"SIRS, ALL IS WELL WITH THE FLEET"
TWO THOUSAND VESSELS IN SERVICE--200,000 MEN OVERSEAS OR
TRANSPORTING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES ACROSS ATLANTIC--373 SHIPS, 81,000
OFFICERS AND MEN IN EUROPEAN FORCES--VISITS OF ROOSEVELT, BENSON,
MAYO AND CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE--PERSHING'S TRIBUTE.
With more than two thousand vessels in service and 533,000 officers
and men, the largest personnel ever possessed by any Navy, our naval
operations in the World War literally belted the globe. Operating with
the Allies from the Arctic to the Adriatic, from Corfu to the Azores,
we manned and operated the vast fleet of American transports carrying
troops, munitions and supplies across the Atlantic, and furnished
man-of-war escort to protect them.
Patrolling our own coasts and the Western Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico
and the Caribbean Sea, our vessels also kept watch in South American
waters and guarded the approaches to the Panama Canal. Our ships in
South American waters, commanded by Admiral W. B. Caperton, coöperated
with the naval forces of our sister republics and gave insurance
against possible raiders and submarines. Ships under Caperton, the
squadron under Anderson in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, and
Mayo's ships further north maintained the patrol throughout the war on
this side of the Atlantic.
Guarding against raiders and German activities in the Pacific, our
operations extended from our west coast to Hawaii, Guam and the
Philippines, and our vessels in the Orient coöperated with the
Japanese and other Allied naval forces from Manila to Vladivostok.
The destroyers sent from Cavite, which voyaged twelve thousand
miles through the Straits, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the
Mediterranean, met at Gibraltar the forces from the other side of the
world.
Eight hundred and thirty-four vessels and two hundred thousand men
of the United States Navy were either serving in European waters
or engaged in transporting troops and supplies to Europe, before
hostilities ended. This was more than twice as many ships and nearly
three times as many officers and men as were in naval service before
the war.
Four hundred vessels were assigned to the Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters, 373 being present at the time of the armistice--70
destroyers, 5 gunboats, 5 Coast Guard cutters, 120 submarine chasers,
27 yachts, 12 submarines, 13 mine sweepers, 10 mine planters, 8
battleships, 3 cruisers, 16 tugs, 4 cross-channel transports, 55
vessels carrying coal for the army, 18 tenders and repair ships, and 7
vessels of miscellaneous types. In addition three Russian destroyers
were manned by United States naval personnel. Eighty-one thousand
officers and men of the Navy were in service in Europe. Thirty thousand
Marines were sent overseas for service with the Army and 1,600 for
naval duty ashore.
But that by no means covers all the service performed for the Allies
and our own forces in Europe. The entire Cruiser and Transport Force,
with its 83 vessels, 3,000 officers and 41,000 men; and the Naval
Overseas Transportation Service, with 378 vessels in operation, manned
by 4,692 officers and 29,175 men, were in trans-Atlantic service,
carrying troops and supplies. Practically all the 384 merchant ships
which had naval armed guards and navy guns were carrying food,
materials and other articles to allied armies and peoples. Thirty
thousand of the naval personnel were, at one time or another, engaged
in this service. Thus, a total of 834 vessels and more than 200,000
officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps were engaged either in
European service or in trans-Atlantic service to and from Europe.
Our forces in Europe operated in forty-seven different localities,
extending from the Arctic Ocean all the way around to the Adriatic Sea.
