In the early months of 1941, Tokyo increasingly committed itself to a
policy dictated by the results of a decade of aggression. Since 1937
Japan had spent nearly 20 billion yen on the war in China, or twice
the total national debt in 1936. She had suffered more than a million
casualties, in killed, wounded and diseased. In return for these great
losses, she expected vast gains.
Thus “Greater East Asia” became the avowed goal of Japan’s foreign
policy. To Japan’s rulers, it represented the full flowering of the
“bloc economy” idea. They now considered not only Manchuria and
China, but the whole of East Asia, necessary for such a bloc. The raw
materials of southeast Asia, especially the oil, tin and rubber of
the Indies and Malaya, were needed to make up the deficiencies of a
“Japan-China-Manchoukuo” bloc. But even with these rich prizes Japan
would not be entirely self-sufficient economically. She would still
lack high-grade machinery and certain other products. Nevertheless,
with the raw materials of East Asia firmly under her control, Japan
believed she would have sufficient bargaining power to secure the
foreign currency necessary for buying all she needed in the world
market.
Japanese statesmen continually stressed this idea of an East Asiatic
bloc in their speeches. To make its realization possible, they
concluded the alliance with Germany. Barring an outright German victory
in Europe, however, the difficulties which confront Tokyo’s advance
toward mastery of East Asia are still formidable.
For Japan’s economic resources are at a low ebb. Industrial production
has begun to decline. Foreign trade is falling off, and reserves of
foreign currency are low. China is unconquered, and relations with
the Soviet Union are uncertain. The British Empire and the United
States, which stand guard over southeast Asia, are the mainstays of
Japan’s foreign trade. By moving against them in that region, Japan
might risk everything gained thus far. For the first time, she would
be staking her future on a war with powers that control the seas and
access to world markets. She would be facing all the dangers that she
successfully avoided in the World War of 1914-18.
Japan’s geographical location, close to the scene of action in the Far
East, is still her great strategic advantage. Her economic deficiencies
have been, and continue to be, her main source of weakness. The ratio
between these two controlling factors may well determine the immediate
future. Is Japan’s new Empire to reach out over immensely larger areas,
or is it to suffer its first great defeat?