----------------------------------------------------------------
Transcriber’s note:
Some of the unusual Latin transliterations of Turkish names from
Arabic-Persian Alphabet used by the Ottomans have been corrected
to be closer to the modern spellings of these names.
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THE TURKISH EMPIRE
ITS GROWTH AND DECAY
_BY THE SAME AUTHOR_
Demy 8vo, cloth, +7s. 6d.+ net.
WITH 4 MAPS AND 8 ILLUSTRATIONS.
The Partitions of Poland
(Second Edition)
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with his usual precision and compression, but adding the special charm
of a delightfully fresh, sustained, and vivid handling.”
+_Westminster Gazette._+
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characteristics of Lord Eversley’s study of the sufferings and wrongs
of Poland during the last 150 years.... It was always Lord Eversley’s
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an assiduous determination to get back to facts, and this volume is a
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LONDON: T. FISHER UNWIN LTD.
[Illustration]
[Illustration: MAHOMET THE CONQUEROR
From a medallion in the British Museum attributed to the Italian artist
Gentile Bellini, who was invited by Mahomet to Constantinople, in 1480,
and painted a portrait of him.
The portrait is in the Layard Collection.]
THE TURKISH
EMPIRE
ITS GROWTH AND DECAY
BY
LORD EVERSLEY
Author of “The Partitions of Poland,” “Peel and O’Connell”,
“Gladstone and Ireland”
WITH A FRONTISPIECE
AND THREE MAPS
LONDON
T. FISHER UNWIN LTD.
ADELPHI TERRACE
_First published in 1917_
_Second Impression 1918_
(_All rights reserved_)
PREFACE
THE favour with which, two years ago, my book on _The Partitions
of Poland_ was received by the public has induced me to devote the
interval to a study of the history of another State which, in modern
times, has almost disappeared from the map of Europe—namely Turkey.
The subject is one in which I have for many years past taken great
interest. In the course of a long life, I have witnessed the greater
part of the events which have resulted in the loss to that State of
all its Christian provinces in Europe and all its Moslem provinces in
Africa, leaving to it only its capital and a small part of Thrace in
Europe, and its still wide possessions in Asia.
So long ago, also, as in 1855 and 1857, I spent some time at
Constantinople and travelled in Bulgaria and Greece, and was able
to appreciate the effects of Turkish rule. As a result, I gave a
full support, in 1876, to Mr. Gladstone in his efforts to secure
the independence of Bulgaria, and in 1879 was an active member of a
committee, presided over by Lord Rosebery, which had for its object
the extension of the kingdom of Greece so as to include the provinces
inhabited by Greeks still suffering under Turkish rule.
In 1887 and 1890 I again visited the East and travelled over the same
ground as thirty years earlier, and was able to observe the immense
improvements which had been effected in the provinces that had gained
independence, and how little change had taken place at Constantinople.
In view of these experiences and of the further great changes portended
in Turkey after the conclusion of the present great war, I have
thought it may be of use to tell, in a compact and popular form, the
story of the growth and decay of the Turkish Empire.
History may well be told at many different lengths and from different
points of view. That of the Ottoman Empire, from the accession of
Othman in 1288 to the treaty of Kainardji in 1774, which secured to
Russia a virtual protectorate in favour of the Christian subjects of
Turkey, has been told at its greatest length by the German professor,
Von Hammer, in eighteen volumes. He is the only historian who has
explored for this long period both Greek and Turkish annals.
The British historian, Knolles, writing in 1610, told the story of the
growth of the Turkish Empire in two bulky folio volumes, much admired
by two such different authorities as Dr. Johnson and Lord Byron. The
work is based on a few only of the Greek annals. It is very discursive
and imperfect, but it contains many most terse and striking passages.
Gibbon, the historian of the Roman Empire, and Sir Edwin Pears, in his
most interesting book on the Destruction of the Greek Empire, have also
relied on Greek authorities up to the capture of Constantinople by the
Turks in 1453, before which date there were no Turkish historians. Very
recently, in 1916, Mr. Herbert Gibbons, of the Princeton University,
published a very valuable work on the foundations of the Ottoman
Empire, dealing with its first four great Sultans. He has again
examined with very great care the numerous and conflicting early Greek
authorities, and has thrown much new light on the subject.
Other historians of Turkey, writing in English and French, such as
Creasy, Lane Poole, La Jonquière, and Halil Ganem (a Young Turk), have
drawn their facts mainly from Von Hammer’s great work. Their books are
all of interest and value. But these writers, and especially Sir Edward
Creasy, in his otherwise admirable _History of the Ottoman Empire_,
written at the time of the Crimean War, to which I have been much
indebted, took what would now be considered too favourable a view of
Turkish rule in modern times, and were over sanguine, as events have
shown, as to the maintenance and regeneration of the Empire. I have
followed their example in basing my narrative mainly on Von Hammer’s
work, correcting it in some important respects from the other sources
I have named, compressing it into much smaller compass than they have
done, treating it from a somewhat different point of view, and bringing
it down to the commencement of the present great war in 1914.
It would have been easier to tell the story at double the length, so
as to include much other important and interesting matter, but, in
such a case, the lesson to be drawn from it would have been obscured by
the maze of detail. My book does not aim at a full history of the long
period dealt with. I have proposed only to explain the process by which
the Turkish Empire was aggregated by its first ten great Sultans, and
has since been, in great part, dismembered under their twenty-five
degenerate successors, and to assign causes for these two great
historic movements.
