On the approach of the Ottoman army to Tabriz, Ismail was at last drawn

from his reserve. He determined to give battle. The two armies met

at Calderan, not far from the capital, on August 14th, 116 days from

the commencement of the march, which must have covered nearly twelve

hundred miles. This was a great performance on the part of the Turkish

army. It was by this time reduced to one hundred and twenty thousand

men, of whom eighty thousand were cavalry. The Persian army consisted

of eighty thousand cavalry, splendidly mounted and equipped, and well

trained. But there were no infantry and no guns. The Turkish soldiers

were fatigued by their long march. They were ill-fed and the horses

were stale and out of condition. The issue turned upon the success

of the charges of the Persian cavalry. They attacked the Turks with

great impetuosity in two bodies on either flank. That under command

of Ismail himself was successful and broke and dispersed the opposing

wing of the Turks. The other column was unsuccessful. The Ottomans

fell back behind their guns. The Janissaries formed a solid front. The

cannons opened a destructive fire, which was supported by the fire of

the Janissaries, who were now armed with muskets. The Persians were

shattered and destroyed. The defeat of the other wing of the Turkish

army was retrieved. Twenty-five thousand Persian horsemen lay dead on

the field. Ismail himself was badly wounded and escaped with difficulty.

After this victory Selim entered Tabriz, and remained there eight

days. It was his wish to winter in Persia and to renew his campaign in

the following spring, but his soldiers objected and insisted on being

led home. This time Selim found himself unable to refuse. He turned

homeward with his army. No terms of peace were concluded with Ismail,

and the two countries continued nominally at war during the remainder

of Selim’s life. But the great provinces of Diarbekir and Khurdistan

remained in the hands of the Turks. Selim left them in charge of

the well-known Turkish historian, Idris, who spent the next year in

organizing these two departments and in putting down any attempt at

resistance. He was eminently successful in this, and the two provinces

were permanently annexed to the Ottoman Empire. The whole campaign of

Selim must be considered as a most striking success. To have marched

a hundred and forty thousand men, with eighty thousand horses and

three hundred guns, over twelve hundred miles, and to have defeated a

powerful army, backed by all the resources of a great country, was an

achievement which earned for Selim a place in the first rank of great

generals. Selim does not appear to have been anxious to include Persia

in his Empire. His hatred of the Schii heresy was such that he aimed

rather at isolation than annexation. He issued a firman forbidding any

trade with Persia, and when a number of merchants were reported to

him for having broken the law by entering into illicit trade with the

Persians, he ordered them to be executed. He was only with difficulty

induced to revoke the order by the Mufti Djemali.

On his return to Constantinople Selim, inflamed by his success in

putting down the heresy of the Schiis and his victory over heretical

Persia, determined to extirpate Christianity from his dominion. Again

with the greatest difficulty he was dissuaded from this course by

the courageous Mufti. But he insisted on depriving the Christians in

Constantinople of all their churches, which he turned into mosques.

In the spring of 1516 Selim determined to extend his Empire by the

conquest of Syria and Egypt. These countries had been for many years

past under the rule of the Mamelukes, a body of soldiers recruited from

Circassian slaves, and from whose ranks Sultans were elected for their

lives. The existing Sultan, Kansar Ghowri, was eighty years of age,

but was still able to take command in the field of his Mamelukes. The

immediate pretext for war, as in the case of Persia, was a religious

one. A claim was preferred by Selim for the protection of the holy

cities of Mecca and Medina.

On June 26th Selim arrived at Konia, and thence sent an insolent

missive of defiance to Ghowri, who was at Aleppo. In return, a mission

was sent to the Turkish headquarters. It consisted of an envoy and a

suite of ten Mamelukes in splendid military array and glittering with

armour. Selim was indignant at this warlike demonstration. He directed

the immediate execution of the ten members of the suite, and with

difficulty was persuaded not to deal in the same way with the envoy. As

an alternative the envoy was shorn of his beard and hair, his head was

covered by a nightcap, and he was mounted on a broken-down donkey, and

was returned in this ignominious way to Ghowri.