The extent of our operations is seen from this list of the principal
naval bases, and the United States naval vessels on duty at each of
them on November 11, 1918:
Queenstown (2 tenders, 24 destroyers, 30 chasers, 3 tugs) 59
Berehaven (3 battleships, 1 tender, 7 submarines, 1 tug,
1 oiler) 13
Brest (1 gunboat, 16 yachts, 3 tenders, 38 destroyers,
9 tugs, 1 station ship, 4 steam barges, 4 barges,
9 mine sweepers) 85
Cardiff (1 tender, 1 refrigerator hulk, 55 colliers) 57
Gibraltar (2 cruisers, 4 gunboats, 5 Coast Guard cutters,
9 yachts, 1 tender, 6 destroyers, 18 chasers) 45
Genoa (2 tugs) 2
Azores (2 yachts, 1 tender, 1 oiler, 2 mine sweepers,
5 submarines, 1 tug) 12
Grand Fleet (5 battleships) 5
Murmansk (1 cruiser, also 3 Russian destroyers) 1
Mine Force (1 tender, 10 mine layers, 2 mine sweepers) 13
Southampton (4 transports) 4
Plymouth (1 tender, 2 destroyers, 36 chasers) 39
Corfu (1 tender, 36 chasers) 37
Liverpool (1 oiler) 1
Naval aviation activities were almost as extensive as those of our
ships, extending from England, Ireland and Northern France to eastern
Italy. There were thirty aviation bases, the Northern Bombing Group
considered as one base:
Ireland--Queenstown (2 stations, seaplane, and assembly and
repair); Whiddy Island, Wexford, Lough Foyle, Berehaven.
England--Killingholme, Eastleigh.
France--Dunkirk, Northern Bombing Group; Treguier, L' Aber Vrach,
Fromentine, St. Trojan, Arcachon, Pauillac, La Trinite, La Pallice,
Moutchic, Paimboeuf, Rochefort, Gujan, Brest, Guipivas, Le Croisic,
and Ile Tudy.
Italy--Lake Bolseno, Porto Corsini, Pescara.
Azores--Marine Corps aviators.
Two divisions of our submarines operated in European waters--seven at
Berehaven, Ireland, with the _Bushnell_ as tender, and five at the
Azores. Twenty-one sightings of enemy submarines and four torpedo
attacks were reported by the Berehaven division. The AL-2 (Lieutenant
P. F. Foster, commanding) had a remarkable encounter on July 10, 1918.
Shaken by a terrific explosion, evidently that of a torpedo, the
AL-2 discovered the periscope of a submarine apparently injured and
attempting to get to the surface. The only chance to get the U-boat
was to ram it submerged, and the AL-2 executed a crash dive, which
carried it down a hundred feet. It barely missed the German, who was
trying to slip under the American submarine. Swinging around, the AL-2
started again after the enemy, which was trying to rise. But it never
came to the surface. Radio calls from another U-boat were unanswered.
The lost submarine was the German U-B-65, known to be operating in
that vicinity. "Known sunk," was the verdict of the British Admiralty,
and for this the AL-2 was given the major part of the credit. Our
submarines did excellent and faithful service, and proved their
usefulness in that new and strange phase of undersea warfare where "sub
hunts sub."
Our vessels in European waters were employed in so many regions that
they did not operate together as one fleet, but constituted a "task
force" of the Atlantic Fleet. In British waters our ships usually
operated with British forces under the direction of British officers.
Elsewhere they remained under the direction of American officers,
always coöperating freely with Allied naval forces. At the United
States Naval Headquarters at London there was a force of 1,200. The
200 commissioned personnel included a number of the ablest officers
in the Navy, with Captain (later Rear Admiral) N. C. Twining as chief
of staff, and Captain W. R. Sexton as assistant chief of staff.
It embraced experts whose daily association with officers in the
Admiralty, under the leadership of Admiral Sims, brought about complete
understanding and perfect team-work. Those at the head of important
divisions were:
Intelligence Department, Commander J. V. Babcock, who also acted
as aid; Convoy Operations, Captain Byron A. Long; Anti-Submarine
Section, Captain R. H. Leigh; Aviation, Captain H. I. Cone, and
afterward, Lieutenant Commander W. A. Edwards; Personnel, Commander
H. R. Stark; Communications, Lieutenant Commander E. G. Blakeslee;
Material, Captain E. C. Tobey; Repairs, Captain S. F. Smith, and
afterward, Naval Constructor L. B. McBride; Ordnance, Commander
G. L. Schuyler, and afterward Commander T. A. Thomson; Medical
Section, Captain F. L. Pleadwell, and afterward, Commander Edgar
Thompson; Legal Section, Commander W. H. McGrann; Scientific
Section, Professor H. A. Bumstead, Ph. D.
