendment as it now stood; he could
not see why the Vice President should not be chosen by a majority,
as well as the President. He considered the possibility of the Vice
President becoming President by any casualty, as a good reason for both
being chosen by the same ratio of numbers. If it should be carried as the
amendment now stands, the office of Vice President would be hawked about
at market, and given as change for votes for the Presidency. And what
would be the effect?--that it might so happen that a citizen chosen only
for the office of Vice President, might by the death of the President,
though chosen only by a plurality, become President, and hold the office
for three years eleven months and thirty days. He did not approve of
many arguments which he had heard on the preceding day, and however
disposed to concur in the principle of designation for the two offices,
he could not give it his vote in the present shape. He would, in order to
render the report more congenial with his wishes, move to strike out the
following words beginning with the words _shall_, in the thirteenth line,
to _constitution_, in the eighteenth. The motion was seconded.
Mr. TRACY opposed the striking out, as not in order, it being an
amendment to an amendment already received by the House. He thought,
however, it would be in order to reconcile the whole, and then any part
might be amended.
The PRESIDENT said that the motion for amending the amendment was not
in order; but if the member from Vermont, or any other gentleman of the
majority on the question yesterday chose to move for a recommittal, or
even to refer the report to a select committee, it would be in order.
Mr. BRADLEY then renewed his motion as before, for striking out and
inserting after the 13th line; this amendment he thought of great
importance, as under the constitution as it now stands the Vice
President must be a person of the highest respectability, well known,
and of established reputation throughout the United States; but if the
discriminating principle prevails without some precautions such as the
amendment proposed, that assurance would be lost; and he should not be
surprised to hear of as many candidates for Vice President as there are
States, as the votes for President would be offered in truck for votes
for Vice President, and an enterprising character might employ his
emissaries through all the States to purchase them, and your amendment
lays the foundation for intrigues. He was desirous that he who is to
be set up as candidate for the Vice President should as at present be
equally respectable, or that there should be none--that at least he
should be the second man in the nation; adopt the designating principle,
without the most guarded precautions, and you lose that assurance.
Mr. HILLHOUSE accorded with the gentleman’s amendment, as it naturally
grows out of the principles of the report. There was not a word in the
constitution about voting for the Vice President, no vote in fact is
given for such an office; the alteration to designation alters the whole
thing; and as the gentleman has expressed, will send the Vice President’s
office into market to be handed about as change for the candidate
supported by larger States; he would prefer leaving the choice of
President and Vice President at once to the larger States than take it
in this way. In calm times any government may work well, but he wished in
calm times to provide against storm. If we designate any, then designate
both and on equal terms.
Mr. JACKSON said, that though coming from a small State he had not been
instructed, and was therefore at perfect liberty to act according to the
best of his judgment; though his State was now, in regard to population,
small, and though it were to remain so, he could have but one opinion on
this subject. He saw abundance of reason for preferring three to five.
The constitution under the present form has directed the choice to be
made from five. But the reason of this was consistent with the result to
be produced; the electors were to vote for two persons indiscriminately,
but with the restriction of voting for one only belonging to the State
where the vote was given. The voting for two would necessarily bring
forward four candidates, and a fifth possibly, for we saw in the two
elections before the last that there was one more than the four, though
in each case the fifth had but one vote; he alluded to the vote for Mr.
Jay. In the amendment proposed you are called upon to designate for each
office, and there can be little apprehension of having more than two
or three principal candidates; and for twenty years to come he had no
apprehension of a greater number of candidates if this amendment prevails.
Mr. WRIGHT.--We need not be told in this house, that the constitution was
the result of a compromise, or that care was taken to guard the rights of
each State; these things we must be very ignorant, indeed, not to know.
But does it therefore follow that it is not susceptible of amendment
or correction under experience? Does it follow, because, for mutual
interest and security, this compromise was made, that we are precluded
from effecting any greater good? No man would accuse him of a wish to
see the interest of any State impaired. But we can preserve the spirit
and intention of the constitution in full vigor, without impairing any
interests. And this is to be done, by the discriminating principle; it
fulfills the intention, and it forefends the recurrence of that danger
from which you have once escaped. By this principle, each elector may
name his man for each office, and this can be done whether the number be
three or five. For the latter number he was disposed; because already
adopted by the other House, and he did not wish to delay its progress.
If we were to form a constitution, he would provide that there should be
only two candidates presented to the House. But he did not rely on any
number so much as on the discriminating principle.
Mr. NICHOLAS.--Several gentlemen profess much reluctance to make any
change in the constitution; he would make no such profession; and though
he should be as jealous of improper alterations, or the introduction
of principles incompatible with Republican Government, he would not
hesitate to make any alteration calculated to promote, or secure the
public liberty upon a firmer basis; nay, if it could be made better he
would expunge the whole book. Gentlemen who are for adhering so closely
to the constitution, appear not to consider that a choice of President
from the number three, is more in the spirit of the constitution than
from five; and preserves the relation that the election of two persons,
under the present form, holds to the number five. A reason equally
forcible with him was, that, by taking the number three instead of five,
you place the choice with more certainty in the people at large, and
render the choice more consonant to their wishes. With him, also, it was
a most powerful reason for preferring three, that it would render the
Chief Magistrate dependent only on the people at large, and independent
of any party or any State interest. The people held the sovereign power,
and it was intended by the constitution that they should have the
election of the Chief Magistrate. It was never contemplated as a case
likely to occur, but in an extreme case, that the election should go to
the House of Representatives. What, he asked, would have been the effect,
had Mr. Jay been elected when he had only one vote? What, he would ask,
would be the impression made upon our own people, and upon foreign
nations, had Mr. Aaron Burr been chosen at the last election, when the
universal sentiment was to place the present Chief Magistrate in that
station? He did not mean any thing disrespectful or invidious towards
the Vice President, he barely stated the fact, so well known, and asked,
what would be the effect? Where would be the bond of attachment to that
constitution which could admit of an investiture in a case so important,
in known opposition to the wishes of the people? The effect would be
fatal to the constitution itself; it would weaken public attachment to
it, and the affectation, if alone for the small States, would not have
been heard of in the deep murmur of discontent.
An adjournment was now called for and carried.
TUESDAY, November 29.
_Amendment to the Constitution._
The order of the day being called up on the amendments to the
constitution, a considerable time elapsed, when
Mr. DAYTON rose and said, that since no other gentleman thought proper to
address the Chair, although laboring himself under a very severe cold,
which rendered speaking painful, he could not suffer the question to pass
without an effort to arrest it in its progress; and should consider his
last breath well expended in endeavoring to prevent the degradation which
the State he represented would suffer if the amendment were to prevail.
As to the question immediately before the Senate for filling the blank
with five, he felt himself indebted to the member from Tennessee for
renewing the subject. He was grateful, also, to the member from Maryland
(Mr. WRIGHT) for declaring he would support it, as well as for giving the
assurance that he was disposed to consider and spare the interests of the
small States as far as possible, consistently with the great object of
discrimination.
