FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION.
The _Liste Libre_, or Free List system, is a far simpler and more
practical method of proportional representation than the Hare system.
The distinctive feature is that it applies the proportional principle
not to individual candidates but to parties. But, like the Hare system,
it places no restriction on the number of parties. It is therefore
particularly adapted to the circumstances of the countries on the
Continent of Europe, which, having already a number of strong party
organizations, wish to retain them and to do justice to each.
Accordingly we find that nearly all experiments in proportional
representation to the present time have been confined to those
countries.
Perhaps the very earliest attempt to apply the proportional principle
was that of Mr. Thomas Gilpin, in a pamphlet, "On the Representation of
Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies,"
published at Philadelphia in 1844. He proposed that electorates should
be enlarged, and that each party should nominate a list of candidates
equal to the number required to be elected, and should place them in
order of preference. Each elector could then vote for one of these
lists; and each party would be allotted a number of representatives
proportional to the amount of support it received. The highest on each
list, to the number allotted, would be elected. It will be seen that
this is really a system of double election; for the order of favour of
the candidates of any party would have to be decided before the
nominations were made.
Only two years afterwards M. Victor Considerant published a similar
scheme at Geneva, Switzerland. Each elector was to vote first for a
party and then for any number of candidates on the party list whom he
preferred. The party votes were to decide the number of members allotted
to each list, and the individual votes the successful candidates.
The little republic of Switzerland has been the scene of nearly all
subsequent improvement. In 1867 Professor Ernest Naville founded the
_Association Réformiste_ at Geneva to advocate the principle of
proportional representation. In 1871 the Association adopted the _Liste
Libre_ system, invented by M. Borely, of Nimes, France, in which each
elector was to place all the candidates of his party in order of
preference. But as this allows the electors little direct influence on
their own candidates and none outside of them, a combination of the
cumulative vote and the _Liste Libre_ was adopted in 1875. Each elector
was to have as many votes as there were seats to be filled, but he
could not only give them to any candidates on any list, but he could
also give as many votes as he liked to any one candidate. Thus if there
were ten seats to be filled the elector could give ten votes to one
candidate, or one vote to each of ten candidates, or five votes to one
candidate and divide the remaining five among others, and so on. The
only condition necessary was that his votes added up to ten. The
aggregate votes given to all the candidates of each party were then to
be taken as the basis of proportional distribution among the parties and
the highest on each list to the number decided were to be elected.
It was not till the year 1890 that this scheme was actually put into
practice. The election of 1889 had resulted so unjustly to the Liberal
party in the canton of Ticino that an insurrection broke out. This
forced the hand of the Federal Government, which had to quell the
disturbance, and proportional representation was recommended and
adopted. Several other cantons followed suit, and it is expected that
the whole of Switzerland will soon adopt the reform.
A modification of this plan has lately been adopted by the Swiss
Association. In this later plan electors can give a single vote only to
individual candidates, but if they do not use all their votes in this
way they may cumulate the balance on any one party list by marking at
the head of the list. Thus if the elector in a ten-seat electorate gives
five votes to individual candidates, and places a mark at the head of
one of the lists, the balance of five votes will count to that list. The
aggregate votes given to individual candidates on any list, plus the
votes placed at the head of the list, will form the basis of
proportional distribution among the lists. This is the plan adopted by
the American Proportional Representation League as most nearly suited to
American habits, and recommended by Professor Commons in his book on
"Proportional Representation."
Belgium has also quite recently adopted a scheme of proportional
representation. As in Switzerland, its advent was hastened by political
disturbances. The Catholic party, not satisfied with exerting a
preponderating influence in the country districts, wished to obtain also
its proportionate share of representation in the cities, and proposed a
scheme of proportional representation for them only. This caused such
ill feeling that riots took place in the streets of Brussels. Finally,
proportional representation was promised all round, and became law for
both the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate at the latter end of
1899. In Brussels, where there are 18 seats to be filled, a trial
election had already been held in 1893 with satisfactory results. Six
lists were nominated, the largest being that of the Socialists, who
nominated ten candidates; and over 12,000 electors voted. Each elector
was allowed 18 votes, and the methods in which he could distribute them
were somewhat complicated. He might (1) mark at the head of a list, (2)
mark at the head of a list and also opposite one or more candidates on
the same list, (3) mark opposite the names of not more than 18
candidates on any list. In the first case his 18 votes counted to the
list marked, in the second case one vote was counted to each of the
individual candidates marked and the balance counted for the list; in
the third case one vote was counted to each candidate marked. The
aggregate of votes marked at the head of each list, plus the individual
votes on the list, was then taken as the basis of proportional
distribution. So many of the votes were cumulated on lists that only
about one-fifth of the votes cast were operative in the selection of
candidates.
