PREFACE.

During the winter of 1901, the Garland-Rodes Camp of Confederate

Veterans of the City of Lynchburg passed a resolution requesting

their comrade, Captain Chas. M. Blackford, of Company B, Second

Virginia Cavalry, C.S.A., to prepare an address upon the Campaign and

Battle of Lynchburg, which was to be delivered on June 18, 1901, the

thirty-seventh anniversary of the events of which he was to speak.

Captain Blackford consented to do this work, and did it so much to the

satisfaction of the Camp that it ordered his address to be printed as

a valuable contribution to the history of the war and the traditions

of our city. It is now presented to our citizens and to all who are

interested in the details of our great struggle.

The Committee have also added, as a matter of local history, a roster

of the various volunteer companies which left here when the war

commenced. Many names were added afterwards, but it is to be regretted

that the list cannot be perfected.

Jno. H. Lewis, Chairman,

N.J. Floyd,

R.H. Boatwright,

W. Barbour Jones,

H. Grey Latham,

Committee.

_December 10, 1901._

The Campaign and Battle of Lynchburg.

The strategic importance of the city of Lynchburg was very little

understood by those directing the military movements of the Federal

armies during the Civil War, or, if understood, there was much lack of

nerve in the endeavor to seize it.

It was the depot for the Army of Northern Virginia for all commissary

and quartermaster stores gathered from the productive territory lying

between it and Knoxville, Tennessee, and from all the country tributary

to, and drained by, the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad. Here, also, were

stored many of the scant medical supplies of the Confederacy, and here

many hospitals gave accommodation to the sick and wounded from the

martial lines north and east of it. Lynchburg was, in addition, the

key to the inside line of communication which enabled the Confederate

troops to be moved from our northern to our eastern lines of defence,

without exciting the attention of the enemy.

Under these circumstances, it can well be understood that the

Confederate authorities were ever on the alert to guard so important

a post. They relied, however, on the facility with which its

garrison could be reinforced, when threatened, and not on an army of

occupation, for it could not afford to keep so many troops idle.

Though equally important to the success of the Northern armies, in

their operations in Virginia, no serious effort was directed against it

until the spring of 1864.

On the 6th of June, 1864, General Grant wrote from the lines around

Richmond to General David Hunter, then commanding the Department of

West Virginia, informing him that General Sheridan would leave the

next day for Charlottesville for the purpose of destroying the Central

(now the Chesapeake & Ohio) Railway. Having given this information, he

directed General Hunter to operate with the same general end in view,

adding that "the complete destruction of this road and of the canal on

the James River is of great importance to us." He further says, "you

[Hunter] are to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. _It would be

of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day._"

According to this letter, Hunter, after reaching Staunton, was to move

on Lynchburg, _via_ Charlottesville, and thence along what Grant calls

"the Lynchburg branch of the Central Road," meaning the Lynchburg

extension of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Having captured

Lynchburg and destroyed the bridges and vast stores there concentrated,

he was to return by the same route, join Sheridan, and together they

were to move east and unite with Grant, who then proposed to move his

whole army south of the James and make his attack on Lee at, and south

of, Petersburg. (70 War of Rebellion, 598.)

Hunter was given some latitude as to how he should execute this order

and as to the best mode of reaching Lynchburg. It seems he determined

to move up the Valley, and to that end called on General William W.

Averell to "suggest a plan of operations, the purpose of which was the

capture of Lynchburg and the destruction of the railroads running from

that place in five days." (Id. 146.)

During the first three years of the war, raids were made upon the line

of the Virginia & Tennessee Railway (now Norfolk & Western) west of

Lynchburg, for the purpose of destroying Lee's communications with the

South and Southwest over that important conduit of supplies.

By these raids some damage was done by burning depots and overturning

bridges, but none which caused any permanent injury or produced any

serious delay in transportation over it. Except for local panics and

the destruction of a small amount of property, these raids were, from

a strategic point of view, a useless expenditure of military strength.

They did, however, fortunately direct the attention of the Confederate

authorities to the importance of this line and greatly increase their

vigilance.

On the 9th of June, 1864, when Averell's plan was laid before Hunter,

he approved and adopted it. He was then at Staunton, Virginia, in

command of an army, the exact number of which is not disclosed by

the records. The official report for the month of May, 1864, for that

department, discloses the fact that upon the 31st of that month there

was in it an aggregate present for duty of 36,509. (70 Id. 571.) The

published correspondence shows that during the month of May every

possible effort was made to concentrate these forces, and it seems

from the roster that every brigade and division in the department was

represented at Staunton when the expedition started. Hence, making due

allowance for heavy details on guard, provost and escort duty, it may

well be claimed that when the start was made there were present for

duty, of all arms, at least 25,000 men, fresh and well equipped. (Id.

103.)

Some of these troops, like their leader, were renegades from the

traditions and instincts of their forefathers, and hence very little to

be trusted, but far the greater proportion of the force was composed of

high types of the soldier from Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York, and,

under a proper leader, would have been very formidable. The want of

such a leader, despite the efficient aid of able subordinates, made the

campaign a fiasco with no historical parallel, except, perhaps, that of

the famous King of France, who,

"With twenty thousand men,

Marched up the hill, and then marched down again."

Hunter's army consisted of four divisions, two of infantry, commanded

respectively by Generals Sullivan and Crook, and two of cavalry,

severally commanded by Generals Duffie and Averell. Each division

consisted of three brigades, and they were accompanied by eight

batteries of artillery, with an aggregate of thirty-two guns.

Major-General David Hunter, the commander, was a Southerner by race

and environment, and members of his family had often been honorably

connected with the history of the State of Virginia. He had been an

officer in the United States army, and on the breaking out of the war

between the States, ignored the traditions of his race and took up arms

against Virginia. It is not the custom of those of Virginian blood to

be disloyal to their State, and it is her proud boast that the roll of

those who have been false is very short. What moved Hunter to act as he

did must be developed by his biographer; it is enough for the historian

to record the fact of his apostasy. Most Southern officers in the old

service disapproved the secession of the States, but on the breaking

out of the war, with rare exceptions, they resisted the powerful

temptations held out as inducements to stay and join the Northern

army. They preferred poverty and the uncertainties of the approaching

conflict to a military distinction which could only be won by shedding

the blood of their brothers and friends. With this faith they joined

in the defence of their several States whether they agreed with them

in their political course or not. Such was the course of the Lees and

the Johnsons, of Stuart and the Hugers, of the Maurys, and of hundreds

of others who stood by their people, right or wrong. They believed it

alike the path of duty and of honor to draw their swords in defence of

their native land, in the hour of its greatest need, and they turned a

deaf ear to the whisper of that tempting thrift which is so often the

reward of fawning.

When Hunter and his army were approaching Staunton, a part of his

force, estimated at about eight thousand men, had a battle with a

small, disorganized detachment under General Wm. E. Jones, at a place

called Piedmont, near Port Republic. The troops under Jones were much

worn, and were weary with hard work, sharp fighting and scant rations.

Those of Hunter were fresh, vigorous and well equipped. Jones and his

men fought well, but he was killed early in the action. His death had

a bad effect on his command, and it gave way in much confusion and

with heavy loss. Much good was done during the confusion by Lieutenant

Carter Berkeley and his two ubiquitous guns, which afterwards did such

good service in the lines around Lynchburg and upon Hunter's retreat.

After this disaster, Jones's command, under Vaughan, fell back first

to Fishers ville and Waynesboro, and then towards Charlottesville.

This left the Valley open as far as Buchanan, except for the small,

but ever vigilant force of cavalry, so skillfully and manfully handled

by Brigadier-General John McCausland, who had shortly before been

transferred from the command of an infantry to a cavalry brigade.

Imboden, with a small body of cavalry, which had escaped from the

battle of Piedmont, and which was badly mounted and equipped, had

crossed the Blue Ridge and was energetically attempting to defend the

Orange & Alexandria Railroad (now the Southern), in Nelson and Amherst

Counties, from a heavy detachment from the column of General Duffie,

sent by Hunter to destroy that road for the purpose of cutting off

reinforcements from Lynchburg.

After the death of General Jones and the defeat of his little army,

Hunter blew his trumpets with boastful triumph. Staunton, of course,

forthwith fell into his hands, which was the occasion for another

blast. General Hunter, in his report of the battle of Piedmont, written

on June 8, says, with pride, that his "combined force, now in fine

spirits and condition, will move, day after to-morrow, toward the

accomplishment of its mission," which was the capture of Lynchburg, and

the destruction of its bridges and stores. (70 W, of R. 95).

The plan of campaign which General Averell had suggested and Hunter

had adopted, was a movement up the Valley to Buchanan in four columns,

each column composed of a division, commanded respectively by himself,

Crook, Sullivan and Duffie. The last-named division was to march in the

same direction on the western slope of the Blue Ridge, sending raiding

parties through the gaps to destroy the Orange & Alexandria Railroad,

and was finally to move through White's Gap to Amherst Courthouse,

whence it was to march toward the James River, cross it below

Lynchburg, cut the James River & Kanawha Canal, destroy the Southside

Railroad, and then move up the river and join in the attack upon the

objective point of the campaign. (70 W. of R. 146).

