It was not long, however, before difficulties began to arise, and

reaction reared its head again at the secret instigation of the Sultan.

There was an outbreak in Albania against the Committee of Union and

Progress. The bodyguard of Albanians was won back to the support of

Abdul Hamid by profuse bribery. Disorder broke out in many parts of the

Empire. It was at Constantinople, however, that the gravest dangers

to the new order of things arose. The first act of the new Government

was to dismiss the host of spies, who had been maintained at a cost

of £1,200,000 a year. It was said at the time that if three persons

were seen talking together in the streets one of them was certain to

be a spy in the employment of the Sultan. These people found their

occupation gone. The new ministers also cleared the public departments

of a vast body of superfluous and useless employés, most of them

hangers-on of the palace. These two classes of people made a formidable

body of malcontents, who conceived that their fortunes depended on

the restoration to the Sultan of his old powers of corruption. They

were supported by a small body of fanatical mollahs, who believed, or

pretended to believe, that the new Constitution was in opposition to

the sacred law. But more important than these agencies of reaction were

the personal efforts made by Abdul Hamid to tamper with the fidelity

to the new Government of the troops at Constantinople by the profuse

distribution of money from his private stores. The new ministers had

also made the mistake of releasing from prison, not merely great

numbers of persons imprisoned at the will of the Sultan for political

reasons, but also all the prisoners convicted of serious crimes. These

formed an element of disorder in the city and caused alarm and distrust

among the well-disposed citizens.

On April 13, 1909, nine months after promulgation of the new

Constitution, a revolt broke out among the troops at Constantinople,

and a counter-revolution was proclaimed. It had no ostensible leader of

any repute or influence. Abdul Hamid avoided committing himself openly

to the movement. But for the moment, backed by elements of discontent,

it was successful. The new ministers, the members of the Committee of

Union and Progress, and the members of the new Assembly were compelled

to seek safety by flight. If Abdul Hamid had boldly come forward as the

champion of the reactionaries and fanatics, he might have crushed his

enemies and have restored the old régime. But he lacked the courage for

a desperate game. He contented himself with the secret supply of money

in support of the movement.

Meanwhile the Committee of Young Turks met at Salonika, and determined

to put down the counter-revolution by force. They called on Mahmoud

Shefket Pasha, in command of the 3rd Army Corps, to support them. He

said that he had sworn to maintain the Constitution, and agreed to

march his army to Constantinople. At San Stefano he met the members of

the Assembly and the ministers who had fled from the city. By the 24th

of April the army had overcome the feeble opposition of the rebellious

troops and were in occupation of the most important parts of the

capital. The counter-revolution was suppressed at a very small cost

of lives. The National Assembly met again, and the first question for

their decision was what should be done with Abdul Hamid. They put the

following question to the Sheik ul Islam:—

“What should be done with a Commander of the Faithful who has

suppressed books and important dispositions of the Sharia law; who

forbids the reading of, and burns, such books; who wastes public money

for improper purposes; who, without legal authority, kills, imprisons,

and tortures his subjects and commits tyrannical acts; who, after he

has bound himself by oath to amend, violates such oath and persists

in sowing discord so as to disturb the public peace, thus occasioning

bloodshed?

“From various provinces the news comes that the population has deposed

him; and it is known that to maintain him is manifestly dangerous and

his deposition is advantageous.

“Under these conditions, is it permissible for the actual governing

body to decide as seems best upon his abdication or deposition?”

The answer was the simple word ‘Yes.’

Never was a sovereign condemned by a more emphatic and laconic word.

Upon this the National Assembly unanimously decided on the deposition

of Abdul Hamid. They sent a deputation to the palace to inform him to

this effect. He appears to have taken the sentence of deportation very

quietly. “It is Kismet,” he said. “But will my life be spared?” He who

had been so merciless to others was chiefly concerned now in claiming

mercy for himself. He pleaded that he had not put to death his two

brothers, Murad and Réchad. The question was reserved for the National

Assembly.