I will only add that I commenced my recent studies under the
impressions derived in part from some of the histories to which I
have referred and with which I was familiar, and in part from the
common tradition in Western Europe—dating probably from the time of
the Crusaders—that the Turkish invasions and conquests in Europe
were impelled by religious zeal and fervour and by the desire to
spread Islam. I have ended them with the conviction that there was no
missionary zeal whatever for Islam in the Turkish armies and their
leaders who invaded Europe, and that their main incentive was the hope
of plunder by the sack of cities, the sale of captives as slaves or
for harems, and the confiscation of land and its distribution among
soldiers as a reward for bravery. I have also concluded that the decay
of the military spirit and the shrinkage of Empire was largely due to
the absence of these motives and rewards when the Turks were on the
defensive.
If I have expressed my views freely on this subject, and on the misrule
of the Turks in modern times, I have endeavoured to state the facts on
which they are based with perfect fairness as between the Crescent and
the Cross.
I have purposely refrained from expressing an opinion as to the future
of Turkey, after the conclusion of the existing great war. The problems
which will then have to be solved are of a different order to those of
the past which have been dealt with in this book. The Turkish Empire,
in the sense of the rule of an alien race over subject races, has
practically ceased to exist in Europe. It survives in Asia and at its
capital, Constantinople, under very different conditions.
With respect to the numerous works I have consulted for the latter part
of my book, I desire specially to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr.
Lane Poole’s admirable _Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe_.
I have to thank Lord Bryce, Lord Fitzmaurice, and Sir Edwin Pears for
their valuable suggestions, and Lady Byles and Mr. Laurence Chubb for
their kind help.
E.
_June 1, 1917._
CONTENTS
_PART I_
THE GROWTH OF EMPIRE
PAGE
I. OTHMAN (1288-1326) 13
II. ORCHAN (1326-59) 20
III. MURAD I (1359-89) 31
IV. BAYEZID I (1389-1403) 44
V. MAHOMET I (1413-21) 59
VI. MURAD II (1421-51) 64
VII. MAHOMET II, ‘THE CONQUEROR’ (1451-81) 73
VIII. BAYEZID II (1481-1512) 98
IX. SELIM I (1512-20) 103
X. SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT (1520-66) 114
XI. GRAND VIZIER SOKOLLI (1566-78) 136
_PART II_
THE DECAY OF EMPIRE
XII. THE RULE OF SULTANAS (1578-1656) 151
XIII. THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS (1656-1702) 168
XIV. TO THE TREATY OF PASSAROWITCH (1702-18) 191
XV. TO THE TREATY OF BELGRADE (1718-39) 203
XVI. TO THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI (1739-74) 211
XVII. TO THE TREATY OF JASSY (1774-92) 223
XVIII. TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST (1792-1812) 238
XIX. MAHMOUD II (1808-39) 255
XX. THE RULE OF ELCHIS (1839-76) 287
XXI. ABDUL HAMID II (1876-1909) 316
XXII. THE YOUNG TURKS (1909-14) 352
XXIII. A RETROSPECT 369
APPENDIX—GENEALOGY OF THE OTTOMAN SULTANS 382
INDEX 385
LIST OF MAPS
1. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST
ENTRY OF THE OTTOMANS IN 1353 _Facing page_ 31
2. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT THE TIME OF ITS GREATEST
EXTENT _Facing page_ 148
3. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AND ASIA MINOR IN 1914 _Facing page_ 369
_PART I_
THE GROWTH OF EMPIRE
OTHMAN
1288-1326
TOWARDS the middle of the thirteenth century a small band or tribe
of nomad Turks migrated from Khorassan, in Central Asia, into Asia
Minor. They were part of a much larger body, variously estimated at
from two to four thousand horsemen, who, with their families, had fled
from their homes in Khorassan under Solyman Shah. They had been driven
thence by an invading horde of Mongols from farther east. They hoped
to find asylum in Asia Minor. They crossed into Armenia and spent some
years in the neighbourhood of Erzerum, plundering the natives there.
When the wave of Mongols had spent its force, they proposed to return
to Khorassan. On reaching the Euphrates River Solyman, when trying, on
horseback, to find a ford, was carried away by the current and drowned.
This was reckoned as a bad omen by many of his followers. Two of his
sons, with a majority of them, either returned to Central Asia or
dispersed on the way there.
Two other sons, Ertoghrul and Dundar, with four hundred and twenty
families, retraced their course, and after spending some time again
near Erzerum, wandered westward into Asia Minor. They came into a
country inhabited by a kindred race. Successive waves of Turks from
the same district in Central Asia, in the course of the three previous
centuries, had made their way into Asia Minor, and had taken forcible
possession of the greater part of it. They formed there an Empire,
known as that of the Seljukian Turks, with Konia, the ancient Iconium,
as its capital. But this Empire, by the middle of the thirteenth
century, was in a decadent condition. It was eventually broken up,
in part, by assaults of a fresh swarm of invaders from Central Asia;
and in part by internal civil strife, fomented by family disputes of
succession.
