Greece with uniform success. The Greeks were exhausted by their
long struggle against the Turks. They could offer but a very feeble
resistance to this new and far more effective enemy. In April, 1826,
the Egyptian army captured Missolonghi, causing a loss to the Greeks
of four thousand men. Thence he gradually subdued the whole of the
Morea. Later the cities of Corinth and Athens fell into the hands
of the Turks, and on May 6, 1827, at a battle at Phalerum, in the
neighbourhood of this last city, Reschid Pasha, in command of an
Albanian army, defeated and dispersed the last army of the Greeks
then in the field. The Greek Government was forced to remove from the
mainland to the island of Poros. The whole of Greece then fell into
anarchy. Though the Greek fleet continued to make a gallant stand
against the combined Turkish and Egyptian fleets, it was not strong
enough to maintain a mastery at sea and to cut off the communication
between Ibrahim’s army and its base in Egypt. It is certain that if
the Great Powers of Europe had not intervened, Greece would have been
completely subdued, and Turkish rule would have been reinstated there.
Ibrahim threatened to remove the whole Greek population and sell them
into slavery, and to replace them by Egyptians and Arabs.
Meanwhile the success of Ibrahim’s army, armed and disciplined on the
model of European armies, as compared with the failure in previous
campaigns in Greece of the ill-disciplined and badly armed troops of
Turkey, produced a great impression at Constantinople. Mahmoud now
found that his long-cherished project for the reform of the army was
supported almost unanimously by the Divan and by the whole of the
ulemas. He determined, therefore, to carry it into effect, and to
suppress his mortal foes, the Janissaries. He had been long engaged in
making preparations for a decisive issue with these turbulent troops.
He had formed a body of fourteen thousand artillerymen, drilled and
armed on the new model, and on whom he could thoroughly rely for
support. His predecessor, Selim, had enlisted a small body of infantry
on the same model. The Agha of the Janissaries, Hussein Pasha, was
devoted to him, as was also the Mufti. The Sultan thereupon, in May
1826, gave orders to the Janissaries that one-fourth of them were
to be incorporated in the new corps of infantry. The Janissaries
refused. They marched in a body, on June 14th, to the palace, intent
on overawing the Sultan, as they had so often done in the past. They
met their master on this occasion. The Sultan summoned the artillery
to his support. He unfolded the sacred banner and directed their
action. They pounded the Janissaries with cannon shot in the streets
leading to the palace and drove them back to their barracks with
heavy loss. The guns were then concentrated on the barracks and set
fire to them. No quarter was given. The Janissaries perished either
by gun fire or in the burning barracks. Four thousand of them were
disposed of in this holocaust. The Sultan ruthlessly followed up his
victory. Many more thousands of the Janissaries were put to death
in Constantinople and in other cities of the Empire. The force was
entirely destroyed. Its very name was erased from official records.
Mahmoud had obtained an overwhelming victory. His new army was at once
increased to forty-five thousand men, exclusive of his artillery, with
the intention of gradually raising it to two hundred thousand. It was
recruited, however, wholly from the Moslem population. The Christians
were excluded from its ranks as rigidly as under the old régime. There
can be no doubt that if time had been allowed to Mahmoud to complete
the number and efficiency of this new army, the Ottoman Empire would
again have become a most formidable military Power. The Sultan did
much more to centralize power in himself. He abolished the military
feudal system, which had become a gross abuse. The beys were everywhere
suppressed, or were allowed to draw their incomes only for the term
of their lives. The rents hitherto paid to these persons were in the
future to be paid directly to the State.
Mahmoud also effected many other important reforms. He abolished the
Court of Confiscations, which had provided a revenue to the State out
of property of persons condemned to death or exile, and which had
become a great abuse. He deprived pashas of their power to put people
to death at their will without trial. He enacted that no one should in
future be so dealt with without formal trial and the right of appeal.
He put the vast Vacouf property (dedicated to Islam) under State
management. He prohibited the wearing of turbans and made the use of
the fez universal in his Empire. He set the example of clothing himself
after the European fashion. He entertained ambassadors and their wives
and others at his palace as other sovereigns did. He contemplated great
reforms in favour of his Christian subjects, but it will be seen that
the task was left incomplete for his successors.