Abdul Hamid found himself deserted and friendless. He was execrated by

his subjects and despised and distrusted by all his fellow sovereigns

in Europe, unless it were the German Emperor, who, of late years, had

given a support to him in all his misdeeds at home and abroad. In his

hour of peril the Emperor gave him no support, but the reverse. When

he found how the wind was blowing, William II commenced an intrigue

with the Committee of Union and Progress through Enver Bey, who had

received a military training in Germany and was personally known to

him. It is said that the Emperor insisted as a condition of recognition

of the new order that the life of Abdul Hamid should be spared. There

was another reason for doing so—namely the hope of the Young Turks

to squeeze his hidden wealth from the deposed Sultan. However that

may be, Abdul Hamid’s life was spared. He was deported with a few

of the more favoured members of his harem to Salonika, where he was

detained as a virtual prisoner, but not otherwise maltreated. After

his departure money and diamonds to the value of over a million pounds

sterling were found in his palace, a small part only of his ill-gotten

wealth. Two millions sterling were deposited with German banks and

very large sums were in the hands of the Emperor William. Thus ended a

reign of thirty-three years, more disastrous in its immediate losses

of territory and in the certainty of others to follow, and more

conspicuous for the deterioration of the condition of his subjects,

than that of any other of his twenty-three degenerate predecessors

since the death of Solyman the Magnificent.

XXII

THE YOUNG TURKS

1909-14

MEHMET RÉCHAD was proclaimed Sultan in place of his brother, under the

title of Mahomet V, at the age of sixty-four. He had spent the whole

period of his manhood as a virtual prisoner, the last thirty-four years

of it under the close surveillance of his brother. He was never allowed

to have friends or even to read newspapers. His servants were in the

pay of Abdul Hamid and acted as spies on him. He devoted his life to

his harem. It was not surprising that he lost what little intellect he

was originally endowed with. A diplomatist who had many opportunities

of seeing him since his elevation to the throne thus describes him:—

The very appearance of Mahomet V suggests nonentity. Small and

bent, with sunken eyes and deeply lined face, an obesity savouring

of disease, and a yellow, oily complexion, it certainly is not

prepossessing. There is little or no intelligence in his countenance,

and he never lost a haunted, frightened look, as if dreading to find

an assassin lurking in some dark corner ready to strike and kill

him.... Abdul Hamid hated and despised him, but was afraid to have

him killed—perhaps through fear that a stronger man might take his

place.[47]

The new Sultan had not been a party to the conspiracy which dethroned

his brother. No one in his senses would have entrusted him with so

important a secret. It was said of him that he simulated the mannerisms

of an idiot in order to allay suspicion in the mind of Abdul Hamid that

he took any interest in politics. He lived in constant fear of being

put to death. A portrait of this degenerate would explain better than

words, if it were not too cruel, the depth to which the once proud

race of Othman has fallen. It was probable, however, that the cunning

men who engineered the revolution thought it would better serve their

purpose to have a cipher as the figure-head of the Empire than a man

with a will of his own.

After the defeat of the reactionaries and the deposition of Abdul

Hamid, in 1909, the Young Turks had another spell of power,

during which they had the opportunity of effecting reforms in the

administration of the Empire. They made a bad use of it. It soon became

evident that there were two sections in the Committee in violent

antagonism to one another. That which succeeded in getting the upper

hand was chauvinistic, vehemently national in its objects and methods,

aiming at the enforcement of unity throughout the Empire by Turkifying

everything, without regard to local customs or to difference of race.

They endeavoured to impose the Turkish language on the many subject

races who spoke only their own language. They forbade the teaching in

schools of the Albanian language in Albania, and of Arabic, the sacred

language of Islam, in Arabia. They introduced compulsory service for

the army, and forced the Christians of the Balkan provinces to serve in

its ranks, with the result that thousands of young Bulgarians, Greeks,

and Serbians, inhabitants of Macedonia, fled the country and sought

refuge in the neighbouring States. The Young Turks availed themselves

of the opportunity which this afforded them of strengthening the Moslem

population of Macedonia by inviting thousands of the lowest class of

Moslem Bosnians to migrate there. These men were the cause of grave

disturbance and disorder. No provision was made for their employment.