The two armies met in battle not far from Aleppo. The issue was not in

doubt. The Egyptians had no guns. They also suffered from the defection

of the Djellans, a section of Mamelukes of the second and inferior

rank. An hour sufficed to ensure complete victory to the Turks.

Ghowri fled and died, trampled to death, it was said, by the mass of

fugitives. The victory caused the loss not only of Aleppo but of the

whole of Syria. Selim, after a few days at Aleppo, went to Damascus,

and there organized the invasion of Egypt. This involved the provision

of many thousands of camels to carry water for the troops when crossing

the desert. He sent five thousand men to Gaza, under Sinan Pasha, the

brave general who had led the victorious wing of his army against the

Persians. They met there an Egyptian army of about the same number, and

a fierce battle ensued, which resulted in the defeat of the Mamelukes,

mainly owing to the Ottoman artillery.

Selim left Damascus with his main army on December 16th. On arrival at

Gaza he ordered the immediate slaughter of all its inhabitants. He also

directed the execution of one of his own generals who ventured to point

out to him the danger of an invasion of Egypt. On January 10th the

arrangements for this expedition were complete. Ten days were occupied

in crossing the desert between Syria and Egypt. The army was harassed

by Arabs, but there was no attempt to resist on the part of the main

Egyptian army. When, at one time, the Grand Vizier, thinking that the

cloud of Arabs meant a more serious resistance, persuaded Selim to

mount his war-horse, the Sultan, on finding it was a false alarm and

that it was only an affair with Arabs, directed the execution of the

Vizier.

On the last day of the year 1516 Selim arrived with his army within

a few miles of Cairo. Meanwhile the Mamelukes had elected Tourman Bey

as Sultan to succeed Ghowri. But there was much opposition to this

on the part of those who favoured the claim of the son of Ghowri. As

a result, there was dissension in the Egyptian army. Two of their

leaders, Ghazali Bey and Khair Bey, entered into treasonable relations

with Selim. Ghazali persuaded Tourman to send the guns, with which

the Egyptian army was now provided, by the ordinary route, and then

secretly sent information of this to Selim, who was able to avoid the

guns by taking another route.

The two armies met near Ridania. The battle resulted in the complete

defeat of the Egyptians, with a loss of twenty-five thousand men, owing

to their want of guns. Selim then advanced on Cairo. There was no

resistance at first, but later the Mamelukes reoccupied it and made a

desperate resistance to the Turkish army. The streets were barricaded

and every house was turned into a fortress. Selim spent three days in

getting possession of the city. Eight hundred Mamelukes who surrendered

on promise of their lives were put to death. A general massacre of the

inhabitants then took place, and fifty thousand of them perished by

the sword, or were thrown into the flames of the burning houses. As a

result of this, and further military operations in the Delta, Egypt was

completely subdued. The brave and generous Tourman was taken prisoner

and, after denouncing the two traitors in the presence of Selim, was

put to death.

Some months were then occupied by Selim in organizing the conquered

country. It was not annexed as an integral part of Turkey. The

Mamelukes, or rather the section of them who had been unfaithful

to their Sultan, and who had survived the general slaughter, were

entrusted with the administration of Egypt, subject to the superior

control of a pasha appointed by the Turkish government. Ghazali and

Khair Bey received the reward of their treason—Ghazali was appointed

Governor of Syria and Khair Bey of Egypt. A garrison of five thousand

Ottoman soldiers was left at Cairo. The Turkish army insisted on an

early return to Constantinople. A war against Moslems, where there was

no opportunity of making captives for sale as slaves or for harems, had

no charm for them. Selim had once more to give way.

It was not till September 17th that he was able to commence his

homeward march. Having safely passed the desert, he said to his Grand

Vizier, Younis Pasha, who was riding beside him, “Well, our backs are

now turned on Egypt and we shall soon be at Gaza.” Younis, who had

originally been opposed to the expedition, could not resist the reply:

“And what has been the result of all our trouble and fatigue, if it is

not that half our army has perished in battle, or in the sands of the

desert, and that Egypt is now governed by a gang of traitors?” This

imprudent speech cost the Grand Vizier his life. His head was struck

off as he rode by his master’s side.