Every member who had spoken on this subject seemed to have admitted, by
the very course and pointing of their arguments, even though they may
have denied it in words, that this was really a question between great
and small States, and disguise it as they would, the question would be
so considered out of doors. The privilege given by the constitution
extended to five, out of which the choice of President should be made;
and why should the smaller, for whose benefit and security that number
was given, now wantonly throw it away without an equivalent? As to the
Vice President, his election had no influence upon the number, because
the choice of President in the House of Representatives was as free and
unqualified as if that subordinate office did not exist. Nay, he said,
he would venture to assert that, even if the number five were continued,
and the Vice Presidency entirely abolished, there would not be as great a
latitude of choice as under the present mode, because those five out of
whom the choice must eventually be made, were much more likely hereafter
to be nominated by the great States, inasmuch as their electors would no
longer be compelled to vote for a man of a different State. The honorable
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) has said, he was not surprised that
those who had seats in the old Congress, should perplex themselves with
the distinctions; but he could tell that gentleman, that it was not in
the old Congress he had learnt them, for there he had seen all the votes
of the States equal, and had known the comparatively little State of
Maryland controlling the will of the _Ancient Dominion_. It was in the
Federal Convention that distinction was made and acknowledged; and he
defied that member to do, what had been before requested of the honorable
gentleman of Virginia, viz: to open the constitution, and point out a
single article, if he could, that had not evidently been framed upon a
presumption of diversity (he had almost said, adversity) of interest
between the great and small States.
Mr. ADAMS in a former debate had stated that he had not a wish to avoid
or seek for the yeas and nays on any question; on the present occasion,
however, he would, when the question was taken, call for the yeas and
nays. But his own vote on the final question would be governed by the
decision of the number five, and he wished to have some record of his
vote, that he might be hereafter able to defend himself against any
charge of inconsistency. On the principle of the amendment he had formed
his opinion, and he was free to confess, that notwithstanding the many
able productions which he had seen against it, he thought it calculated
to produce more good than evil. He was not, however, influenced in this
opinion by the instructions which had been read in a preceding debate
from a former Legislature of Massachusetts to their Senators; he presumed
these were not read by way of intimidation. To the instructions of those
to whom he owed his seat in that House he would pay every respect that
was due, but he did not think that the resolutions of a Legislature
passed in March 1799 or 1800 ought to have the same weight. Since that
time four total and complete changes had taken place, and probably not
one third of those who gave those instructions now remained. He held a
seat in the Legislature himself three years since, but did not perceive
any particular anxiety on the subject, and he did not think that the
present Legislature would be extremely offended if he were to give a
direct vote against what was recommended four years ago.
The constitution was a combination of federative and popular principles.
When you argue upon, or wish to change any of its federative principles,
you must use analogies as arguments; popular arguments will not apply
to federative principles. The House of Representatives was founded on
popular principles; in this House the representation is federative,
and not popular; it is in its nature aristocratic. The foundation of
all popular representation is equality of votes; but even the ratio
of representation is different in different States; the numbers in
Massachusetts and Virginia, in Vermont and Delaware, are different in
their proportions; but still an equality of representation is preserved,
and the only difference is in the details. But if you argue upon the
principles of the Senate, this equality of popular representation, or by
an equal or relatively equal number, will not apply; you must discuss it
upon another species of equality, of sovereignties, and the independence
of several States federatively connected. Applying principles then to the
election of President, if you reduce the number from which the House of
Representatives is authorized to choose, do you not attack the principles
of the federal compact, rather than the rights of the small States?
The Executive, it had been said, is the man of the people; true, and
he is also, as was said, though upon different grounds, the man of the
Legislature--it was here a combined principle, federative and popular.
Virginia had in that House twenty-two popular representatives, in this
she has two federative; Delaware has one popular and two federative
representatives. And even in the operation of election in the popular
branch of Congress, the federative principle is pursued, and the State
which has only one popular representative has an equal voice in that
instance with the State that has twenty-two popular representatives. It
was therefore evident that the attempt to alter the number from five to
three, is an attack upon the federative principle, and not upon the small
States.
Mr. S. SMITH, when he made the motion for filling up the blank with
three, did it after the most deliberate consideration of the theory and
the principles of the constitution; which, if he understood it right,
intended that the election of the Executive should be in the people, or
as nearly as was possible, consistent with public order and security to
the right of suffrage. The provision admitting the choice by the House
of Representatives, was itself intended only for an extreme case, where
great inconvenience might result from sending a defective election back
to the people, as is customary in Massachusetts, where, if the majority
is deficient, a new election is required. Our object in the amendment
is or should be to make the election more certain by the people. This
was to be done most effectually by leaving it to them to designate the
persons whom they preferred for each office. As under the present form
there was an extreme case, so there might be when the change of number
should take place; for, although even with the number three, there was
a possibility of the choice devolving on the House of Representatives,
yet the adoption of the designating principle and the number three,
would render the case less probable. It never was the intention of the
framers of the constitution that the election should go to the House of
Representatives but in the extreme case; nor was it ever contemplated
that about one-fifth of the people should choose a President for the
rest, which certainly would be the case if what some gentlemen contended
for were to take place. When gentlemen contend for such a power as
would transfer the choice from the people, and place it in the hands
of a minority so small, how happens it that gentlemen will not bear to
hear of the efforts which such arguments or such measures would produce
on the larger States? It was not the interest of the small States to
combine against the large. Suppose it were possible that the four large
States should combine--and a combination of the small States alone could
produce such an effect--nine States in the Union have but thirty-two
votes out of one hundred and forty-two, yet nine States, with one vote
each, make a majority of seventeen, though in relation to population they
contain only about one-fifth of the whole; and by such a proceeding the
one-fifth might choose a President and Vice President in defiance of the
other four-fifths. What would be the consequence of such an election?
At a subsequent election the large States would combine, and by the use
of their votes they would frustrate every object which the small States
might use their efforts to accomplish.
Notwithstanding what had been said concerning the jealousy of States, he
could see nothing in it but the leaven of the old Congress, thrown in to
work up feelings that had been long still. It was the forlorn hope, the
last stratagem of party; and he was the more disposed to think so, when
he saw gentlemen from the large States coming forward as the champions of
the small--this might, to be sure, be magnanimity; but if his discernment
did not deceive him, it was a stratagem to divide the friends of the
amendment. Why was not the same jealousy entertained of the power of
thirteen out of seventeen combining and giving absolute law to the other
four? Why have gentlemen paid no regard to the experience which they
have had from the last election, when less than one third of the members
harassed the public mind, kept the Union in agitation, and Congress
engrossed to the exclusion of nearly all other business for two weeks?
Suppose that the House had been as accessible to corruption as the diets
of other nations have been, and that three men, having in their power
the votes of three States, had been seized upon, and the election made
contrary to the wishes of the people. What would be the effect--on the
minds of the people--on the administration of the Government--and on the
attachment which the people feel for the constitution itself? He need not
attempt to describe the effects. But it is our duty to prevent the return
of such dangers, by keeping the election out of that House. And the most
effectual mode is to fix the selection from the number three.
Mr. PICKERING had not intended to have spoken on this question so far
as it concerned the numbers; but as he should probably vote differently
from his colleague, he conceived it proper to give his motives for his
vote. His wishes for the entire preservation of the constitution were so
strong, that he regretted any change was contemplated to be made in it,
and he wished if an alteration was made to keep as near as possible to
the spirit of the constitution as it now is, and it appeared to him that
the number _three_ conformed more to that spirit than the number _five_.