This large establishment in Grosvenor Gardens had been built up from
the small beginning in 1917 when Admiral Sims, accompanied by his aid,
arrived just after war was declared. Entrusted first with the duty of
conferring with the British Admiralty and reporting the naval situation
with his recommendations, Admiral Sims was soon designated as commander
of our forces in European waters with the rank of vice admiral, and
before the armistice was promoted to admiral. Keeping in constant
touch with the British and other Admiralties, representing our Navy
upon the Allied Naval Council, the information he secured, with that
furnished us by Allied naval officers stationed in Washington, enabled
the Navy Department to keep pace with all naval activities, and his
recommendations were taken into consideration in important decisions
that were made. Serving with zeal and ability, he won the regard and
confidence of his associates of the allied navies, and received high
honors from European governments.
In addition to the daily exchange of messages between London
headquarters and Washington, information from special Government
missions, and the intimate intercourse of officers of all the Allied
navies, high ranking officials of our Navy from time to time went to
Europe for conferences and inspection of our forces and activities,
among them Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and Admirals Benson, Mayo and
Gleaves. The Assistant Secretary, going over in the destroyer _Dyer_,
spent six weeks abroad in the summer of 1918. He had conferences with
the Allied naval authorities in London, Paris and Rome, and inspected
our bases and mine depots, and witnessed the work of laying the North
Sea barrage. Reporting that our personnel there had done well under
hazardous and difficult circumstances, he advised a like mine barrage
across the strait of Otranto.
Admiral Benson, going abroad in 1917, took part in the organization
of the Allied Naval Council, and urged a more vigorous offensive,
which we had favored from our entrance into the war. Months before,
Admiral Benson had prepared, and I had approved and sent to the British
Admiralty, "proposed measures to prevent German submarines from
operating against Allied commerce in the Atlantic," which pointed out
the following courses which were open to us:
We may attempt to--
(a) Reduce the Heligoland region and close exits for submarines.
(b) Reduce the Zeebrugge region and close exits for submarines.
(c) Enter the Baltic and close exits for submarines from the
Baltic bases.
(d) Prevent Danish and Dutch territory being used for submarine
bases.
(e) Construct and maintain mine barriers about the Heligoland
area.
(f) Construct and maintain a mine barrier in the Skagerrack or
Kattegat.
(g) Construct and maintain mine barriers in the Zeebrugge region.
(h) Construct and maintain a mine barrier across the North Sea.
(i) Close Dover straits to submarines by a mine barrier and
surface patrol.
These matters were discussed by Benson with officers of the British
Admiralty, and the methods and the difficulties of carrying them out
were considered. Speaking, sometime after the war, of the offensive
plans he advocated, Benson said:
I think that the bases of the German submarines should have been
attacked, and I so urged when the war was in progress; and one of
my conferences with the British Admiralty in London in 1917 was to
urge more active operations against the bases of the submarines.
But it was an operation that had to be not only a concerted action,
but the principal part of it would have been necessary to be taken
by the Allies, we simply to add our part to it; and all during the
summer of 1917, I urged active operations of that kind and could
never understand why we did not get definite plans from the other
side as to how such operation should be carried out.
While in London I agreed with Admiral Jellicoe on a plan, a very
confidential plan, that was to be carried out later on, in which I
not only volunteered to place our ships but insisted that our ships
should be placed there.
During Benson's absence from Washington, Captain (later Admiral) W.
V. Pratt in both 1917 and 1918 acted as Chief of Operations. In the
discharge of that duty, as well as Assistant Chief of Operations,
succeeding Captain Volney Chase, who died in the summer of 1917,
Admiral Pratt demonstrated ability unsurpassed by any officer serving
in any important position during the World war. When Captain Pratt
later was ordered to sea, Admiral Josiah S. McKean, who had served with
marked ability as Chief of Material during the war, became Acting Chief
of Operations and added to his well-earned reputation.
