The opposition [he said] must be ended; these barriers must be

removed. It was for them to complete the work of their fathers. They

had now against them a single city, one which could not resist their

attacks; a city whose population was greatly reduced and whose former

wealth had been diminished by Turkish sieges, and by the continued

incursions made by his ancestors upon its territories; a city which

was now only one in name, for in reality its buildings were useless

and its walls abandoned and for the great part in ruins. Even from

its weakness, however, they knew that from its favourable position,

commanding both land and sea, it had greatly hindered their progress

and could still hinder it, opposing their plans and being always

ready to attack them. Openly or secretly it had done all it could

against them. It was the city which had brought about the attack by

Timerlane and the suffering which followed. It had instigated Hunyadi

to cross the Danube, and on every occasion and in every possible

manner had been their great enemy. The time had now come when, in

his opinion, it should be captured or wiped off the face of the

earth. One of two things: he would either have it within his Empire

or he would lose both. With Constantinople in his possession, the

territories already gained could be safely held and more would be

obtained; without it, no territory that they possessed was safe.[15]

In the ensuing winter (1452) Mahomet made every preparation at

Adrianople for a campaign in the next year. Having no means of casting

cannons, which at that time were coming into use in European armies,

he tempted a Wallachian, who was experienced in such work, and who

was in the service of the Greeks, to come over to his side for higher

pay, and devised with him a cannon of enormous size, firing stone

balls of 2½ feet in diameter, and many other smaller, but still

large, guns throwing balls of 150 lb. weight, for use against the walls

of Constantinople. He also constructed a large fleet of war vessels

propelled by oars, biremes and triremes, to be used in the siege of the

city. He was most active and eager, working day and night in concerting

plans with his generals for his great purpose. Early in the following

year (1453) he collected in front of the walls of Constantinople

an army, estimated at a hundred and fifty thousand men, including

twelve thousand Janissaries, and a vast number of irregulars and camp

followers eager for the sack of the great city.

Constantine, on his part, was equally engaged in making preparations

for the defence of his capital. He collected supplies of every kind.

He did his best to repair and strengthen the walls of the city, which

had been neglected and badly repaired by fraudulent Greek contractors.

He invited the aid of the Christian princes of Western Europe for the

coming struggle. In this view, and in the hope of getting full support

from the Pope, he agreed to a scheme of union between the Greek and

Latin Churches, in which everything was conceded to the latter. A great

service was held at St. Sophia to ratify this union. Cardinal Isidore,

the legate of the Pope, a Greek by birth, presided. It was attended by

the Emperor and all his Court, clergy, and the officers of State. This

gave great offence to the main body of the Greek clergy, and to the

great majority of the people of Constantinople. There was implacable

hatred between the members of the two Churches, and not even the grave

peril of the State could induce them to compose their differences. St.

Sophia was deserted by its congregation. It was thought to be polluted

by the service.[16] The Grand Duke Notaras, the second person in the

State after the Emperor, in command of all the forces, was specially

offended. He even went the length of saying in public that he would

rather see the turban of the Turks at Constantinople than the hat of a

cardinal. It resulted that the Greeks were divided into two parties.

Priests refused to give the sacrament to dying men not of their

party. The Churches refused to contribute out of their vast wealth to

necessities of the State. Constantine was seriously embarrassed and

weakened by the division among his people. Of a total population of the

city, reduced as it was, as compared with the past, and estimated at a

hundred thousand, not more than six thousand took up arms in support of

Constantine against the Turks.

The appeals to the Western Powers resulted in a certain, but very

insufficient, number of volunteers from Southern Europe giving their

services to support the Greek cause in its final struggle with the

Moslems. Seven hundred Genoese came under the command of Giustiniani,

an able soldier of fortune, who proved to be the main support of

Constantine. Others had come with Cardinal Isidore, at the instance of

the Pope, and with some small amount of money from the same quarter.