When Ertoghrul’s band appeared on the scene, Sultan Alaeddin ruled
at Konia over what remained to him of the Seljukian State. Other
remnants of it survived under independent Emirs at Karamania, Sarukhan,
Mentsche, and numerous other smaller States. Between them they
possessed nearly the whole of Asia Minor, with the exception of a few
cities in its north-west, such as Brusa, Nicæa, and Nicomedia and the
districts round them, and a belt of territory along the Bosphorus, the
Sea of Marmora, and the Hellespont, to which the Byzantine Emperors,
formerly the owners of nearly the whole of Anatolia, were now reduced.
Two small Christian States also still existed there—Trebizond, in the
north-east, and Little Armenia, in Cilicia, in the south-east. Though
divided among many independent Emirs, the people of Asia Minor, with
the exception of the Greeks and Armenians, were fairly welded together.
The invading Turks had intermixed with the native population, imposing
on them the Turkish language, and had themselves adopted the religion
of Islam. Ertoghrul and his nomad tribe, before entering this country,
were not Moslems, but they were not strangers in language. Whatever
their religion, it was held lightly. They were converted to Islam after
a short stay in the country and, as is often the case with neophytes,
became ardent professors of their new faith.
The oft-told story of the first exploit of Ertoghrul and his four
hundred and twenty horsemen, on coming into the country of the Seljuks,
as handed down by tradition, though savouring somewhat of a myth, is
as follows: They came unexpectedly upon a battle in which one side was
much pressed. They knew nothing of the combatants. Ertoghrul spoke to
his followers: “Friends, we come straight on a battle. We carry swords
at our side. To flee like women and resume our journey is not manly. We
must help one of the two. Shall we aid those who are winning or those
who are losing?” Then they said unto him: “It will be difficult to aid
the losers. Our people are weak in number and the victors are strong!”
Ertoghrul replied: “This is not the speech of bold men. The manly part
is to aid the vanquished.” Thereupon the whole body of them fell upon
the Mongols, who were the winning side, and drove them into flight.
The side to which they brought aid and victory proved to be that of
Sultan Alaeddin of Konia. In return for this providential aid, Sultan
Alaeddin made a grant of territory to Ertoghrul to be held as a fief
under the Seljuks. It consisted of a district at Sugut, about sixty
miles south-east of Brusa, and a part of the mountain range to the west
of it.
Ertoghrul and his horsemen were a welcome support to Alaeddin’s waning
fortunes. In a later encounter with a small Byzantine force they
came off victorious, and Alaeddin made a further addition to their
territory on the borders of his own, over which he had a very nominal
sovereignty. Thenceforth Ertoghrul lived an uneventful pastoral life
as the head of his clan or tribe of Turks in the ceded territory, till
his death in 1288, nearly fifty years from the date of his leaving
Khorassan. His son, Othman, who was born at Sugut in 1258, was chosen
by the clan to succeed him, and soon commenced a much more ambitious
career than that of his father. When of the age of only sixteen he had
fallen in love with the beautiful daughter of Sheik Idebali, a holy man
of great repute in Karamania. It is evidence of the small account then
held of Ertoghrul and his son that the Sheik did not think the marriage
good enough for his daughter. It was only after a long and patient
wooing by Othman, and as the result of a dream, which foretold a great
future of empire for his progeny, that Idebali gave consent to the
marriage.
There were no contemporary Turkish histories of the early Ottoman
Sultans. It was not till many years after the capture of Constantinople
in 1453 that Turkish historians wrote about the birth of their State.
They had to rely upon traditions, which must be accepted with much
reserve. This, however, is certain, that Othman, in his thirty-eight
years of leadership, increased his dominion from its very narrow limits
at Sugut and Eski-Sheir to a territory extending thence northward to
the Bosphorus and Black Sea, a distance of about a hundred and twenty
miles by an average breadth of sixty miles, an area of about seven
thousand square miles. There are no means of estimating its population.
It was probably sparse, except on the coast of the Marmora and Black
Sea. It included only one important city, Brusa, which was surrendered
by its garrison and citizens shortly before the death of Othman
in 1326, after being hemmed in and cut off from communication with
Constantinople for many years. Considerable as these additions were,
the nascent State could not even yet be considered as important in
size. It was exceeded by several of the larger Turkish Emirates in Asia
Minor, such as Karamania, Sarukhan, and others.
It is notable that Othman, from the outset of his career, devoted his
efforts, not against the Turkish Moslem States lying to the south and
west of him, but against the territory to the north in possession
of the Byzantine Empire, or which had recently been more or less
emancipated from it, and inhabited chiefly by Christians. It is to be
inferred from this that the motive of Othman was partly a religious
one, to extend Islam. This was not effected by any signal victories
over the armies of the Greek Empire. There was only one recorded battle
against any army of the Emperor, that at Baphœon, near Nicomedia, where
Othman, who by this time reckoned four thousand horsemen among his
followers, defeated the inconsiderable body of two thousand Byzantine
troops. In the following year, 1302, the Greek Emperor, Michael
Palæologus, alarmed at the progress of Othman, crossed in person into
Asia Minor at the head of a small army of mercenary Slavs. But he
brought no money with him to pay his soldiers. They would not fight
without pay. They dispersed, and Michael was obliged to return to his
capital. This was his last attempt to defend his remaining territory in
that district. He was hard pressed in other directions by other Turkish
Emirs in Asia Minor, and in the first decade of the fourteenth century
the Greek Empire lost all its possessions in the islands of the Ægean
Sea.