The conquest of Egypt entailed the acquisition of the interests of

that country in a great part of Arabia, including the holy cities of

Mecca and Medina. Selim was also able to induce the titular Caliph, who

through many generations had inherited from the early successors of

Mahomet a certain undefined authority in the religious world, and who

held a shadowy Court at Cairo, to make over to him and his successors,

as Sultans of Turkey, the barren office, together with its symbols,

the standard and cloak of the Prophet. These symbols were removed

to Constantinople, and thenceforth the Sultans assumed the title of

Caliphs and Protectors of the Holy Places—and this may have added to

their prestige in the Moslem world, though it may be doubted whether

it contributed much to the strength of the Turkish Empire. Of more

material advantage was the fact that an annual tribute was paid by the

Egyptian government, which a few years later, under Solyman, was fixed

at 80,000 ducats. It also contributed men and ships to wars undertaken

by the Sultan. In the siege of Rhodes, in 1524, Egypt sent three

thousand Mamelukes and twenty vessels of war.

Selim spent some time at Damascus and Aleppo on his way back in

organizing his new acquisitions. Syria was incorporated in the Turkish

Empire, and has remained so to the present time.

The campaign which ended in the conquest of Egypt and Syria was not

less conspicuous in its result than that against Persia, more on

account of the difficulties of organization, than for success on

the field of battle. Treason and the want of artillery were more

responsible for the defeat of the Mamelukes than the valour of the

Ottoman troops. It is not easy for us to understand why Egypt was not

incorporated in the Empire in the same way as Syria. The Mamelukes were

as much strangers to the country as the Turks themselves. The minority

of them, who survived the war and the bloody executions by Selim, had

no claim to recognition as the ruling class in Egypt, other than their

treachery to their fellow-Mamelukes and their Sultan and the aid which

they had given to the invaders. It will be seen that these surviving

Mamelukes soon regained full power in Egypt, and reduced the pashas

appointed from Constantinople to puppets.

Selim returned to his capital in 1518. In the remaining two years

of his life there were no further military exploits. He made great

preparations for another campaign. He added greatly to the strength of

his navy. He built a hundred and fifty ships of war, many of them of

great size for those days. It was generally believed that he intended

an attack on Rhodes to avenge the defeat of his grandfather, the

acquisition of which, lying as it did across the route to Egypt, was of

great importance. Before, however, any decision was arrived at, Selim

died on his way to Adrianople, very near to the spot where his father

had been poisoned by his orders. He left the reputation of being one of

the ablest organizers of victory, but also the most cruel despot of the

Othman line. It was for long a common expression with the Turks, by way

of a curse, “May’st thou be a vizier to Sultan Selim.”

X.

SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT

1520-66

SELIM was succeeded by his only son, Solyman, at the age of twenty-six,

who reigned for forty-six years, a period of unexampled splendour in

the history of the Ottoman Empire—its culminating era. This was mainly

due to the personal qualities of the new Sultan. He surpassed all his

predecessors, and still more his degenerate successors, in dignity

and graciousness. He was not behind the best of them in military

capacity, vigour of action, and personal courage. He combined with

these qualities statesmanship of high order. With rare exceptions

he stood by his engagements and did not follow the precept of the

Koran that faith need not be kept with infidels. He was great as an

administrator and legislator. Before he mounted the throne he had been

employed by his father as governor of three very important provinces,

and had gained a high reputation for his determination to secure

justice to his subjects, whatever their race or creed. His private

life was free from scandal. He was noted for his clemency and kindness

of heart. If massacres took place after victories or after capture of

fortresses when he was in command, it was because he could not restrain

his turbulent and bloodthirsty Janissaries; but the occasions of such

scenes were comparatively rare. He had, however, a blend of cruelty in

his character, as had most of his predecessors. Being an only son, he

had no occasion, on mounting the throne, to carry out the fratricidal

law of Mahomet II. But he was determined that there should be no

possible rival in his family, however remote. After the surrender of

Rhodes, two years later, on the promise of life and property to its

defenders, he singled out, in breach of his promise, a son of Prince

Djem, who was one of those included in the amnesty, and directed

the immediate execution of him and his four sons. Worse also than

fratricide was the murder by Solyman of two of his own sons. The eldest

of them, Mustapha, was a most promising prince. He had already shown

his capacity as governor of a province. He was endowed with all his

father’s best qualities. He was the idol of the army and the hope of

his country.

