SHUTTING UP THE HORNETS IN THEIR NESTS
MINE BARRAGE ACROSS NORTH SEA A TERROR TO U-BOATS--GERMANS PLANNED
BIG DRIVE, BUT SUBMARINE CREWS REFUSED TO GO TO SEA--MORALE
SHATTERED, KAISER'S NAVY WAS WRECKED BY MUTINY--PROPOSED BY U.
S. NAVY IN APRIL, 1917, EIGHTY PER CENT OF BARRAGE WAS LAID BY
AMERICANS.
Germany planned a great naval offensive in the fall of 1918--that is,
the German authorities did, the High Command. Why was it never carried
out? Why were the U-boats recalled? Why did the Kaiser's High Seas
Fleet surrender without striking a blow?
When Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the British Admiralty, visited
Washington in October, 1918, he told me that we might expect a decided
increase in submarine activity, a German drive at sea. In the official
conferences we held, Sir Eric and his associates predicted that,
notwithstanding all the efforts we were making, vastly more tonnage
might be sunk in the ensuing months. The British were striving to
increase ship production, and put as many war vessels as possible into
commission.
The next day I telegraphed the leading shipbuilders of the country,
asking them to come to Washington. Over 200 destroyers were under
construction or contracted for, and rapid progress was being made on
them. But I thought that, by special effort, we might rush a larger
number to completion. The critical situation outlined by the British
authorities was explained to the builders, and they were directed
to make construction continuous--to run three shifts of eight hours
each, working day, night and Sundays, and to speed up to the utmost on
destroyers and all anti-submarine craft. They pledged their earnest
assistance, proposing to increase forces, if labor could be secured,
and to push the program already undertaken on the highest gear.
While the visit of the British mission as announced was to "discuss
certain matters concerning the naval situation," and its conferences
were confidential, its members in public statements made clear their
belief that easy or early victory was not to be expected.
"I have made it the keynote of all my policy and all my advice to
others not to be deluded with hopes of an early peace, but to prepare
for an ever-receding duration of the war," said Sir Eric Geddes. "We
must always be prepared for two years more, and then only shall we have
the sure means of victory in our hands."
More significant still, more to the point, was the remark made by Sir
Eric just before he sailed for Europe:
"A great renewed effort on Germany's part is impending. We know it, and
its extent."
Before he reached England, U-boat warfare was practically ended. Within
ten days the submarines were recalled to their home bases. As they were
returning to Germany they sank a few ships. But these were the last few
examples of German frightfulness on the seas.
What had brought about that tremendous change? It was not due to any
lack of determination on the part of the German Admiralty, or the
Kaiser. But they found that the big stick with which they were to
strike was only a broken reed. The morale of their navy was shattered.
Officers were willing enough to obey orders, but their men refused to
fight.
The U-boat crews, for years the pick and pride of the service, refused
to go to sea. Germany was building hundreds of submarines, they were
being turned out by the score. She might soon have sent out a dozen for
every one she had when ruthless warfare began. But willing crews were
lacking to man them.
This was a complete reversal of previous experience. A year before
U-boat duty had been the most sought-for branch of the service.
Essaying long voyages in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, cruising
for weeks around the waters of England and France, their officers
and men had braved many dangers, and returning were hailed by their
countrymen as conquering heroes.
Sinkings had been made more difficult by the convoy system. Listening
devices had made it more dangerous for submarines to remain in the
vicinity of naval vessels. Patrol, by surface ships and aircraft,
had become more efficient. Shipping was more difficult to get at and
destroy. More submarines were being sunk than in the early days. But,
with all these operating against them, the U-boats, even if they could
not make such high scores in tonnage, had more than an even chance to
reach their home bases unscathed.
Now was another danger to face, however; one that was hidden and
deadly, and it had to be faced by every boat departing or returning.
Some U-boats, putting out to sea from their nesting places on the
German coasts, vanished utterly. No trace was left, no record of what
fate befell them.