There were Catalans and Aragonese from Spain, but the number of these

recruits from Western Europe did not exceed three thousand. The total

force under the command of Constantine for the defence of the city

amounted to no more than eight thousand. It is strange that there were

no volunteers from France and Germany, or from Hungary and Poland,

from whence so many crusaders had volunteered in previous years to

drive the Turks out of Europe. Nor was there any valid assistance in

men and money from the numerous Greeks in the Levant. The unfortunate

Constantine was not only very deficient in men, but his resources in

money were very low. He had, however, in his service twenty powerful

galleys well manned, and three galleys had come from Venice.

It would seem that the cause of Constantine did not much interest

Europe, and did not even meet with an effective support among the

Greeks themselves.

The city of Constantinople, as it then existed, was situate between

the Golden Horn, its great harbour, and the sea of Marmora. Its land

frontage, distant about nine miles from the entrance to the harbour,

was four miles in length. It was protected by a triple line of

walls, the two inner of which were very massive, flanked by towers

at distances of 170 feet. There was a space of 60 feet between these

walls. The third and outer wall was a crenelated breastwork on the

other side of a fosse, of a width of 60 feet. This powerful line of

defence had been devised by the Emperor Theodosius II about a thousand

years ago and had protected the city in twenty sieges. Before the

invention of cannon it was practically impregnable.[17] There were also

fortifications extending for about nine miles on the side of the Golden

Horn. The eight thousand men were too few even for effective defence

of the four miles of walls, which were to be attacked directly by the

Ottoman army, to say nothing of the fortifications along the side of

the Golden Horn. The defence, however, with these limited means, was a

spirited one. It showed that if the Greek Emperor had been adequately

supported by the Western Powers Mahomet might not have been able to

capture the city.

The siege was commenced by Mahomet on April 6, 1453. Much time had been

occupied in conveying the cannon from Adrianople. There were two very

interesting incidents in the siege which are worth recording. The one

was the breaking of the close blockade of the port by four powerful

and well-manned Genoese galleys, bringing provisions and stores to the

beleaguered city from Chios. They sailed across the Marmora and up the

Bosphorus with a strong breeze in their favour. The Sultan sent against

them a hundred and forty of his fleet of smaller vessels propelled

by oars. They found great difficulty in stemming the heavy sea. The

four larger Genoese vessels came down on the smaller craft, crashing

against them and shivering their oars. Their crews hurled big stones

on the Turkish galleys and emitted against others the inextinguishable

fire of which the Greeks had the secret. The Turkish boats could make

no headway against the superior weight of the bigger vessels. A large

number of them were sunk with serious loss of life. When near to the

entrance of the harbour the wind died off and the Genoese vessels were

in imminent peril, surrounded as they were by the numerous Turkish

craft. But at the last moment an evening breeze sprang up. The Genoese

vessels were able to force their way through. The chain which prevented

ingress to the harbour was lowered, and the relieving vessels were

admitted.

The Sultan had watched the naval battle from the shore. He spurred his

horse some distance into the shallow sea in the hope of animating his

sailors to greater efforts. He was bitterly disappointed at this first

engagement of his new fleet. The next morning he sent for the admiral,

Balta Oghlou, a sturdy Bulgarian by birth, and bitterly reproached him

for his failure. He directed the admiral to be laid on the ground

and held there by four strong men, while he was bastinadoed. Some

historians state that the Sultan himself belaboured the unfortunate

admiral with his mace.