For the purpose of carrying out this plan, General Hunter left

Staunton on the 10th of June, with his army marching in four columns,

as suggested by Averell. Drums were beating, flags were flying and

triumphant bulletins flashed over the wires to announce to the

Secretary of War the great deeds which were soon to astonish the nation.

* * * * *

On the day Hunter left Staunton with so much pomp and circumstance,

the City of Lynchburg was resting quietly, guarded only by the

convalescents from the hospitals, and the halt and the maimed who were

there congregated in invalid camps. A gallant and appropriate leader

was found for this anomalous force in General Francis T. Nicholls,

who was in command of the post. He had left _a leg and an arm_,

respectively, upon two different battle-fields, but he still managed to

mount his horse and do heroic service. He heard of Hunter's movements

as soon as a start was made, and commenced organizing his sick and

wounded into an army of occupation. From his trenchant dispatches

it seemed that he had determined to hold the town with his cripples

against Hunter's whole force. (70 W. of R. 760).

The little remnant of the detachment which had been defeated under

Jones at Piedmont was then along the line of the Orange & Alexandria

Railroad, and near Charlottesville, under General Vaughan, much

demoralized and short of ammunition and supplies. It came by forced

marches, however, to the aid of Lynchburg, where it was under the

immediate orders of General John C. Breckinridge, the commander of the

Confederate Department of Southwest Virginia. Unfortunately General

Breckinridge, though in Lynchburg, was an invalid in bed, having been

injured when his horse was shot under him at Cold Harbor. Some of the

troops which had fought under him around Richmond were _en route_

to the Valley, and, their destination being changed, they reached

Lynchburg before Early's corps, or any part of it, came up.

There was also another small but efficient force which, by almost an

accident, was added to the troops defending Lynchburg. The Botetourt

Artillery, a battery of six guns, under Captain H.C. Douthat, had

been operating in Southwestern Virginia. On the fifth of June it was

ordered to the Valley, _via_ Lynchburg, to the command of General

W.E. Jones. It reached Lynchburg as soon after receiving the order as

transportation could be afforded, and reported to General Jones by the

wires. He directed the battery to remain in Lynchburg until further

orders.

The battery was on the 11th of June ordered to Staunton, and it and its

men, about one hundred in number, were at once put on a freight train

on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad and started, despite rumors of

raiding parties, on its proposed route.

At New Glasgow Station the conductor was notified that a large raiding

party was at Arrington Depot, and the smoke disclosed the fact that the

depot buildings were being destroyed.

Captain Douthat at once pushed forward with the train, upon which

there happened to be a car-load of muskets, with suitable ammunition.

Douthat's object was to reach the Tye River bridge before the Federal

troops and save it from destruction. This he did, and, breaking open

the ordnance boxes, armed his men with muskets and forty rounds of

ammunition, and then, at a double quick, crossed the Tye River, and got

into position to defend the bridge.

When the Federal videttes came in contact with what seemed a heavy

infantry picket they retired and reported a large infantry force on

hand, and the whole raiding party at once withdrew and the bridge

was saved. Had it been destroyed, Lynchburg must have fallen, as

reinforcements could not have come up in time to protect it.

The sound judgment and prompt and bold action of Captain Douthat and

the gallantry of his men on this occasion is worthy of all praise--yet,

strange to say, as he was unattached at the time, there is no official

report of this valuable service.

The battery, after this, was unable to continue its journey to

Staunton, as the railroad had been much damaged, and it therefore

fortunately returned to Lynchburg and took a very active part in the

defence of the city. It aided in the repulse of Duffie's division on

the Forest Road, one section of two guns being stationed at the old

soapstone quarry on that road, on the crest of the hill beyond the road

to Tate's Spring. These two guns protected the railroad bridge over Ivy

Creek and drove the Federal cavalry from it whenever they approached.

The other four were on the other side of the road, supporting the

brigade under Colonel Forsberg, and kept up a very heavy fire on

the enemy during his stay. Our comrade and fellow-citizen, Mr. A.H.

Plecker, was a gunner in this battery, and for his gallant services was

tendered a commission. This he declined on the ground that he could do

better service as a gunner, in the discharge of which duty he had won

much reputation.

The arrival of these different detachments of troops gave much comfort

to Nicholls, and they were at once placed in position. There were

still, however, so few of the Confederates on the ground that they

counted more as a picket than as a regular line of battle.

To add to the general confusion incident to this campaign which had

been inaugurated in General Lee's rear, it must be remembered that

General Sheridan, with a large body of well-equipped and well-mounted

cavalry, had, on the 7th of June, crossed the Chickahominy, and on the

10th had struck the Virginia Central Railroad (now the Chesapeake &

Ohio), with the intention of joining Hunter in his march on Lynchburg.

He was met on the 11th and 12th of June at Trevilian's Depot, in Louisa

County, by a Confederate force of cavalry, under General Wade Hampton,

and was repulsed with such disorder that he hurried back to the cover

of Grant's lines in disorganized confusion, leaving the road open for

the reinforcements which Lee was hurrying to the defence of Lynchburg.

Some description of Hampton's great cavalry battle at Trevilian's Depot

would strictly be a part of any history of the siege and battle of

Lynchburg, for had he failed, Lynchburg would necessarily have fallen

into the hands of the enemy; but time will not permit so pleasant a

digression. It is enough to say that it was one of the most brilliant

and successful engagements in which our troops were involved during

the war, and one which shed well-deserved renown not only on General

Wade Hampton, who commanded, but on every officer and man under him.

Conspicuous for their gallantry and valuable service in that battle was

the Second Virginia Cavalry, under our distinguished fellow-citizen,

General T.T. Munford. This great regiment was made up of companies

from Lynchburg and the surrounding counties, and was therefore one of

whose record we all have a right to be proud. On the day of that fight

it was especially distinguished for its daring courage and for its

achievements. It was in the front of the charging column which broke

Custer's line and captured _four_ out of the five caissons lost by

Sheridan on that day. It captured Custer's headquarters, his sash and

private wagon and papers. The wagon was used by General Munford until

it was recaptured, a few days before Appomattox.

On the 12th of June General Lee, who had anxiously been watching the

movements of the enemy in the Valley, and who was perfectly informed

of his designs, gave verbal orders to General Jubal A. Early to hold

his corps (the Second, or Ewell's), with Nelson's and Braxton's

artillery, in readiness to march to the Shenandoah Valley. After

dark upon that day these orders were repeated in writing, and he was

directed to move to the Valley that night at three o'clock _via_ Louisa

Courthouse, Charlottesville and Brown's Gap. He was further ordered

to communicate with General Breckinridge at Lynchburg, with a view of

a combined attack on Hunter. Breckinridge was to attack in front and

Early in the rear.

The Second Corps was then at Gaines' Mill, near Richmond, numbering

about eight thousand muskets. (Memoirs of J.A. Early, page 40.) It

had been for the last forty days constantly fighting, and had taken

a prominent part in the battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania

Courthouse, Gaines' Mill and Cold Harbor, and had had no time or place

for rest or reorganization. At Spottsylvania Courthouse it lost nearly

a whole division. Its commander, Major-General Edward Johnson, had been

wounded and captured. Four of its Brigadier-Generals had been killed

during the campaign, four desperately wounded, and two more had been

promoted to Major-Generals and removed to other commands. The troops

therefore, though hardy and well-tried veterans, were in bad condition

for so arduous an undertaking. Despite these facts, so well calculated

to throw the command out of joint, it was on the march an hour before

that fixed by General Lee in his order! No one but Early knew where

they were going, but all felt that if Lee ordered the march it was

right and led to victory. When it started, Hunter was within fifty

miles of Lynchburg, while Early, on his route by Charlottesville, had

to move one hundred and sixty miles, of which a part of his troops had

the aid of very poor railway transportation for sixty miles.

On the 16th of June Early had reached Charlottesville, and his corps

was at the Rivanna bridge, four miles east of that place, having

marched eighty miles in four days, well maintaining the reputation

won under Jackson as "foot cavalry." Here Early received a dispatch

from Breckinridge announcing that Hunter was at Liberty (now Bedford

City), only distant twenty-five miles. The Orange & Alexandria Railroad

had not been sufficiently repaired for transportation in cars. Every

effort was made, however, to hurry the repairs and to secure trains

to speedily forward the troops from Charlottesville to Lynchburg, for

Early, when the perilous position of that city was known, was ordered

to push on to save it from Hunter's advancing host. He could get only

one engine and a few cars at first, but soon added to this limited

transportation enough to enable him to move a part of his command.

Duffie's attack upon the road between Charlottesville and Lynchburg

had not been very serious either to the railroad or to the telegraph

lines, and both were repaired in one or two days, hence at sunrise on

the morning of the 17th, Early commenced to move his corps by rail.

