THE ANSWER TO THE 75-MILE GUN
GERMAN LONG-DISTANCE FREAK STOPPED BOMBARDING PARIS WHEN NAVAL
RAILWAY BATTERIES ARRIVED--MANNED BY NAVY CREWS, HUGE 14-INCH
GUNS OPERATED WITH FRENCH AND AMERICAN ARMIES--ADMIRAL PLUNKETT
IN COMMAND--MOST POWERFUL ARTILLERY USED BY ALLIES ON THE WESTERN
FRONT.
"Paris bombarded!" was the news that shocked the world on March 23,
1918. Two days before the Germans had begun their great drive for the
Channel ports. Their armies to the north were breaking through the
Allied defenses, taking one position after another. But their nearest
lines were nearly seventy miles from Paris. No gun known would shoot
half that distance. How could they be shelling the French capital?
That was what mystified the Parisians. Falling out of a clear sky, the
missiles fell, bursting in the streets. Aeroplane bombs, was the first
thought, for Paris was used to aerial raids. But these were undeniably
shells, not bombs, and there were no aeroplanes in sight. And they
continued to fall with painful regularity. Arriving at 15-minute
intervals, it was found that at least 21 shells had fallen that day.
They were not huge, weighing about 260 pounds, but they were large
enough to do considerable destruction, and to kill people in streets,
squares, and markets.
For a week they kept falling, and then occurred a tragedy that shocked
not only Paris but the whole Christian world. It was Good Friday,
and the cathedrals and churches were crowded with worshipers. As the
congregation--women and children, and men too old to fight--prayed in
the Church of St. Gervais, a shell crashed through the roof of the
building, and exploded. Seventy-five persons were killed, of whom
54 were women--and five of these were Americans. Ninety others were
injured.
In all Christian lands people were aghast at this slaughter of the
defenseless. Indignation was stirred all the more by the knowledge that
this bombardment was wholly without military value. Its entire object
was to terrorize the civilian population. It was only another example
of German frightfulness.
After long search by aircraft it was discovered that shells were coming
from the forest of Gobain, near Laon, nearly 75 miles from Paris.
There, inside the German lines, was located this new instrument of
warfare, the latest surprise sprung by the Germans and one of the most
sensational of the whole war. Worst of all, the Allies had no effective
reply. Aeroplane bombing proved ineffective, and the Allies had no guns
which could reach it.
For five months Paris endured this menace. No one knew where the shells
would fall next, or who would be the victim. The city, however, went
about its business and kept up its courage. But here in America there
was being prepared the Nemesis of the Teuton terror.
The United States Navy was at that very time building long-range guns
that, while not capable of firing such great distances as the German
cannon, were far more powerful and effective in action. Germany's gun
was a freak, merely able to hurl comparatively small shells seventy
miles or more. Huge projectiles weighing 1,400 pounds were fired by our
guns, and wherever they hit, everything in the vicinity was smashed.
Elaborate emplacements were required for the German gun, taking
considerable time to construct. Their cannon could be fired from only
one point. The American guns were on railway mounts, and could be
rapidly moved from place to place, wherever they were needed. Only
a few hours were required to get them into position. In fact, if
necessary, they could fire from the rails.
Five of these immense naval railway batteries were built and sent to
France. When the first battery arrived, on its way to the front, the
Germans stopped shelling Paris. Their long-distance gun was hastily
withdrawn, and it never fired another shot.
What these batteries saved us from can be judged from Admiral Sims'
statement that, encouraged by the shelling of Paris, the Germans were
preparing to conduct long-distance bombardments at various points
along the front. They were taking large guns from battle cruisers, to
be mounted where they could bombard Dunkirk, Chalons-sur-Marne, Nancy
and other cities. Sixteen huge rifles, it was reported, had left Kiel
for this purpose. But, so far as known, they never got into action.
The Germans never carried out their plan to scatter that terror to the
cities of France.
These railway batteries, the largest ever placed on mobile mounts,
proved an effective answer to the Germans. They were distinguished not
only by what they prevented, but what they accomplished in action.
Engaged with the French and American armies from September 6th until
hostilities ceased, this was the most powerful artillery used by the
Allies on the western front.
The guns were of the largest type on our dreadnaughts--14-inch, 50
caliber, capable of throwing a 1,400-pound projectile 42,000 yards,
nearly 25 miles. In action, the firing was usually from 18 to 23 miles.
Operating at various points along the lines from Laon to Longuyon,
these batteries tore up enemy railways, cutting important lines of
communication; blew up ammunition dumps and bases, and scattered
destruction far in the rear of the German trenches. Manned entirely by
Navy personnel, the force was under command of Rear Admiral Charles P.
Plunkett.
Each battery comprised an entire train of 15 cars, made up as follows:
1 Locomotive
1 Gun car
1 Construction car
1 Construction car with crane
1 Sand and log car
1 Fuel car
1 Battery kitchen car
2 Ammunition cars
3 Berthing cars
1 Battery headquarters car
1 Battery headquarters kitchen car
1 Workshop car
Thus each battery was self-sustaining, carrying not only its own
ammunition, fuel and food, but also machinery and mechanics for making
repairs. The total weight of the gun-car was about 535,000 pounds,
the gun, breech mechanism, and yoke weighing 192,500 pounds. The
five batteries, including the staff train of eight cars, comprised 6
consolidation locomotives and tenders (tractive power 35,600 pounds),
5 gun-cars and 72 auxiliary cars.
The first mount, complete with its huge gun, rolled out of the shops
on April 25, 1918, less than a month from the time of the Good Friday
slaughter in the Paris church. Tested at Sandy Hook, N. J., five days
later, it proved a complete success, hurling its immense projectiles
more than twenty-five miles.
If our guns had been built in Paris we could have had them at the front
in three days. They were made to move by rail, and to be ready for
almost immediate action. But they had to get to France first, and the
difficulties of fighting a war 3,000 miles away were impressed upon
us by this necessity for transporting them. No ship was big enough
to carry one of them set up. Each had to be taken to pieces before
loading. The last of the mounts was completed May 25--a new record for
quick construction. But getting a ship to take them over was no easy
task.
The first ship assigned was so badly battered up on the incoming voyage
that it had to go into dock for repairs. The second ship, the _Texel_,
was sunk by a U-boat near our coast. It was June 29 before the first
of the battery transports, the _Newport News_, heavily laden with
material, sailed for France, arriving at St. Nazaire July 9th.
Setting up these immense batteries was a trying job. Facilities at
St. Nazaire were very limited for the work of assembly. Lieutenant
Commander D. C. Buell, an officer of railroad experience, who as
inspector had watched the building of the mounts, was sent to France.
Admiral Plunkett and his force were on hand when the major part of the
material arrived. All set to work, and in a little more than two weeks
the first train was assembled.
Then arose another complication. When the French saw the size of these
mounts, they were afraid their immense weight would crush the rails
and probably break through or weaken bridges. The railroad authorities
were unwilling for them to move over their lines. For a time it seemed
as if they would never get to the front. But Admiral Plunkett and his
aids had more confidence than did the French. The first train, which
had been completed a week before, left St. Nazaire August 17th. It
proceeded slowly and all doubts were removed when it rode the rails and
passed over bridges without the slightest trouble.
The news of its coming had somehow spread through France and its
progress toward Paris was like a triumphal procession. All along the
route crowds assembled, cheering the American naval gunners "going to
land," and girls decorated the gun with flowers. A second battery was
on the way before the first arrived. Camouflage was no concealment.
Everybody knew the big American cannon were on the way. And the Germans
must have learned it, too. For, when the battery got near the front,
the German long-distance gun was hurried away.
These two batteries were to proceed to Helles-Mouchy, and from there
search out the hidden enemy in Gobain. But when the batteries reached
this position, it was found that the German terrifier was gone, leaving
only its emplacement to mark the spot at which it had so long operated.
Battery No. 1 proceeded to the French proving ground at Nuisemont,
where firing tests were made with complete success. Battery No. 2
proceeded to Rethondes, in the forest of Compiegne, to fire upon an
ammunition dump at Tergnier, but after one shot, fired September 6,
ceased firing, as the French captured the village. Battery No. 1 was
taken to Soissons where, on September 11, position was taken near St.
Christopher Cemetery. No. 2 proceeded to Fontenoy-Ambleny.
While these two batteries were operating, work was continuing on the
remaining three. Trains No. 3 and 4 left St. Nazaire September 13,
followed by No. 5 on the 14th. They arrived at the railroad artillery
base, Haussimont, on September 23rd, 24th and 26th, respectively.
Weather conditions preventing observation by aeroplane or balloon,
it was decided to proceed without observation, so on September 14th
Battery No. 2 fired ten rounds at an ammunition dump in Besny-Loisy,
just west of Laon. No. 1 on September 28th fired into the German lines
at Laon, putting over 47 rounds between 1 and 5:30 p. m., at a range
of 34,000 yards. The target was the railroad yards. One hundred and
twelve rounds were fired against this objective between September 28th
and October 2nd. Battery No. 2 fired twelve rounds into Besny-Loisy on
September 15th.
The Germans began retreating from Laon while this long-range
bombardment was in progress, leaving these targets in the hands of the
Allies. It was found that, though the batteries had only maps to use
in directing the firing and without aeroplane observation, the shots
in nearly all cases were effective hits. One 14-inch shell wrecked
a three-track railroad line, making a gap of 100 feet, tearing up
rails, shattering ties and blowing a crater in the road-bed. Another
projectile struck a moving picture theater during a performance,
killing 40 men outright and severely wounding sixty. Two other shells
struck this theatre, completely demolishing it and several other
surrounding buildings. A freight train on a siding had been struck, and
one of the cars was lifted from the tracks and thrown a distance of
thirty feet.
Time and again enemy aeroplanes bombed the vicinity of these batteries.
Shells were continually passing overhead. On October 5th, at 4:30 p.
m., a shell burst directly over Battery No. 1, followed by three other
high bursts. A succession of shells followed. One struck only 16 feet
from the gun, fragments hitting the sideplates and breaking the casting
of the gas engine support, but doing no further damage.
Battery No. 2 was taken to Flavy-le-Martel, arriving October 8th. No. 1
remained at Soissons until October 24th, firing in all 199 rounds from
the same pit foundation. After the capture of Laon, the target was, on
October 2, shifted to a point northeast of that town, where 87 rounds
were fired at ranges from 28,000 to 36,660 yards.
Having performed so satisfactorily in the vicinity of Soissons with the
Tenth French Army, Batteries No. 1 and No. 2 were ordered to join the
First American Army. They arrived at Nixeville, just south of Verdun,
October 28th. Batteries 3, 4 and 5, already in that region, had fired
several rounds at open fields in the German lines near the targets
selected, in order to obtain aviation photographs and correct the
range. On the 30th and 31st six rounds per gun were fired each day, the
two guns at Thierville firing at an aviation field south of Longuyon
and the two batteries at Charny firing at points near Montmedy. Battery
No. 2 bombarded the railroad yards at Montmedy with 43 rounds on
November 1st and 2nd.
As General Foch was preparing for a big offensive east of Metz, the
French requested that two of the naval batteries be assigned to take
part in this operation. Accordingly Nos. 1 and 2 were assigned to the
French, while the remaining three remained at Thierville and Charny
to keep up the bombardment of Montmedy and Longuyon. No. 1 proceeded
via Champigneulles, arriving at its firing position, in the forest of
Velor, November 6th, its objective being Sarrebourg. Leaving Charny
November 3rd, Battery No. 2 reached Moncel-Lunéville, in the forest
of Mondon, November 9th, having orders to fire on Bensdorf. Both
targets were important German railroad centers. But the signing of the
armistice, on the 11th, put an end to the French offensive for which
huge preparations had been made.
Battery No. 3, which was shifted from Thierville to No. 2's position at
Charny, on November 1, fired at the Longuyon railway yards. No. 4 fired
23 rounds into Montmedy, and No. 5, 44 rounds at the transportation
centres of Longuyon. The next day Nos. 3 and 5 each fired 25 rounds
at Longuyon and No. 4, 20 rounds at the Montmedy railroad. On account
of the enemy's activities at Louppy and Remoiville, No. 4 November 3,
fired 25 rounds at a large ammunition dump and at the lower railroad
dump at Montmedy. On November 4, Battery No. 4 again took up position
at Thierville. No. 3 opened fire on Louppy and Remoiville on the
morning of November 4, firing 44 rounds at the two targets. Twelve
rounds were also fired at Montmedy.
The naval guns were last fired on November 11th, batteries 4 and 5
sending five shells each into Longuyon. The last shot was fired by No.
4, from Charny, at 10:58:30 a. m., ninety seconds before hostilities
ceased.
While direct observations could not be obtained in the Verdun sector,
there was evidence from the enemy of the effectiveness of these
guns. On November 5, the southern part of Montmedy, which was under
bombardment, was reported on fire. Later a German prisoner stated that
the firing on Montmedy had caused a great deal of damage, one shell
which landed in the railway yards, killing all the Germans in two
coaches.
[Illustration: NAVAL RAILWAY BATTERY FIRING FROM THIERVILLE UPON
LONGUYON
Insert: Rear Admiral Charles P. Plunkett, commanding the Naval Railway
Batteries in France.]
The batteries at Charny and Thierville were repeatedly shelled and
bombed. On October 30th, when the enemy was shelling crossroads
between No. 2 gun and its berthing cars, three American engineers
working on the track near by were killed, and the headquarters car and
one berthing car derailed. On the same day five soldiers were killed
and others wounded by shells which fell around Battery No. 4 at Charny.
Three men of Battery 4 were wounded by shell fire on October 28th, one
of these, A. P. Sharpe, seaman first class, dying the next day in the
hospital at Glorieux.
[Illustration: ON THE TURRET PLATFORM OF A BATTLESHIP
A naval airplane is mounted, on the turret platform, ready for the call
to the sea.]
One of the most important services rendered by the naval batteries was
the shelling of the railroad running through Longuyon and Montmedy,
the only line (except one running far to the north through Belgium),
by which the Germans could bring troops to Sedan. Though some shots
fell several hundred yards beyond the ranges calculated from the range
table, the railroad line and yards were struck frequently, and traffic
stopped completely, not only during the actual firing, but from six to
ten hours each day after the firing ceased.
General Pershing, in his report of November 20, 1918, said:
Our large caliber guns were advanced, and were skilfully brought
into position to fire upon the important lines at Montmedy,
Longuyon, and Conflans. On the 6th a division of the First Corps
reached a point on the Meuse opposite Sedan, 25 miles from our
lines of departure. The strategical goal which was our highest hope
was gained. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications,
and nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army from
complete disaster.
Though these batteries fired a total of 782 rounds and were under enemy
shell-fire repeatedly, there was no material damage to guns, mounts or
equipment, which met every condition imposed. The total rounds fired
per gun were: No. 1, 199; No. 2, 113; No. 3, 236; No. 4, 122; No. 5,
112.
In France the naval railway batteries operated as five separate and
independent units, all under command of Admiral Plunkett. His principal
assistants were Lieutenant Commanders G. L. Schuyler and J. W. Bunkley.
The commanders of the batteries were: No. 1, Lieutenant J. A. Martin;
No. 2, Lieutenant (junior grade) E. D. Duckett; No. 3, Lieutenant W. G.
Smith; No. 4, Lieutenant J. R. Hayden; No. 5, Lieutenant J. L. Rodgers.
The use of these guns at the front was first proposed in November,
1917. Impressed by the Allies' lack of long-range artillery, the Chief
of the Bureau of Ordnance pointed out that a number of 14-inch guns at
the Washington Navy Yard were available and suggested that they might
be mounted on the Belgian coast to reply to the powerful artillery the
Germans were using against Dunkirk. Upon consideration, it was decided
that it was practicable to place these naval guns on railway mounts,
though they were heavier than any mobile artillery that had been built
by any country. On November 26, 1917, I instructed the Bureau of
Ordnance to proceed with the building of five of these mounts, with
complete train equipment. Though many problems had to be solved, the
naval gun factory completed the designs within two months, and the 136
standard drawings and 36 sketches required were ready to submit to
bidders on January 26, 1918.
With the numerous other war requirements, which taxed steel and
locomotive plants to their capacity, it seemed, at first, almost
impossible to secure the building of the mounts, locomotives and
cars required. But bids were secured, accepted on February 13, 1918,
and the contractors pushed the work so energetically that the first
mount was completed 72 days from the award of the contract. Scheduled
for delivery on May 15, it was completed April 25. The last mount,
scheduled for June 15, was completed May 25. The first gun and mount
complete arrived April 27 at Sandy Hook, N. J., where it was subjected
to severe firing tests. The locomotives and auxiliary cars were
completed June 1, and shipment overseas was begun. Credit for this
speedy construction is due contractors as well as naval officers,
and particularly Mr. Samuel M. Vauclain, president of the Baldwin
Locomotive Works, who took an intense personal interest in the whole
undertaking.
While construction was under way, the Navy had been selecting and
training the personnel, 30 officers and 500 men, required to man
and operate the batteries. Men were carefully chosen--some 20,000
volunteered for this detail--and were given an intensive course of
training.
The approximate cost of the five mounts, locomotives, cars, spare parts
and ammunition was $3,337,970.
As other artillery could accomplish with less expenditure of
ammunition and expense the results desired at the shorter ranges the
naval guns were used entirely for strategical purposes and were fired
at ranges between 30,000 and 40,000 yards, shelling objectives that
less powerful guns could not reach. The ammunition supply which was
gauged by the estimated "life" of the gun--that is, the number of times
it could fire with accuracy--consisted of 300 rounds for each gun, and
this quantity proved adequate. Battery No. 3 made a record for guns of
this size in firing 236 rounds without serious deterioration.
From beginning to end, this entire enterprise was so well planned and
carried out, that we may well consider it one of the most successful
operations in which the Navy ever engaged.