Others, badly damaged, limped back to port. Survivors told of colliding
with mines hidden far below the surface, whose presence could not be
guessed. No vigilance could locate or action avoid them. They might
run into them anywhere within hundreds of miles. This was a terror the
undersea boatmen were unwilling to face. The revolt of the U-boat crews
spread to other branches of the naval service, and the entire German
navy began to disintegrate.
The mutiny in the German sea forces, the demoralization of its
personnel, has no parallel in naval history. This was undoubtedly due
to various causes, but, in my belief, there was no one thing that had
more influence in breaking the German morale, particularly in the
U-boat service, than did the Northern Mine Barrage.
Stretching across the North Sea, from Norway almost to the Orkneys,
this heavy barrier of powerful mines opposed any enemy vessels which
attempted to make their way around the north of Scotland into the
Atlantic. The Germans had only two exits from the North Sea, the one
covered by this mine barrier, and, to the south, the narrow Straits of
Dover, also partially mined and guarded by the famous Dover Patrol.
It was a new factor in war, this vast barrage, the most successful
innovation, the biggest new naval offensive put forth after our
entrance into the war. American in conception, it was also mainly
American in construction. A joint British and American undertaking,
as it was, four-fifths of the mines laid were of American design and
manufacture, made in this country, taken across the Atlantic in
American ships, and laid by American naval vessels.
Though not actually laid until the summer of 1918, this was the first
big project proposed by the United States Navy after our entrance into
the war. In fact, it was only nine days after war was declared that
the Bureau of Ordnance presented an elaborate memorandum, outlining
the proposition. But the British Admiralty, without whose consent and
coöperation it could not be constructed, and Admiral Sims pronounced it
"impractical" and "unfeasible." It was not until six months later that
we secured the Admiralty's approval, and the great project got under
way.
The first mine was laid on June 8, 1918. "The barrier began to take
toll of the enemy's submarines as early as July 9, when one was
disabled on the barrier and compelled to return to Germany," reported
Admiral Joseph Strauss, commander of American mining operations in the
North Sea. "It is not known how many submarines were sunk or disabled
in the mine field. It has been placed as high as twenty-three. My own
estimate, based on known sinkings, is ten, although I am inclined to
think that is a modest one."
Captain Reginald R. Belknap, commander of Mine Squadron 1, says the
barrage began to yield results before it was half way across. "From the
nature of the case it may never be known definitely how many actually
did come to grief there," he said; "but the best information gives
a probable ten before the middle of October, with a final total of
seventeen or more. In addition to this toll, the squadron should be
given credit for two submarines lost in the field of British mines laid
by the _Baltimore_ off the Irish coast."
Eight and one-half per cent of the total number of submarines lost
during the war were brought into the list of missing by the barrage,
was the estimate of Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Bureau of
Ordnance, under whose administration and leadership the mine barrage
was conceived, projected and constructed. Admiral Earle reported to me:
It has been established that six submarines were lost in the
barrage and three more so badly damaged that they never again put
to sea. However, from further evidence, the British Admiralty
officially credit the barrage with fourteen additional, or a
total of twenty-three. Two hundred German U-boats were destroyed
in the war, or fifty more than the Allies could account for.
To err on the conservative side, we claim but eight out of the
fourteen credited the barrage by the British Admiralty, or a total
of seventeen. This is also the figure arrived at by Captain R. R.
Belknap, commander of Mine Squadron 1. What does this figure show?
Eight and one-half per cent of the total number of submarines
lost during the war were brought into the list of missing by the
barrage, which existed for only six per cent of the period of the
war. Such results more than justified the effort and time and funds
expended.
[Illustration: PLANTING MINES IN THE NORTH SEA
A squadron of American mine planters at work. Inset: Rear Admiral
Joseph Strauss, who was in general command of mining operations.]
