[The following are extracts from a letter of Judge Sargeant to
the Hon. Joseph Badger of Gilmanton, N. H., who was a Delegate
to the Convention of that state for the adoption of the Federal
Constitution.]
I make no doubt but you have carefully compared y^e old
confederation with y^e new constitution and I wish you to review
them again. Can there be such a thing as Government without
Power? What is advice, recommendation, or requisition? It is not
Government.--Congress has a right to raise an army, to make war
and Peace, of entering into Treaties and alliances to borrow
money and appropriate y^e same--to ascertain y^e sums necessary
to be raised for y^e Service of y^e United States--to emit bills
of credit--to build and equip a navy, and to make requisitions
on y^e states for their quota of men, to Cloath, arm and equip
them. But who will lend Congress Money when they have not Power
to raise a Single Shilling to repay them? Who will take their
bills of Credit when every Body knows they can never redeem them?
Who will enlist into their army when Congress has no money to
pay them a Bounty or their wages or find them in Provisions? Who
will build and equip a navy for them without money? Who will
trouble themselves about Congress' making war or Peace when they
can't command a Shilling to support a war? To what Purpose is
it to appropriate money when they can't get it?--What end does
it answer for other nations to make treaties and alliances with
Congress when any one State by its obstinacy, fraud or some
Paltry private interest may defeat y^e treaty or by main force
break through it?
What good end will be answered by ascertaining y^e Sums necessary
to be raised when thirteen independent Legislatures are to judge
whether those sums are necessary or not and whether they will
raise them or not and if one State won't raise their quota, y^e
other states are more than foolish, they are distracted if they
raise theirs.--What effect will a requisition on y^e states
for raising, cloathing, arming, and equipping their quotas of
men have, when y^e 13 Legislatures are left to judge of y^e
expediency, or necessity of this equipment, whether they are
not charged above their proportion--whether it won't do as well
sometime hence? What security is it possible to have under such a
Government? A Government without energy, without power. Zeal and
enthusiasm carried us thro' y^e last war without any Government
till March 1781, when y^e Confederation was compleated and then
we hobbled along 21 months longer under it until peace took
place, and since y^e Peace, Requisitions from Congress have had
no more effect than y^e Pope's bulls wou'd have had. The old
Confederation is just y^e same to y^e United States as a people,
as a milk and water diet wou'd be to a labouring man, both wou'd
grow weaker and weaker till they were not able to crawl. Nothing
ever gave us any respectability abroad but y^e readiness and
chearfulness with which we complied with all y^e recommendations
of Congress when we had no Government at all. That enabled us
to form treaties with other nations, to hire money, and their
hatred to Great Britain engaged them to join in y^e war against
her. The nations in Europe discovered this weakness long before
we did. Great Britain for 5 years has refused to make any Treaty
of commerce with us, has shut all her Ports against our shipping,
while our Ports are filled with their shipping and seamen and
are picking up our seamen for their employ--they bring their
Produce and manufactures to us to buy but won't let us carry
our own to them. They have embarrass'd our commerce with other
nations by setting y^e Algerines upon our shipping and thereby
obliged us to give 5 per Cent. to them for insurance against the
Algerines--all this while we have not had y^e power to retalliate
upon them in one Single Article. The other Powers viz: France,
Holland, Spain and Portugal have now taken y^e hint and are
imposing duties upon our Produce and Manufactures to y^e great
encouragement of their own and discouragement of ours, and we
can't make any Regulations to counterwork them. Massachusetts
some years ago took y^e lead and made some very advantageous
Regulations. New Hampshire followed, and Rhode Island adopted a
small part. Soon y^e People in New Hampshire grew restive and
obliged y^e Government to repeal y^e same. Rhode Island followed
and Massachusetts was obliged to follow them, so that you see
what a rope of sand we are. This conduct of y^e European nations
will in time, if it produces good Government, prove of eminent
advantage to us. They drained us of almost all our Cash. This put
People upon being industrious and frugal. Industry has occasioned
great improvements in agriculture and in manufactures. The first
has rendered Provisions plenty and so cheap that we sell them
to almost all nations. The latter has supplied us with many
necessaries which we used to send cash for, and we remitted to
other nations pay for what necessaries we wanted. Frugality has
prevented us from sending our Cash abroad for many Superfluities
which we can do as well or perhaps better without; so that now it
is an undoubted fact that y^e exports from America greatly exceed
y^e imports; consequently Cash may now become as plenty as it
wou'd be best it shou'd be.