At this point of his career Mahmoud had attained unqualified success.
He had succeeded in putting down all the rebellious pashas, such as
Ali of Janina and others. Mehemet Ali of Egypt had recognized the
supremacy of the Sultan by sending his army and navy to suppress the
Greek rebellion. Greece had been practically reconquered. The Greeks
in other parts of the Empire had been terrorized into submission.
Insurrection in Moldavia and Wallachia had been suppressed. The Serbian
fortresses were in his hands. Above all, the Janissaries, who had
proved to be so useless as a military force and who had murdered two
of his predecessors and deposed many others, were suppressed. He had
carried out great reforms in his Empire. Mahmoud had effected all this
by his own inflexible firmness and by statesmanship of a high order,
not unmixed with cruelty and cunning.
Two events now occurred which materially affected the position of
Turkey, and deprived Mahmoud of the fruits of his ably devised
policy. The one was the death of Alexander, the Emperor of Russia,
the other the decision of the British Government to intervene on
behalf of Greece. Alexander for some years past had been on the horns
of a dilemma. He had a deep sympathy for the subjects of the Ottoman
Empire who were members of the Greek Church, and a great aversion to
Turkish rule. But he also hated and feared revolution. He believed
in the divine right of rulers, however bad, and would take no step
to support the revolt of their subjects, however oppressive their
government. He feared that a dangerous precedent might be extended to
his own Empire. This conflict of views paralysed his action. He gave
no assistance to the Greek insurgents. So long as he lived there was
little hope that Greece would recover its independence. He died late
in 1825, and was succeeded by his brother, Nicholas, a much younger
and more vigorous man, and a truer exponent of Russian ideals. The new
Czar had no objection to insurrection if it was not directed against
his own government. He hated the Turks and wished to drive them out of
Europe much more than he sympathized with the Greeks. He had many other
grounds of complaint against the Porte. It has also been suggested that
he wished to come to conclusions with it before time had been given for
perfecting his new army.
As regards Great Britain, its Government had not originally sympathized
with the Greek revolution, but the reverse. But public opinion,
outraged by the barbarities which had been committed, had produced
an influence on it, and Mr. Canning, the Foreign Secretary, was
personally very favourable to the cause of Greece. The Government as a
whole held the view that the continuance of disorder in Greece was a
menace to the peace of Europe. They had no wish for the extension of
Russia at the expense of Turkey. They thought that if Greece were not
pacified Russia would intervene, and would not confine its claim to
the settlement of the Greek claims, but would aim at other conquests.
They decided, therefore, to make an effort to settle the Greek question
on the basis of autonomy, subject to the suzerainty of the Sultan. In
this view the Cabinet sent the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg in
1826 to negotiate with the Czar. He effected an arrangement which was
later embodied in the treaty of London of July 6, 1827, between the
three Powers, Great Britain, Russia, and France, for the pacification
of Greece. Under the terms of this treaty it was agreed, with a view
to bringing about a reconciliation between the Ottoman Porte and the
Greeks, to offer mediation, and to demand an immediate armistice as a
preliminary to the opening of a negotiation.
Under the arrangement to be proposed to the Ottoman Porte, Greece was
to be granted complete autonomy, under the suzerainty of the Sultan,
and was to pay a fixed annual tribute. It was to be governed by
authorities whom its people were to nominate. In order to bring about
a complete separation between the individuals of the two nations and
to prevent the collisions resulting from a long struggle, the Greeks
were to enter upon possession of all Turkish property, either on the
continent or in the isles of Greece, on condition of indemnifying
the former proprietors by the payment of an annual sum to be added
to the tribute. By an additional secret article it was provided that
“if, within one month, the Ottoman Porte did not agree to accept
the mediation of the three Powers and consent to an armistice, the
signatories of the treaty would find the necessity for an approximation
with the Greeks by entering into relations with them, and would employ
all their means for the accomplishment of the objects of the treaty
without, however, taking any part in the hostilities between the two
contending parties.”