[Illustration: HOW THE BIG MINES IN THE NORTH SEA BARRAGE WORKED
Fig. 1. Mine and Anchor leaving launching rails.
Fig. 2. Fifth wheel released, plummet supported by dashpot.
Fig. 3. Plummet released and unwinding cord.
Fig. 4. Plummet at end of cord. Slip hook pulled off.
Fig. 5. Anchor paying out mooring cable as it sinks. Plummet strikes
bottom and locks cable drum.
Fig. 6. Anchor on bottom submerging mine distance equal to length of
plummet cord.
A. MINE CASE
B. ANCHOR
C. PLUMMET
D. PLUMMET CORD
E. SLIP HOOK
F. MOORING]
The barrage did more than take toll of submarines sent to kingdom come
by its mines. "There is no doubt," reported Sims in the "Summary of
Activities of American Forces in European Waters," "that the barrage
had a considerable moral effect on the German naval crews, for it is
known that several submarines hesitated some time before crossing.
Also, reports from German sources are that the barrage caused no small
amount of panic in some of the submarine flotillas. It is also probable
that the barrage played a part in preventing raids on Allied commerce
by fast enemy cruisers."
Admiral Strauss, in his testimony before the Senate Investigating
Committee, declared that if the Northern Barrage and that across the
Straits of Dover had been fully completed as we planned, "it would have
ended the submarine menace, so far as submarines going from the North
Sea into the Atlantic were concerned;" and that the building of the
mine barriers across the Adriatic and Aegean seas, for which we were
preparing materials, "would have actually ended submarine operations."
Could it have been built in 1917, a year earlier than it was? Strauss
said it could, and this was the firm belief of Earle and other
ordnance experts. True, the antenna mine we developed later was a big
improvement, superior to any previously devised. It would have taken
two or three times as many mines of the type then in use, perhaps
180,000 of them, as was estimated. We manufactured 100,000 of the
antenna type, and could have made as many more, if necessary. The
British had no antenna mines, Admiral Strauss pointed out, and all the
mines they laid in the barrage were of the older type. After all the
objections were presented to him, Admiral Strauss, when asked if he
still considered it would have been feasible to have gone ahead with
the barrage in 1917, unhesitatingly answered: "Yes."
Not laying that barrage earlier--in fact, at the earliest possible
moment--was, in my opinion, the greatest naval error of the war. If the
British had erected it early in the war, and put a similar effective
barrier across the Straits of Dover and Otranto, the Germans would have
been so restricted that widespread U-boat warfare, with its terrible
destruction of life and shipping, would have been impossible.
"Shutting up the hornets in their nests," as President Wilson expressed
it, was the first idea that occurred to us when we went to war. The
Bureau of Ordnance on April 15, 1917, submitted a memorandum urging
that we "stop the submarines at their source" and suggesting that
mine barriers be laid across the North Sea, the Adriatic and the
Dardanelles. "The northern barrier," it stated, "would extend from the
mid-eastern coast of Scotland to the Norwegian coast, a distance of
about 250 miles," and the southern (that is, to close the Straits of
Dover) would extend "from the southeast coast of England and to a point
on the French coast near the Belgian frontier, a distance of about
forty miles." Next day I cabled Admiral Sims, who had just arrived in
London:
Is it not practicable to blockade German coast efficiently and
completely, thus making practically impossible the egress and
ingress of submarines? The steps attempted or accomplished in this
direction are to be reported at once.
Two days later came the answer:
To absolutely blockade the German and Belgian coast against
the entrance and departure of submarines has been found quite
unfeasible.