Admiral Mayo, in his capacity of commander-in-chief of our ships in
European as well as home waters, made an official visit to Europe in
September, 1917, inspecting bases and forces, and conferring with naval
leaders of Great Britain, France and Italy. He was on duty again in
Europe in 1918. Attending the Allied Naval Conference in London, he
urged the construction of the North Sea Barrage, which was shortly
afterwards approved.
Visiting the famous Dover Patrol, he witnessed a bombardment of Ostend
by British monitors, and had the experience of being under enemy
fire. The flotilla leader _Broke_, in which he embarked with Sir John
Jellicoe, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and other British officers
of high rank, flew the flags of both Mayo and Jellicoe.
The monitors, armed with 15-inch naval guns, were accompanied on these
expeditions by spotting aircraft and destroyers. The party accompanied
the _Terror_. Soon after she began to fire, the German shore batteries
got the range. Firing with precision and accuracy, some of the German
shells fell within a short distance of the _Broke_. Admiral Reginald
Bacon gives this interesting account of the incident:
On Tuesday, September 25th [1917], Sir John Jellicoe, Admiral Sir
Henry Oliver, and Admiral Philpotts arrived at Dover and came
with Admiral Mayo and his staff up the patrol line. It was a
quaint experience for them. Half an hour after leaving Dunkirk in
the _Broke_ we lost sight of the shore. After an hour's steaming
we sighted the _Terror_ and destroyers in the open sea, and the
motor-launches just starting their smoke-screen. Nothing else was
in sight except a small monitor five miles away right out at sea,
burning her searchlight for an aiming mark. Really our visitors
must have thought we were humbugging when the _Terror_ opened fire
and fired single rounds at fixed intervals.
A few seconds afterwards while steaming about in the _Broke_--we
had altered course three points--a splash came from a Tirpitz shell
about 300 yards off. It fell very near the spot where we would have
been if we had kept on our original course. I apologized to the
American Chief of the Staff for not having kept on and brought the
shell nearer. His reply was quaintly American in humor:
"Don't mention it, Admiral; by the time we get to New York that
shell will have been close alongside right enough!"
The result of the _Terror's_ shooting was most successful, as
all the rebuilding in the dockyard done by the Germans was again
demolished. On October 19th, the _Terror_ was torpedoed, and had
to be docked. On the following day the _Soult_ fired at Ostend and
destroyed a high explosive magazine. One German craft was sunk, and
two more damaged.
Upon his return, Admiral Mayo made detailed reports covering the
entire naval situation, with important recommendations as to plans
and measures. When war began it was expected that the time would come
when the entire Atlantic Fleet would be sent abroad, and Admiral Mayo
would command all our forces in the looked-for great naval battle with
the German fleet. Our vessels in Europe were, therefore, considered our
advance forces, a "task force" assigned to special duties until the
whole fleet should be united for action. But the character of the war
called for wide dispersion of its units, and it was not until after
hostilities ended that they were reunited under the commander-in-chief,
who was in command when the dreadnaughts sailed from Brest in December,
1918.
No navies in all history ever worked together in such close coöperation
as did ours with the British, French and Italians. The cordial
relations between the civilian populations, as well as the naval
personnel, will be a lasting tie. I wish it were possible to put
on record the sentiments expressed, the appreciation felt by all
Americans in the Navy for the gracious courtesies and friendly offices
shown to our men serving a common cause far from their homes. The one
regrettable incident at Cork, where an unruly element attacked some of
our sailors, was recognized as an exception. It was confined to the few
engaged in the trouble, the people of that city and country having no
relation to it and not affected by it in their feeling of friendship
for our sailors and our country. It left no resentment towards
the great Irish people, who received us with open arms and showed
hospitality and cordiality towards our forces domiciled in that country.
One of the services which the people of Lille, France, will long
remember is the voluntary act of men of the Navy in turning carpenters
for the time, and building with their own hands scores of houses for
the homeless people. That act, together with the generous gift by
American sailors of their own rations to needy peoples, illustrates the
spirit that actuated our men. At one place, so moved were they by the
lack of food for women and children, the sailors denied themselves to
such an extent that the captain was forced to issue an order limiting
their generosity to prevent a shortage of food for the sustenance of
the crew.