He believed it to be the intention of the constitution, that the people
should _elect_. As to what gentlemen said concerning the will of the
people, he paid but little regard to it. The will of the people! he did
not know how the will of the people could be known--how gentlemen came by
it; it would not be asserted that it was to be found in the newspapers,
or in private society; in truth he believed it never had been fairly
expressed on the subject. We have seen an amendment brought forward from
New York, but was that an expression of the public opinion? if it was,
it was a very remarkable one, for it contained an absurdity--visible to
every one. He wished to avoid innovations on the constitution, and to
preserve the combined operation of federative and popular principles upon
which it rested unimpaired.
Mr. WORTHINGTON hoped the number three would be adopted in preference to
five. Nevertheless he approved so much of the principle of designation in
the election of the President and Vice President, that rather than lose
it he would vote for it with either number.
The yeas and nays being called for on filling up the blank with the
largest number according to order; the votes were--yeas 12, nays 19, as
follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Adams, Bailey, Butler, Condit, Dayton,
Hillhouse, Olcott, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, White, and Wright.
NAYS.--Messrs. Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke,
Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Pickering,
Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor,
and Worthington.
The question on the number three being inserted was then put, and the
yeas and nays being demanded by one fifth of the members present; they
were, yeas 21, nays 10, as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown,
Cocke, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas,
Pickering, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith,
Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright.
NAYS.--Messrs. Adams, Butler, Condit, Dayton, Hillhouse,
Olcott, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, and White.
The House then adjourned.
FRIDAY, December 2.
Mr. WHITE, of Delaware, rose and addressed the chair as follows:
Mr. President: It may be expected that we, who oppose the present
measure, and especially those of us who belong to the smaller States,
and who think the interests of those States will be most injuriously
affected by its adoption, shall assign some reasons for our opinion, and
for the resistance we give it: I will for myself endeavor to do so. I
know well the prejudices of many in favor of this proposed amendment to
the constitution; I know too, and acknowledge with pleasure, the weight
of abilities on the other side of the House by which those prejudices, if
I may so be permitted to call them, will be sustained; this might perhaps
be sufficient to create embarrassment or even silence on my part, but
for the consciousness I feel in the rectitude of my views, and my full
reliance on the talents of those with whom I have the honor generally to
think and act. Upon a subject of the nature and importance of the one
before us a great diversity of sentiment must be expected, and is perhaps
necessary to the due and proper investigation of it. Without detaining
the Senate with further preliminary remarks, presuming upon that
patience and polite indulgence that are at all times extended by this
honorable body to gentlemen who claim their attention, I will proceed
immediately to the subject of the resolution; barely premising that
notwithstanding the opinions of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TAYLOR)
and the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. JACKSON,) whose opinions I highly
respect, I must yet think with my honorable friend from New Jersey (Mr.
DAYTON) that the Constitution of the United States bears upon the face
of it the strongest marks of its having been made under the influence of
State classifications. It was a work of compromise, though not formed,
as stated by the gentleman from Virginia, by the large States yielding
most, but by the smaller States yielding much more to the general good.
It will be recollected that, previous to the adoption of the
constitution, on all legislative subjects, in fact, on every measure of
the constitution, each State had an equal voice; but very different is
the case now, when, in the popular branch of your Government, you see
one State represented by twenty-two members, and another by but one,
voting according to numbers. So that, notwithstanding the ideas of those
gentlemen, and the declaration of an honorable member from Maryland, on
my right, (Mr. SMITH,) that, during his ten years’ service in Congress,
he had never seen anything like State jealousies, State divisions,
or State classification, I must be permitted to predicate part of my
argument upon this business. Should any gentleman be able to show that
the foundation is unsound, the superstructure of course will be easily
demolished. Admitting, then, sir, for the sake of argument, that there
were no very great objections to this proposed alteration in the mode of
electing a President and Vice President, and that it were now part of the
constitution, it might be unwise to strike it out, unless much stronger
arguments had been urged against than I have heard in favor of it; yet I
would not now vote for its adoption.
The United States are now divided, and will probably continue so,
into two great political parties; whenever, under this amendment, a
Presidential election shall come round, and the four rival candidates
be proposed, two of them only will be voted for as President--one of
these two must be the man; the chances in favor of each will be equal.
Will not this increased probability of success afford more than double
the inducement to those candidates, and their friends, to tamper with
the Electors, to exercise intrigue, bribery, and corruption, as in an
election upon the present plan, where the whole four would be voted for
alike, where the chances against each are as three to one, and it is
totally uncertain which of the gentlemen may succeed to the high office?
And there must, indeed, be a great scarcity of character in the United
States, when, in so extensive and populous a country, four citizens
cannot be found, either of them worthy even of the Chief Magistracy
of the nation. But, Mr. President, I have never yet seen the great
inconvenience that has been so much clamored about, and that will be
provided against in future by substituting this amendment. There was,
indeed, a time when it became necessary for the House of Representatives
to elect, by ballot, a President of the United States from the two
highest in vote, and they were engaged here some days, as I have been
told, in a very good-humored way, in the exercise of that constitutional
right. They at length decided; and what was the consequence? The people
were satisfied, and here the thing ended. What does this prove? that the
constitution is defective? No, sir, but rather the wisdom and efficiency
of the very provision intended to be stricken out, and that the people
are acquainted with the nature of their Government; and give me leave
to say, if fortune had smiled upon another man, and that election had
eventuated in another way, the consequence would have been precisely
the same; the great mass of the people would have been content and
quiet; and those factious, restless disorganizers, that are the eternal
disturbers of all well administered Governments, and who then talked of
resistance, would have had too much prudence to hazard their necks in
so dangerous an enterprise. I will not undertake to say that there was
no danger apprehended on that occasion. I know many of the friends of
the constitution had their fears; the experiment however proved them
groundless; but what was the danger apprehended pending the election
in the House of Representatives? Was it that they might choose Colonel
Burr or Mr. Jefferson President? Not at all; they had, notwithstanding
what had been said on this subject by the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr.
WRIGHT,) a clear constitutional right to choose either of them, as much
so as the Electors in the several States had to vote for them in the
first instance; the particular man was a consideration of but secondary
importance to the country; the only ground of alarm was, lest the House
should separate without making any choice, and the Government be without
a head, the consequences of which no man could well calculate.
It has of late, Mr. President, become fashionable to attach very little
importance to the office of Vice President, to consider it a matter but
of small consequence who the man may be; to view his post merely as an
idle post of honor, and the incumbent as a cipher in the Government; or
according to the idea expressed by an honorable member from Georgia, (Mr.