The next day he wrote a long letter, amplifying the difficulties and
reporting against any such barriers. But our ordnance experts were
thoroughly convinced the project was feasible. On May 9th they outlined
their plans in a memorandum to be submitted to the British Admiralty,
and on May 11th I cabled to Admiral Sims: "Much opinion is in favor of
concerted efforts by the Allies to establish a complete barrier across
the North Sea, Scotland to Norway, either direct or via the Shetlands,
to prevent the egress of German submarines." I added, "The difficulty
and size of the problem is recognized, but if it is possible of
accomplishment the situation would warrant the effort." He was directed
to consult with the British Admiralty regarding this plan. Two days
later came the reply:
From all experience Admiralty considers project of attempting to
close exit to North Sea to enemy submarines by the method suggested
to be quite impracticable. Project has previously been considered
and abandoned.
In a dispatch on May 14th Sims said: "The abandonment of any serious
attempts at blockading such passages as Scotland-Norway, the Skagerrack
and Scotland to Shetland has been forced by bitter and expensive
experience."
"As may well be imagined," he wrote later, "this whole subject has
been given the most earnest consideration, as it is, of course,
realized that if submarines could be kept from coming out, the whole
problem would at once be solved." But he said, "I cannot too strongly
emphasize the fact that during nearly three years of active warfare
this whole question had been the most serious subject of consideration
by the British Admiralty," which had concluded that no "barrier can be
completely effective."
This, however, did not deter our ordnance experts. The more they
studied the question, the more were they convinced that the barrier
could be "put across." Believing in mines, preparing for mine
operations on a large scale, they were astonished when, on May 31st,
Sims reported that, instead of our giving attention to mine production,
the British Admiralty "consider we can more profitably concentrate on
other work."
Earle and his associates in the Bureau of Ordnance never doubted final
success. They experimented with mines, firing and anchoring devices,
and on July 30th announced the development of a new type of mine,
particularly adapted to deep waters. A unique feature of this mine was
that it did not have to be struck to explode, but would explode if a
submarine passed close to it. This was due to the firing apparatus,
which was evolved from an electrical device submitted by Mr. Ralph C.
Browne, of Salem, Mass., to be used on a submerged gun. Officers of the
Bureau concluded this could be adapted to mines, and in May began work
to that end. Commander S. P. Fullinwider, chief of the Mine Section,
was aided by Mr. Browne, Lieutenant Commander T. S. Wilkinson, Jr.,
and Commodore S. J. Brown in producing this firing device, and others
who assisted in developing the mine were Lieutenant Commanders O. W.
Bagby, J. A. Schofield, W. A. Corley, C. H. Wright and H. E. Fischer,
Lieutenant S. W. Cook and Lieutenant (junior grade) B. W. Grimes.
With this improved mine as an argument, our ordnance officers renewed
the proposal of a mine offensive in the North Sea. The memorandum the
Bureau submitted was comprehensive, and contained all the essential
features of the barrage plan that was later adopted and carried into
effect.
How could the project be best presented to the British Admiralty again?
Admiral Mayo was preparing to sail within a short time for Europe. Just
before his departure the entire project was discussed and the operation
of the improved mines explained, as he was to bring the whole matter to
the attention of the British Admiralty and the Allied Naval Council. To
prevent loss of time and further insure the Admiralty's consideration,
on August 17th, before Mayo sailed, I cabled Sims:
Bureau of Ordnance has developed a mine which it hopes may have
decisive influence upon operations against submarines. Utmost
secrecy considered necessary. Request that an officer representing
the Admiralty, clothed with power to decide, be sent here to
inspect and thoroughly test mine, and, if found satisfactory,
arrange for coöperation in mining operations.
The Allied Naval Conference, held in London September 4th and 5th,
which Mayo attended, took up not only the barrage project, but another
proposition our Navy Department had suggested months before, a close
offensive in German waters. After the meeting Mayo cabled:
Conference completed after agreement upon the following points:
1. That close offensive in German waters should be carefully
considered by Allies, after which they should indicate to British
Admiralty contribution of old war ships they are prepared to
furnish should offensive prove practicable.
2. That alternative offensive employing effective mine field or
mine net barrage to completely shut in North Sea not practicable
until adequate supply satisfactory type mines assured, and
that pending such supply, extension present system mine fields
desirable and that mine net barrage impracticable.