The transportation was so limited that he could only get half of his

infantry moved on that day. Ramseur's division, one brigade under

Gordon and part of another, were placed upon the train, while Rodes'

division and the residue of Gordon's were ordered to march along the

county road, which runs parallel to the railroad, and to meet the train

as it returned. The artillery and wagon trains were started over the

county road the night before, but got no aid from the railway, and did

not reach Lynchburg in time to take any part in the engagement at that

point. Rodes demanded the right to be sent forward with his division

ahead of Ramseur, on the ground that he should be called upon to defend

his native city. This privilege, from some unaccountable reason, was

denied him, a denial which led to high words between Early and himself.

General Early was on board the first train, but so indifferent was the

motive power, and so bad the condition of the track, that he and the

first half of his corps did not reach Lynchburg until the afternoon of

the 17th, and the rest of his small army did not arrive until nearly

night the next day--too late to take part in the engagement. Early

found Breckinridge in bed suffering from the injury to which reference

is made above, and as Breckinridge could not go out to reconnoitre,

he had called upon General D.H. Hill, who happened to be in the city,

to ascertain and define the best lines of defence. This duty was

performed by General Hill, with the assistance of General Harry T.

Hays, of Louisiana, who was also in town disabled by a wound received

at Spottsylvania Courthouse. Hill established the line close to the

city in breastworks, which had been thrown up on College Hill. These

were at once occupied by the disorganized infantry force which had

been defeated at Piedmont under Jones, the Virginia Military Institute

Cadets, and the invalid corps. To this was added Breckinridge's small

command, when it arrived on the 16th, and Douthat's battery.

Early, on his arrival, thought this line too near the city for the

main defence. He feared that in case of battle the shot and shell of

the enemy would do damage to the property and the people of the town;

consequently a new line, further out, was established, to which were

taken the troops with Early, Breckinridge's men and the artillery.

When he reached the field on the afternoon of the 17th, Early found

Imboden with his small remnant of cavalry, and McCausland with his

little brigades, occupying the hill at the old Quaker Meeting House,

on the Salem Turnpike. This cavalry, with their gallant leaders, was

holding the enemy in check, which was a great achievement, and was one

absolutely essential to the safety of the city. They were, however,

very slowly driven back as the main body of Hunter's army advanced.

The small force under Ramseur, which arrived on the evening of the

17th, was at once thrown forward and occupied the new line established

by Early, across the Salem Turnpike, about two miles from the city and

a mile and a half beyond Hill's line on College Hill. This force, with

two guns of Breckinridge's command, in charge of Lieutenant Carter

Berkeley, of Staunton, now Dr. Carter Berkeley, of Lynchburg, two guns

of Lurty's battery, some of the guns of Floyd King's battalion and two

of Douthat's battery, were placed in the redoubt near the toll-gate and

stayed the advance of the enemy until dark closed the engagement for

the day.

These guns of Lieutenant Berkeley had done good service in the Valley

and rendered themselves and their young commander very famous. They

reached Lynchburg by forced marches, through the upper part of Amherst

County, on the evening of the 16th of June. On their arrival at the

bridge across James River, they were urged forward, as it was supposed

Hunter was even then in sight. The general direction in which the

enemy was expected was pointed out to Berkeley, who was ignorant of

Lynchburg and its topography. He was told to go directly out from the

bridge to the hills west of the city, so he urged his weary horses up

Ninth street, passed the old market house to the foot of Courthouse

hill. There even his nerve was daunted, and he turned up Church street

to Eighth. He halted a moment, wondering what sort of teams and

conveyances they had in Lynchburg, but noticing that Eighth street

was the nearest route to the enemy, he urged his horses up the steep

declivity, putting several men at each wheel. One-third of the hill was

thus surmounted, but there is a limit to human and equine endurance,

and the two guns and their caissons stalled hopelessly. Fortunately

some of Imboden's cavalry were just passing at the foot of the hill

on Church street. They saw the trouble, and knowing how important it

was to get those useful guns into action, jumped from their horses,

reinforced the storming party and soon had the guns at the top of the

hill; thence, at a gallop, they moved forward into the line of battle.

The line then selected extended from a point some distance to the

left of the turnpike through the toll-gate into what is now known

as Langhorne's field. The residue of Early's command did not reach

Lynchburg until late on the afternoon of the 18th, when it was hurried

through the city at a double quick, much to the relief of the citizens,

who cheered them on their pathway. During the night of the 17th a yard

engine, with box cars attached, was run up and down the Southside

Railroad, making as much noise as possible, and thus induced Hunter to

believe and to report that Early was rapidly being reinforced.

Senator John W. Daniel, then a Major on Early's staff, though at the

time disabled from duty by a very dangerous wound, describes the

entrance of these troops upon the scene as follows:

"In this condition Tinsley, the bugler of the Stonewall Brigade, came

trotting up the road sounding the advance, and behind him came the

skirmishers of Ramseur's Division with rapid strides. Just then the

artillerists saw through the smoke the broad white slouch hat of 'Old

Jube,' who rode amongst them....

Poor Tinsley! His last bugle call, like the bagpipes at Lucknow,

foretold the rescue of Lynchburg, but on that field he found, in a

soldier's duty and with a soldier's glory, a soldier's death."

Up to that time Hunter's army was several times larger than that

opposing him. The addition of Rodes' command and the residue of

Gordon's to the Confederate forces the next night diminished the

disparity, but made our army but little over one-half as large as that

under Hunter. Yet Hunter did not make any serious demonstration on the

17th, nor until after two o'clock on the 18th. There was firing along

the picket line and much cannonading, but no serious fight until that

hour.

Half of the Second Corps and Breckinridge's command, with some fifteen

guns, occupied the front line, while the cadets, the dismounted cavalry

and the invalid corps occupied the inner line established by Hill.

On the 18th General Duffie's division of the enemy made some attack on

Early's right. This attack by Duffie with his division of two brigades

of cavalry and a battery of artillery is described by him in a report

made in the field to General Hunter on June 18. He says:

"I have carried out your order in engaging the enemy on the extreme

left. I attacked him at 12:30 and drove him into his fortifications.

Have been fighting ever since. Two charges have been made and

the enemy's strength fully developed in our front. His force is

much superior to mine. All my force is engaged. The enemy is now

attempting to turn my right. I shall send a force to check him. I do

not communicate with Averell on my left." (70 W. of R. 650.)

This force which Duffie describes as so superior to his consisted

of two small brigades of infantry under General Gabe C. Wharton and

the cavalry under General John McCausland. It is impossible that the

whole force was half the size of Duffie's. Wharton's command was but

a remnant left from Gaines' Mill and Cold Harbor, and McCausland's

had been in one continuous fight for ten days, and was therefore

much dismounted, worn and weary. Of the two so-called brigades under

Wharton, one was commanded by our gallant comrade, Colonel Aug.

Forsberg, and had, under his leadership, been more than decimated in

the fights around Richmond during the four weeks immediately preceding.

Had Hunter made a vigorous assault on the line through Judge Daniel's

Rivermont farm, he could have marched directly into Lynchburg and

burned the railroad bridges without successful resistance, for Early

could not have spared a man from his line to oppose him. Wharton's two

brigades were both east of the Blackwater, and between that stream and

James River there was only the skirmish line of McCausland's cavalry,

and a few old men in the trenches across the Rivermont farm. These old

citizens, however, though entirely "muster free" either from age or

physical infirmity, did good service. They remained in the trenches,

though without equipment or even the scant comforts of the regular

soldier, and were anxiously and gallantly awaiting the anticipated

attack. Had it been made, they were ready to die in defence of their

homes.

A reconnoissance was made by Averell on the 18th in the direction of

the Campbell Courthouse Turnpike. It amounted to nothing, and he soon

returned to the main lines. Beyond these two movements, picket firing

and artillery duels, nothing was done until about 2:30 o'clock in the

afternoon, when the infantry divisions of Sullivan and Crook commenced

their advance upon Early's centre. This brought about for a short time

a very active engagement. Our skirmish line was driven in upon the main

body, as is usual in such cases, and the engagement was fairly general

and, for a time, very sharp. The enemy soon fell back into a new line,

and there each side rested on their arms apparently for the night.

Early scarcely felt himself strong enough, before Rodes arrived, to

attack the enemy on ground selected by them, but was courting an attack

all day. The enemy's forces showed no signs of weakness or timidity,

but the indications were that its movements were lacking in well

defined purpose, and there was obviously want of confidence on the part

of the subordinate Brigadiers in the Major-General commanding. That

this feeling prevailed amongst the division and brigade commanders

is clearly observed on reading their official reports, in which they

differ with him as to what was done and the causes of the failure to do

more.

The report of General Crook, who was a very excellent officer, is

particularly striking. After telling of his march and the occupation of

his corps on the 17th, he says (70 W. of R. 121):

"Next morning I was sent to the right with my division to make a

reconnoissance for the purpose of turning the enemy's left; found

it impracticable after marching some three or four miles, and just

returned with my division and got into position to support Sullivan's

division when the enemy made an attack on our lines."

Having said this, and without further word of explanation or

description of the result, he continues:

"_On the retreat this evening_ my division brought up the rear. When

I reached Liberty, I found General Averell had gone into camp on the

edge of the town. The infantry were going into camp some mile and a

half further on."