The old Confederation without Power or Energy destroyed y^e
Credit of y^e United States. The scarcity of Cash, and y^e
embarrassments of y^e Government, for want of some fixed
System of finance has destroyed y^e credit of y^e individual
States--different Tender acts in different States, different
sorts of paper money in different States, (for almost all y^e
States have either paper money or tender acts,) have destroyed
private Credit; so that we are now as a people and as individuals
totally without either public or private Credit. Under these
circumstances money never can circulate in plenty, let y^e
advantages for importing it be what they may--
Is it now possible for a Government, under these disadvantages,
whether it be continental or particular, to support itself any
length of time? Will not private industry be discouraged? Can
such a Government protect y^e industrious from y^e hands of
invaders or y^e more savage hands of violence among ourselves?
Anarchy will soon rear its head and y^e Tyranny of some ambitious
Demagogue will soon tread on its heels. Suppose for a moment y^e
General Court of New Hampshire or Massachusetts were to agree
that such a sum of money was necessary to be raised for y^e
building and maintaining of a colledge for supporting schools
in different Parts, for supporting ministers, for encouraging
y^e Iron manufactory, y^e manufactory of cloath, for repairing
y^e highways, for training and disciplining y^e militia, and
procuring a stock of guns and ammunition and building forts for
y^e defence of y^e State and then send a recommendation to y^e
several towns desiring them to raise their quota of that sum,
being so much.
Wou'd not this be a laughable way of raising money for y^e public
exigences? One town wou'd say there was no need of building
a Colledge; others wou'd say there is no need of Schools or
ministers; let them that work Iron and cloath get their own pay;
our highways will do well enough without repairs; y^e militia
are good gunners already, there is no need of forts, and there
is no war at hand, and we can do without Guns and ammunition a
little longer; besides all they have rated our town too high.
Wou'd not this be y^e common language? A precious little money
wou'd be raised, I trow. Let me ask, if y^e People in our town
meetings are competent Judges of y^e necessity and advantage of
raising money for these purposes? You will instantly answer me,
no not one in six. Can they have large and extensive views of
y^e interest, of y^e essential and important interests of y^e
whole state? No, perhaps, not one, thô many of them when they
had met with other persons from all parts of y^e state, and had
freely conversed with them might be good Judges afterwards. How
absurd and impolitic then is it to trust y^e great affairs and
interests of a continent, 1500 miles long and 1000 miles wide to
y^e determination of 2600 men deputed from some little spots of
6 miles square y^e greatest part of whom never went further than
y^e next market town perhaps, or at y^e outside to y^e shire town
of y^e state and never expects to go again after his year is up,
or if he does, it is only to get his 3_s._ 6_d._ a day without
labour or at y^e most to have y^e honour of saving a small Tax
upon his own town--and these men are not to meet altogether where
they might, if disposed, get y^e necessary information to form a
Judgment by,--but in thirteen different places where they have
different interests, different leaders and different information.
How much more ridiculous is it then, that all these men are to
determine of y^e necessity of Peace or War--of y^e sums of Money
necessary to be raised, of y^e best and easiest mode of raising
it thro' all y^e states, regulating y^e value of money thro' all
y^e states, of defining and punishing Piracies and felonies on
y^e high seas and of Offences against y^e law of nations--when
it is necessary and proper to grant Letters of Marque and
reprisal--what are y^e rights and duties of Ambassadors, Consuls
and public ministers, what are proper rules respecting captures
where other nations are concerned with us in y^e capture or are
interested in y^e vessel captured, what regulations of Trade may
be carried into effect in other nations so as not to injure our
own commerce. These and a thousand other matters respecting our
intercourse with other nations and other great national concerns,
must be determined by some Body of men with decision and be
carried into effect too. How preposterous is it then for us to
think of going on under y^e old Confederation where y^e several
states or some of them wou'd hiss any Law that might be proposed
on those matters out of Doors.