This indicated to us that the British still doubted the effectiveness
of a barrage, as well as our ability to furnish an adequate supply of
mines. It was evident that, after five months of earnest advocacy,
further urging was needed to secure approval of the project. Benson,
therefore, on September 12th, cabled Mayo:
There are great possibilities in the satisfactory solution of
the mine and depth-charge question. Officers sent over here most
satisfactory and remarkably well posted. I think it would help the
whole situation wonderfully if Commodore Gaunt could visit the
Admiralty for a few days and have a heart-to-heart talk. No time to
be lost.
What happened next? The day after Benson's message was received,
the British Admiralty made out for Mayo a paper entitled, "General
Future Policy, Including Mine Policy," with an appendix, "Mine Barrage
Across the North Sea." The policy outlined by the Admiralty, announced
September 14th, was the same the Navy Department had suggested nearly
five months previous.
Even then there was delay. On October 9th, Sims reported that the
Admiralty was "thoroughly investigating the question" and that "the
discussion of this question will probably be postponed by the Admiralty
until the return of the commander-in-chief." We were still not certain
as to whether the British were ready to put it through. But, believing
that the plan must finally be put into effect, our Bureau of Ordnance
went ahead, and let the contracts for 100,000 mines. Upon Mayo's return
October 15th, the amendments suggested by the British were approved by
the General Board and accepted by the Department. Nothing definite,
however, had come from London and on October 20th Sims was cabled:
The Department requests to be informed whether the plan for
the placing of a mine barrier across the North Sea on the
Aberdeen-Egersund line has the approval of the Admiralty.
Finally on October 22nd, an answer direct from the British Admiralty
said, "Admiralty has approved mine barrier and now confirms approval."
All the details were then perfected--this required several days--and
on October 29th I received and approved the completed plans. The
President, who for months had been impatient of delay, gave his
approval as soon as they were laid before him. This was at a cabinet
meeting on October 30th. The same day a cable was sent to the Admiralty
that we had taken steps to fit out mine-planters; that shipment of
mines would begin the first of January, and officers would be sent in a
few days to arrange details.
So after months of opposition, doubt and indecision, the two navies
united in the construction of this most stupendous job of the kind ever
conceived or undertaken. It was well done and the result demonstrated
its effectiveness. Admiral Sims himself, after its completion and
success, said that "no such project has ever been carried out more
successfully" and that "as an achievement it stands as one of the
wonders of the war."
I am not giving these details in any spirit of criticism of the
British Admiralty or our representative in London, but to do justice
to the vision, initiative and resource of the American Navy. It was,
indeed, a bold and gigantic experiment, calling for many millions of
money and the strenuous and dangerous work of many men. That it was so
successfully done reflects credit alike on Britons and Americans, and
both share in the honor of its accomplishment.
Manufacturing 100,000 mines was a big order, but that was only
the beginning. They had to be shipped 3,500 miles overseas, which
necessitated a fleet of mine-carriers. Twenty-three cargo vessels
were converted, and assigned to this duty. To fill the mines with
explosives a mine-loading plant of 22 buildings was erected at St.
Julien's Creek, Va., capable of receiving, loading and shipping 1,000
mines a day. Advanced bases, for inspection and assembly of the mines,
were established in February, 1918, on the east coast of Scotland, at
Inverness and Invergordon, with Captain O. G. Murfin in charge.