Committees of Young Turks were formed there, who incited the Turkish

local authorities to deeds of arbitrary tyranny rivalling, if not

excelling, the infamies of Abdul Hamid’s rule. The autocracy of that

tyrant was broken at Constantinople and his system of espionage, which

had caused such indignation, was suppressed, but hundreds of local

Abdul Hamids came into existence in the provinces.

The central Government at the capital followed the method of the late

Sultan in minute interference with every detail of administration.

There can be no doubt that the condition of the Christian provinces

of the Empire became worse than ever. Meanwhile the enthusiasm for

England and for the principles of the British Constitution cooled

down at Constantinople. Whatever may have been the cause, the fact was

certain that British influence at the Porte fell to a vanishing point,

while that of Germany rapidly rose. The military alliance which has

been so valuable to Germany in the existing great war was then formed.

The period was also marked by repeated changes of the Grand Vizier,

according as one or other section of the Young Turks got the upper hand.

It was not long before the process of dismemberment of the Empire was

renewed and the wolves were gathered round it to share in the spoil.

The Young Turks were less successful in resisting them than Abdul

Hamid, who, at least, had kept them at bay by his cunning and shifty

diplomacy during the many years which had elapsed since the Congress

of Berlin, though it may well be said of him that the pent-up evils

of his long misgovernment were in great part responsible for the

dismemberments which followed in the régime of the Young Turks.

Very soon after the revolution of 1908, on October 7th, before there

was experience of the new Constitution, the Austro-Hungarian Government

took advantage of the crisis and proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia

and Herzegovina, in defiance of the treaty obligations imposed by the

Great Powers at Berlin. There was no attempt to justify this. The

annexations made little or no difference to the people of the two

provinces. They were already, for all practical purposes, under the

rule of Austria-Hungary. The main difference was that the Bosnian

soldiers discarded the fez which they wore as the symbol of Ottoman

suzerainty. The annexation, however, caused great indignation among

the Turks, who regarded it as an insult to their Empire. It was also

the cause of ill-feeling in Russia, and did something to bring about

the great war of 1914. The Austrian Government gave up its occupation

of the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar and agreed to take over a share of the

Ottoman debt, to the amount of about four millions sterling. As these

concessions were accepted, the Porte must be held to have condoned the

offence. Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria very soon followed the example of

the Austro-Hungarian Government. He proclaimed himself an independent

sovereign. This also made very little practical difference to his

subjects. On October 12th the Cretan Assembly proclaimed the union of

the island with Greece.

The next blow to the Ottoman Empire came from a very unexpected

quarter, from Italy, which made a sudden and unprovoked attack on

Tripoli. This province in Africa had never been autonomous. It was

an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, governed directly from

Constantinople. Its population was purely Moslem—Turks and Moors

in the city of Tripoli and other places on the coast, and with

semi-independent Arabs in the hinterland. There was no demand on the

part of these natives for a change of government. Italy had no valid

cause of complaint on behalf of its few subjects who resided in the

province, though it trumped up something of the kind. It was a case of

pure aggression, prompted by jealousy of France in respect of Tunis, to

which, geographically and economically, Italy had a stronger claim. It

may be confidently assumed that the French Republic gave its consent to

the seizure of Tripoli by Italy, and that Great Britain acquiesced in

it, if it did not formally approve.

Up to the end of 1910, the Italian Government had constantly professed

the desire to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. When

rumours arose of an intention to grab Tripoli, its Foreign Minister,

so late as December 2, 1910, emphatically denied them in the Italian

Chamber. “We desire,” he said, “the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and

we wish Tripoli always to remain Turkish.” Nothing had since occurred

to disturb the relations between the two countries. But in September

1911 the Italian Government sprang a mine on the Porte by declaring

its intention to occupy Tripoli. On October 26th it notified to the

Powers of Europe its intention to annex that province. It sent an army

of fifty thousand men for the purpose. Its fleet bombarded the Turkish

town of Prevesa, in the Adriatic, and drove the Turkish fleet to seek

refuge within the Dardanelles. It took possession of several of the

islands in the Ægean Sea.