Solyman was persuaded by his latest favourite concubine, a Russian

lady, Ghowrem by name, who had unbounded influence over him and

retained it till late in life, that Prince Mustapha was intriguing

against him, and aimed at dethroning him, as Selim had done in the case

of Bayezid. She hoped to secure the succession for her own son. Without

a word of warning or any opportunity of defending himself, Mustapha,

in the course of the second Persian campaign in 1553, on entering his

father’s tent, was seized by the mutes and was strangled while Solyman

looked on at the foul deed. There was more excuse for putting to

death another son, Bayezid, who had been goaded by an intrigue in the

Sultan’s harem into taking up arms, in 1561, against his brother Selim.

He was defeated and fled to Persia, where he was at first received

with great honour by Shah Talmasp, the successor to Ismail, with the

distinct promise that he would not be given up. But Solyman obtained

his extradition by threat of war and the promise of 400,000 pieces of

gold. The unfortunate prince was treated with the greatest indignity.

His hair and beard were shorn. He was handed over, together with his

four sons, to an emissary of his brother Selim, who at once put to

death the whole party.

As a result of the murders of these two sons of Solyman, a third one,

the son of Ghowrem, was the only heir to the throne. He succeeded

Solyman and was known as “Selim the Sot.” It will be seen that this

prince had none of the qualities of his race. He was the first of a

long line of degenerates who eventually lost the greater part of the

Empire which had been built up by Solyman and his predecessors.

Though the office of Grand Vizier was not so dangerous to its holders

as under Selim I, it proved to be fatal to two of the nine men who

held it during Solyman’s reign. One of the most remarkable incidents

of Solyman’s life was his infatuation for Ibrahim, the second of his

Grand Viziers. Ibrahim, a renegade Greek by birth, had been captured

as a boy by corsairs and sold as a slave to a widow in Magnesia, who

brought him up as a Mussulman. Recognizing his talents, this lady gave

him an excellent education. Solyman, on a visit to that province, came

across Ibrahim, and, attracted by his musical talent, took him into

service, where he rose to be master of the pages and grand falconer. He

soon acquired immense influence over his master, whose sister was given

to him in marriage. He was rapidly promoted, and in 1523 was appointed

Grand Vizier. The Sultan and his favourite became inseparable. They had

their meals alone together. They concerted between them all the affairs

of State. Ibrahim justified this preference, for he proved to be of

great capacity, not inferior in any respect to his master, and his

superior in education and knowledge of languages and history. He was

appointed Seraskier, or Commander-in-Chief, when the Sultan was unable

personally to command. In the earlier campaigns in Hungary and Persia,

and in the siege of Vienna, he took a most active part, and was the

main adviser to his master.

After thirteen years of implicit confidence in Ibrahim, suspicion arose

in the mind of the Sultan and was fanned by the Sultana Ghowrem, who

coveted the post of Grand Vizier for her son-in-law, Roostem Pasha.

There does not appear to have been any ground for these suspicions,

save that Ibrahim, intoxicated by his elevation, assumed the airs

almost of an equal with the Sultan. A vizier suspected was very near to

his doom. Entering the palace one day in 1536 to dine with the Sultan

as usual, he was never seen alive again. The next morning his body was

found in the palace. His immense wealth was confiscated to the State.

It was said that Solyman in an adjoining room to that where this murder

was perpetrated was smothered with kisses by Ghowrem so as to drown the

cries of the dying Vizier.

In another case, the Grand Vizier Achmet was decapitated in the council

chamber by order of Solyman, solely because he gave advice which

displeased his master. Von Hammer gives a long list of other high

officials who shared the same fate.