The extensions of territory by Othman, during his long reign of
thirty-eight years, were effected by a slow process of attrition, by
capturing from time to time petty fortresses and castles and annexing
the districts round them. He acted in this respect, in the earlier
stages, as fief of the Seljuk State; but later, when that Empire came
to an end, Othman declared his independence, and thenceforth his
accretions of territory were on his own behalf. It would seem that, as
these additions were made, their populations, or the greater part of
them who were Christians, adopted Islam, not under compulsion—for there
is no record of the massacre of captives or of the sale of them as
slaves—but because they were abandoned by their natural protectors,
the Greeks of Constantinople. The important fact, clearly shown by
Mr. Gibbons in his recent work, is that the new State thus created by
Othman did not consist purely of Turks. It had a very large mixture of
Greeks and Slavs, who were welded with Turks by the religion of Islam.
They were, from an early period, very distinct from the people of other
Turkish States. They called themselves Osmanlis. The term ‘Turk’ was
used by them rather as a term of contempt for an inferior people, as
compared with themselves. It was only in later years, when the other
Turkish States of Asia Minor were incorporated in the Empire, that
the term ‘Turk’ was applied to its people, in the first instance by
outsiders, and eventually by themselves.
To Othman, therefore, is due the credit of this inception of a new
State and a new and distinct people. He did not, however, assume the
title of Sultan. He was simply an Emir, like so many other rulers of
petty States in Asia Minor. He was not a great general. He had no
opportunity of conducting a great campaign. He was a brave soldier
and a sagacious leader, who inspired confidence and trust in his
followers and subjects. He pursued with great persistency the policy of
enlarging his domain. He was also a wise and capable administrator, and
was assisted in this by his father-in-law, Idebali, who acted as his
Vizier. He meted out equal justice to all his subjects, irrespective
of race and religion. He was simple and unostentatious in his habits.
There is no record of his having more than one wife or more than two
sons. He did not amass wealth. He divided the loot of war equally among
his soldiers, setting apart a portion for the poor and orphans.
Othman had a vein of cruelty in his character, as had so many of his
descendants, the Ottoman Sultans. When, on one occasion, he propounded
to his war council a scheme of further aggression on his neighbours,
his uncle, Dundar, a nonagenarian, who had been companion in arms
to Ertoghrul, ventured to raise objection to the policy of further
extension. Othman, instead of arguing the question with him, took up
his cross-bow and shot his uncle dead on the spot, and in this way
closured the discussion and put down, at the outset, opposition in the
council.
Von Hammer, in relating this story, says:—
This murder of the uncle marks with terror the commencement of the
Ottoman dominion, as the brother’s murder did that of Rome, only
the former rests on better historical evidence. Idris (the Turkish
historian), who, at the beginning of his work, declares that,
passing over in silence all that is reprehensible, he will only hand
down to posterity the glorious deeds of the royal race of Othman,
relates, among the latter, the murder of Dundar. If then such a
murderous slaughter of a relative be reckoned by the panegyrists of
the Osmanlis among their praiseworthy acts, what are we to think of
those which cannot be praised and of which their history therefore is
silent?[1]
We must judge of Othman, however, not by the standard of the present
time, but by that of his contemporaries. By that standard he was
reckoned a humane and merciful sovereign. This view is expressed in the
prayer which has been used in the religious ceremony, on the accession
of every one of his successors to the throne, when he is girt with the
double-edged sword of the founder of the Empire, “May he be as good as
Othman.”
In his old age, when Othman was incapable of taking the field himself,
his son, Orchan, took his place as the leader of the army, and just
before the death of Othman, Brusa surrendered to him. It was then, as
now, one of the most important cities in Asia Minor.
When Othman was on his deathbed, after a reign of thirty-eight years,
his son Orchan, in terms of affection and lamentation, addressed
him: “Oh, Othman! Thou fountain of Emperors, Lord of the World, Thou
conqueror and subduer of Nations.” The dying king replied:—
Lament not, oh my sons: delight! for this my last conflict is the
lot of all human kind, common to young and old, who equally breathe
the air of this malignant world. Whilst I now pass to immortality,
live thou glorious, prosperous, and happy. Since I have thee for
successor, I have no cause to grieve at my departure. I will
give thee my last instructions, to which be attentive. Bury the
cares of life in oblivion. I conjure thee, crowned with felicity,
lean not to tyranny, nor so much as look towards cruelty. On the
contrary, cultivate justice and thereby embellish the earth. Rejoice
my departed soul with a beautiful series of victories, and when
thou art become conqueror of the world, propagate religion by thy
arms. Promote the learned to honour, so the divine law shall be
established, and in what place soever thou hearest a learned man,
let honour, magnificence, and clemency attend him. Glory not in thy
armies, nor pride thyself in thy riches. Keep near thy person the
learned in the law, and, as justice is the support of kingdoms, turn
from everything repugnant thereto. The Divine law is our sole arm,
and our progress is only in the paths of the Lord. Embark not in vain
undertakings or fruitless contentions. For it is not our ambition to
enjoy the empire of the world, but the propagation of the faith was
my peculiar desire, which therefore it becomes thee to accomplish.