The Porte was caught at a disadvantage. Abdul Hamid had for many years

completely neglected his navy. He owed it a grudge for having taken

part in the deposition of his predecessor. He feared that its guns

might be trained on his palace. He had allowed the Minister of Marine,

the most corrupt and greedy of all his Pashas, to appropriate to his

own use the money allotted by the budget for the repair of warships.

For many years the battleships never left the Golden Horn. But for this

the Ottoman navy, which in the time of Abdul Aziz had been the third

most powerful in Europe, might have made the landing of an Italian army

in Africa impossible. The garrison in Tripoli, which Abdul Hamid had

always maintained in strength, had been greatly reduced by the Young

Turks. The reinforcement of it after the declaration of war, when Italy

had command of the sea, was a very difficult task, the more so as the

British Government proclaimed the neutrality of Egypt, though it was

still tributary to the Porte, and forbade the passage of Turkish troops

into Tripoli.

In spite of these obstacles, the Porte made a gallant fight for its

African province, with the aid of the Arabs of the hinterland. Both

Turkish and Italian armies committed the most horrible atrocities in

this war, and there was little to choose between them in this respect.

The war lasted till October, 1912, and was only brought to an end when

the Porte found itself confronted by danger from a quarter much nearer

home.

There can be little doubt that the war with Italy, the consequent

engagement of a large Turkish army in defence of Tripoli, and the

blockade of Turkish ports by the Italian navy, making it difficult for

the Porte to transfer its troops from Asia direct to the Balkan States,

precipitated the intervention of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia on behalf

of the Christian inhabitants of the remaining provinces of the Porte in

Europe, which were now on the eve of revolt.

The condition of these Christian provinces had in no way improved under

the régime of the Young Turks, but very much the reverse. The governors

and other Ottoman officials were as corrupt, rapacious, and arbitrary

as they had ever been. There was no security for life or property. The

Turkish soldiers plundered the villages of Christians which they were

sent to protect. Bands of brigands, sometimes wearing the uniforms of

Greek, sometimes of Bulgarian soldiers, devastated the country. No

attempt was made by the Young Turks to put in force any part of the

reforms which had been proposed by the Commission appointed by the

Great Powers after the Congress of Berlin.

Lord Fitzmaurice’s scheme remained as much a dead letter as it had been

for over thirty years under Abdul Hamid. The Young Turks had added new

difficulties and more causes of complaint by their attempts to Turkify

everything, and by their extension of conscription to the Christian

population. The physical situation of Macedonia made it impossible

that its people would willingly submit to this continued misgovernment

and tyranny. Their immediate neighbours were Bulgarians, Serbians, and

Greeks, of kindred race, all of whom, with the assistance of Russia

and other European Powers, had obtained freedom from Turkish rule.

The peoples of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia sympathized with their

compatriots who were still under the detested yoke.

If ever intervention by neighbouring States was justified for the

purpose of restoring order and securing good government in accordance

with treaty obligations, this was a case for it. The crisis was

precipitated by massacres of Bulgarians at Kotchana, in Macedonia, and

of Serbians on the borders of Montenegro.

Early in 1912 negotiations for armed intervention in Macedonia took

place between the Governments of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, at

the instance mainly of the able and patriotic Premier of Greece, M.

Venezelos. For the first and only time in their history a combination

was effected between these three States against the Turkish Empire.

It will be seen that, though it was most effective for its immediate

purpose of defeating the Turks and expelling them from nearly the whole

of their European possessions, it broke down, with most unfortunate

results, almost immediately after this great success.

On March 18, 1912, a treaty was signed between Bulgaria and Serbia

for mutual military aid to one another in war with Turkey. A secret

clause provided that in the event of any portion of Macedonia being

conquered the parts respectively nearest to the two States should be

annexed to them, and that the intervening territory should be divided

between them by the arbitration of Russia. This clearly showed that the

intervention aimed at territorial conquest. Two months later another

treaty was signed between Greece and Bulgaria, binding the two States

to aid one another if attacked by Turkey, or in the event of systematic

violation of rights by that Power. Nothing was said in this as to the

division of spoil after the war. Montenegro later came into the chain

of alliances, and, in fact, was always eager for war with Turkey.