Cardiff does not bulk large on the war maps. Mention of it recalls no
such adventure as at Zeebrugge, no such achievement as laying the
mine-barrage in the North Sea, or sinking of submarines at Durazzo
or on the high seas. But it spelled coal for our forces, and meant
hard work and called for efficient management. The limited number of
colliers, the time for making voyages to American coal fields, and the
hazard from U-boats suggested obtaining coal from Wales for the needs
of the army in France. The Army requested the Navy to release colliers
for that service, and at first to operate twenty "lake" and other
chartered boats and undertake the carrying of coal from Great Britain
to supplement the steady flow from America. Admiral Philip Andrews,
with headquarters at Cardiff, directed this work, which required a
naval personnel of 4,101, operated 65 ships, and delivered 30,000 to
45,000 tons of coal each month.
There is no glamour about the work of repairing ships. Even in peace
times it is a hard overalls job, but our nine European bases with
eleven repair ships and tenders, kept our ships in condition. If I were
a poet I would immortalize the skilled men, working in the dark, often
flat on their backs, to keep our ships fit and to repair the ravages of
U-boat attacks. Not counting the 500 ships going and coming from the
United States to Europe, often calling for first aid, we had nearly 400
ships on duty in European waters. Though taxed by their own needs, the
facilities of our Allies were freely at our disposal, but the fact that
it was possible to make our forces so nearly self-sustaining is a high
tribute to the officers and men charged with that duty. Allied navies
expressed admiration for the ability of a ship's force to do much of
their own repairing, and marvelled at the efficiency of the repair
ships--the _Melville_, _Dixie_, _Panther_, _Prometheus_, _Bridgeport_,
_Black Hawk_.
Our own Shipping Board voiced its thanks for naval assistance abroad
as well as at home. In fact, in all ship construction and repair work
as well as plans for operation and navigation undertaken by that
organization the Navy furnished constructors and other experts, and was
ready upon call with its entire facilities.
Little has been heard of the _Scorpion_, which was interned in Turkish
waters during the war. The crew of that ship, whose base had long
been at Constantinople, protected the American and British embassies,
one regular duty of the vessel being to act as despatch boat to our
Ambassador to Turkey. After America entered the war, some of them,
eager to get into the fray, made their escape over land and joined the
American forces in France.
From the outbreak of the European conflict the _Scorpion's_ men had a
"front seat at the show," and witnessed many interesting sights. From
the deck of their ship they saw the thrilling finish of the race of the
German cruisers _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, which made their sensational
escape from British pursuers and then interned in the harbor of
Constantinople. They saw the Teutonic crews of the erstwhile ships
of the Germany Navy, hastily doffing their German caps and donning
Moslem fezzes to camouflage their nationality, as the Turkish flag was
hoisted to the mastheads. They observed, from their point of vantage,
the gallant sweep of the harbor by a British submarine which bobbed
up in the Bosporus as the Turks were preparing to send reinforcements
to Gallipoli, torpedoed a Turkish vessel at its dock, and caused such
consternation that the Turks, at the quays ready to sail with 40,000
troops, did not dare venture out with their transports. One single
daring British submarine caused all the troops to be disembarked, and
the sea expedition to the Dardanelles was abandoned.
The "Scorpions," as they called themselves, brought one story home with
them which, if verified, is worthy of the best French epic. The Turks,
as the story was told in Constantinople, captured a French submarine,
the _Turquoise_. Not one of the captors who boarded the ship understood
how to operate its delicate mechanism. Therefore, the French engineers
were ordered to start the engines. Nothing loath, the orders were
obeyed. The sub dived, carrying with it Turkish captors and French
engineers, never to return. Whether or not that particular act can be
confirmed, the war produced many men of the navies with the spirit
which the incident illustrates.
The _Scorpion_ was truly a ship of mercy. First, under the direction of
Ambassador Morgenthau and afterwards of Ambassador Elkus, it carried
hundreds of refugees to places of safety, was the almoner of many in
distress and gave asylum to Americans, who were heartened in that
harbor, crowded with ships carrying the flags of many nations, to see
the glorious Stars and Stripes floating from the mainmast.