He sings no paean of victory, as did Hunter, but preserved a silence

which is suggestive, if not eloquent.

General Sullivan made no report. All that General Averell says about

the movements is an elaborate analysis of the causes of the failure,

chief amongst which he asserts was General Hunter's delay at Lexington

(70 W. of R. 148). Colonel Frost, who commanded a regiment in Crook's

division, reports that on the 18th--

"His command marched three miles to the right, and on the afternoon

was ordered again to the front of the enemy's works, and were

afterwards formed in line on our left under a heavy fire of artillery.

Our brigade charged the enemy and drove them back to his rifle-pits.

Here the right gave way, and our brigade being exposed to a close

firing of musketry, grape and canister, we were obliged to retire

about thirty paces to a new line of battle, which was held _until

orders were received to fall back. Marched all that night_, and

reached Liberty about 3 p.m. on the 9th." (70 W. of R. 135.)

Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, afterwards President of the United States,

in reporting the battle of the 18th, says:

"Pursued the retreating rebels and drove them from their rifle-pits to

the protection of their main works. The works being too strong to be

carried by the force then before them, the regiment _retired in some

disorder_, but was promptly reformed before reaching our own lines.

After leaving Lynchburg the officers and men of the First Brigade

sustained themselves through the hardships and privation of the

retreat like good soldiers." (70 W. of R. 123.)

Other quotations from other reports might be made to the same effect.

That these reports may have their true significance it is necessary

that we note what General Hunter himself says of what took place on the

17th and 18th. It will be found difficult to understand where all the

glory comes in. He writes:

"Early in the morning of the 17th orders were given for the troops

to move, but the march was delayed for several hours at the Great

Otter River, owing to the difficulty in crossing the artillery, and

in consequence we did not overtake the enemy until four o'clock in

the afternoon. At that hour Averell's advance came upon the enemy,

strongly posted and intrenched at Diamond Hill, five miles from

Lynchburg. He immediately attacked, and a sharp contest ensued.

Crook's infantry arriving at the same time, made a brilliant advance

upon the enemy, drove him from his works back upon the town, killing

and wounding a number and capturing seventy men and one gun. It being

too late to follow up this success, we encamped upon the battle-field.

The best information to be obtained at this point of the enemy's

forces and plans indicated that all the rebel forces heretofore

operating in the Valley and West Virginia were concentrated in

Lynchburg, under the command of General Breckinridge. This force was

variously estimated at from ten thousand to fifteen thousand men, well

supplied with artillery, and protected by strong works.

"During the night the trains on the different railroads were heard

running without intermission, while repeated cheers and the beating

of drums indicated the arrival of large bodies of troops in the town,

yet up to the morning of the 18th I had no positive information as

to whether General Lee had detached any considerable force for the

relief of Lynchburg. To settle the question, on this morning, I

advanced my skirmishers as far as the toll-gate on the Bedford Road,

two miles from the town, and a brisk fire was opened between them

and the enemy behind their works. This skirmishing with musketry,

occasionally assisted by the artillery, was kept up during the whole

of the forenoon. Their works consisted of strong redoubts on each of

the main roads entering the town, about three miles apart, flanked

on either side by rifle-pits protected by abatis. On these lines the

enemy could be seen working diligently, as if to extend and strengthen

them. I massed my two divisions of infantry in front of the works on

the Bedford Road, ready to move to the right or left as required, the

artillery in commanding positions, and Averell's cavalry division in

reserve. Duffie was ordered to attack resolutely on the Forestville

Road, our extreme left, while Averell sent two squadrons of cavalry

to demonstrate against the Campbell Courthouse Road, on our extreme

right. This detachment was subsequently strengthened by a brigade.

Meanwhile I reconnoitred the lines, hoping to find a wreak interval

through which I might push with my infantry, passing between the main

redoubts, which appeared too strong for a direct assault. While the

guns were sounding on the two flanks, the enemy, no doubt supposing

my centre weakened by too great extension of my lines, and hoping

to cut us in two, suddenly advanced in great force from his works,

and commenced a most determined attack on my position on the Bedford

Turnpike. Although his movement was so unexpected and rapid as almost

to amount to a surprise, yet it was promptly and gallantly met by

Sullivan's division, which held the enemy in check until Crook was

enabled to get his troops up. After a fierce contest of half an hour's

duration, the enemy's direct attack was repulsed; but he persistently

renewed the fight, making repeated attempts to flank us on the left

and push between my main body and Duffie's division. In his effort he

was completely foiled, and at the end of an hour and twenty minutes

was routed and driven back into his works in disorder and with heavy

loss. In the eagerness of pursuit, one regiment (One Hundred and

Sixtieth Ohio) entered the works on the heels of the flying enemy,

but being unsupported, fell back with trifling loss. Our whole loss

in this action was comparatively light. The infantry behaved with the

greatest steadiness, and the artillery, which materially assisted

in repelling the attack, was served with remarkable rapidity and

efficiency. This affair closed about two p.m. From prisoners captured

we obtained positive information that a portion of Ewell's corps was

engaged in the action, and that the whole corps, twenty thousand

strong, under the command of Lieutenant General Early, was either

already in Lynchburg or near at hand. The detachment sent by General

Averell to operate on our right had returned, reporting that they

had encountered a large body of rebel cavalry in that quarter, while

Duffie, although holding his position, sent word that he was pressed

by a superior force. It had now become sufficiently evident that

the enemy had concentrated a force of at least double the numerical

strength of mine, and what added to the gravity of the situation

was the fact that my troops had scarcely enough of ammunition left

to sustain another well-contested battle. I immediately ordered all

the baggage and supply trains to retire by the Bedford turnpike, and

made preparation to withdraw the army as soon as it should become

sufficiently dark to conceal the movement from the enemy. Meanwhile,

as there still remained five hours of daylight, they were ordered to

maintain a firm front, and with skirmishers to press the enemy's lines

at all points. I have since learned that Early's whole force was up in

time to have made a general attack on the same afternoon (18th)--an

attack which under the circumstances would probably have been fatal to

us; but, rendered cautious by the bloody repulse of Breckinridge, and

deceived by the firm attitude of my command, he devoted the afternoon

to refreshment and repose, expecting to strike a decisive blow on

the following morning. As soon as it became dark I quietly withdrew

my whole force, leaving a line of pickets close to the enemy, with

orders to remain until twelve o'clock (midnight), and then follow the

main body. This was successfully accomplished without loss of men or

material, excepting only a few wounded who were left in a temporary

hospital by mistake."

By a critical examination and comparison of these reports it will be

seen that the men who did the fighting say nothing of the Confederate

force being "disgracefully routed," or of their "overwhelming numbers,"

and maintain a prudent silence as to the cause of Hunter's withdrawal.

No one can read the whole correspondence without being satisfied that

such men as Averell, Crook, Sullivan and Hayes, who seemed to have

all been gallant soldiers, were much discouraged and had no faith in

Hunter. They believed they could have forced their way through our

lines and were anxious to do so, for they knew that they had force

superior both in numbers and equipment. Believing this, they were

chagrined that a retreat was ordered just as victory was apparently

within their grasp.

Hunter claimed that he was overwhelmed by numbers, and that he was

short of ammunition. That he was not outnumbered the official reports

plainly show. He had two full divisions of infantry, each with three

brigades, two of cavalry, composed in the aggregate of five brigades

and thirty-two guns. Early, on the other hand, had only the small

though very efficient force belonging to Breckinridge's department,

McCausland's and Imboden's cavalry, the corps of cadets, the Silver

Grays of the city, the invalids, and about one-half of Ewell's corps;

the second half did not reach Lynchburg in time to take active part in

the battle on the 18th. Opposed to Hunter's thirty-two guns, Early had

none of the artillery attached to the second corps and only the guns

under Major Floyd King belonging to Breckinridge's command, Douthat's

battery, two of Berkeley's and several of Lurty's, some fifteen or

twenty all told. King had four companies of four guns each in his

command, but Otey's battery was on duty elsewhere. The batteries with

him were Chapman's, Bryant's and Lowry's. Doing good service in Lowry's

company was our townsman M.H. Dudley, of the Glamorgan Works.

Early's cavalry, opposed to the elegant divisions of Averell and

Duffie, consisted of Imboden's remnant, one-half of which was

dismounted, and all of which, though it did good service, was

disorganized by the defeat at Piedmont, and, in addition, the gallant

little brigade so admirably handled by General McCausland.

If General Hunter did not know all this, it was his fault, for it

was his duty to know, and he had ample opportunity to acquire the

information. He had scouts on both railroads and the country was filled

with the vigilant spies who prided themselves on their cleverness. They

were famous under the name of "Jessie's Scouts"; a name assumed in

honor of Mrs. General Fremont, who was a daughter of Senator Thomas H.

Benton. He also had the aid of several notorious local traitors, who

affected to keep him informed. The truth is he had all the necessary

information, but lacked the nerve to act on it.