JACKSON,) quoting, I believe, the language of some Eastern politician,
as a fifth wheel to a coach; but in my humble opinion this doctrine is
both incorrect and dangerous. The Vice President is not only the second
officer of Government in point of rank, but of importance, and should be
a man possessing and worthy of the confidence of the nation. I grant,
sir, should this designating mode of election succeed, it will go very
far to destroy, not the certain or contingent duties of the office,
for the latter by this resolution are considerably extended, but what
may be much more dangerous, the personal consequence and worth of the
officer; by rendering the Electors more indifferent about the reputation
and qualification of the candidate, seeing they vote for him but as a
secondary character; and which may occasion this high and important
trust to be deposited in very unsafe hands. By a provision in the first
section of the second article of the constitution, “in case of the
removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation or
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the
same shall devolve on the Vice President”--and he is constitutionally
the President, not until another can be made only, but of the residue
of the term, which may be nearly four years; and this is not to be
supposed a remote or improbable case. In the State to which I have the
honor to belong, within a few years past, two instances have happened
of the place of Governor becoming vacant, and the duties of the office,
according to the constitution of that State, devolving upon the Speaker
of the Senate. We know well too, generally speaking, that before any man
can acquire a sufficient share of the public confidence to be elected
President, the people must have long been acquainted with his character
and his merit; he must have proved himself a good and faithful servant,
and will of course be far advanced in years, when the chances of life
will be much against him. It may indeed, owing to popular infatuation,
or some other extraordinary causes, be the ill fate of our country, that
an unworthy designing man, grown old and gray in the ways of vice and
hypocrisy, shall for a time dishonor the Presidential chair, or it may
be the fortune of some young man to be elected, but those will rarely
happen. The convention in constructing this part of the constitution, in
settling the first and second offices of the Government, and pointing
out the mode of filling, aware of the probability of the Vice President
succeeding to the office of President, endeavored to attach as much
importance and respectability to his office as possible, by making it
uncertain at the time of voting, which of the persons voted for should
be President, and which Vice President; so as to secure the election of
the best men in the country, or at least those in whom the people reposed
the highest confidence, to the two offices--thus filling the office of
Vice President with one of our most distinguished citizens, who would
give respectability to the Government, and in case of the Presidency
becoming vacant, having at his post a man constitutionally entitled to
succeed, who had been honored with the second largest number of the
suffrages of the people for the same office, and who of consequence would
be probably worthy of the place, and competent to its duties. Let us now,
Mr. President, examine for a moment the certain effect of the change
about to be made, or what must be the operation of this designating
principle, if you introduce it into the constitution. Now the Elector
cannot designate, but must vote for two persons as President, leaving it
to circumstances not within his power to control which shall be the man:
of course he will select two characters, each suitable for that office,
and the second highest in vote must be the Vice President; but upon this
designating plan the public attention will be entirely engrossed in the
election of the President, in making one great man. The eyes of each
contending party will be fixed exclusively upon their candidate for this
first and highest office; no surrounding object can be viewed at the
same time, they will be lost in his disc. The office of President is, in
point of honor, profit, trust, and influential patronage, so infinitely
superior to any other place attainable in this Government, that, in the
pursuit and disposal of it, all minor considerations will be forgotten,
every thing will be made to bend, in order to subserve the ambitious
views of the candidates and their friends. In this angry conflict of
parties, amidst the heat and anxiety of this political warfare, the Vice
Presidency will either be left to chance, or what will be much worse,
prostituted to the basest purposes; character, talents, virtue, and
merit, will not be sought after in the candidate. The question will not
be asked, is he capable? is he honest? But can he by his name, by his
connections, by his wealth, by his local situation, by his influence
or his intrigues, best promote the election of a President? He will be
made a mere stepping-stone of ambition. Thus, by the death or other
constitutional inability of the President to do the duties of the office,
you may find at the head of your Government, as First Magistrate of the
nation, a man who has either smuggled or bought himself into office; who,
not having the confidence of the people, or feeling the constitutional
responsibility of his place, but attributing his elevation merely to
accident, and conscious of the superior claims of others, will be without
restraint upon his conduct, without that strong inducement to consult the
wishes of the people, and to pursue the true interests of the nation,
that the hope of popular applause, and the prospect of re-election, would
offer. Such a state of things might be productive of incalculable evils;
for it is, as I fear time will show, in the power of a President of the
United States to bring this Government into contempt, and this country to
disgrace, if not to ruin.
Mr. PLUMER said that he had generally contented himself with expressing
his opinion by a silent vote, but on a question which affected the rights
of the smaller States, (one of which he had the honor to represent,) he
requested the indulgence of the Senate to a few observations.
He said the constitution had provided only two methods for obtaining
amendments, and both are granted with great caution. If two-thirds of
the several State Legislatures apply, Congress shall call a convention
who are to propose amendments, which, when ratified by the conventions
of three-fourths of the States, will be valid. If this mode is adopted,
Congress have nothing to do but to ascertain the fact, whether the
necessary number of States require a convention. If they do, a convention
must be called. The State Legislatures are only to apply for a
convention. They can neither propose nor decide the amendments.
The other mode is, if two-thirds of both Houses of Congress deem
it necessary to propose amendments, and three-fourths of the State
Legislatures ratify them, they are valid. This is the present mode. The
State Legislatures have nothing to do till after Congress has proposed
the amendments, and then it is their exclusive province either to
ratify or reject them. But they have no authority to direct or even
request Congress to propose particular amendments for themselves to
ratify. Instructions on this subject are therefore improper. It is an
assumption of power, not the exercise of a right. It is an attempt to
create an undue influence over Congress. It is prejudging the question
before it is proposed by the only authority that has the constitutional
right to move it. If these instructions are obligatory, our votes must be
governed, not by the convictions of our own judgments, or the propriety
and fitness of the measure, but by the mandates of other Legislatures.
This would destroy one of the checks that the constitution has provided
against innovation. State Legislatures may, on some subjects, instruct
their Senators; but on this, their instructions ought not to influence,
much less bind us, to propose amendments, unless we ourselves deem them
necessary.
The Senate consists of two members from each State; and in this case, the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Senate are necessary. A majority
of the Senate constitutes a quorum to do business, but that quorum is a
majority of all the Senators that all the States are entitled to elect.
This applies with equal force to the term “two-thirds of the Senate.”
But in cases where from necessity a speedy decision is requisite, and
where the concurrence of two-thirds is required, the constitution is
explicit in confining that two-thirds to the members present, as in cases
of treaties and impeachments; and also a fifth of the members present
requesting the yeas and nays. If amendments can be constitutionally
proposed by two-thirds of the Senate present, it will follow that twelve
Senators, when only a quorum is present, may propose them against the
will of twenty-two Senators.
This amendment affects the relative interest and importance of the
smaller States. The constitution requires the Electors of each State to
vote for two men, one of whom to be President of the United States. This
affords a degree of security to the small States against the views and
ambition of the large States. It gives them weight and influence in the
choice. By destroying this complex mode of choice, and introducing the
simple principle of designation, the large States can with more ease
elect their candidate. This amendment will enable the Electors from
four States and a half to choose a President, against the will of the
remaining twelve States and a half. Can such a change tend to conciliate
and strengthen the Union?
This amendment has a tendency to render the Vice President less
respectable. He will be voted for not as President of the United States,
but as President of the Senate, elected to preside over forms in this
House. In electing a subordinate officer the Electors will not require
those qualifications requisite for supreme command. The office of Vice
President will be a sinecure. It will be brought to market and exposed
to sale to procure votes for the President. Will the ambitious, aspiring
candidate for the Presidency, will his friends and favorites promote the
election of a man of talents, probity, and popularity for Vice President,
and who may prove his rival? No! They will seek a man of moderate
talents, whose ambition is bounded by that office, and whose influence
will aid them in electing the President. This mode of election is
calculated to increase corruption, promote intrigue, and aid inordinate
ambition. The Vice President will be selected from some of the large
States; he will have a casting vote in this House; and feeble indeed must
his talents be, if his influence will not be equal to that of a member.