In the bill which has recently become law a new method has therefore
been adopted, which gives more power to the party committees, but allows
the electors to modify their choice. For this purpose the party
organization nominates the candidates in order of preference. The
elector may then accept this order by marking at the head of the list,
or he may give his vote to any one candidate on the list. If all the
electors of a party vote in the first way, those nominated highest on
the list, to the number to which the party becomes entitled, are
elected. But if all the electors vote in the second way, those with the
highest single votes are elected. The actual result will usually be a
compromise between the two, and it is evidently the interest of the
party organization to place the candidates in their real order of
favour, in order that the electors may accept the list. For if an
unpopular candidate were placed at the head of the list few would accept
it.
The first election under this system has just taken place, and the
result was, as expected, to reduce the Clerical representation
considerably.
In all the above variations of the Free List system the distribution of
seats is effected by dividing the aggregate votes polled by each party
by a unit of representation, but three different methods of determining
this unit are in use. The first is obtained by simply dividing the total
number of votes by the number of seats.
The objection to this unit is that when there are several parties, part
of the seats only can be allotted on full units, and the rest have to be
allotted to those parties which have the highest remainders or fractions
of a unit, and this unduly favours small parties, who do not poll even a
single unit. The rule to divide the total votes by the number of seats
increased by one, which was first proposed by Mr. H.R. Droop, reduces
slightly the number of seats allotted on remainders, and was adopted by
the canton of Soluthern in 1895. In Belgium a third plan, devised by
Professor D'Hondt, of Brussels, is used, which is designed to prevent
any seats being allotted on remainders. This unit is evidently smaller
than either of the others, and is to be found by trial. It is only
necessary that the sum of the quotients obtained by dividing it into
each of the lists shall be equal to the number of seats to be filled.
Suppose a five-seat electorate in which 6,000 votes are divided among
four parties, who poll 2,500, 1,850, 900, and 750 votes respectively.
Then if we take one-fifth, or 1,200 votes, as the unit, the result would
be the following:--
(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 100 remainder = 2 seats.
(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 650 remainder = 1 seat.
(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat.
(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = 1 seat.
If the Droop unit of one-sixth, or 1,000 votes, be used, the result will
be different:--
(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 500 remainder = 2 seats.
(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 850 remainder = 2 seats.
(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat.
(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = seat.
By the third method any number of votes between 834 and 900 will be
found to comply with Professor D'Hondt's condition, and the result
would, in this instance, be the same as by the Droop method. Although
the highest number was at first used, the lower limit has been adopted
in the new bill.
In no case can the proportional distribution be considered satisfactory.
If the electorates are small, and the number of parties large, accurate
proportional representation is quite out of the question. In
Switzerland, however, the electorates are made to contain sometimes as
many as 30 seats. The effect of such large electorates must be in time
to encourage the formation of a great number of small factions. At the
same time there is not so much incentive to split up the parties as by
the Hare system.
Passing now to the selection of party candidates, none of the methods
can be said to ensure the election of those most in general favour. When
electors are allowed to cumulate on individual candidates, the
favourites of sections within the party will be elected. If, on the
other hand, they are allowed to cumulate on party lists, all votes thus
given are ineffective in the selection of the successful candidates. It
may be noted that although the nomination of candidates in lists by
party organizations is less in accordance with the practice of British
countries than the individual candidature of the Hare system, there is
nothing to prevent one candidate being nominated to stand in the place
of a party.
A word of warning must be added as to the danger of holding up Belgium
and Switzerland as examples of true electoral justice to Australia. The
direct government of the people which Switzerland has adopted bears not
the slightest resemblance to the representative institutions of British
countries. Both the referendum and proportional delegation are suited to
direct government and are destructive to party responsible government.
The Swiss adopted the referendum to save themselves from the lobbying
and plutocratic character of their legislatures. The initiative and
proportional delegation have followed because they are complementary
reforms. The consequence is that the legislators have been degraded to
mere agents for drawing up measures, and leadership has been transferred
to the press. It is the peculiar conditions of Switzerland which enable
it to tolerate unrestrained majority rule. It is a small country,
surrounded by powerful neighbours, whose strength lies in its weakness.
Moreover, the people are very conservative. In Zurich, for instance,
which is largely devoted to manufactures, a proposal to limit the hours
of work in factories to twelve hours a day was rejected by the people.
Nor is direct government proving a success; the tyranny of the majority
is already apparent. The first federal initiative demanded a measure to
prevent the slaughter of animals by bleeding, designed to interfere
with the religious rites of the Jews. Despite the fact that it was
opposed by the Federal Council, as contrary to the right of religious
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, it was carried by the
referendum. Belgium, again, can hardly be taken as a model of
constitutional liberty. Surely we in Australia do not want the factious
strife of religious, racial, and class sections, which so nearly brought
on a revolution last year. Yet this is exactly what proportional
delegation to sections would bring about. Belgium has a hard task to
reconcile two races so differently constituted as the Walloons and
Flemings, and has been able to avoid instability of the ministry so far
only because the Clerical party, which is mostly Flemish, still has a
majority. The new system has only consecrated the sectional principle,
and will do nothing to restore harmony.