Study to be impartially gracious to all, and take care to discharge
the public duties of thy office, for a king not distinguished by
goodness belies the name of a king. Let the protection of thy
subjects be thy constant study, so shalt thou find favour and
protection from God.[2]
It is probable that much of this was the invention of some historian,
writing many years later. It may be taken, however, as a summary, based
on tradition, of the principles which had actuated the dying chief
during his long reign.
Othman died shortly after receiving the welcome news of the surrender
of Brusa, and by his last wish was buried there. He was the progenitor
of a royal race who, for nine more generations, continued the career
of conquest which he inaugurated, till the Empire, in the middle of
the sixteenth century, two hundred and seventy-eight years from the
accession of Othman, under Solyman the Magnificent, the greatest of his
race, reached its zenith. It was only after ten generations of great
Sultans that the race seemed to be exhausted, and thenceforth, with
rare exceptions, produced none but degenerates down to the present
time.
II
ORCHAN
1326-59
OTHMAN, on his deathbed, designated as his successor the younger of his
two sons, Orchan, aged forty-two, who had been brought up as a soldier
under his father’s eye, and had shown capacity in many campaigns, and
especially in that resulting in the surrender of Brusa. Alaeddin, the
elder brother, was not a soldier. He had led a studious life, devoted
to religion and law, both founded on the Koran, under the guidance of
Idebali.
The Turkish historians agree in stating that Orchan was most unwilling
to act on his father’s wishes and take precedence over his elder
brother, and that he proposed to divide the heritage of state between
them, but that Alaeddin declined the offer. Orchan is then reported
to have said: “Since, my brother, thou wilt not take the flocks and
herds which I offer thee, be the shepherd of my people. Be my Vizier.”
Alaeddin agreed to this, and devoted himself to the administration of
the growing State and to the organization of the army, under the rule
of his brother.[3]
Orchan followed closely the example of his father. He pursued the same
method of slow, but sure and persistent, aggrandizement of his State.
It will be seen that he succeeded in adding to it a territory nearly
three times greater than that which he inherited. Two-thirds of this
were in the north-west corner of Asia Minor, along the shore of the
Marmora and the Dardanelles, and the remaining third in Europe, where
he was the first to make a lodgment for the Ottomans. He made Brusa his
capital, and there, after a time, he assumed the title of Sultan. He
coined money with the inscription, “May God cause to endure the Empire
of Orchan, son of Othman.” The phrase must be taken rather as a measure
of his ambition than as a description of his existing State, for it was
then inferior in size to several of the Turkish Emirates in Asia Minor
and to most of the Balkan States. Orchan led a most active and simple
life. He was always on the move. When not in the field with his troops,
he spent his time in visiting his many petty strongholds, seldom
remaining more than a month in any one of them.
The immediate objects of Orchan’s ambition, on his accession, were the
Greek cities of Nicæa and Nicomedia, with their surrounding districts,
the last important possessions of the Byzantine Empire in Asia. Nicæa
was then a great city. It had attained greater importance during the
sixty years when the Latins were in occupation of Constantinople and
the Greek Emperors were relegated to Asia and made it their capital.
It was well fortified. It could only be captured, as Brusa had been,
by cutting off its communications with Constantinople, and depriving
its people of the means of subsistence. The Greek Emperor, Andronicus
III, made an effort to relieve it. He hastily raised an army of
mercenaries, in 1326, and led them across the Bosphorus. He fought a
battle against Orchan at Pelecanon, on the north shore of the Gulf of
Nicomedia. According to the Greek historians, the Ottomans had much
the worst of it, losing a great number of men, while the losses of the
Greeks were trivial. However that may have been, Andronicus decided on
a retreat. But a scrimmage occurred in the night between his bodyguard
and the enemy, in which the Emperor himself was slightly wounded. He
thereupon fled precipitately, and was conveyed in a litter to the
Bosphorus and thence to Constantinople. His army, dispirited by this
abandonment by their Emperor, was defeated and dispersed. As a result,
Nicæa surrendered in the following year, 1327, on favourable terms. The
majority of its garrison and citizens followed the example of those of
Brusa and adopted Islam. Very few availed themselves of the offer to
transfer themselves to Europe. This ill-starred campaign and cowardly
flight of Andronicus was the last effort of the Byzantine Emperors to
save their possessions in Asia. What remained of them, chiefly the city
of Nicomedia, were left to their own resources, without further aid
from Europe. Nicomedia was well fortified and was apparently a tough
job for the Ottomans, for it held out till 1337, or possibly 1338, and
eventually surrendered in the same way, and on the same terms, as Brusa
and Nicæa.
In the interval of ten years between the capture of Nicæa and
Nicomedia, Orchan was further engaged in extending his State
elsewhere in Asia, not towards Angora, in the south, as stated by
some historians, but to the north-west, in the ancient Mysia, by the
conquest of the Emirate of Karasi, which lay immediately to the north
of Sarukhan and with a frontage to the sea opposite to the island of
Mytilene. The Emir of this State died in 1333. His two sons disputed
the succession. The younger one was favoured by the Ottomans, and when
he was put to death by his brother, Orchan sent an army ostensibly to
avenge him. The Emir was driven into exile and his State was promptly
annexed by Orchan. The same fate befell some other petty Emirates
on the southern borders of the Marmora and the Hellespont, rounding
off the boundary of the Ottoman State in the north-west corner of
Anatolia. The population of Karasi and the smaller States was mainly
Turkish, but there must have been many Greeks on the coast who probably
adopted Islam, as had the majority of the Greeks of Brusa and Nicæa.