No story of the Navy's preparedness and efficiency would be complete
without recognition of the wisdom of the Council of National Defense,
authorized by Congress and appointed by the President in 1916. That
Council had large responsibility, and measured up to its great duties
before and during the war. The Council was thus constituted: Secretary
of War Newton D. Baker, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels,
Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of Agriculture
David F. Houston, Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield, Secretary
of Labor William B. Wilson.
The Advisory Commission of the Council was composed of these men:
Daniel Willard, Howard E. Coffin, Julius Rosenwald, Bernard M. Baruch,
Dr. Hollis Godfrey, Samuel Gompers, Dr. Franklin Martin, Walter S.
Gifford, director, Grosvenor B. Clarkson, secretary.
Eight months before the Armistice, March 11, 1918, the House
Sub-Committee, composed of men of both parties--W. B. Oliver, chairman,
W. W. Venable, Adam B. Littlepage, James C. Wilson, Fred A. Britten,
John A. Peters and Frederick C. Hicks--which had made a thorough
investigation of the Navy and naval administration, unanimously
reported:
First. All appropriations have been expended or obligated with
judgment, caution and economy, when you consider that haste was
necessary to bring results and abnormal conditions obtained in
reference to all problems of production or operations.
Second. The Navy, with limited personnel and material, was suddenly
called to face many difficult and untried problems in sea warfare,
and has met the situation with rare skill, ingenuity, and dispatch
and a high degree of success.
Third. The efficiency of the Navy's pre-war organization, the
readiness and fitness of its men and ships for the difficult and
arduous tasks imposed by war were early put to the acid test and
thus far in no way have they been found wanting, and we feel that
the past twelve months presents for the Navy a remarkable record
of achievement, of steadily increasing power in both personnel and
material, of rapidly expanding resources, and of well-matured plans
for the future, whether the war be of long or short duration.
They could say at the close of hostilities, as they said then: "Sirs,
all is well with the fleet."
The immense scope and signal success of our operations in Europe
surprised even those familiar with the Navy, and the great work of the
war. Leading members of the House Committee on Naval Affairs--Chairman
Lemuel P. Padgett, Representative Thomas S. Butler, the present
Chairman, and Representatives Daniel J. Riordan, Walter L. Hensley,
John R. Connelly, William B. Oliver, William W. Venable, James C.
Wilson, William J. Browning, John R. Farr, John A. Peters, Frederick C.
Hicks and Sydney A. Mudd--in July and August, 1918, made an inspection
of our naval activities in Europe. Chairman Padgett, for the committee,
on his return, said:
The magnitude of our naval operations overseas, on the water and in
the air, reflects credit upon the American people, and commands the
respect and admiration of our Allies. When the war is over and the
full history of our naval operations abroad may be given in detail,
it will be a source of pride and honor to the American people, and
the fidelity, patriotism and devotion of our naval officers and
enlisted men, embracing as a part of the Navy the Marine Corps
officers and men, will form a bright part in the world's history. *
* *
The record speaks for itself. "Hindsight is better than foresight," and
if it was to be done over again, the Navy, with its war experience,
might do it better. But when all is said as to errors and achievements,
this is the imperishable record:
_The Navy performed successfully every task with which it was
entrusted. In not one did it fail._
_If it made mistakes--(and some were made)--not one of them had any
serious or disastrous result._
_If there were delays--(and there were some unavoidable ones)--not one
of them had any material effect upon the trend or duration of the war._
_If all the criticisms, of whatever kind or character, that have been
made be lumped together, they would not tilt the scales one degree, if
balanced against the Navy's achievements._
After the war was all over and the men were returning home, with time
and opportunity to assess the value of the service rendered, General
John J. Pershing, in command of the American Expeditionary Forces,
wrote on April 21, 1919:
We fully realize that had it not been for the Navy, who kept watch
and guard night and day over our transport fleet, the American
effort in France would never have been successful. The Navy's
assistance was whole-hearted and arduous, and was always given in a
most generous spirit of coöperation.