This will, in fact, be giving to that State a third Senator.
In the Southern States the blacks are considered as property, and the
States in which they live are thereby entitled to eighteen additional
Electors and Representatives--a number equal to all the Electors and
Representatives that four States and a half are entitled to elect. Will
you, by this amendment, lessen the weight and influence of the Eastern
States in the election of your first officers, and still retain this
unequal article in your constitution? Shall property in one part of the
Union give an increase of Electors, and be wholly excluded in other
States? Can this be right? Will it strengthen the Union?
Mr. TRACY.--I shall attempt to prove, sir, that the resolution before
us contains principles which have a manifest tendency to deprive the
small States of an important right, secured to them by a solemn and
constitutional compact, and to vest an overwhelming power in the great
States. And, further, I shall attempt to show that, in many other points,
the resolution is objectionable, and, for a variety of causes, ought not
to be adopted.
As I shall be obliged, in delineating the main features of this
resolution, to mention the great States in the Union as objects of
jealousy, I wish it to be understood that no special stigma is intended.
“Man is man,” was the maxim expressed in an early part of this debate, by
the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. BUTLER,) and in application to
the subject of government, the maxim is worthy to be written in letters
of gold. Yes, sir, “man is man,” and the melancholy truth that he is
always imperfect and frequently wicked, induces us to fear his power,
and guard against his rapacity, by the establishment and preservation
of laws, and well-regulated constitutions of government. Man, when
connected with very many of his fellow-men, in a great State, derives
power from the circumstance of this numerous combination; and from every
circumstance which clothes him with additional power, he will generally
derive some additional force to his passions.
Having premised this, I shall not deem it requisite to make any apology,
when I attempt to excite the attention, the vigilance, and even the
jealousy of the small, in reference to the conduct of the great States.
The caution is meant to apply against the imperfections and passions
of man, generally, and not against any State, or description of men,
particularly.
It may be proper, in this place, to explain my meaning, when I make use
of the words “small” and “great,” as applicable to States.
Massachusetts has been usually called a great State; but, in respect
to all the operations of this resolution, she must, I think, be ranked
among the small States. The district of Maine is increasing rapidly,
and must, in the nature of things, soon become a State. To which
event, its location, being divided from what was the ancient Colony of
Massachusetts, by the intervention of New Hampshire, will very much
contribute. I believe there is a legislative provision of some years’
standing, authorizing a division at the option of Maine. When this event
shall occur, Massachusetts, although, in comparison with Connecticut and
Rhode Island, she will not be a small State, yet, in comparison with
many others, must be so considered. I think myself justifiable, then,
for my present purposes, in calling Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and
South Carolina, small States. They are limited in point of territory,
and cannot reasonably expect any great increase of population for many
years, not, indeed, until the other States shall become so populous as
to discourage emigration, with agricultural views; which may retain the
population of the small States as seamen or manufacturers. This event,
if it ever arrives, must be distant. A possible exception only may exist
in favor of Maine; but, when we consider its climate, and a variety of
other circumstances, it is believed to form no solid exception to this
statement.
By the same rule of deciding, the residue of the States must be called
great; for although Georgia and several others are not sufficiently
populous, at this time, to be considered relatively great States, yet
their prospect of increase, with other circumstances, fairly bring them
within the description, in respect to the operation of the measure now
under consideration.
It will be recollected that, in the various turns which the debate has
taken, gentlemen have repeatedly said that the constitution was formed
for the people; that the good of the whole was its object; that nothing
was discernible in it like a contest of States, nothing like jealousy
of small States against the great; and although such distinctions and
jealousies might have existed under the first confederation, yet they
could have no existence under the last. And one gentleman (Mr. SMITH,
of Maryland) has said that he has been a member of this Government ten
years, and has heard nothing of great and small States, as in the least
affecting the operations of Government, or the feelings of those who
administer it.
Propriety, therefore, requires that we attentively examine the
constitution itself, not only to obtain correct ideas upon these
observations, so repeatedly urged, but to place in the proper light the
operations and effects of the resolution in debate. If we attend to the
constitution, we shall immediately find evident marks of concession
and compromise, and that the parties to these concessions were the
great and small States. And the members of the convention who formed
the instrument have, in private information and public communications,
united in the declaration, that the constitution was the result of
concession and compromise between the great and small States. In this
examination of the constitution it will be impossible to keep out of
view our political relations under the first confederation. We primarily
united upon the footing of complete State equality--each State had one,
and no State had more than one vote in the Federal Council or Congress.
With such a confederation we successfully waged war, and became an
independent nation. When we were relieved from the pressure of war, that
confederation, both in structure and power, was found inadequate to
the purposes for which it was established. Under these circumstances,
the States, by their convention, entered into a new agreement, upon
principles better adapted to promote their mutual security and happiness.
But this last agreement, or constitution, under which we are now united,
was manifestly carved out of the first confederation. The small States
adhered tenaciously to the principles of State equality; and gave up
only a part of that federative principle, complete State equality, and
that with evident caution and reluctance. To this federative principle
they were attached by habit; and their attachment was sanctioned and
corroborated by the example of most if not all the ancient and the modern
confederacies. And when the great States claimed a weight in the councils
of the nation proportionate to their numbers and wealth, the novelty of
the claim, as well as its obvious tendency to reduce the sovereignty of
the small States, must have produced serious obstacles to its admission.
Hence it is, that we find in the constitution but one entire departure
from the federal principle. The House of Representatives is established
upon the popular principle, and given to numbers and wealth, or to the
great States, which, in this view of the subject, are synonymous. It was
thought, by the convention, that a consolidation of the States into one
simple Republic would be improper. And the local feelings and jealousies
of all, but more especially of the small States, rendered a consolidation
impracticable.
The Senate, who have the power of a legislative check upon the House
of Representatives, and many other extensive and important powers, is
preserved as an entire federative feature of Government as it was enjoyed
by the small States, under the first confederacy.
In the article which obliges the Electors of President to vote for one
person not an inhabitant of the same State with themselves, is discovered
State jealousy. In the majorities required for many purposes by the
constitution, although there were other motives for the regulations, yet
the jealousy of the small States is clearly discernible. Indeed, sir,
if we peruse the constitution with attention, we shall find the small
States are perpetually guarding the federative principle, that is, State
equality. And this, in every part of it, except in the choice of the
House of Representatives, and in their ordinary legislative proceedings.
They go so far as to prohibit any amendment which may affect the equality
of States in the Senate.
This is guarding against almost an impossibility, because the Senators
of small States must be criminally remiss in their attendance, and
the Legislatures extremely off their guard, if they permit such
alterations, which aim at their own existence. But lest some accident,
some unaccountable blindness or perfidy should put in jeopardy the
federative principle in the Senate, they totally and for ever prohibit
all attempts at such a measure. In the choice of President, the mutual
caution and concession of the great and small States is, if possible,
more conspicuous than in any other part of the constitution.