After these acquisitions, and that of Nicomedia in 1338, there were no
further additions to the Ottoman State in Asia Minor during Orchan’s
reign.
There followed, after the capture of Nicomedia, a few years of peace,
and it may well be that, during this time, Orchan completed the scheme
for the organization of his State and his army. Hitherto, when Othman
and Orchan were involved in disputes with their neighbours, and it was
necessary to use armed force in resistance or attack, an appeal was
made for the voluntary service of all the male members of their petty
State or clan capable of bearing arms; and the appeal was responded to
without question. When the occasion for their service was at an end,
the warriors returned to their homes and to their usual vocations. With
a rapidly expanding territory and with great ambitions for further
conquests, it was evidently thought necessary to constitute a permanent
and well-disciplined force, and Orchan, whether adopting, or not,
the plans of his brother Alaeddin, determined to effect this. On the
one hand, he enrolled a considerable body of infantry for continuous
service. They were subject to strict discipline and were well paid,
and it will be seen that they could be sent beyond the realm to assist
the Greek Emperor or otherwise.[4] On the other hand, a large body
of horsemen was provided, not under continuous service, but under
obligatory service, when occasion arose for calling them out.
For this purpose the country districts were divided into fiefs, the
holders of which were bound to serve in the event of war, and to
come provided with horses and equipment, or to find substitutes in
proportion to the extent of their fiefs. It was, in fact, the adoption
of the feudal system, then almost universal in Europe, with this marked
difference, that the fiefs were small in extent and were not, as a
rule, hereditary. They were given for life as rewards for military
service, and on the death of their holders were granted to other
soldiers, though in some cases hereditary claims were recognized. When
new territories were acquired by conquest from non-Moslems, large parts
of them were divided into new fiefs, and were granted to the soldiers
who had distinguished themselves in the war. Military service, whether
in the new infantry or in the feudal cavalry, was strictly confined to
Moslems. Christians, who were thus exempted from military duty, were
subjected to a heavy capitation tax from which Moslems were free.
This new organization of the army, commenced by Orchan and extended
and perfected by his son Murad, who also, it will be seen, created the
famous corps of Janissaries, converted the nascent Ottoman State into
a most powerful engine for war, and gave an immense impetus to the
conquest of non-Moslem countries. Most splendid rewards were held out
to the Moslem soldiers for victory and bravery. In the event of victory
they benefited not only from the ordinary booty in money and chattels,
on the sack of cities and the pillage of country districts. They also
received as their share four-fifths of the proceeds of the sale of
captives as slaves, the other fifth being reserved as the share of
the Sultan. The captives were not only the enemies’ soldiers taken in
battle, but in many cases the inhabitants of the conquered districts.
The strong and the young of both sexes were carried off and were sold,
the men as slaves, the fairer women for wives or concubines, or for
harems. The soldiers further received, as has been shown above, a large
share of the confiscated lands to be held as military fiefs in reward
for bravery in battle. As these fiefs were granted for life only, there
was a further distribution among the soldiers of the fiefs held by
their comrades who were killed in battle, and often, it is said, the
same fiefs changed hands many times in the course of a campaign.
The Moslem inhabitants of a conquered territory were not sold off as
slaves, nor were their lands confiscated. These measures were reserved
for Christians or non-Moslems. In some cases the Christians were
given the option of embracing Islam in order to avoid slavery and the
confiscation of their land. But these exceptions were rare in the
conquests in Europe, and it is obvious that, to whatever extent they
took place, the rewards obtained by the soldiers were reduced.
It has been shown that hitherto in the Ottoman conquests in Asia Minor
at the expense of the Byzantine Empire a great proportion of the
Christian population embraced Islam; and it may well have been that
the spread of Islam and the conversion of infidels to the true faith
were in part the incentives for the expansion of the Ottoman Empire.
But henceforth, after the organization of the army by Orchan and Murad
and the great rewards held out to the soldiers for the conquest of
non-Moslem territories, it does not appear that the Ottoman armies were
inspired by any missionary zeal for the spread of Islam. The main, if
not the sole motives, were loot and plunder, the sale of captives as
slaves, and the confiscation of land and its distribution among the
soldiers as fiefs; and these objects were attained to a far greater
extent by the invasion of Christian States in Europe than by the
extension of the Empire over Moslem countries in Asia.
In the year 1354 Orchan, after completing the organization of his
army, turned his attention for the first time to Europe. Thenceforth,
till his death in 1359, his restless ambition was directed against the
Byzantine Empire. Advancing age prevented his taking the field himself
at the head of his army. But his eldest son, Solyman, who had all the
great qualities of his race, and who was the idol of the army, took his
place in command of the invading forces.
It may be well to point out here that, at this time, the middle of
the fourteenth century, the Byzantine Empire was already reduced to
very insignificant proportions, compared to its ancient grandeur.