In accordance with this treaty, a demand was made on the Porte,
by the ambassadors of the three Powers, for an armistice, and for
a pacification of Greece on the basis above described. The Porte
indignantly refused to entertain the proposed mediation. It denied the
right of the Powers to intervene as regards its Greek subjects. In a
manifesto to its own people, the Porte justified its refusal to mediate
on the proposed basis. It denied that the Greeks had any cause for
complaint against the Ottoman rule. “It is notorious,” it said, “that
these Greeks have been treated like Mussulmans in every respect and as
to everything which regards their property, their personal security,
and the defence of their homes, and that they have been loaded with
benefits by the present Sultan.”
The negotiations between the Porte and the ambassadors were protracted
by the former, in order that an Egyptian fleet, bringing large
reinforcements to Ibrahim in Greece, might arrive at Navarino before
the conclusion of them. After the final rejection of the proposals of
the ambassadors, instructions were given to the combined fleet of the
three Powers to effect a blockade of the Greek ports, and to prevent
the entrance or departure of any Turkish or Egyptian vessels of war.
The combined fleet, under command of the British admiral, Sir Edward
Codrington, thereupon took up a position outside the bay of Navarino.
The admiral then entered into negotiations with the Turkish admiral and
concluded an armistice on behalf of the Greeks. In spite of this, the
Egyptian troops, under Ibrahim Pasha, continued to ravage the Morea in
the most cruel manner, devastating property, murdering the men, and
carrying off the young women for sale as slaves in Egypt. As the winter
was approaching, the British admiral thought it would be difficult
to maintain his position outside the bay. He determined, therefore,
to enter the bay with his fleet. The combined fleet consisted of ten
vessels of the line, ten frigates and smaller vessels, with about
twelve hundred guns. The Turko-Egyptian fleet consisted of five ships
of the line, fifteen frigates, and sixty-two smaller vessels, armed
with two thousand guns. It was anchored in a crescent facing the
entrance of the bay. There were also batteries on shore commanding
the entrance of the bay. The allied fleet entered the bay without
opposition from these batteries and anchored in a line alongside of the
Turkish and Egyptian vessels.
It was obvious that the position was a most critical one, almost
certain to lead to an armed conflict. The Turks fired the first gun
and broke the armistice, whether intentionally, or not, is not quite
clear. The challenge was taken up. There followed a fierce battle
between the two fleets. In a few hours of this 20th of October, 1827,
the Turko-Egyptian fleet was completely destroyed. With the exception
of some of the smaller craft, all the vessels were sunk or burnt. Their
crews had fought valiantly, but they were no match for those of the
allied fleet. But their guns caused much loss of life and did much
damage, and the British battleships, after the battle, were compelled
to return to England for repairs. The batteries on shore did not begin
to fire until the allied fleet had taken position. They might have
effected much more damage if they had fired on the fleet when entering
the bay. A more complete destruction of a fleet had never occurred.
This great victory gave no satisfaction to the British Government.
The spirit of Canning no longer inspired it. He had died since the
initiation of the policy which inevitably led to this naval battle. On
the meeting of the British Parliament, early in 1828, the Speech from
the Throne referred to the battle in the following terms: “His Majesty
deeply laments that this conflict should have occurred with the naval
force of our ancient ally. He still entertains a confident hope that
this untoward event will not be followed by further hostilities.” The
Duke of Wellington, who was now Prime Minister, when challenged in the
House of Lords as to the expression ‘untoward event,’ said:—
The Ottoman Empire was an essential part of the balance of power
in Europe. Its preservation had been for many years an object to
the whole of Europe. While he acquitted the British admiral of all
blame, he pointed out that, under the treaty of London, one of the
stipulations was that the operation was not to lead to hostilities.
When, therefore, the operation under the treaty did lead to
hostilities, it certainly was an untoward event.
It is difficult, however, to conceive how the Duke, who had negotiated
the treaty with the Czar of Russia, could have supposed that, in the
event of the Sultan not agreeing to the terms of mediation, the use of
force against him could be avoided.
However that might have been, the destruction of the Ottoman fleet at
Navarino was of momentous importance. It cut off the communication
between Ibrahim Pasha and Egypt. It restored to Greece command of the
sea in the archipelago. It assured the supremacy of the Russian fleet
in the Black Sea. This last was of enormous value to the Russians in
the war which soon broke out with Turkey. It facilitated the capture
of Varna, and enabled the Russian army to advance across the Balkans
and to threaten Constantinople.
Ibrahim Pasha, finding his position in the Morea untenable, entered
into a convention with the British admiral under which he was permitted
to withdraw the Egyptian army from Greece and embark it for Alexandria
without molestation from the allied fleet. There remained in the Morea
only the Turkish troops. They held most of the fortresses there. Later,
a French army, under General Maison, was, by agreement with the allies,
sent to the Morea. It soon cleared the whole country of the Turkish
troops.
Meanwhile, the Sultan at Constantinople, in spite of the destruction
of his fleet at Navarino, still maintained an obstinate refusal to
accede to the terms of the treaty of London. The ambassadors of England
and France thereupon left the city. Differences then began to arise
between the three allied Powers. The Emperor of Russia proposed to
employ coercive measures against Turkey, and for this purpose to occupy
Moldavia and Wallachia. England and France rejected the proposal.
They wished to preserve the Ottoman Empire as well as to secure the
independence of Greece. But the Greek question was only one of the
complaints of Russia against Turkey. It had also grave reasons to
complain that the treaty of Bucharest and the later treaty of Akermann
of 1826, confirming and extending it, were disregarded by the Porte,
which still occupied Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia by its armies.
The Sultan, in a manifesto to his own people, had publicly announced
that he had entered into the treaty of Akermann with the full intention
of not being bound by its terms, and that he regarded Russia as his
hereditary foe.
On April 26, 1828, Russia declared war against Turkey. England and
France found themselves in a position when they could not object, for
the Porte still refused their demands as regards Greece. They had
joined with Russia in destroying the Turkish fleet. They were now
compelled to stand by while the Russians invaded Turkey. The position,
and still more the results of the war, showed what a grave error
Mahmoud committed when he refused to agree to the scheme of the allied
Powers for granting autonomy to Greece under the suzerainty of Turkey.
If he had accepted, his fleet would have been intact. England and
France would have been in a position to object to Russia’s schemes.
As it was, Greece secured an absolute independence, and Wallachia,
Moldavia, and Serbia were soon, by the victories of Russia, to secure
the status of complete autonomy which the Sultan had refused to Greece.
The Emperor Nicholas, in nominal command of his army, crossed the
Pruth on May 7, 1828. His force consisted of not more than sixty-five
thousand men, a surprisingly small number for the greatest military
Power in Europe to put into the field. It was necessary, however, to
keep a large army in Poland, where an outbreak was expected. Another
army was stationed in the Ukraine to watch Austria, who regarded the
Russian attack on Turkey with suspicion and malevolence; and a fourth
army of thirty thousand men, under General Paskiewich, invaded Asia
Minor from the Caucasus. With the main army it was hoped to cross the
Balkans and to menace Constantinople. The Turks offered no resistance
in Moldavia and Wallachia. But it was not till June 8th that the
Russians were able to effect a crossing over the Danube. The Sultan,
on his part, commenced the campaign under great disadvantages. His
old army of Janissaries had recently been destroyed. The new army,
equipped and drilled in the fashion of European armies, was very raw
and ill-trained. It consisted of very young men, who were recruited
with difficulty, often by compulsion, for the new service was very
unpopular, and the older men could not be induced to join. It did not
count more than forty-five thousand men, exclusive of the artillery.
It was supplemented by irregulars from Asia, and the total force under
arms was estimated at one hundred and eighty thousand men, of whom,
after providing for the defence of Constantinople and the Dardanelles,
for a reserve at Adrianople and for other demands on the Empire in
Europe and Asia, there remained only fifty thousand men to oppose the
Russians in Bulgaria, and to provide garrisons for the fortresses on
the Danube and for Schumla and Varna. These garrisons, however, were
supported by the armed Turkish inhabitants of the towns, who could be
relied on for a vigorous resistance. The Turks were under the further
disadvantage that the greater part of their fleet had been destroyed
at Navarino. The Russians were, in consequence, completely masters in
the Black Sea. They were able to send to the Ægean archipelago another
fleet, which blockaded the Dardanelles.
In spite of these difficulties, the Turks made an unexpectedly vigorous
defence against the Russian invasion in Europe. The campaign of 1828
was mainly one of sieges, where the Turkish soldiers, supported by
Moslems of the fortified towns, fought to the best advantage behind
walls and earthworks. They could make but a poor stand in the open
against their better trained enemy.
The Russians, after crossing the Danube, laid siege to Ibrail, the
most important fortress on the lower stretch of the river, and which
it was essentially necessary to capture before making an advance to
Schumla. The garrison and inhabitants made a gallant resistance, and it
was only after five weeks that it was compelled to surrender, on June
17th. The Russian army was then divided into three parts—the one to
attack Silistria, the capture of which was almost as necessary as that
of Ibrail; the second to besiege Varna; the third and most important,
under the Emperor, to march to Schumla. The attack on Silistria
failed, and after some weeks the force employed against it marched in
the direction of Schumla to support the Czar’s army. Even with this
addition it was found impossible to invest the fortified camp of the
Turks behind Schumla, and, after a demonstration, it was compelled to
hold a defensive position, in front of Schumla, while the Czar and a
part of the army marched in support of the division before Varna.
On August 18th the Czar arrived there with a reinforcement of nine
thousand men, and the siege then commenced, while the Russian Black Sea
fleet of eight ships of the line and three frigates, under command of
Admiral Greig, joined in the attack from the sea. The Turks again made
a desperate and prolonged defence, which might have been successful if
it had not been that Jussuf Pasha, in command of the garrison, with
five thousand of his men, traitorously deserted the city, on October
14th, and threw themselves on the mercy of the Czar. The remainder
of the garrison, under the Capitan Pasha, refused to be a party to
the surrender. It was said that the cause of this extraordinary act
of treachery was that the Sultan, in pursuance of his policy of
concentrating all power and authority in himself, had been persuaded by
an intrigue to confiscate the property of Jussuf, who was one of the
few large landowners in Turkey, while the owner was gallantly fighting
the enemy at Varna. However that may be, the remaining garrison was
soon compelled to capitulate, and this most important stronghold fell
into the hands of the Russians. Without it no advance could possibly
have been made across the Balkans.
The campaign of 1828 came to an end with the surrender of Varna. Though
the Russians had been able to capture two of the four fortresses which
barred their way to the Balkans, the campaign had not been without
success to the Turks. They had shown unexpected powers of resistance,
and had prevented for a year the achievement of the main object of the
Russians—their advance to Constantinople. The losses of the Russians
had been very great, not only in the sieges, but by disease, which
dogged their armies as usual.
Baron von Moltke, the German general, who, at the invitation of the
Sultan, was with the Turkish headquarters during this war, writes of
the Russian and Turkish troops in his remarkable history of it:—
The faults of the Russian Staff were atoned for by the innate
excellence of the Russian troops. The self-sacrificing obedience of
the commanders, the steadiness of the common soldiers, their power
of endurance and unshaken bravery in times of danger, were the
qualities that enabled them to avert the dangers of their position
before Schumla and to hold the Turks in check, and to make up for all
deficiencies and overcome all resistance at Varna.[32]
Of the Turks he adds:—
We cannot say much for the skill of the Turkish commanders, but the
conduct of the Turks, from the highest officers to the last soldier
at the storming of Ibrail, their courage and steadiness in the mines
and trenches before Varna, were far above all praise.
In Asia the Turks had not done so well. General Paskiewich was able to
defeat the army in front of him and to capture the important stronghold
of Kars and its adjoining district.