Now let us consider y^e new Constitution. Are there any
objects, of Legislation in this, which were not left to y^e
decision of Congress under y^e old Articles? Very few, save
that of Regulating commerce with foreign nations for want of
which we have suffered enough already--also to form a rule
for naturalization Laws about Bankruptcies--fix y^e standard
of weights and measures--to promote y^e progress of arts
and Sciences--to prevent counterfeiting y^e Securities and
current coin of y^e states, to provide for organizing, arming,
disciplining and calling forth y^e militia on necessary
occasions; to exercise exclusive Jurisdiction over 10 miles
square of land where Congress may sit, if so much is ceded to
them by any state to their satisfaction and such other places
where continental arsenals are kept. Our People are taught y^e
necessity of this provision for if a man of less penetration
and decision had been in y^e chair y^e year before last--they
would have lost their most useful and costly magazine. Is it not
reasonable that these matters shou'd be done with uniformity
thro' y^e states? Can these great objects ever be accomplished
without making laws to bind all persons in y^e Jurisdiction?
Who are to make those Laws but y^e Representatives chosen
by y^e People at large every two years, and where an equal
representation is provided for, and a Senate chosen by y^e state
Legislatures, one third of which are to be chosen every two
years. When Laws are made they are nonsensical unless they can
be carried into execution; therefore it is necessary somebody
shou'd have a Power of determining when they are broken, and to
decree y^e forfieture in consequence of such breach. This shows
y^e necessity of y^e Judicial Power--and an executive with y^e
necessary officers are requisite for carrying those decrees into
execution--and without all this y^e whole parade of making laws
wou'd be idle.
That these parts, y^e Judicial and executive, shou'd be
appointed by congress is necessary in order that y^e proceedings
may be uniform and to prevent one state from conniving at or
disregarding y^e laws made for y^e benefit of y^e whole. If they
are to raise money they must have officers to collect it. These
must be appointed by Congress or such men will be appointed by
particular states as will shew y^e most favour--and look thro'
y^e whole, I believe you will not find a Single Power given but
what would maim y^e constitution if it was left out. Perhaps it
may be said this will be an expensive Government. The Legislative
will not be more expensive, if so much, as y^e present congress
for after they have got matters a going properly, they may
be at home half their time. The other officers must be paid
it is true, but when we consider y^e advantages of a steady
uniform Government with proper energy, I believe we shall find
y^e Benefits purchased at a cheap rate. Perhaps some may say
that this annihilates our own state Governments, and our own
Legislatures will have nothing to do; but y^e Laws respecting
criminal offenders in all cases, except Treason, are subjects
for Legislation. We may increase, lessen, or change punishments
for crimes as we think best, and make any act criminal or pœnal
as far as Law can make it so at our pleasure. The regulating
Towns, parishes, Providing ministers, schools, looking after
Poor persons, punishing Idlers, vagabonds &c. &c. regulating
Highways, bridges, fisheries, common fields &c. are also matters
pertaining to y^e General court--but above all y^e great rules
for regulating inheritances, descent of estates, Partition of
them, last wills and Testaments, executors, Administrators, and
Guardians are subjects for our own Legislation--y^e appointment
of all courts, and y^e rules of Proceeding in them and of
determining all controversies between our own citizens, Rules
of Legitimacy, marriage and divorce and in fine all matters not
expressly given to congress are still to be the subjects of our
own Legislation to be carried into Effect by our own courts and
officers. Over what things does y^e constitution give congress
a Power only those of great national concern, which require a
large comprehensive view and which, Heaven knows, our Houses of
R-p-s-t-tives were never capable of comprehending or of judging
whether they were acting right or wrong.--I write very freely to
you, without any reserve. Y^e regard I have for my Children, my
Kinsmen, my friends, my Neighbours, Posterity and my country,
makes me bless God that those objects are likely for ever to
be taken out of such hands, two thirds of whom were never from
their fire side before, and never comprehended in their view more
than their own farms and their own little private interest. I
cou'd write a volume on this subject, but thus much must suffice
for y^e present. I believe you are tired now as well as your
affectionate
Kinsman and sincere friend and Serv^t
NATH'L PEASLEE SARGEANT.
A COMPLETE LIST OF THE MINISTERS OF BOSTON OF ALL DENOMINATIONS, FROM
1630 TO 1842, ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF THEIR SETTLEMENT.