The territories subject to it, which for centuries had extended to
the Danube in Europe, and in Asia over Anatolia and Syria, had been
already greatly diminished when the leaders of the fourth Crusade, in
1204, in one of the most disgraceful episodes in history, turned aside
from their avowed object of attacking the Moslems in Palestine and, in
lieu thereof, attacked and captured Constantinople, and compelled the
Byzantine Emperor to transfer the seat of his government to Nicæa, in
Asia Minor. There followed the brief period of the Latin Empire. But in
1261 the Byzantine Greeks reconquered Constantinople, and the ephemeral
Latin Empire disappeared from history. The Byzantines were then able to
recover a small part only of their old dominions in Europe and Asia. At
the time when Orchan, who had driven them from Asia, decided to attack
them in Europe, they held there no more than Thrace with Adrianople,
a part of Macedonia with Salonika, and the greater part of the Morea
in Greece. To the north of them Serbia, under Stephen Dushan, the most
eminent of its rulers, had asserted supremacy over the greater half
of the Balkan peninsula, was threatening Salonika, and had ambition
to possess himself of Constantinople. Bulgaria, though it had lost
territory to Serbia, still possessed the smaller half of the Balkans.
The Republics of Venice and Genoa owned many commercial ports and
islands in the Ægean Sea and Adriatic, and were madly jealous of one
another. The position was such as to afford a favourable opportunity
to new invaders like the Ottomans, for there was no probability of a
combination among these Christian communities to resist them.
The story of the first entry of the Ottomans into Europe, as told by
the early Turkish historians and adopted by Von Hammer and others,
is shortly this. In the year 1356 Solyman, the son of Orchan, at the
head of a small body of Ottoman troops, variously estimated at from
seventy-five to three hundred, under the inspiration of a dream,
stealthily crept, it is said, across the Hellespont in boats, and
succeeded in surprising and overcoming the Greek garrison of the
small fortress of Tzympe, on the European side of the Straits, and
having thus gained possession of it, increased the invading force to
three thousand. Mr. Gibbons, on the other hand, has unravelled from
the Byzantine historians a much fuller and more reliable story of the
successive entries of Ottoman troops into Europe from 1345 downwards.
It may be briefly epitomized as follows, in explanation of the great
historic event—the first entry of the Ottomans into Europe—a story
which is most discreditable to the Byzantine Greeks:—
On the death, in 1338, of the Greek Emperor Andronicus III, the most
feeble and incompetent of the long line of Palæologi, his Grand
Chancellor, Cantacuzene, was appointed, under his will, guardian of
his son, John Palæologus, and as co-regent with his widow, the Empress
Anna. Cantacuzene, not satisfied with this arrangement, and ambitious
to secure supreme power in the Empire, had himself proclaimed Emperor
at Nicotika in 1343. This was bitterly resented and opposed by the
Empress Anna. Civil war broke out. Both Anna and Cantacuzene appealed
to Orchan, their new and powerful neighbour across the Straits, for aid
against the other. Cantacuzene offered his young daughter, Theodora,
in marriage to Orchan in return for the aid of six thousand Ottoman
troops. Orchan apparently thought this a better offer than that of the
Empress Anna, whatever that may have been. He was perhaps flattered
by the prospect of a family connection with a Byzantine Emperor. He
closed with the offer and sent six thousand soldiers into Europe, in
1345, in support of Cantacuzene, who made use of them by investing
Constantinople, of which the Empress had obtained possession. After a
year’s siege, Cantacuzene effected an entry into the city by the aid
of his partisans there, who treacherously opened its gates to him.
The Empress was thereupon compelled to come to terms. She agreed that
Cantacuzene and his wife should be crowned as Emperor and Empress,
together with herself and her son. This union was further cemented by
the marriage of the young Emperor John, at the age of sixteen, with
another daughter of Cantacuzene. Orchan, in pursuance of his agreement
with the new Emperor, was married in 1346 at the ripe age of sixty-two
to the young Theodora, who was to be allowed to remain a Christian.
It may be assumed that the six thousand soldiers lent to Cantacuzene
returned to Asia. But the loan of them soon became a precedent for
other transactions of the same kind. In 1349 the Serbians, under
Stephen Dushan, were seriously threatening Salonika, and had ultimate
designs on Constantinople itself. Orchan was again appealed to for aid
by the two Emperors, his father-in-law and brother-in-law, and at their
instance he sent twenty thousand soldiers into Europe for the relief of
Salonika. With their aid Cantacuzene was able to defeat the Serbians,
and to extinguish for ever their hope of replacing the Byzantine
Empire at Constantinople. On this occasion, again, it appears that the
Ottoman troops, having effected their purpose, returned to Asia. But
four years later another opportunity befell Orchan of sending troops
across the Straits, and this time of effecting a permanent lodgment in
Europe. Cantacuzene, not satisfied with being only a co-Emperor with
his son-in-law and the Empress Anna, attempted, in 1353, to usurp the
supreme power in the State. His son-in-law, John Palæologus, now of
full age, strongly opposed this. Civil war again broke out. For a third
time Cantacuzene appealed to his son-in-law Orchan for aid. In return
for the loan of twenty thousand soldiers he offered to hand over to
the Ottomans a fortress on the European side of the Hellespont. Orchan
agreed to this. The Ottoman soldiers were sent into Europe, under
Solyman, and were employed by Cantacuzene in fighting against his other
son-in-law, the co-Emperor John. They were successful in this, and
occupied Demotika. Meanwhile the insignificant fortress of Tzympe was
handed over to Orchan and was occupied by Ottoman troops with the full
consent of Cantacuzene.