He is to be chosen by Electors appointed as the State Legislatures shall
direct, not according to numbers entirely, but adding two Electors in
each State as representatives of State sovereignty. Thus Delaware obtains
three votes for President, whereas she could have but one in right of
numbers. Yet, mixed as this mode of choice is, with both popular and
federative principles, we see the small States watching its motions and
circumscribing it to one attempt only, and, on failure of an Electoral
choice, they instantly seize upon the right of a federal election, and
select from the candidates a President by States and not by numbers. In
confirmation of my assertion, that this part of the constitution was
peculiarly the effect of compromise between the great and small States,
permit me to quote an authority which will certainly have great weight,
not only in the Senate, but through the Union, I mean that of the present
Secretary of State, (Mr. Madison,) who was a leading member of the
Federal Convention who formed, and of the Virginia Convention who adopted
the constitution.
In the Debates of the Virginia Convention, volume 3, page 77, Mr. Madison
says, speaking of the mode of electing the President:
“As to the eventual voting by States, it has my approbation.
The lesser States and some larger States will be generally
pleased by that mode. The Deputies from the small States
argued, and there is some force in their reasoning, that, when
the people voted, the large States evidently had the advantage
over the rest, and, without varying the mode, the interests of
the little States might be neglected or sacrificed. Here is a
compromise. For in the eventual election, the small States will
have the advantage.”
After this view of the constitution, let us inquire, what is the direct
object of the proposed alteration in the choice of President?
To render more practicable and certain the choice by Electors--and for
this reason: that the people at large, or in other words, that the great
States, ought to have more weight and influence in the choice. That it
should be brought nearer to the popular and carried further from the
federative principle. This claim we find was made at the formation of
the constitution. The great States naturally wished for a popular choice
of First Magistrate. This mode was sanctioned by the example of many
of the States in the choice of Governor. The small States claimed a
choice on the federative principle, by the Legislatures, and to vote by
States; analogies and examples were not wanting to sanction this mode of
election. A consideration of the weight and influence of a President of
this Union, must have multiplied the difficulties of agreeing upon the
mode of choice. But as I have before said, by mutual concession, they
agreed upon the present mode, combining both principles and dividing
between the two parties, thus mutually jealous, as they could, this
important privilege of electing a Chief Magistrate.
This mode then became established, and the right of the small States
to elect upon the federative principle, or by States, in case of the
contingency of electoral failure of choice, cannot with reason and
fairness be taken from them, without their consent, and on a full
understanding of its operation; since it was meant to be secured to them
by the constitution, and was one of the terms upon which they became
members of the present confederacy; and for which privilege they gave an
equivalent to the great States in sacrificing so much of the federative
principle, or State equality.
The constitution is nicely balanced, with the federative and popular
principles; the Senate are the guardians of the former, and the House of
Representatives of the latter; and any attempts to destroy this balance,
under whatever specious names or pretences they may be presented,
should be watched with a jealous eye. Perhaps a fair definition of the
constitutional powers of amending is, that you may upon experiment so
modify the constitution in its practice and operation, as to give it,
upon its own principles, a more complete effect. But this is an attack
upon a fundamental principle established after a long deliberation,
and by mutual concession, a principle of essential importance to the
instrument itself, and an attempt to wrest from the small States a vested
right, and by it, to increase the power and influence of the large
States. I shall not pretend, sir, that the parties to this constitutional
compact cannot alter its original essential principles, and that such
alterations may not be effected under the name of amendment; but, let
a proposal of that kind come forward in its own proper and undisguised
shape; let it be fairly stated to Congress, to the State Legislatures,
to the people at large, that the intention is to change an important
federative feature in the constitution, which change in itself and all
its consequences, will tend to a consolidation of this Union into a
simple republic; let it be fairly stated, that the small States have too
much agency in the important article of electing a Chief Magistrate,
and that the great States claim the choice; and we shall then have a
fair decision. If the Senators of the small States, and if their State
Legislatures, will then quietly part with the right they have, no person
can reasonably complain.
Nothing can be more obvious, than the intention of the plan adopted by
our constitution for choosing a President. The Electors are to nominate
two persons, of whom they cannot know which will be President; this
circumstance not only induces them to select both from the best men; but
gives a direct advantage into the hands of the small States even in the
electoral choice. For they can always select from the two candidates set
up by the Electors of large States, by throwing their votes upon their
favorite, and of course giving him a majority; or, if the Electors of
the large States should, to prevent this effect, scatter their votes
for one candidate, then the Electors of the small States would have it
in their power to elect a Vice President. So that, in any event, the
small States will have a considerable agency in the election. But if
the discriminating or designating principle is carried, as contained in
this resolution, the whole, or nearly the whole right and agency of the
small States, in the electoral choice of Chief Magistrate, is destroyed,
and their chance of obtaining a federative choice by States, if not
destroyed, is very much diminished.
The whole power of election is now vested in the two parties; numbers and
States, or, great and small States; and it is demonstration itself, if
you increase the power of the one, in just such proportion you diminish
that of the other. Do the gentlemen suppose that the public will, when
constitutionally expressed by a majority of States, in pursuance of the
federative principle of our Government, is of less validity, or less
binding upon the community at large, than the public will expressed by
a popular majority? The framers of your constitution, the people who
adopted it, meant, that the public will, in the choice of a President,
should be expressed by Electors, if they could agree, and if not, the
public will should be expressed by a majority of the States, acting in
their federative capacity, and that in both cases the expression of the
public will should be equally binding.
It is pretended that the public will can never properly or
constitutionally be expressed by a majority of numbers of the people, or
of the House of Representatives. This may be a pleasing doctrine enough
to great States; but it is certainly incorrect. Our constitution has
given the expression of the public will, in a variety of instances, other
than that of the choice of President, into very different hands from
either House of Representatives or the people at large. The President and
Senate, and in many cases the President alone, can express the public
will, in appointments of high trust and responsibility, and it cannot
be forgotten that the President sometimes expresses the public will by
removals. Treaties, highly important expressions of the public will, are
made by the President and Senate; and they are the supreme law of the
land. In the several States, many great offices are filled, and even
the Chief Magistracy, by various modes of election. The public will is
sometimes expressed by pluralities instead of majorities, sometimes by
both branches of the Legislatures, and sometimes by one, and in certain
contingencies, elections are settled by lot. The people have adopted
constitutions containing such regulations, and experience has proved that
they are well calculated to preserve their liberties and promote their
happiness. From what good or even pardonable motive, then, can it be
urged that the present mode of electing our President has a tendency to
counteract the public will? Do gentlemen intend to destroy every federal
feature in this constitution? And is this resolution a precursor to a
complete consolidation of the Union, and to the establishment of a simple
republic?--Or will it suffice to break down every federative feature
which secures to one portion of the Union, to the small States, their
rights?
Mr. TAYLOR.--The opposition to this discriminating amendment to the
constitution is condensed into a single stratagem, namely: an effort to
excite the passion of jealousy in various forms. Endeavors have been made
to excite geographical jealousies--a jealousy of the smaller against the
larger States--a jealousy in the people against the idea of amending
the constitution; and even a jealousy against individual members of
this House. Sir, is this passion a good medium through which to discern
truth, or is it a mirror calculated to reflect error? Will it enlighten
or deceive? Is it planted in good or in evil--in moral or in vicious
principles? Wherefore, then, do gentlemen endeavor to blow it up? Is it
because they distrust the strength of their arguments, that they resort
to this furious and erring passion? Is it because they know that
----“Trifles light as air,
Are, to the jealous, confirmations strong
As proofs of holy writ!”