The other incident, growing out of the naval defeat, was that Mahomet,

on finding that his small craft, propelled only by oars, were of little

effect against the powerful vessels at the disposal of the Greeks,

determined to transfer a large number of them from the Bosphorus to the

upper part of the harbour, where the bigger vessels could not engage

them, owing to the shallow depth of water, and where they would be of

use against the inner defence of the city. For this purpose Mahomet

directed the construction of a broad plank road from Tophane, on the

Bosphorus, across the hill intervening between it and the head of the

Golden Horn. This road was well greased with tallow, and the vessels

were dragged up it with windlasses and oxen. The descent on the other

side of the hill was easy enough. The scheme was not quite a novelty,

as an operation of the same kind, though on a smaller scale, had been

attempted elsewhere. It was carried out with striking success; and in

one night eighty of the Turkish galleys were transferred in this way

to the upper harbour. Mahomet also constructed a pontoon bridge across

the harbour, on which batteries were erected. The two schemes together

enabled him to attack the Greek defences along the line of the harbour,

and compelled Constantine to withdraw many men from the defence of the

landward walls, where the main attack was made.

The young Sultan took a most active part in the siege work. He traced

the lines of fourteen batteries from which the walls were bombarded.

The first great cannon was a failure. It burst at the first shot and

blew to pieces the Wallachian who had cast it. It was recast, however,

and two others of the same size were also cast. About two hundred

smaller guns were used. They threw stone balls[18] against the walls

and towers of the city, and ultimately succeeded in effecting a breach.

There can be no doubt that the capture of the city was mainly due

to the provision of these great guns, which were far above anything

previously used against fortresses. The Greeks also used cannons in

defence, but the parapets of the walls were not wide enough to allow of

the recoil of the guns, and where it was possible to use them the walls

suffered from the concussion. Gunpowder was also deficient.

After seven weeks of siege the bombardment effected breaches in the

walls at three points such as to give Mahomet every hope of success in

a final assault. The principal breach was at St. Romanus, where the

outer of the two main walls was practically levelled for a length of

four hundred yards, and four of the flanking towers were destroyed. The

broad ditch was filled in part by the débris of the wall and in part by

fascines. The Sultan decided that the assault should take place on May

29th. This became known to the Greeks in the city, and both sides made

every preparation for a supreme effort.

On the 28th, Mahomet ordered a proclamation to be made to his troops,

to the effect that when the city was captured it would be given up

to them to sack at their will for three days. The Sultan, it said,

had sworn by the everlasting God, by the four thousand prophets, by

Mahomet, and by his own soul that the whole population of the city,

men, women, and children, should be given over to them. This was

received by the troops with tumultuous expressions of delight.

On the same day the Sultan reviewed his army in three divisions, each

of fifty thousand men, and afterwards received in his tent all the

leaders, military and naval. He made a speech to them in which he

announced his intention to make a final assault on the city on the next

day, explained to them the method of attack, and gave his final orders.

He enlarged on his promise to give to the troops the plunder of the

city.

In the city [he said] there was an infinite amount and variety of

wealth of all kinds—treasure in the palaces and private houses,

churches abounding in furniture of silver, gold, and precious stones.

All were to be theirs. There were men of high rank and in great

numbers who could be captured and sold as slaves; there were great

numbers of ladies of noble families, young and beautiful, and a host

of other women who could either be sold or taken into their harems.

There were boys of good family. There were houses and beautiful

gardens. “I give you to-day a grand and populous city, the capital

of the ancient Romans, the very summit of splendour and of glory,

which has become, so to say, the centre of the world. I give it over

to you to pillage, to seize its incalculable treasure of men, women,

and boys, and everything that adorns it. You will henceforward live

in great happiness and leave great wealth to your children. The

great gain to all the sons of Othman would be the conquest of a city

whose fame was great throughout the world. The greater its renown,

the greater would be the glory of taking it by assault. A great city

which had always been their enemy, which had always looked upon

them with a hostile eye, which in every way had sought to destroy

the Turkish power, would come into their possession. The door would

be open to them by its capture to conquer the whole of the Greek

Empire.”[19]

We have quoted this speech of Mahomet as further proof that plunder and

the capture of men, women, and boys for sale or for their harems, and

not religious fanaticism, was the main incentive to Moslem conquest.

The night before the assault was spent by the Turks in rejoicing. Their

camp was illuminated. Very different was the action of the Greeks

on this last day of their Empire. There was a religious procession

through the city, in which every one whose presence was not required in

defence of the walls took part and joined in prayer, imploring God not

to allow them to fall into the hands of the enemy. Eikons and relics

were paraded. At the close of the procession the Emperor Constantine

addressed a gathering of nobles and military leaders. He called

attention to the impending assault. He said:—

It had always been held the duty of a citizen to be ready to die

either for his faith, his country, his sovereign, or his wife and

children. All these incentives to heroic sacrifice were now combined.

The city was the refuge for all Christians, the pride and joy of

every Greek, and of all who lived in Eastern lands. It was the Queen

of Cities, the city which, in happy times, had subdued nearly all the

lands under the sun. The enemy coveted it as his chief prize. He had

provoked the war. He had violated all his engagements in order to

obtain it. He wished to put the citizens under his yoke, to take them

as slaves, to convert the holy churches, where the divine Trinity

was adored and the most holy Godhead worshipped, into shrines for

his blasphemy, and to put the false prophet in the place of Christ.

As brothers and fellow-soldiers it was their duty to fight bravely

in the defence of all that was dear to them, to remember that they

were the descendants of the heroes of ancient Greece and Rome, and

so conduct themselves that their memory should be as fragrant in the

future as that of their ancestors.... For himself, he was determined

to die in its defence.... He and they should put their trust in God,

and not, as did their enemy, in the multitude of his hordes.

In the evening a solemn service was held at St. Sophia, memorable

as the last Christian service before its conversion into a Turkish

mosque. The Emperor and his followers partook of the Sacrament and bade

farewell to the Greek Patriarch. It was a memorable scene—a requiem

service for the Empire which was about to expire. Later the Emperor

paid a last visit to his palace and bade farewell there to its staff.

It was a most touching occasion. One who was present there wrote of

it: “If a man had been made of wood or stone, he must have wept at the

scene.” It is very certain that the Emperor had no hope of saving the

city from capture by its mortal foes.

Very early in the morning of the next fateful day, the 29th May, 1453,

the final assault was delivered by the Turkish army. The scheme of the

Sultan was to attack the walls of the city at many points, from both

land and sea, but to make the main assault on the part of the wall

which had been so much injured by the cannon in the Lycus Valley, near

the gate of St. Romanus, and then, by successive waves of his vastly

greater army, to overwhelm the defenders, using first his inferior

troops, and reserving his best for the last attack, when the enemy

would be wearied by long fighting. The first assault was made by an

immense horde of irregulars, armed with bows and arrows, and with

slings throwing stones and iron balls. Gunpowder, though already used

for cannon, was not yet applied to muskets. The men advanced with

scaling-ladders for the assault, and a cloud of arrows darkened the

sky. No more than two thousand Greeks could be spared to defend this

part of the long line of fortifications. They were collected in the

_peribolus_ between the two walls. The gates in the inner wall were

closed, so that these men had no opportunity of shirking the defence

and retreating into the city. They had to fight for their very lives

between the two walls.

The Sultan directed the great cannon to be brought to the edge of

the fosse, and a shot from it broke down the stockade which had been

erected in place of the outer wall. Under cover of the dust the Turks

made the assault. They were bravely met by the defenders, and were

driven back with heavy loss. A second assault was then made by the

Anatolian infantry, a very superior force to the irregulars. But they

were no more successful. The Sultan, thinking that the Greeks must be

exhausted by these two assaults, then personally led a third great

body of men to a third assault. It consisted of his Janissaries. He

led them to the edge of the fosse, and thence directed their attack.

The cannon was used again against the stockade, and again under cover

of the dust caused by it the Janissaries made their assault. Some of

them succeeded in getting over the stockade, and a hand-to-hand fight

occurred between them and the Greeks. The defenders seemed to have

the best of it. But at this crisis a grave misfortune occurred to the

Greeks. Giustiniani, who commanded them, was severely wounded. Blood

flowed freely from his wounds. He decided to leave the field of battle

and return to his ship in the harbour, for medical relief. The Emperor

Constantine, who was near by, in vain implored him to remain, pointing

out to him the damaging effect his departure would have on the soldiers

who remained. Others thought that the wounds were not very serious

and that the general was not justified in leaving the field. But he

insisted on doing so, and demanded the key of the gate in the inner

wall. With him departed some of his Genoese soldiers. This defection

caused dismay and depression among the troops. Their resistance to the

Turks slackened.

Some Greek historians accuse Giustiniani of cowardice in deserting the

battle at so critical a moment, and Gibbon lends the weight of his

great authority to this. The reputation, however, of the famous Italian

soldier has been vindicated by later historians, such as Mr. Finlay and

Sir Edwin Pears. They have shown that Giustiniani died of his wounds

within a few days of the capture of Constantinople, the best proof

of their serious and fatal character. All the same, he may not have

sufficiently appreciated the effect of his withdrawal on the soldiers.

It might have been better to have died there rather than on board his

ship. However that might have been, all are agreed that the departure

of the general was the turning-point of the day, and that it had the

worst effect on the soldiers engaged in the defence.

The Emperor did his utmost to retrieve the position. He took upon

himself the charge vacated by Giustiniani, and led the defence.

Mahomet, on his part, had observed from the other side of the fosse

the slackening of the defence. He called out to the Janissaries: “We

have the city! It is ours! The wall is undefended!” He urged them to a

final effort. They rushed the stockade and effected an entry into the

_peribolus_. Soon great swarms of others followed, and overwhelmed the

defenders with their vast numbers. The Emperor, despairing of success,

threw aside his imperial mantle. He called out, “The city is taken and

I am still alive!” Drawing his sword, he threw himself into the mêlée.

He died fighting gloriously for his city and his Empire. His body was

never found, though search was made for it by order of the Sultan.

The Greek and Italian soldiers in the _peribolus_ were now completely

outnumbered. There was no exit through the inner wall by which they

could escape. They were in a trap between the two walls. They were

massacred to a man. The Janissaries, having effected this, found no

difficulty in making their way through the inner wall, which, as we

have explained, was not defended owing to the want of men.

All attacks on other parts of the city were failures. This one alone

succeeded. Victory here was due in part to the good generalship

of Mahomet and to his indomitable persistency, and in part to the

ill-fortune of the Greeks in the withdrawal of Giustiniani at the

critical moment of the defence. The defenders of the city had nobly

performed their duty. Their numbers were quite insufficient. They had

received no adequate support from Western Europe, or even from the

neighbouring Christian States. It is quite certain that a few thousand

more soldiers would have saved the city. Thirty galleys sent by the

Pope with reinforcements were on their way when the city fell. They had

been detained at Scio by adverse wind. “Auxilium deus ipse negavit,”

says the Greek historian.

When the Turks entered the city they began to massacre all the persons

they met in the streets, without distinction of age or sex. But there

was practically no resistance. There were no armed men left in the

city. The population was cowed and panic-stricken, as well they might

be in face of the overwhelming misfortune which now came upon them.

After a short period of massacre the Turks turned their attention to

the more practical business of looting and taking captives for sale.

They effected this in a deliberate and systematic way. One great

band of soldiers devoted themselves to plundering the palaces of the

wealthy, another to the churches, and a third to the shops and smaller

houses. Everything of value was gathered together for subsequent

division among the soldiers. Of the inmates of the palaces and houses

the older people were put to death; the stronger and younger of both

sexes were carried off in bands as prisoners, bound together with

ropes, with a view to ultimate sale as slaves.

The Turkish historian, Seadeddin, in words which seem to smack of

pleasure at the scene, says:—

Having received permission to loot, the soldiers thronged into the

city with joyous hearts, and there, seizing the possessors and their

families, they made the wretched unbelievers weep. They acted in

accordance with the precept, “Slaughter their aged and capture their

youth.”[20]

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