Shortly after this an earthquake occurred in the Thracian
Chersonese—not an unfrequent event there. It did great damage to many
cities, among others to Gallipoli, the most important fortress on the
European side of the Hellespont, and at no great distance from Tzympe.
Its walls and ramparts were in great part tumbled down and destroyed,
so that entrance to it was made easy. The Ottoman troops at the
neighbouring Tzympe, under Solyman, when this opportunity was afforded
to them of getting possession of such an important fortress, determined
to avail themselves of it. The Greek garrison of Gallipoli, under the
belief that the earthquake and the tumbling down of the walls indicated
the Divine will, made no resistance, and the Ottomans established
themselves there without opposition. Cantacuzene complained of this to
Orchan as a gross breach of their treaty, and demanded that Gallipoli
should be restored to him. He offered also to pay a fair price for
Tzympe. Orchan, though willing enough to take money for Tzympe, refused
point-blank to give up Gallipoli. “God,” he said, “having manifested
His will in my favour by causing the ramparts to fall, my troops have
taken possession of the city, penetrated with thanks to Allah.” It
will be seen that Greeks and Turks took the same view of the Divine
intervention, the one to excuse their failure to defend the fortress,
the other to justify their seizure of it.
This action of Orchan roused great indignation at Constantinople.
Cantacuzene now began to see how grave an error he had committed when
inviting the Turks into Europe. Public opinion compelled him to declare
war against Orchan. He appealed to the Czars of Serbia and Bulgaria to
assist him in driving the Ottomans back to Asia. They flatly refused to
do so. The Czar of Bulgaria replied: “Three years ago I remonstrated
with you for your unholy alliance with the Turks. Now that the storm
has burst, let the Byzantines weather it. If the Turks come against me
we shall know how to defend ourselves”—a very unfortunate prediction as
events ultimately proved! The whole course of history might have been
altered if these two Balkan States had joined with the Byzantines in
preventing this lodgment of the Turks in Europe. Want of union of the
Christian Powers was then, as on many other later occasions, mainly
responsible for the extension of the Ottoman Empire in that continent.
Cantacuzene was soon to reap the just reward for his treachery to his
country. So far everything had gone well with him. He had ousted the
Palæologi from the throne, of which, it must be admitted, they were
quite unworthy. He had proclaimed his son Matthew as co-Emperor with
himself. But when the full effect of his policy of inviting the Turks
into Europe was understood there was a revulsion of feeling against
him at Constantinople. The Greek Patriarch refused to crown Matthew. A
revolution took place in the city. Cantacuzene found himself without
friends. He was everywhere accused of having betrayed the Empire to
the Turks. He was compelled to abdicate. He became a monk and retired
to a monastery in Greece. He spent the remaining thirty years of his
life in seclusion there, and in writing a history of his times, which,
though very unreliable, tells enough of his own misdeeds to justify the
conclusion that, by inviting the Ottomans into Europe, he proved to be
a traitor to his country. The Empress Irene, his wife, became a nun.
John Palæologus was recalled by the people of Constantinople, and,
after defeating Matthew, not without difficulty, was established there
as sole Emperor. His reign lasted for fifty years, a period full of
misfortune for the Empire. He was no more able to compel or induce the
Turks to evacuate Europe and return to Asia than his father-in-law. The
twenty thousand soldiers who had been invited to Europe by Cantacuzene
remained there as enemies of the State they had come to assist.
Under the command of Solyman, they advanced into Thrace and captured
Tchorlu, within a few miles of Constantinople. Though the occupation
of this city and of Demotika was only temporary, the Ottomans firmly
established themselves in the southern part of Thrace. The Emperor John
was eventually compelled to sign a treaty with Orchan, which recognized
these Ottoman conquests in Thrace. Thenceforth the Byzantine Empire
became subservient to, and almost the vassal of, the Ottoman Sultan.
Solyman brought over from Asia many colonies of Turks and settled them
in the Thracian Chersonese and other parts of Thrace.
In 1358 Solyman, who had shown great capacity when in command of
the Ottoman army, met with his death by a fall from his horse when
engaged in his favourite sport of falconry. His father, Orchan, died
in the following year at the age of seventy-two. He had enormously
increased the Ottoman dominions. He had achieved the first great
object of his ambition, that of driving the Byzantines from their
remaining possessions in Asia. He had rounded off his boundaries in
the north-west corner of Anatolia by annexing Mysia. He had invaded
Europe and had extended Ottoman rule over a part of Thrace. He had
reduced the Byzantine Emperor almost to vassalage. These great results
had been achieved not so much by force of arms as a general, for he
is not credited with any great victory in the field, or by successful
assaults on any great fortresses, as by crafty diplomacy and intrigue,
backed up by superior force, and by taking advantage of the feebleness
and treachery of the Byzantines. He also forged the military weapon
by which his son, Murad, was able to effect far greater territorial
conquests, both in Europe and Asia.
[Illustration: