BUILDING A THOUSAND SHIPS
SIX HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS FOR DESTROYERS--"WARD" LAUNCHED 17-1/2
DAYS AFTER KEEL WAS LAID--"REID" COMPLETED IN 45 DAYS--GREAT
DESTROYER PLANT BUILT AT SQUANTUM--PATRIOTS IN OVERALLS--WHY WERE
NOT MORE DESTROYERS BUILT BEFORE THE WAR?--NEW NAVY WILL SURPASS
ALL OTHERS--REDUCTION OF ARMAMENT.
"Destroyer _Ward_ launched seventeen and a half days after laying of
keel," was the message from Mare Island Navy Yard that announced a new
world's record in ship construction.
In pre-war days from twenty months to two years had been required to
build a destroyer. Now they were being completed in a fraction of
that time. All the yards were working at top speed, far excelling any
previous accomplishments, but Mare Island had set a new pace hard to
equal.
"Liberty Destroyer," the _Ward_ was designated, and the way in which
she was put through was like a continuous Liberty Loan rally. "This
destroyer is needed to sink Hun submarines; let all hands help sink
them," was one of the numerous placards posted around her. Each day's
progress was marked on the big canvas banner stretched above the bow.
In twenty-four hours she began to assume shape. In two weeks they were
putting the finishing touches to the hull, and the banner read:
[Illustration:
+---------------------------------+
| LIBERTY DESTROYER No. 139 |
| |
| Keel Laid May 15th 14 DAYS |
| Will be Launched OLD |
| June 1st TODAY |
| |
| SHE'S SOME BABY |
+---------------------------------+]
Three and a half days later, she was sent down the ways. As she slid
into the water, officers and workmen cheered as they had never cheered
before.
This was the quickest time in which a vessel had ever been launched.
But the record for completion--the _Ward_ was commissioned in 70
days--was later bettered at the great Victory Plant at Squantum, Mass.,
where the _Reid_ was finished and made ready for her trials in 45-1/2
working days.
Before war began we ordered scores of destroyers, and soon afterwards
contracted for all that American yards could build. But we wanted more.
The question was how to get them. The Navy Department, after conferring
with one of the leading shipbuilders, determined on a bold stroke.
All the contractors, those building engines and machinery as well as
hulls, were summoned to Washington, and met with the Chief Constructor
and Engineer-in-Chief of the Navy in my office. "One hundred and fifty
more destroyers must be built," they were told. That proposition was
a "stunner." They had already contracted to build every one for which
they had facilities. And here was a demand that more than as many again
be constructed. Some shipyards would have to be enlarged, some new ones
built. The same was the case with engine manufacturers, and producers
of forgings; for producing enough engines was quite as difficult as
building hulls. Where companies could not finance additions, we agreed
that the Government would build them, as well as the new factories
or yards. Even at that, it was a staggering proposition. But the
contractors were game and patriotic. They promised every coöperation
and with the Navy experts began working out the thousand details
involved.
Congress was asked to appropriate $350,000,000 more for destroyers, to
build new plants required, as well as for ship construction. When the
bill was passed, October 6, 1917, the plans were ready, contracts were
signed, and the enlarged program was under way. Ground was broken at
Squantum the next day, October 7. Thousands of laborers were at work,
dredging, draining, making roads, driving piles, erecting buildings,
transforming that marsh into a fit habitation and working-place for
10,000 men. Buildings sprang up like magic. One concrete, steel and
glass structure three stories high and 200 feet long was finished in
two weeks. When winter came on, the laborers had to use picks and
shovels to dig through the frozen clay to lay foundations, and all the
workmen were handicapped by the bitter cold. Concrete poured hot--and
thousands of tons were used--had to be protected by masses of hay and
sheets of canvas, with heated air circulating inside to keep it from
freezing. But the work never halted, and in spite of all handicaps, was
completed in record time.
There were eighteen acres of shipyards covered by one continuous roof;
the arrangements being so complete that raw material went in at one end
and destroyers slid out at the other. There were hundreds of buildings,
not a few of them covering one to three acres. There were enough ways
for ten destroyers, and a score could have been under construction at
the same time.
Six months after ground was broken I had the privilege of witnessing
there the laying of the keels of five destroyers in one day.
The building of Squantum was rivaled by the erection of the big plants
at Erie, Pa., to make forgings for destroyer shafts and turbines; the
plant at Buffalo and by other feats of construction that would be
difficult to excel. All were erected and in operation in half the time
they could have been completed under ordinary conditions.
Our construction program embraced practically a thousand vessels--275
destroyers, 447 submarine-chasers, 99 submarines, 100 eagle boats, 54
mine-sweepers, and a number of gunboats and ships of other types. All
these in addition to the capital ships and scout cruisers authorized
in the three-year program. Though some contracts were cancelled
after the armistice, all but 100 or so of these vessels were built,
nearly 500 completed before the end of hostilities. In addition 1,597
privately-owned vessels, ranging from small patrol craft to huge
transports, were converted by the Navy for war purposes.
Over 2,000 vessels were in naval service before hostilities ended--six
times as many as were on the Navy list when war was declared. How was
it possible, in a country where shipbuilding had declined until it was
"a craft and not a trade," to build and alter and repair all these
ships, and also to provide munitions and build great establishments
ashore on both sides of the sea?
It was made possible by the foresight of Admirals Griffin and Taylor
and their associates, who before the war had made designs for building
various types of ships and for converting the ex-German vessels and
privately-owned craft suitable for war service. I wish the whole
country could know the true value of the work of these able officers
and their naval and civilian assistants. But for their forehandedness
and ability, our Navy would not have been able to have rendered such
prompt and valuable service. Great credit is due, alike, to the
shipbuilders who carried their plans into effect, devoting their
talents and untiring efforts to further warship construction.
It was also because the 100,000 mechanics and workers in navy yards and
naval plants, and the many more in private plants, who, with patriotic
naval and civilian experts, worked as never before. Many of these
"patriots in overalls" sacrificed their desire to enlist when told
that they could do more to win the war by driving rivets, fashioning
guns or making munitions. Labor was whole-heartedly in the war, and
would not tolerate slackers in production or in service. In the heat of
summer and the cold of winter, they rushed construction and astonished
the world by the celerity with which American skill and industry
turned out ships, weapons and supplies. On every war board labor had
its representative--in the Cabinet as well--and its patriotism and
unity made for a united and efficient America. The Navy and other war
agencies found the militant spirit and wise counsel of Samuel Gompers
worth a regiment of fighting men.
The Navy did not wait for war to begin building ships. When the program
for 156 vessels was proposed in 1915, without awaiting congressional
action, work was begun on plans so that on the very day that the
bill became a law the plans and specifications were issued for 20
destroyers, 27 submarines, 4 dreadnaughts and 4 scout-cruisers.
Contracts were placed for their construction as soon as the bids were
received. "Such speed," said Admiral Taylor, "was without precedent in
the history of the Navy Department. It was the result of the persistent
insistence by the Secretary of the Navy that work should be pushed and
his loyal support in this respect by bureaus concerned. There was no
procrastination or dilatoriness in the largest undertaking ever entered
into by the United States Navy, and the most important from the point
of view of preparation for any eventuality. While the large vessels
of the program had to be suspended during the war, the destroyers were
pressed."
Completion of the destroyer program gives the United States Navy 267
destroyers of the latest pattern, in addition to those of older type,
which, in the emergency of war, rendered such good service. These
destroyers have an aggregate of 7,400,000 horse-power, and they cost
approximately $600,000,000, counting $40,000,000 spent for new plants
and building ways. This sum is greater than the cost of all the ships
of the Navy available for service when we entered the war. The record
of our destroyers overseas won the admiration of Allied navies, and
reflected credit upon Congress, the naval administration and the
country.
But, in view of the need of thousands to patrol the seas in 1917-18,
where we only had scores, it has been asked, "Why did not the Navy
Department build hundreds of destroyers in 1915 and 1916 and have them
ready in 1917?" Looking backward, all of us admit that was the thing
that should have been done. No naval experts, however, either in Europe
or America, recommended in pre-war days such a building program.
All European admiralties, as well as our own, regretted that they
had not built more destroyers against the day when they were so much
needed. In reply to an inquiry made by a United States senator, Admiral
Sims said:
If we could have imagined that the Germans would do what they did
do we could have prepared for it and built destroyers galore, if
we could have persuaded Congress to give us the money. Nobody had
any experience with this kind of war at all, and nobody could be
savage enough in his disposition to know what the Germans would do,
and therefore to prepare for it; so that I would advise you to be a
little gentle in criticisms of naval officers in general, because
they were not prepared for this war, because we are a more or less
civilized people.
After ruthless submarine warfare began, we contracted, as we have
shown, for 275 destroyers, many more than any nation had ever attempted
to build in anything like so short a time.
But destroyers were by no means the only anti-submarine craft we
built. Realizing the usefulness of small craft, the Navy Department,
in 1916, turned its attention to the utilization of motor yachts and
other small power-driven vessels. Assistant Secretary Roosevelt
conferred with owners and builders, and an inventory of such craft was
taken. He started a campaign to interest owners of yachts and motor
boats and induce them to design their boats so that they could readily
be converted to war uses. Naval architects and their clients were
encouraged to submit their designs to the Navy Department. To give
further impetus to the movement, two small boats were constructed as
models.
Early in 1917, before war was declared, the Department's construction
experts, under the leadership of Captain J. A. Furer, naval
constructor, in coöperation with Mr. A. Loring Swazey, who later
enrolled as lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve, submitted to
the General Board, in February, a design for those wonderful boats
which became known as submarine-chasers. They were to be 110 feet long,
with a speed of 14 knots and a cruising radius of 800 miles, armed
with 3-inch guns, Y-guns for firing depth-charges, machine-guns and
depth-bombs. The shortage of structural steel and of labor required for
steel construction, necessitated building them of wood.
On March 19, 1917, orders were issued for building sixty chasers at
the New York navy yard and four at the New Orleans yard. On March 21st
orders were placed with private firms for 41 boats. Ten days later
contracts were placed with private builders for 179 additional boats,
and orders given for 71 more to be constructed at the navy yards at
Norfolk, Charleston, Mare Island and Puget Sound, a total of 355, all
ordered before war was declared. Fifty of these were, after completion,
turned over to the French government. The French were so pleased with
them that they ordered fifty more. A total of 447 chasers were ordered,
and 441 were completed. Their service far surpassed expectations of
designers and builders. Originally constructed for use in rivers
and harbors and near home coasts, they crossed the ocean and became
a reliance not only for patrol work but for offensive against the
U-boats--chasing submarines.
In the three-year program, there was provision for 58 coast submarines,
of which appropriations were made for thirty. On March 4, 1917, 20
additional submarines were provided for, and their construction was
begun. The Portsmouth (N. H.) navy yard had been made a submarine
construction yard and the orders were divided between that yard and
private contractors. Forty were completed before the armistice. We
sent several submarines to the Azores and a number to British waters,
where they operated from Bantry Bay. They gave an excellent account of
themselves, one, the AL-2 being credited with causing the destruction
of the German UB-65.
Having ordered all the destroyers and sub-chasers that could be built,
other sources were sought to produce more anti-submarine craft. On
December 24, 1917, I received a letter from Mr. Henry Ford proposing
quantity production of fabricated boats, suggesting that at least 500
could be built, and saying: "We will undertake the construction of
these boats with all possible speed, and deliver them to the United
States Government without profit to us." I telegraphed him, suggesting
that he send his engineers and construction men to confer with our
designers. Captain Robert Stocker and his associates in the Design
Division completed the plans and specifications in a few days, and
they were submitted to Mr. Ford. On January 15 he made a definite
proposal to build 100 to 500 of these vessels. I consulted with the
General Board, and two days later telegraphed him to proceed with
construction of 100. Later twelve additional were ordered for the
Italian Government. They were to be of 500 tons displacement, 200 feet
long, speed 18 knots, with a cruising radius of 3,500 miles. They were
to be armed with two 4-inch 50 caliber guns, discharge projectors,
anti-aircraft and machine guns.
These "eagle boats," as they were named, were built specifically to
hunt submarines. For their construction Mr. Ford erected a special
plant on the River Rouge near Detroit. Though only a few were in
service before the armistice, sixty in all were built. The completion
of 23 in one month in 1919 indicated that Mr. Ford was not far wrong
in his original estimate that it was possible, when his plant got into
quantity production, to turn out 25 per month.
"Eagles" went from New York to Inverness, Scotland, over a 4,500-mile
course, and after they had steamed 11,500 miles officers confirmed
their seaworthiness and their fitness for the task for which they
were built. Several sailed to Arctic waters, through fields of
ice. They were used to maintain dispatch service between ports in
Northern Russia, in which duty Admiral McCully reported they were very
successful.
Orders for many mine-sweepers were placed early in 1917, their design
permitting their construction by certain companies without interfering
with the building of naval or merchant craft. Some were built at the
Puget Sound and Philadelphia navy yards. The new mine-sweepers proved
exceptionally seaworthy. Thirty-six were employed in sweeping the mines
in the North Sea. In addition to the vessels designed and built for
this purpose, we employed a fleet of privately-owned ships of all sorts
and sizes, which were fitted out and used first as patrol and then as
mine-sweepers.
While war was on, construction had to concentrate on destroyers and
other anti-submarine craft. However, we completed two battleships, the
_Mississippi_ and _New Mexico_, and practically finished the _Idaho_;
but work was suspended on capital ships that were not already far
advanced.
Hostilities ended, attention was turned to the completion of the
program authorized in 1916. Should we proceed with the dreadnaughts and
battle-cruisers on the pre-war plans; or modify the plans, but still
build two distinct types; or abandon the plans altogether and build
a single type to do the work of both battleship and battle-cruiser?
These were questions that addressed themselves to naval administration.
Officers were debating them. From London came the information that the
British Admiralty had built a capital ship, the _Hood_, a composite
of the dreadnaught and the cruiser, which was said to combine the
advantages of both.
After consultation with leading members of the Naval Affairs Committee,
and upon their advice, accompanied by Admirals Griffin, Taylor
and Earle, heads of the Bureaus of Engineering, Construction and
Ordnance, I went to Europe to learn, at first hand, what changes,
if any, war experience taught should be incorporated into the new
ships to be constructed. An examination of the _Hood_ by our expert
officers disclosed that this new ship had more speed than earlier
battle-cruisers, though less than that of our design; a heavier
battery, though of only about half the power of that of our projected
battleships; and had protection much greater than that of earlier
battle-cruisers.
[Illustration: FITTING OUT FOR DISTANT SERVICE
New destroyers built and equipped at a privately owned ship yard in
Camden, New Jersey.]
[Illustration: HANGING UP A RECORD
The launching of the destroyer _Ward_ at the Mare Island Navy Yard
17-1/2 days after her keel was laid established a new record.]
Upon our return from Europe all the information gathered was laid
before the General Board. Admirals Mayo and Rodman, who had recently
returned from Europe, where they had been interested in the question,
were invited to act with them. The General Board made a unanimous
recommendation that the twelve battleships should be "completed
as expeditiously as possible on present lines of development in
battleship construction." In view of the importance of protection
as indicated by experience at the Battle of Jutland, where thinly
protected battle-cruisers were unable to stand up under heavy fire,
the Board recommended that "the six battle-cruisers now authorized be
completed as expeditiously as possible, but with additional protection,
particularly to turrets, conning towers, magazines and communications,
at the expense of a small reduction in speed." The recommendations were
approved, and directions given to press their construction.
The new battleships under construction will be 660 feet long, with
displacement of 43,200 tons, with an extreme breadth of 105 feet and a
mean draft of 33 feet. Engines developing 60,000 horse-power will drive
them at a speed of 23 knots. Their twelve 16-inch guns will be mounted
in four turrets, which revolve so that all can be fired simultaneously
to either side of the vessel. In a single salvo these guns will throw
25,000 pounds of projectiles. In every way they outclass any ships of
the line ever built.
The six battle-cruisers will be larger than any warships heretofore
constructed. Each will have 43,500 tons displacement, practically the
same as the battleships, but will be longer by over 200 feet, their
length being 874 feet, and they will be ten knots faster, making
33-1/4 knots, 38 miles an hour. No less than 180,000 horse-power is
required to drive these immense vessels through the water. Their
engines will develop as much electric power as is required to supply a
good-sized city. The six battle-cruisers will have a total of 1,080,000
horse-power. Each will be armed with eight 16-inch guns, firing 16,800
pounds of projectiles. The weight of metal is not, however, nearly as
important in gunfire as is the range. The guns of our battle-cruisers
will easily outrange those of any ships now afloat. Both battleships
and battle-cruisers will be propelled by electric drive, the new method
which, first installed on the _New Mexico_, proved its superiority, and
was adopted for all our later major vessels.