When it became known to the Great Powers that these alliances were

formed, and that war was imminent, they made every effort to allay

the storm and to maintain peace. A strong protest was addressed, on

September 25th, by Russia and Austria on behalf of all the Powers.

They endeavoured to resuscitate the treaty of Berlin, which had so

signally failed, to secure order and good government in the remaining

Christian provinces of Turkey. They undertook, by virtue of the

twenty-third article of that treaty, to insist on the realization of

the promised reforms in the administration of these provinces, but

with the reservation, which made the promise futile in the eyes of

all concerned, that the reforms should not in any way diminish the

sovereignty of the Sultan or impair the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The allied Balkan States, in a very dignified despatch of October 15th,

declined to act on the advice of the Powers.

The Governments of the Balkan States [they said] consider that after

so many promises of reform have been so often and so solemnly given

by Turkey, it would be cruel not to endeavour to obtain in favour

of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire reforms of a more

radical and definite nature which would really ameliorate their

miserable condition if applied sincerely and in their integrity.

They enclosed a copy of an ultimatum which, on the same day, they

addressed to the Porte, insisting on the carrying out of a series of

reforms specially detailed.

If [they said] the Porte desires to accept these proposals, order and

tranquillity will be reinstated in the provinces of the Empire, and a

desirable peace will be assured between Turkey and the Balkan States,

which have hitherto suffered from the arbitrary and provocative

measures adopted by the Porte to them.

Among the list of reforms insisted on was the ceding and confirmation

of the ethnical autonomy of provinces of the Empire, with all its

consequences. The ultimatum was presented to the Porte, which treated

it as a declaration of war. Its first and most important act was to

come to terms with Italy in order to free its hands for the more

important war at its very portals. A treaty of peace was signed on

October 15th, by which the Porte agreed to withdraw its troops from

Tripoli, and thus virtually recognized the acquisition of that province

by Italy. Italy, on the other hand, agreed to withdraw from the islands

of the Ægean Sea which it had occupied—a promise which, in fact, it did

not perform.

Meanwhile hostilities had already commenced in the Balkans. Montenegro

declared war on October 8th. The three other States followed suit on

October 18th, and each of them sent its army on the same day, or nearly

so, across its frontiers to invade Turkey. Beyond the desire for the

better government of the Christian provinces of Turkey, there were

doubtless _arrières pensées_ on the part of all the allied States.

Greece coveted Crete and other islands in the Ægean Sea, and hoped to

extend its frontiers on the mainland. Bulgaria yearned for the big

Bulgaria as defined by the treaty of San Stefano. Serbia had ambitions

for a revival of its wide boundaries under Stephen Dushan, and aimed

at access both to the Ægean Sea and the Adriatic. Montenegro wished

for a part of Albania and for extensions in the Adriatic. Each State

had large populations of a kindred race beyond its frontier suffering

from cruel misgovernment and tyranny and crying for help. But it seems

improbable that they could have expected to realize their full hopes,

or to achieve such a _dénouement_ as actually occurred.

The allies between them had seven hundred thousand men under arms.

Turkey had no more than four hundred thousand in Europe. It had,

however, great reserves in Asia, and its aggregate force largely

exceeded that of the allies. It was to be expected that the Turkish

armies in Europe would make a good fight, and would at least afford

time for these reserves to come up.

The Greek army, under the command of the Crown Prince Constantine (the

present King of Greece), who had received a military education in

Germany, crossed the northern frontier and, in four days, on October

22nd, encountered a Turkish army, under Hassan Pasha, at Sarandoporus.

The Turks held a very strong position and were little inferior in

numbers. In spite of this, they were worsted, and were compelled to

retreat in the following night. The next day the Greeks renewed

their attack. The unfortunate Turks, disheartened by their defeat at

Sarandoporus and wearied by the long night march, were caught unawares

in a ravine which offered no possibility of defence. Terror-stricken

and demoralized, they fled before their foe. They left behind them the

whole of their artillery and transport.

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