instant the bold rider was already struggling through the dangerous
swamp; in another, his powerful charger had carried him across. Halting
for a few minutes, lance in rest, till his troops had also forced their
passage, gained the level ground unperceived, and sufficiently breathed
their horses, he drew up his little force in a compact column. Then,
with a few words of encouragement, he launched them at the foe. The
violent and entirely unexpected shock was even more successful than the
Prince had anticipated. The hostile cavalry reeled and fell into
hopeless confusion, Egmont in vain striving to rally them to resistance.
That name had lost its magic. Goignies also attempted, without success,
to restore order among the panic-struck ranks. The sudden conception of
Parma, executed as suddenly and in so brilliant a manner, had been
decisive. Assaulted in flank and rear at the same moment, and already in
temporary confusion, the cavalry of the enemy turned their backs and
fled. The centre of the states' army thus left exposed, was now warmly
attacked by Parma. It had, moreover, been already thrown into disorder
by the retreat of its own horse, as they charged through them in rapid
and disgraceful panic. The whole army bloke to pieces at once, and so
great was the trepidation, that the conquered troops had hardly courage
to run away. They were utterly incapable of combat. Not a blow was
struck by the fugitives. Hardly a man in the Spanish ranks was wounded;
while, in the course of an hour and a half, the whole force of the enemy
was exterminated. It is impossible to state with accuracy the exact
numbers slain. Some accounts spoke of ten thousand killed, or captive,
with absolutely no loss on the royal side. Moreover, this slaughter was
effected, not by the army under Don John, but by so small a fragment of
it, that some historians have even set down the whole number of royalists
engaged at the commencement of the action, at six hundred, increased
afterwards to twelve hundred. By this calculation, each Spaniard engaged
must have killed ten enemies with his own hand; and that within an hour
and a half's space! Other historians more wisely omit the exact
statistics of the massacre, and allow that a very few--ten or eleven, at
most--were slain within the Spanish ranks. This, however, is the utmost
that is claimed by even the Netherland historians, and it is, at any
rate, certain that the whole states' army was annihilated.
Rarely had a more brilliant exploit been performed by a handful of
cavalry. To the distinguished Alexander of Parma, who improvised so
striking and complete a victory out of a fortuitous circumstance,
belonged the whole credit of the day, for his quick eye detected a
passing weakness of the enemy, and turned it to terrible account with the
promptness which comes from genius alone. A whole army was overthrown.
Everything belonging to the enemy fell into the hands of the Spaniards.
Thirty-four standards, many field-pieces, much camp equipage, and
ammunition, besides some seven or eight thousand dead bodies, and six
hundred living prisoners, were the spoils of that winter's day. Of the
captives, some were soon afterwards hurled off the bridge at Namur, and
drowned like dogs in the Meuse, while the rest were all hanged, none
escaping with life. Don John's clemency was not superior to that of his
sanguinary predecessors.
And so another proof was added--if proofs were still necessary of Spanish
prowess. The Netherlanders may be pardoned if their foes seemed to them
supernatural, and almost invulnerable. How else could these enormous
successes be accounted for? How else could thousands fall before the
Spanish swords, while hardly a single Spanish corpse told of effectual
resistance? At Jemmingen, Alva had lost seven soldiers, and slain seven
thousand; in the Antwerp Fury, two hundred Spaniards, at most, had
fallen, while eight thousand burghers and states' troops had been
butchered; and now at Gemblours, six, seven, eight, ten--Heaven knew how
many--thousand had been exterminated, and hardly a single Spaniard had
been slain! Undoubtedly, the first reason for this result was the
superiority of the Spanish soldiers. They were the boldest, the best
disciplined, the most experienced in the world. Their audacity,
promptness, and ferocity made them almost invincible. In this particular
action, at least half the army of Don John was composed of Spanish or
Spanish-Italian veterans. Moreover, they were commanded by the most
renowned captains of the age--by Don John himself, and Alexander of
Parma, sustained by such veterans as Mondragon, the hero of the memorable
submarine expeditions; Mendoza, the accomplished cavalry officer,
diplomatist, and historian; and Mansfeld, of whom Don John had himself
written to the King that his Majesty had not another officer of such
account in all the Netherlands. Such officers as these, besides Gonzaga,
Camillo Monte, Mucio Pagano, at the head of such troops as fought that
day under the banner of the Cross, might go far in accounting for this
last and most tremendous victory of the Inquisition. On the other hand,
although Bossu and Champagny were with the states' army, yet their hearts
were hardly with the cause. Both had long been loyal, and had earned
many laurels against the rebels, while Champagny was still devoutly a
Papist, and wavered painfully between his hatred to heresy and to Spain.
Egmont and De Heze were raw, unpractised lads, in whom genius did not
come to supply the place of experience. The Commander, De Goignies, was
a veteran, but a veteran who had never gained much glory, and the chiefs
of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery, were absent at the Brussels
wedding. The news of this additional massacre inflicted upon a nation,
for which Berghen and Montigny had laid down their lives, was the nuptial
benediction for Berghen's heiress; for it was to the chief wedding guests
upon, that occasion that the disaster was justly attributed. The rank
and file of the states' army were mainly mercenaries, with whom the hope
of plunder was the prevailing motive; the chief commanders were absent;
while those officers who were with the troops were neither heartily
friendly to their own flag nor sufficiently experienced to make it
respected.
ETEXT EDITOR'S BOOKMARKS:
Absurd affectation of candor
Always less apt to complain of irrevocable events
Imagined, and did the work of truth
Judas Maccabaeus
Neither ambitious nor greedy
Superfluous sarcasm