So far as these efforts have been directed towards a geographical
demarcation of the interests of the Union into North and South, in order
to excite a jealousy of one division against another; and, so far as they
have been used to create suspicions of individuals, they have been either
so feeble, inapplicable, or frivolous, as to bear but lightly upon the
question, and to merit but little attention. But the attempts to array
States against States because they differ in size, and to prejudice the
people against the idea of amending their constitution, bear a more
formidable aspect, and ought to be repelled, because they are founded on
principles the most mischievous and inimical to the constitution, and,
could they be successful, are replete with great mischiefs.
Towards exciting this jealousy of smaller States against larger States,
the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. TRACY) had labored to prove that the
federal principle of the constitution of the United States was founded in
the idea of minority invested with operative power. That, in pursuance
of this principle, it was contemplated and intended that the election of
a President should frequently come into the House of Representatives,
and to divert it from thence by this amendment would trench upon the
federal principle of our constitution, and diminish the rights of the
smaller States, bestowed by this principle upon them. This was the scope
of his argument to excite their jealousy, and is the amount also of
several other arguments delivered by gentlemen on the same side of the
question. He did not question the words, but the ideas of gentlemen.
Words, selected from their comrades, are easily asserted to misrepresent
opinions, as he had himself experienced during the discussion on the
subject.
This idea of federalism ought to be well discussed by the smaller
States, before they will suffer it to produce the intended effect--that
of exciting their jealousy against the larger. To him it appeared to
be evidently incorrect. Two principles sustain our constitution: one a
majority of the people, the other a majority of the States; the first
was necessary to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the people; the
last, to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the States. But both are
founded in the principle of majority; and the effort of the constitution
is to preserve this principle in relation both to the people and the
States, so that neither species of sovereignty or independence should
be able to destroy the other. Many illustrations might be adduced. That
of amending the constitution will suffice. Three-fourths of the States
must concur in this object, because a less number or a majority of States
might not contain a majority of people; therefore, the constitution
is not amendable by a majority of States, lest a species of State
sovereignty might, under color of amending the constitution, infringe
the right of the people. On the other hand, a majority of the people
residing in the large States cannot amend the constitution, lest they
should diminish or destroy the sovereignty of the small States, the
federal Union, or federalism itself. Hence a concurrence of the States
to amend the constitution became necessary, not because federalism was
founded in the idea of minority, but for a reason the very reverse
of that idea--that is, to cover the will both of a majority of the
people and a majority of States, so as to preserve the great element
of self-government, as it regarded State sovereignty, and also as it
regarded the sovereignty of the people.
For this great purpose certain political functions are assigned to be
performed, under the auspices of the State or federal principle, and
certain others under the popular principle. It was the intention of the
constitution that these functions should be performed in conformity to
its principle. If that principle is in fact a government of a minority,
then these functions ought to be performed by a minority. When the
federal principle is performing a function, according to this idea,
a majority of the States ought to decide. And, by the same mode of
reasoning, when the popular principle is performing a function, then a
minority of the people ought to decide. This brings us precisely to the
question of the amendment. It is the intention of the constitution that
the popular principle shall operate in the election of a President and
Vice President. It is also the intention of the constitution that the
popular principle, in discharging the functions committed to it by the
constitution, should operate by a majority and not by a minority. That
the majority of the people should be driven, by an unforeseen state of
parties, to the necessity of relinquishing their will in the election of
one or the other of these officers, or that the principle of majority, in
a function confided to the popular will, should be deprived of half its
rights, and be laid under a necessity of violating its duty to preserve
the other half, is not the intention of the constitution.
But the gentleman from Connecticut has leaped over all this ground,
and gotten into the House of Representatives, without considering
the principles of the constitution, as applicable to the election of
President and Vice President by Electors, and distinguishing them
from an election by the House of Representatives. And by mingling and
interweaving the two modes of electing together, a considerable degree
of complexity has been produced. If, however, it is admitted that in an
election of a President and Vice President by Electors, the will of the
electing majority ought fairly to operate, and that an election by the
will of a minority would be an abuse or corruption of the principles of
the constitution, then it follows that an amendment, to avoid this abuse,
accords with, and is necessary to save these principles. In like manner,
had an abuse crept into the same election, whenever it was to be made
under the federal principle by the House of Representatives, enabling
a minority of States to carry the election, it would not have violated
the intention of the constitution to have corrected this abuse, also,
by an amendment. For, sir, I must suppose it to have been the intention
of the constitution that both the federal principle and the popular
principle should operate in those functions respectively assigned to
them, perfectly and not imperfectly--that is, the former by a majority of
States, and the latter by a majority of the people.
Under this view of the subject, the amendment ought to be considered.
Then the question will be, whether it is calculated or not to cause the
popular principle, applied by the constitution in the first instance, to
operate perfectly, and to prevent the abuse of an election by a minority?
If it is, it corresponds with the intention, diminishes nothing of the
rights of the smaller States, and, of course, affords them no cause of
jealousy.
Sir, it could never have been the intention of the constitution to
produce a state of things by which a majority of the popular principle
should be under the necessity of voting against its judgment to secure a
President, and by which a minor faction should acquire a power capable
of defeating the majority in the election of President, or of electing
a Vice President contrary to the will of the electing principle. To
permit this abuse would be a fraudulent mode of defeating the operation
of the popular principle in this election, in order to transfer it to
the federal principle--to disinherit the people for the sake of endowing
the House of Representatives; whereas it was an accidental and not an
artificial disappointment in the election of a President, against which
the constitution intended to provide. A fair and not an unfair attempt
to elect was previously to be made by the popular principle, before
the election was to go into the House of Representatives. And if the
people of all the States, both large and small, should, by an abuse of
the real design of the constitution, be bubbled out of the election of
executive power, by leaving to them the nominal right of an abortive
effort, and transferring to the House of Representatives the substantial
right of a real election, nothing will remain but to corrupt the election
in that House by some of those abuses of which elections by diets are
susceptible, to bestow upon executive power an aspect both formidable and
inconsistent with the principles by which the constitution intended to
mould it.
The great check imposed upon executive power was a popular mode of
election; and the true object of jealousy, which ought to attract the
attention of the people of every State, is any circumstance tending
to diminish or destroy that check. It was also a primary intention of
the constitution to keep executive power independent of legislative;
and although a provision was made for its election by the House of
Representatives in a possible case, that possible case never was
intended to be converted into the active rule, so as to destroy in a
degree the line of separation and independency between the executive and
legislative power. The controversy is not therefore between larger and
smaller States, but between the people of every State and the House of
Representatives. Is it better that the people--a fair majority of the
popular principle--should elect executive power; or, that a minor faction
should be enabled to embarrass and defeat the judgment and will of this
majority, and throw the election into the House of Representatives? This
is the question. If this amendment should enable the popular principle
to elect executive power, and thus keep it separate and distinct from
legislation, the intention of the constitution, the interest of the
people, and the principles of our policy, will be preserved; and if so,
it is as I have often endeavored to prove in this debate, the interest of
the smaller States themselves, that the amendment should prevail. For,
sir, is an exposure of their Representatives to bribery and corruption
(a thing which may possibly happen at some future day, when men lose
that public virtue which now governs them) an acquisition more desirable
than all those great objects best (if not exclusively) attainable by
the election of executive power by the popular principle of the Federal
Government, as the constitution itself meditates and prefers?
So far, then, the amendment strictly coincides with the constitution and
with the interests of the people of every State in the Union. But suppose
by some rare accident the election should still be sent into the House of
Representatives, does not the amendment then afford cause of jealousy to
the smaller States? Sir, each State has but one vote, whether it is large
or small; and the President and Vice President are still to be chosen out
of five persons. Such is the constitution in both respects now. To have
enlarged the number of nominees, would have increased the occurrence of
an election by the House of Representatives; and if, as I have endeavored
to prove, it is for the interest of every State, that the election should
be made by the popular principle of Government and not by that House,
then it follows, that whatever would have a tendency to draw the election
into that House, is against the interest of every State in the Union; and
that every State in the Union is interested to avoid an enlargement of
the nominees, if it would have such a tendency.
To illustrate this argument, I will repeat a position which I lately
advanced, namely, that the substance of a constitution may be effectually
destroyed, and yet its form may remain unaltered. England illustrates
it. The Government of that country took its present form in the
thirteenth century; but its aspect in substance has been extremely
different at different periods, under the same form. Without taking
time to mark the changes in substance which have taken place under
the form of Kings, Lords, and Commons, it will suffice to cast our
eyes upon the present state of that Government. What are now its chief
and substantial energies? Armies, debt, executive patronage, penal
laws, and corporations. These are the modern energies or substance
of the English monarchy; to the ancient English monarchy they were
unknown. Of the ancient, they were substantial abuses; for, whether
these modern energies are good or bad, they overturned the ancient
monarchy substantially, without altering its form. Under every change
of Administration these abuses proceeded. The _outs_ were clamorous for
preserving the constitution, as they called it; for, though divorced
from its administration, the hope of getting in again caused them to
maintain abuses, by which their avarice or ambition might be gratified
upon the next turn of the wheel; just as in Prussia, where divorces are
common, nothing is more usual than for late husbands to affect a violent
passion for a former wife, if she carried off from him a good estate! And
the _ins_, fearing the national jealousy, and the prepossession against
amending the form of Government, and meeting new abuses by new remedies,
brought no relief to the nation. So that under every change of men abuses
proceeded.
The solution of this effect exists in the species of political craft
similar to priestcraft. Mankind were anciently deprived of their
religious liberty by a dissemination of a fanatical zeal for some idol;
in times of ignorance, this idol was of physical structure; and when
that fraud was detected, a metaphysical idol in the shape of a tenet or
dogma was substituted for it, infinitely more pernicious in its effects,
because infinitely more difficult of detection. The same system has
been pursued by political craft. It has ever labored to excite the same
species of idolatry and superstition for the same reason, namely, to
conceal its own frauds and vices. Sometimes it sets up a physical, at
others a metaphysical idol, as the object of vulgar superstition. Of one,
the former “Grand Monarch of France;” of the other, the present “Church
and State” tenet of England is an evidence. And if our constitution is
to be made like the “Church and State” tenet of England, a metaphysical
political idol, which it will be sacrilege to amend, even for the sake of
saving both that and the national liberty; and if, like that tenet, it is
to be exposed to all the means which centuries may suggest to vicious men
for its substantial destruction, it is not hard to imagine that it also
may become a monument of the inefficacy of unalterable forms of political
law to correct avarice and ambition in the new and multifarious shapes
they are for ever assuming.
It has been urged, sir, by the gentlemen in opposition, in a mode, as
if they supposed we wished to conceal or deny it, that one object of
this amendment is to bestow upon the majority a power to elect a Vice
President. Sir, I avow it to be so. This is one object of the amendment;
and the other, as to which I have heretofore expressed my sentiments,
is to enable the Electors, by perfecting the election of a President,
to keep it out of the House of Representatives. Are not both objects
correct, if, as I have endeavored to prove, the constitution, in all
cases where it refers elections to the popular principle, intended that
principle to act by majorities? Did the constitution intend that any
minor faction should elect a Vice President? If not, then an amendment
to prevent it accords with, and is representative of, the constitution.
Permit me here again to illustrate by an historical case. England, in the
time of Charles the Second, was divided into two parties--Protestants
and Papists--and the heir to the throne was a Papist. The Protestants,
constituting the majority of the nation, passed an exclusion bill, but
it was defeated, and the minor Papist faction, in the person of the
Duke of York, got possession of executive power. The consequences were,
domestic oppressions and rebellions, foreign wars occasionally for almost
a century, and the foundation of a national debt, under which the nation
has been ever since groaning, and under which the Government will finally
expire.
Had the majority carried and executed the proposed exclusion of James
II. from executive power, the English would have escaped all these
calamities. Such precisely may be our case. I beg again that it may be
understood that, in this application, I speak prospectively and not
retrospectively.
But it is far from being improbable, that in place of these religious
parties, political parties may arise of equal zeal and animosity. We may
at some future day see our country divided into a republican party and
a monarchical party. Is it wise, or according to the intention of the
constitution, that a minor monarchical faction should, by any means,
acquire the power of electing a Vice President, the possible successor
to executive power? Ought a republican majority to stake the national
liberty upon the frail life of one man? Will not a monarchical Executive
overturn the system of a republican Executive? And ought the United
States to shut their eyes upon this possible danger until the case shall
happen, when it may be too late to open them?
Sir, let us contemplate the dreadful evils which the English nation have
suffered from the cause of investing executive power in a man hostile
to the national opinion, and avoid them. They suffered, because their
exclusion bill was abortive. Election is our exclusion bill. Its efficacy
depends upon its being exercised by a majority. It is only a minority
which can render election insufficient to exclude monarchical principles
from executive power. It is against minority that election is intended to
operate, because minority is the author of monarchy and aristocracy.
Shall we, sir, be so injudicious as to make election destroy the
principle of election by adhering to a mode of exercising it, now seen to
be capable of bestowing upon a minority the choice of a Vice President?
Shall we make election, invented to exclude monarchy, a handmaid for
its introduction? Or shall we, if we do not see monarchy at this day
assailing our republican system, conclude that it never will; although
we know that this system has but two foes, of whom monarchy is one? No,
sir, let us rather draw instruction from the prophetic observations of
a member of the English House of Commons, whilst the bill for excluding
James II. was depending, who said:
“I hear a lion in the lobby roar,
Say, Mr. Speaker, shall we shut the door,
And keep him there! Or shall we let him in,
To try if we can get him out again!”
Instead of shutting the door, the English left it open; tyranny got in;
and the evils produced by its expulsion, to that nation, may possibly
have been equal to those which submission would have produced.
The question was called for loudly at half-past nine, and put--the yeas
and nays being taken, were:
YEAS.--Messrs. Anderson, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley,
Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson,
Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith,
Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright--22.
NAYS.--Messrs. Adams, Butler, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott,
Pickering, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, and White--10.