With the completion of these eighteen capital ships, together with the
scout cruisers and other types under construction, the Navy of the
United States will be at least "equal to the most powerful maintained
by any other nation of the world." That was the goal in view when the
big three-year program proposed in 1915 was adopted by Congress in the
act of August 29, 1916, to which, when this program is completed, the
Navy will owe its supremacy.
It is a matter of gratification that the United States, which
brought forth the steamship, the ironclad monitor, the torpedo boat,
the aeroplane, the flying boat, has again taken the lead in naval
construction and will soon have the most powerful of all armadas.
This country should keep that position for all time until--and
unless--with a powerful navy and great national wealth, the United
States succeeds in securing an international agreement to reduce
armament. The very act making possible our supremacy on the seas,
declared it to be the "policy of the United States to adjust and
settle its international disputes through mediation and arbitration";
authorized the President to invite a conference of all the great
governments to formulate a plan of arbitration and "consider the
question of disarmament"; and declared that the ships authorized but
not already under contract were not to be built if international
reduction of armament could be secured.
That statement of policy in the naval appropriation act of 1916--"a
most unusual place," said the President in an address at Seattle--was
in line with the policy of the Government from the day of Wilson's
inauguration. It was the authorization for the international
agreement looking to a reduction of armament contained in the Treaty
of Versailles. The Bryan treaties, ratified by every European
country except Germany, which insured cooling time and opportunity
for discussion in a world forum, were a long step toward settling
international differences by reason rather than by resort to war. It
was about the time those treaties were proposed that Winston Churchill,
First Lord of the British Admiralty, suggested a "naval holiday." In
my first report in 1913, reiterated in every subsequent report, I
declared: "It is not a vacation we need, but a permanent policy to
guard against extravagant and needless expansion." I recommended then
that "the war and navy officials, and other representatives of all
nations, be invited to hold a conference to discuss whether they cannot
agree upon a plan for lessening the cost of preparation for war" and
added this observation:
It is recognized that the desired end of competitive building,
carried on under whip and spur, could not be effective without
agreement between great nations. It ought not to be difficult to
secure an agreement by which navies will be adequate without being
overgrown and without imposing over-heavy taxes upon the industries
of a nation.
Long before the match was struck by the assassination of the Archduke
Ferdinand, President Wilson, Ambassador Page and Colonel House were
taking steps which, if Germany had been willing and Great Britain and
France had sensed the coming conflict, might have averted the World
War. To that end in the early part of 1914, President Wilson sent
Colonel House abroad with letters to the Kaiser and the heads of the
British and French governments, with whom earnest conferences were
held. President Wilson and his associates in 1913-14, as this shows,
had the vision of world agreement for peace to secure which he and the
representatives of other free nations signed the treaty in Paris in
1919.
"The last thing Germany wants is war," said the Kaiser to Colonel
House, just three months before he precipitated the conflict. The
Kaiser was obsessed at that time, so Colonel House reported, with the
thought of what he called "the Yellow Peril." The Kaiser said: "The
white nations should join hands to oppose Japan and the other yellow
nations, or some day they will destroy us." That fear, or simulated
fear, and his statement that Germany could not hastily join a peace
pact so long as 175,000,000 Slavs threatened his empire, furnished the
excuse for brushing aside the suggested agreement to prevent war.
Did he fear that President Wilson's tentative move early in 1914 toward
a League of Nations for world peace would be successful? Was the Kaiser
convinced that he must strike in that year, or surrender his mad
ambition for world domination?
As these lines are written a conference of five nations, called by
President Harding, is in session at Washington, where the discussion
of reduction of naval armament was given first place in a proposal to
scrap all pre-dreadnaughts and also the incompleted great dreadnaughts,
and not to build or complete the battle-cruisers under construction.
The plan presented by the American representatives is to adopt the
ratio of capital ships for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan
at five for the United States, five for Great Britain, and three for
Japan. Such a program, if followed by scrapping all submarines and
placing them in the category of outlaws, would, with reduction of land
armament and regulation of aircraft, carry out the hopes of those
responsible for the naval program authorized in 1916.