The other excuse made by General Hunter that his army was out of

ammunition, is equally untenable. It cannot be believed that a corps

was short of ammunition which had been organized but a few weeks, a

part only of which had been engaged at Piedmont, and which had fought

no serious pitched battle, and the sheep, chickens, hogs and cattle

they wantonly shot on their march could not have exhausted their

supply. The corps would not have started had the ammunition been so

scarce. It would have been against all precedent, and any thinking

man must know that the Ordnance Department of the United States army,

always full-handed, had well supplied ammunition to an army about to

start on so important an undertaking. No brigade or division commander

in his correspondence or in his report made any such complaint. It

would have given them pleasure to have had some excuse for retreating.

They undertook to give no excuse, and their silence is so logical that

it points out with great effect the fact that they had no belief in

Hunter's excuses, and laid the real blame of the ignominious failure

upon the incompetence of Hunter himself.

The obvious cause of Hunter's failure was that he did not reach

Lynchburg on the 16th, the day upon which, according to Averell's

plan, he was due. Had he reached his destination on the 16th he could

have occupied the town without opposition. General Breckinridge was

there, an invalid, and his troops were there in small numbers, much

wearied, and they, with a few Silver Gray home guards, and the boys

from the Institute, constituted the sole garrison opposing his army of

twenty-five thousand men. Why he did not come up is accounted for upon

two grounds. The first of which was the unnecessary delay at Lexington.

He says in his report, after giving the detail of his performance

there, "I delayed one day in Lexington" (70 W. of R. 97). Colonel Hayes

says _two_ days. (Id. 122.) Had he marched without delay he would

have been in Lynchburg before Early or any part of his troops left

Charlottesville, and the town would have surrendered without firing a

gun. He delayed at Lexington that he might vent his personal ill-will

upon the State of Virginia. He says in his report that he ordered the

Virginia Military Institute, a college for the education of youth,

to be burned, and that he also ordered the burning of the residence

of Hon. John Letcher, formerly Governor of Virginia, alleging as his

reason for this latter act of barbarity that the governor had urged the

people to rise in arms to repel the invasion. In burning both places he

gave no time for anything to be saved. The family of Governor Letcher

barely escaped with the clothes upon their persons, and the torch was

applied to the Institute without the opportunity to save its library,

its philosophical apparatus, its furniture or its archives. All alike

were consumed to appease his vindictive spite. The statue of the Father

of his Country, belonging to the Institute, was stolen and sent to be

erected upon the grounds at West Point. (Id. 640.) It was returned

after the war.

General Early in his memoirs says:

"The scenes on Hunter's route to Lynchburg were truly heart-rending;

houses had been burned, and helpless women and children left without

shelter. The country had been stripped of provisions and many

families left without a morsel to eat. Furniture and bedding had been

cut to pieces, and old men and women and children robbed of all the

clothing they had except that on their backs. Ladies' trunks had been

rifled and their dresses torn to pieces in mere wantonness; even the

negro girls had lost their little finery.

* * * * *

"Hunter's deeds were those of a malignant and cowardly fanatic, who

was better qualified to make war upon helpless women and children than

upon armed soldiers. The time consumed in the perpetration of these

deeds was the salvation of Lynchburg, with its stores, foundries and

factories, which were so necessary to our army at Richmond."

There was, however, another more potent influence which stayed Hunter's

advance. General John McCausland had been operating against the enemy

in Southwest Virginia with a body of cavalry. When Hunter reached

Staunton he was ordered across the country to meet him. When near

Staunton, McCausland was joined by a small brigade under the command of

Colonel William E. Peters, now professor of Latin at the University of

Virginia, who was then Colonel of the Twenty-first Virginia Cavalry.

These two brigades, aggregating some sixteen hundred men, under

McCausland's leadership, ably seconded by Peters, at once commenced to

worry Hunter and to keep his whole force in a constant state of alarm.

This force was so ubiquitous that it was estimated by the enemy as

being five times its real size. Amongst the officers in the force under

Colonel Peters was his nephew, and our fellow-citizen, Major Stephen P.

Halsey, who did good service and distinguished himself for his active

gallantry.

As Hunter moved from Staunton to Lynchburg these brigades were ever

in his front, one hour fighting and the next falling back as the main

column would appear, but ever causing delay and apprehension. The

tireless little band performed deeds of gallantry as they hung upon

Hunter's front which entitled every officer and man to a cross of honor.

When Hunter's army reached Buchanan, McCausland had been hovering in

front of his vanguard for many miles. There was a bridge at this point

across James River, over which Hunter expected to cross. McCausland

sent his men over the bridge, and from the south side of the river they

opened fire on the head of Hunter's column as it appeared in sight, and

thus checked their advance. McCausland had caused hay to be piled on

the bridge, much of which was wet with coal oil. He, with Captain St.

Clair, of his command, had remained on the north side for the purpose

of setting fire to the bridge. The Federal cavalry charged up very

close to him before McCausland applied the match, as he was desirous

that every man of his command should get safely over. As fire was

opened on him he applied the torch to the hay, and the coal oil at once

flashed up in a furious blaze.

Captain St. Clair ran up the river bank, and the enemy was so occupied

in the effort to kill him that they did not see McCausland, who escaped

in a small boat under the burning bridge, and was not again under their

fire until he was climbing up the opposite bank of the river.

This thoughtful and gallant conduct of McCausland delayed Hunter's

column for a whole day, thus giving Lynchburg a better chance for

defence and rendering Hunter's raid ineffectual.

In Early's dispatch reporting the battle at Lynchburg an expression is

used which implies a doubt as to whether the cavalry would do its duty.

Never did cavalry do better service than did that under McCausland,

both as Hunter advanced and as he retreated. Had McCausland had the

full command of the cavalry on the retreat, Hunter's wagon train

and artillery would have fallen into the hands of the Confederates;

but for some reason, which it is now unnecessary to explain, great

opportunities were permitted to pass without advantage being taken

of them. McCausland at Hanging Rock with his force was in a position

to have attacked the retreating column of the enemy and to have cut

off his wagon train and many of his guns. He begged to be allowed to

attack, but was told to await the arrival of the infantry. While he

waited the enemy discovered his position and so far withdrew that when

the inhibition was withdrawn the great opportunity was gone, though,

despite the delay, a number of guns, wagons and supplies were captured

by his force.

During the second day that Hunter was in the lines around Lynchburg

McCausland made a raid around his rear and attacked his train at Forest

Depot, driving a guard of one regiment of infantry and one of cavalry

back to the Salem pike. This gave Hunter much apprehension and threw

his force into confusion; how much it contributed to his rapid flight

that night can never be known. Due credit was not given McCausland for

this, nor for many of his other valuable services.

Lynchburg owes much to Ramseur's division of the Second Corps and to

the men who occupied the lines when Hunter arrived, but it was the

skill of McCausland and Peters and the unflagging energy and courage

of their officers and men, which so retarded Hunter's movements that

when he did arrive there was force enough on our line to prevent his

capturing the city. McCausland and his command were the real saviors of

the city, and some lasting memorial of its gratitude should be erected

to perpetuate their deeds.

McCausland proved himself a soldier of a high type. There were few

officers in either army who, with such a force, could have accomplished

as much. His little command had been in constant contact with the enemy

for many days, had been continuously in the saddle and on exhausting

marches, was badly mounted and badly equipped; everything about it was

worn and weary but their dauntless spirit; that, under the example of

their indomitable leaders, never flagged for an instant. The truth

is, heroism was so common a quality amongst the "old Confeds" during

that war that heroes were almost at a discount and heroic acts passed

unnoticed, however great.

The services of this command were recognized at the time by a vote of

thanks adopted by the City Council of Lynchburg on the 24th of June,

1864, "for their gallantry in opposing for ten days the march of a

greatly superior force, thereby retarding the advance of the enemy on

our city until a proper force could be organized for its defence." The

citizens of the town at the same time presented General John McCausland

with a sword and a pair of silver spurs in token of their gratitude.

It is not fair to close this special notice of the service rendered

the city by McCausland's command without referring especially to the

gallant conduct of Captain E.E. Bouldin, of the Charlotte cavalry, who

commanded its rear guard as it fell back before Hunter's army. The

records show that the numberless charges of Captain Bouldin and his

valiant band upon Hunter's vanguard were conspicuous, even amongst the

men of a command where each proved himself a hero. Captain Bouldin

still survives, and is a useful and modest citizen of Danville,

Virginia, and a learned and efficient member of its bar.

What General McCausland did in this defence was not the only service

he rendered the city. When Lee surrendered he rode off with his men

toward the mountains of Southwest Virginia for the purpose of there

disbanding. As he approached Lynchburg a committee from the civil

authorities met him, and, after telling him that the place was being

looted by lawless squads of disbanded soldiers from Lee's army, asked

his aid. He at once sent in a squadron which cleared the streets and

soon restored order. He continued to preserve order until the civil

authorities organized a force sufficient to maintain it.

When Hunter commenced his advance from Staunton our townsman,

Colonel J.W. Watts, of the Second Virginia Cavalry, was at his home

near Liberty, recuperating from severe wounds. Despite his disabled

condition, he mounted his horse, joined McCausland and rendered him

valuable aid. To him was assigned the duty of blocking the road from

Buchanan to the Peaks of Otter. He did this work very thoroughly, but

he states that so complete was the equipment of Hunter's pioneers

that they cleared the road in less time than it took him to blockade

it. Nevertheless the blockade was one of the causes which materially

delayed the advance of Hunter, and therefore was one of the causes

which led to the relief of the city.

Major Robert C. Saunders, of Campbell, was at the time of the attack

by Hunter a resident of the city, being in charge of the Quartermaster

Department for the collection of the tax-in-kind for this Congressional

District. He had been in the field as captain of an infantry company

from Campbell County, and as soon as Hunter's approach was a certainty

General Nicholls sent for him and sent him out to bring him definite

information of Hunter's position. He started immediately and soon was

among Hunter's vanguard, but, though much exposed, he wonderfully

escaped under cover of the night and brought accurate information

which was very valuable. He was sent out again, and was in the sharp

battle fought by General McCausland at New London and by McCausland and

Imboden at the Quaker Meeting House, and then, as Hunter retreated,

he was with McCausland and Peters and saw much hard service with those

sturdy soldiers and their men. His manuscript account of what he saw is

very interesting, and might properly be inserted in this paper but that

it would make it too long for one evening's address.

Be the causes of General Hunter's failure what they may, the fact is

he did fail, and failed disgracefully, where he should have succeeded,

for he had every advantage of numbers, of guns and of equipment. There

are many pages of reports of Federal officers about this campaign

published in the Records of the War of the Rebellion by the United

States Government, but the cotemporaneous literature on the part of

Confederate officers is very scant; they fought better and longer

than they wrote. As a specimen of the Confederate reports, that of

General Early may fitly be taken. It contrasts strikingly with the

ten-page document of General Hunter upon the same subject, found in the

seventieth volume of the War of the Rebellion, page 94.

General Early's report is as follows:

"New London, June 19, 1864, 9:30 A.M.

"_General_:

"Last evening the enemy assaulted my line in front of Lynchburg and

was repulsed by the part of my command which was up. On the arrival

of the rest of the command I made arrangements to attack this morning

at light, but it was discovered that the men were retreating, and I

am now pursuing. The enemy is retreating in confusion, and, if the

cavalry does its duty, we will destroy him.

"J.A. Early,

"Lieutenant General.

"_General R.E. Lee._"

This report is brief and to the point. It has been construed as

ignoring the troops belonging to the command of Breckinridge, and as

doing injustice to the cavalry of Imboden and McCausland. General Early

should have been more careful in writing it, but it must be remembered

that when it was written he was not informed of the great service which

had been rendered by the cavalry, or of the faithful work which had

been done by the troops, other than those belonging to the Second Corps.

In his memoirs (on page 44) General Early says that some time after

midnight it was discovered that Hunter was moving, but, owing to

the uncertainty as to whether he was merely changing front or

retreating, nothing could be done until daylight, when, the retreat

being ascertained, the pursuit commenced. Early's army moved in three

columns, the Second Corps on the Salem Turnpike, Breckinridge's

command, under Elzey, on the Forest Road, and the cavalry, placed by

Early under General Robert Ransom, on the right of Elzey. The enemy's

rear was overtaken at Liberty by Ramseur's division and was driven

through that place at a brisk trot.

It is not within the scope of this paper to follow up the retreat of

Hunter, nor to narrate the incidents of Early's campaign in Maryland

and the scare he gave the Government at Washington. What a commotion

his little army created can be easily understood by inspecting the 70th

and 71st volumes of the War of the Rebellion, a large part of which

is taken up by the numberless orders and counter-orders, alarms and

outcries incident to the fright then prevailing. General Grant seems

to have been the only person in command on the other side who kept his

equilibrium and acted with consistent courage and judicious poise.

But before we return to the scenes around Lynchburg incident to the

attack, it may well be noted that Hunter, after reaching Salem, turned

off to Lewisburg, West Virginia, and did not feel safe until he had

placed his army far beyond the Alleghanies and upon the banks of the

Ohio at Parkersburg. The effect of this remarkable line of retreat was

that the Valley was left open, and Early seized the opportunity and at

once commenced his march for the Potomac practically unmolested. On the

5th of July Hunter and his command were at Parkersburg, on the Ohio,

while Early, whom he was to obstruct, was crossing the Potomac River

into Maryland.

Poor Hunter! he seems to have had few friends, and it is almost

cruel to recite his history, but men who undertake great enterprises

must expect to be criticised when they fail. He got little comfort,

and expected none, from the Confederate leaders, but he got even

less from the Federal, except when it came in the form of such

reports as that sent by Captain T.K. McCann to General Meigs, the

Quartermaster-General, in which he says that "General Hunter fought

four hours on the 17th; on the 18th the General ascertained that Rebel

force at Lynchburg was fifty-thousand men, and from a prisoner taken

it was reported that Lee was evacuating Richmond and falling back on

Lynchburg, and consequently General Hunter was obliged to fall back."

(Id. 679.) General Grant, however, on the 21st of June, wrote General

Meade to know where Hunter was, and said, "Tell him _to save his army_

in the way he thinks best." (Id. 657.)

On the 17th of July Halleck wrote to Hunter, giving him some directions

in regard to his future movements, saying that "General Grant directs,

if compelled to fall back, you will retreat _in front of the enemy_

towards the Potomac, so as to cover Washington _and not be squeezed

out to one side_, so as to make it necessary to fall back into

West Virginia to save your army." This order he disregarded most

ignominiously.

In the same letter Halleck wrote Hunter that General Grant said that in

the marching _he does not want houses burned_, but "that he wants your

troops to eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they can, so that

crows flying over it for the balance of the year will have to carry

their rations with them." (Id. 366.)

C.A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, wrote to Grant on the 15th of

July (Id. 332): "Hunter appears to have been engaged in a pretty active

campaign _against the newspapers_ in West Virginia." And Halleck on the

same day wrote to Grant that he thought "_Hunter's command was badly

used up in the Lynchburg expedition_." (Id. 331.)

These assaults, and many others of a like nature, wounded General

Hunter so greatly that he not only asked to be relieved, but wrote a

letter to Grant, in which, after speaking of the depressing effect

upon him of these comments, he unstopped the vials of his wrath against

his subordinates, upon whom he put the blame of his defeat.

In this letter he says that Sullivan, who commanded one of his

divisions, was "_not worth one cent_; in fact very much in my way,"

and, again, he says: "I dashed on toward Lynchburg, and _should

certainly have taken it if it had not been for the stupidity and

conceit of that fellow Averell_, who unfortunately joined me at

Staunton, and of whom I unfortunately had, at the time, a very high

opinion, and trusted him when I should not have done so." (71 W. of R.

366.)

With these quotations from the correspondence of his associates,

General Hunter may be left to the verdict which will be accorded him by

the future historian of the stirring events in which he took part.

War is not a gentle occupation, and its customs are harsh. To make it

effective, it is clearly within the rules of civilization to strip an

enemy's country through which a hostile army is passing of everything

which will sustain the life of either men or beasts. Hence Grant's

historic order about the crow carrying his rations, while cruel, is

within the line of legitimate warfare. But putting non-combatants

to death, insults to women and children, the wanton destruction of

household goods and clothes, the application of the torch to dwellings,

factories and mills, or the destruction of public buildings, and

especially of institutions of learning and their libraries, and works

of art and science, is a style of warfare long since relegated to the

savage. The disgrace of reviving this barbaric strife in modern times

was reserved for Hunter. General Crook, one of his division commanders,

a soldier brave and true, felt constrained to note the conduct of the

troops, and published an order in which he says he "_regrets to learn

of so many acts committed by our troops that are disgraceful to the

command_." Hunter knew all this, but there was no word of protest or

repression from him.

It is to be regretted that later in this campaign, when we carried the

war across the Potomac, some of our troops retaliated for these brutal

acts, upon innocent parties. That Hunter had set the example was no

good excuse, though it was pled. (See General Bradley T. Johnson's

Report, 90 W. of R. 7.)

General Early has been severely criticised for permitting the escape of

Hunter. It is always much easier to criticise than to accomplish; to

point out how a thing should have been done, after we know the result

of what was done, than to do it at the time. The facts heretofore

stated can leave no doubt that all was done, as far as the prompt

pursuit of Hunter is concerned, which could have been done. Early's

line of defence, owing to the smallness of his force, was not only

thin but was short; he had therefore to keep in such a condition that

by changing front rapidly with the troops he had, he could supply the

place of those he did not have. Hence, when he noticed Hunter moving

away from his immediate front, he did not suppose he was retiring,

but merely withdrawing for the purpose of making his attack at another

point, and prudence demanded that he should keep his troops in hand

until the enemy's purpose was developed. To do this the delay until

daylight was essential.

It is a subject of remark that with Hunter's army there were two

men who very faithfully discharged their duties as soldiers and

subsequently became Presidents of the United States--one Colonel

Rutherford B. Hayes, who commanded a brigade, and the other Major

William McKinley, who was a staff officer.

The loss on neither side was very heavy, but it was very much greater

on that of the invader than upon ours. Hunter left his dead on the

field to be buried by his enemy, and his wounded in a field hospital;

facts which show how precipitously he departed.

The Federal line of battle was formed on the left, directly through the

yard of the residence of the late C.H. Moorman, whose farm lay on both

sides of Blackwater Creek, and occupied most of what is now called West

Lynchburg. When it was known that Hunter was approaching, Mr. Moorman

packed several wagons with provisions, and, with his negroes and stock,

moved down toward the Staunton River, leaving his house in charge

of his young, unmarried daughter, now Mrs. Hurt, his wife, an old

negro man and several negro women. Before Mr. Moorman cleared his own

plantation, which was large, he found it necessary to lighten his load,

and to that end selected a spot and buried his supply of well-cured and

much prized hams. It turned out that the line of battle of Crook's

division ran across the spot, and the buried treasure was discovered,

much to the delight of the troops, who greatly enjoyed a very fine lot

of old Virginia hams, always valuable, but especially so under such

circumstances.

At sunrise on the morning of the 17th, Miss Moorman went out on a hill

near her house to reconnoitre the military situation. She saw a column

of Federal troops moving on the Salem Turnpike, and was looking at

them very anxiously when she was shocked to see a line of blue coats

crossing the field close to her home. She at once ran back, sheltering

herself behind the fence, but the officer in command was at the door

before she was, and very politely advised her to stay in the house

while the fight was going on. The family were not molested during the

two days that the troops were there. With exceptional visits to the

front yard, she obeyed the officer's instructions very carefully. She

heard the constant cannonading and the picket firing without cessation

all of the 17th and until the evening of the 18th, when the sounds

changed and indicated that a real battle was going on close at hand.

She was naturally in a fever of excitement, but could hear nothing

of the result. About midnight of the 18th, or more probably on the

morning of the 19th, she heard the rumbling of wagons and artillery on

the Salem Turnpike, and found the lines around her house were being

withdrawn, but it was some time before she discovered that the Federal

troops were retreating. It was then nearly daylight, and she slipped

out of the house and ran down to the ford across Blackwater Creek and

notified the cavalry at that point what she had seen. A company was

at once sent off in pursuit to verify her statement. After they had

gone, and as she returned home, she met a solitary Federal soldier on

foot, who asked her what had become of his command. She told him they

had been whipped and had retreated, and informed him that he was her

prisoner. He stated he had fallen asleep and had been left, and at once

surrendered to her.

On reaching her home, although it was not yet sunrise, she started over

on foot to the point where the heaviest fighting had taken place, that

she might learn the fate of her brother, Major Marcellus N. Moorman,

who commanded a battalion of artillery in the Second Corps. He had not

been in the fight, as the battalion had not reached Lynchburg until

during the night of the 18th. His command had started in the pursuit

when she left home on her mission, but she met him on the battle-field

going to tell his mother good-bye. Thus another son of Lynchburg was in

line to battle for her defence.

On the extreme right of the Confederate lines, and on a part of what

is now the farm of Senator Daniel, was stationed the brigade in

command of Colonel Aug. Forsberg, then a stranger in the city, and

here merely by the accident of war. On the right of his brigade was

the Thirtieth battalion of Virginia infantry, under the command of

Captain, now Judge, Stephen Adams, who, on the breaking out of the

war, was a practicing attorney of West Virginia. He had married Miss

Emma Saunders, of Lynchburg, but was then a stranger thrown into the

line of defence of the city by the like accident. Captain Adams, after

he became a citizen of Lynchburg, purchased the very land on which

his men were that day formed in line of battle, and has often dug up

pieces of shell and bullets which were fired at him. He now preserves

them as pleasant reminders of the past. Both Captain Adams and Colonel

Forsberg are now valued citizens of Lynchburg, and we owe them a debt

of gratitude for their gallant efforts in its defence.

It is not generally known that a few of the Federal shells were thrown

into the city, but such was the case. The writer has in his possession

a part of a three-inch percussion shell, shot from a rifle cannon,

which fell in what was then known as "Meem's Garden," near the spot

where the Catholic Church of the Holy Cross is now situated. His mother

lived in the immediate vicinity of the place where it exploded, and,

when the sound was heard, one of the servants ran over and picked it

up, and it was thus preserved in the family.

The blood-stained and battle-torn little command of Breckinridge

reached Lynchburg on the 16th of June. Up to that moment no one in the

city had hoped that the place could be saved from Hunter's vandalism by

the cordon of boys, cripples and irregular troops which surrounded it,

and there was an anxiety which cannot be described; its depth may be

imagined, but the pen cannot paint it.

The arrival of this small force brought hope back to the hearts of the

old men and helpless women and children who constituted the population

of the city, and as the hardy old veterans moved up Main and then up

Fifth streets they were cheered by joyous crowds of excited women,

jubilant convalescents and hopeful old men. The troops had made a

two-days' forced march from the headwaters of Rockfish River and were

in bad physical condition, but in high spirits. They much enjoyed their

cordial reception. This is shown by a little incident preserved out of

the many of the same character by a person who was one of the girls

present on the occasion.

In the column of troops, as they swung along in a double-quick to meet

the advancing foe, was one red-haired soldier who had lost both hat and

shoes, but was advancing with the same alacrity as his comrades who had

been more fortunate in preserving these valuable articles of dress.

Miss Sally Scruggs, then a young lady, radiant with the enthusiasm of

the occasion, was standing upon the wall of the front yard of what was

then the residence of Mr. H.I. Brown, at the south corner of Fifth

and Church streets, together with a great many other ladies. She was

wearing a Confederate broad-brimmed straw hat of her own make, trimmed

with all the colors which could be raked from the discarded finery of

the past. Seeing the gallant fellow passing without a hat, she tore

her own from her head and threw it to him. He caught it, tied it over

his auburn locks, raised his musket to a present arms, and the brigade

cheered as long as they were in sight.

The writer has taken much pains to gather from eyewitnesses incidents

of these eventful days in the history of our city, but with little

success. It is astonishing how few people took note, or, if they did,

can narrate the small incidents which would be so interesting to the

present generation. The main and patent facts they remember well,

but the official reports and newspapers preserve them to us very

accurately. What is wanted, and what was the prime aim of this paper,

is the preservation of those traditional facts which give a reality

to history which historic papers cannot impart. Little aid has been

rendered in this respect, though many letters have been written asking

it, and many personal applications made to those who might, with a

little trouble, have reproduced from memory many of those incidents so

essential to the personal interest of such a sketch as this.

Among the facts which have been preserved, it is pleasant to tell of

another soldier whose subsequent career was one in which every citizen

took pride. Young W.C. Folkes, the son of our late much respected

member of the Legislature from this city, Ed. J. Folkes, was at home

disabled by a wound which had carried away one of his legs. Though

far from recovered, he seized his crutch and a musket and started out

to the lines, taking with him our townsman, Mr. E.C. Hamner, then

not sixteen years old. The two marched out to the furthermost line,

and there did a soldier's duty under fire all day. Young Folkes,

after the war, studied law at the University of Virginia and then

moved to Memphis, Tennessee, where he soon rose to the front rank

in his profession, and, while yet a young man, was elevated to the

Supreme bench of the State, where, after a few years of distinguished

usefulness, he died, beloved and respected in his adopted as well as

his native State.

The last incident shows the spirit of the boys. But the old men on that

day were boys also. Mr. Mike O'Connell was over eighty years of age.

He went out with the Silver Grays. His company was placed on the inner

line, but with his long rifle he marched out to the skirmish line and

kept up a constant fire on the enemy all day, though himself under a

heavy fire.

The writer of this sketch was, he regrets to say, in another part

of the Army of Northern Virginia at this time, and therefore can

give nothing from his own experience. He was, however, in constant

correspondence with his wife, who wrote him very full accounts of all

that happened. Unfortunately all her letters on this subject, but one,

have been lost; one extract from that may be worth inserting. It is

dated Tuesday, June 21, 1864:

"I received three letters from you, for all of which you must accept

my thanks. It was amusing to me in reading those of the 17th and 19th

to see how little idea you had of the stirring times through which we

were passing at Lynchburg.

"On Monday, the 13th, we begun to fear that Hunter would make

Lynchburg his point of attack, but it was not a definite fear until we

heard of his being in Lexington, and that he was turning this way. On

Thursday, the 16th, we heard of his being at Liberty, marching in this

direction, and then all was excitement and apprehension.

"General Breckinridge, with some troops, got here on Wednesday night,

and as we saw them passing out West street, it was a most reassuring

sight, and never were a lot of bronzed and dirty looking veterans,

many of them barefooted, more heartily welcomed. The streets were

lined with women, waving their handkerchiefs and cheering them on as

they moved out to a line on the hills west of the city. We were made

more hopeful also by the knowledge that General Early, with several

brigades, was at Charlottesville, en route to reinforce the small

command of Breckinridge. He arrived with some of his troops on the

evening of Friday, the 17th, but could do little more than get what he

had into position. On Saturday, the 18th, more of Early's men came,

and it was a delightful sound to hear their cheers as they passed out

to the lines. Eugene was among them, and seemed to delight in the

chance of making a fight right at home.

"Saturday, the 18th, was a day we will not soon forget. There was no

general engagement until about three o'clock, but a constant cannonade

and heavy skirmishing went on all day. Our lines were out near and in

Spring Hill Cemetery; the enemy's further out. Their skirmish line was

in Mr. John B. Lee's yard, where a number were killed by our cannon.

I went out on College Hill and watched the fighting much of the time.

It was very exciting to see the cannon fire from both sides and the

explosion of the shells on the opposite side. It was fascinating

beyond description. I could see our troops moving and taking new

positions, and could see the Yankee batteries doing the same thing,

and then the fearful reality of the scene was forced upon me by the

line of ambulances which were kept busy bringing our wounded into town.

"Colonel Floyd King called at our house and told me, on Friday

night, that we should put our most valuable things in the cellar for

protection, and should stay down there ourselves. Many things were

carried into the basement, including the pictures, china, silver,

etc., etc., but we did not go there to sleep, thinking it was time

enough to do so when the shells actually commenced to fly. Our people,

of course, were very much excited, but, on the whole, behaved very

well, and with more coolness than I had anticipated. I had so much to

do I did not have time to be scared, though I was deeply anxious. The

sight of the familiar faces of the veterans as they marched through

our streets, reassured me entirely. Early got his men into line on

Saturday evening, but for some reason I do not understand did not

attack, and the next morning the coward, Hunter, was gone. Early at

once started after him, but has not yet overtaken him, we hear.

"Our people criticise Early with much bitterness for not attacking

Saturday, but I think we ought to be only too glad we got through

safely without the hazard of a battle. Eugene had the headquarters of

his sharpshooters at one time in the cemetery, close by his father's

grave. He went on, of course, with his command. It was a great relief

when we heard that Hunter was gone. Mother stood it remarkably well.

She was, of course, very anxious about Eugene, as she would hear the

booming of the cannon, but she kept up her nerve and spirits.

"Hunter's headquarters were at old Major Hutter's. He told them that

he proposed to capture or burn Lynchburg. Major Hutter was of course,

politely treated while Hunter was there, but after he and some of his

generals who were with him had left the house, other officers and men

robbed it--robbing Miss Hutter's chamber of her clothing and other

valuables. Many wounded were left in Major Hutter's yard; indeed,

the flight was so rapid that all but the slightly wounded were left

behind, together with many small arms and some cannon. Early may

not have done all he might have done, but, certain it is, Hunter's

whole campaign seems to have been a farce. He was gallant when there

was no enemy, and a coward when they were in sight. He burned the

Military Institute, which was not even garrisoned by boys, and set

fire to Governor Letcher's house, which only a woman protected. If the

'bravest are the tenderest,' how true it is that the cowards are the

cruelest. The renegade, David R. Strother (Porte Crayon), was with

Hunter as one of his staff at Major Hutter's. Another traitor to his

State, his name and his race.

"The soldiers who came up with Early gave the most distressing

accounts of the condition of affairs in Louisa County, where the

Yankee raids have done so much harm to the unprotected. They say the

desolation is so great that as they marched through the women and

children flocked to the road for something to eat, and would grasp

eagerly all the bits of cold corn-bread they could spare them from

their haversacks. Is it not horrible to think of?"

A remarkable incident happened in connection with the depredation of

Hunter's troops at Lexington. When the corps of cadets was ordered to

leave the Institution on the approach of Hunter, they deposited their

trunks in the residences of neighboring gentlemen for safe keeping.

Young Mr. Carter H. Harrison, of Staunton, was then a cadet, and, with

several others, put his trunk at Professor Campbell's to save it. When

the battle was over at Lynchburg and Hunter was gone, the cadets were

not put in the chasing column, but were relieved from further active

duty. Mr. Harrison, with others of the corps, went to the battle-field,

and during his inspection visited the field hospital where the wounded

of the enemy were being cared for by our surgeons. He noticed one man

who was badly wounded in the leg, and whose pantaloons were ripped up

that the surgeon might more easily dress the wound. As Harrison looked

at the soldier he observed his own initials on his socks, and upon

further investigation discovered that all the man's underclothes were

similarly marked and all belonged to him, and were a part of those he

had left in his trunk at Professor Campbell's.

The man confessed that they had looted Professor Campbell's house, and

that the underwear was part of the booty. Arrangements were made by

which possession followed the legal title.

It is needless to attempt to describe the anxiety of the citizens

as Hunter approached, heralded by the accounts of his vandalism at

Lexington and on his march. Until their nerves were restored by the

arrival of Breckinridge's little army of some fifteen hundred men

and the guns of Berkeley and W.S. Lurty's battery, every woman and

non-combatant was actively engaged in hiding silver, jewels, provisions

and other valuables--generally putting them in the very place where

skilled looters would be sure to go in search. Many things were put

away at that time which have never been found since, and never will be.

The anxiety of the hiders so affected their memory that the place of

hiding was forgotten.

As soon as hope was restored by the appearance of additional troops,

the energies of the women were directed to the effort of giving food

to the hungry and travel-worn troops whose arrival had brought them

so much comfort. While the cannon were booming over the hills of the

suburbs and the fierce rattle of contending musketry could be heard,

our women were bending over the fires cooking rations for the men in

the lines, or scraping lint and rolling bandages for the wounded.

The first ray of hope restored confidence, and the inhabitants of

Londondery or Leyden were not more calm or heroic, or more actively

engaged in doing all in their power for defence, than were these women

and the old men, who were the only other inhabitants of the city left.

The old men, with such weapons as they could procure of every variety

of style, were in the trenches across the plateau now known as

Rivermont, ready to sacrifice their lives in protecting their loved

ones and their homes from the marauding troops which were advancing

with a devastating purpose, long since abandoned as unfit for civilized

warfare. Thus men and women alike braced themselves for the great

struggle, and, though not put to the final test, were calm, collected

and brave in the supreme moment when the enemy were thundering at

our gates. This fact is one of which the city may well be proud, and

should stimulate coming generations to emulate the example of their

forefathers.

* * * * *

The Garland-Rodes Camp has induced the preparation of these pages, that

the truths of history may be preserved from that oblivion to which

human memory consigns all details dependent upon it. It is their duty,

indeed it is the duty of every citizen of the whole State and of every

part of it, to garner up the facts connected with our heroic struggle

and to so preserve them that they shall become the well-established

traditions of our people. Such traditions are a part of the wealth of a

race. They both elevate and stimulate succeeding generations. By them

a high national character is established, and under their influence

that species of patriotism is engendered whence springs the glorious

sentiment,

"_Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori_."

The fires of patriotism do not burn most fiercely where the land is

most productive, or where wealth most accumulates. Nations which have

owned broad savannahs upon which nature has been most lavish have often

been driven from their country with little show of manly courage and

without that zealous patriotism which creates heroes, while the peasant

of Switzerland and the cottager of the Highlands, neither of whom can

afford greater luxuries than oatmeal and goat's milk, have held their

vales and their fastnesses for centuries against all odds. To them

each dell has its story of valiant deeds of their forefathers and each

mountain is crowned by traditions which tell of the great achievements

of their race. For dells and mountains thus sanctified by the glories

of the past, the peasant and the lord of the manor alike are willing to

die. It was their love for the stories and romance of their race which

sustained the nerve of the Swiss Guards in the discharge of their duty

to the King when, without a faltering nerve, one by one they sunk under

the blows of the infuriated Jacobins of Paris, and well won the grand

inscription to their courage on the Lion of Lucerne. A like love was

the foundation of the wonderful heroism of the Highlanders at Lucknow

and of the Scotch who climbed the Heights of Abraham at Quebec. So it

was their love for the historic memories of Virginia which nerved the

courage of that dauntless division which, under a fire never before

poured on line of battle, reached the brow of the hill at Gettysburg.

By gathering the traditions of the Highlands and thus perpetuating

them, Scott has done a great work for Scotland. Others have done the

same thing for England. It is for this generation to gather the same

wealth for Virginia. Thus will the history of her people, of her

valleys, her rivers and her mountains, be preserved and the facts be

secured to generations yet to come which, when mellowed by time, will

be perpetuated in story, in poetry and in song.

Thus and thus only can we keep Virginia and her people on the elevated

plane upon which they have stood for centuries, and thus can we make

her, in the future, the land of poetry and romance. It is Wallace

and Tell who are the heroes of the poet and the novelist, not the

commanders of the great forces with which they contended. In the far

future many a novel, many a poem and many a song will tell of Lee, of

Jackson, of Stuart and of Mosby--ideal heroes of romance--long after

the names of the leaders who fought them will be mere facts in the

prosaic history of the power of the greater to overcome the less.

It is not our duty to weep over the past or to bemoan the fate which

resulted in the final overthrow of the Confederacy; nor should we do

anything to keep alive the bitterness of that strife. On the contrary,

it is our duty to bow to the logic of what has happened and to believe

in the wisdom of the all-wise Director of the affairs of nations and

of peoples; but it is also our duty to see to it that what is good

and great be preserved, and that our children and children's children

keep green the traditions which will nerve them to a higher courage

and stimulate them to a generous emulation of the deeds of their

forefathers.