During the forty-six years of his reign Solyman added enormously to

the Empire. Belgrade, Rhodes, nearly the whole of Hungary, the Crimea,

the great provinces of Mossul, Bagdad, and Bassorah, and a part of

Armenia taken from Persia, Yemen and Aden in Arabia, Algiers, Oran, and

Tripoli, and an undefined extent of hinterland inhabited by Arabs in

North Africa, and a wide extension of Egypt in the direction of Nubia,

were the contributions which he transmitted to his successors. There

were few years of his long reign in which he was not under arms. War

with Hungary and Austria in the north alternated with war with Persia

in the east and with Spain in the west. Solyman was often in command of

his armies. He conducted personally thirteen campaigns, some of them,

such as those against Persia, extending over two years. For the most

part these wars were embarked on without any just or even plausible

cause. They were stimulated by lust of conquest on the Sultan’s part,

and by craving for active service and for loot on the part of the

Janissaries. Religious fanaticism seems to have had little concern with

the motives or results of them.

Solyman’s first campaign, in 1521, was directed against Belgrade, the

city which had successfully defied Mahomet II. He marched against it at

the head of an army of a hundred thousand men with three hundred guns.

It was bravely defended by the Hungarians. But they had no guns. After

seven days of bombardment the city was assaulted and captured. There

was no massacre of the garrison or the inhabitants. Solyman converted

the principal church into a mosque. The city was thenceforth garrisoned

by a Turkish force. It constituted the principal stronghold of the

Empire on the Danube, and was the gateway for many invasions of Hungary.

In the next year, 1523, Solyman followed up this success by an

attack on the island of Rhodes, where Mahomet had also failed, and

the capture of which had become more important since the conquest of

Egypt, lying as it did on the direct route by sea from Constantinople.

For this purpose Solyman sent a fleet of three hundred vessels with

eight thousand Janissaries and a hundred siege guns. He marched at

the head of a hundred thousand men through Asia Minor to the bay of

Marmerice, opposite to Rhodes, whence they were conveyed to the island.

The knights, six hundred in number, with only five thousand trained

soldiers and a _levée_ of peasants on the island, made a heroic defence

under their Grand Master, de Lisle Adam. It was only after a siege of

nine months that they were at last compelled to capitulate. It was the

first occasion on which a great fortress was approached by sap and

spade work, so as to avoid gun fire, and in which bombs were used by

the attacking army. Solyman’s army is said to have lost fifty thousand

men in casualties and as many more by disease. Under the terms of

capitulation, the survivors of the garrison with all their personal

property were to be conveyed to Crete, after twelve days, in their

own galleys. After an interview with the Grand Master the Sultan is

reported to have said, with great generosity, “It is not without regret

that I force this brave man from his home in his old age.” The arms of

the knights are still to be seen carved on the houses they occupied in

Rhodes. The Turks have always respected them in memory of the gallant

defence. The terms of surrender were faithfully observed by Solyman

with the exception already referred to. The knights eventually settled

at Malta, at that time a nearly desert island. They made it the seat of

their order and fortified it. Its central position in the Mediterranean

made it a stronghold of the utmost importance. Solyman, in the last

year but one of his long reign, thought it necessary for the expansion

of his Empire, in the North of Africa, to oust the knights from their

new nest. He sent an army and a fleet under command of Piale Reis to

besiege it. There commenced another celebrated siege in which the

knights, under command of their Grand Master, Lavallette, covered

themselves with glory. The Turks were defeated in many assaults on the

fortress, and were ultimately compelled to withdraw with heavy losses.

The two years after the conquest of Rhodes were spent by Solyman in

organizing his kingdom. His inaction was greatly resented by the

Janissaries, who hated their dull life in barracks and longed for

war and for loot. They broke out in revolt and pillaged the houses

of Ibrahim and other great functionaries. The outbreak was quelled,

Solyman killing with his own hand three of the rebels. Their Agha

and other leaders were put to death. But Solyman found it expedient

to appease the mercenaries by generous presents, and in the next

year—mainly at their instigation—embarked on another war. He was urged

to invade Hungary by Francis I, King of France, who hoped to create a

diversion from the ambitious projects of the Emperor Charles V. This

may be considered as the first entry of the Turks into the maze of

European politics. Hungary and Bohemia were at that time united under

the rule of Louis II, a very young and inexperienced man.

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