For the work of mine-laying, a Mine Squadron was created, under command
of Captain Reginald R. Belknap. This consisted of the flagship _San
Francisco_ (Captain H. V. Butler), and her consort, the _Baltimore_
(Captain A. W. Marshall), "crack cruisers of the vintage of 1890,"
as Captain Belknap called them; and eight former merchant vessels
converted into naval mine planters. Four of these were Southern
Pacific or Morgan liners, carrying freight between New York and
Galveston, renamed the _Roanoke_ (Captain C. D. Stearns), _Canonicus_
(Captain T. L. Johnson), _Housatonic_ (Captain J. W. Greenslade), and
_Canandaigua_ (Commander W. H. Reynolds). Two were the Old Dominion
passenger liners _Jefferson_ and _Hamilton_, running between New York
and Norfolk, renamed _Quinnebaug_ (Commander D. Pratt Mannix), and
_Saranac_ (Captain Sinclair Gannon). The remaining two were the fast
Boston and New York passenger steamers, _Massachusetts_ and _Bunker
Hill_, of the Eastern Steamship Corporation, renamed _Shawmut_ (Captain
W. T. Cluverius), and _Aroostook_ (Captain J. Harvey Tomb). They were
accompanied abroad by several seagoing tugs, the _Sonoma_, _Ontario_,
_Patapsco_ and _Patuxent_.
Admiral Strauss, who was in general command of mining operations,
went to England in March, inspected the bases, and conferred with the
British authorities as to the general arrangements. His flagship was
the _Black Hawk_ (Captain R. C. Bulmer), which was also the repair
vessel of the mine force. The British began mine laying in March, but
one of their vessels, the _Gailardia_, was sunk; and operations were
suspended for a time until the safety of the mines could be assured.
The _Baltimore_, the first of our vessels sent over, arrived in the
Clyde in March. Submarines were very active in Irish waters, and the
Admiralty decided to lay a deep mine-field off the north coast of
Ireland, in the North Channel. As all British mine-layers were employed
elsewhere, the Admiralty requested the use of the _Baltimore_. This was
readily granted and the _Baltimore_ engaged in this from April 13th
until the latter part of May, joining our squadron in Scotland June
2nd. The _Roanoke_, sent over to assist her, was instead ordered to our
base at Invergordon.
Sailing from Newport, May 12th, the _San Francisco_ and other vessels
arrived at Inverness, May 26th, all ready to begin operations.
Twelve days later the squadron started on its first mine-planting
"excursion." On these expeditions, which lasted usually from 40 to
80 hours, the squadron was regarded as a part of the British Grand
Fleet. Screening it against submarines, and hostile mines casually
placed, was an escort of eight to twelve British destroyers, which
formed around the squadron upon its leaving the base and kept with it
until its return. To guard against attack from enemy cruisers, while
away from the coast, the squadron was accompanied by a supporting
force, consisting of a battleship or battle-cruiser squadron and a
light-cruiser squadron of the Grand Fleet, sometimes by all three,
according to the estimated probabilities of attack. On the second
mining excursion the support was the Sixth Battle Squadron, the
American battleships, commanded by Admiral Rodman. Captain Belknap gave
a vivid picture of the dangerous character of mine-laying when he said:
One may imagine with what feelings we saw our own great ships file
out of Scapa Flow, form line on our quarter, and slowly disappear
in the haze, as they swept off to the southeastward. It will be
readily understood that the way had to be made smooth for the mine
planters. As long as it was so, all would go well; but a single
well placed torpedo or mine, or a few enemy shells, would certainly
finish one vessel, and probably destroy all ten of them. Each mine
planter carried from 24 to 120 tons of high explosive, a total of
nearly 800 tons in the squadron, many times more than the amount
that devastated Halifax. With this on board, the squadron was
hardly a welcome visitor anywhere.
Operations as a whole were conducted in conjunction with a British
mine-laying squadron of four vessels, under command of Rear Admiral
Clinton-Baker. American and British squadrons often went out at the
same time, under protection of the same heavy vessels, but except on
two occasions they worked separately, in different parts of the barrage
area. Thus there were altogether fourteen mine planters at work at the
same time.
On the first excursion, June 7th, the American squadron planted a mine
field 47 miles long, containing 3,400 mines, in 3 hours and 36 minutes.
Everything went without a hitch. One ship emptied herself of 675 mines
without a single break, one mine every 11-1/2 seconds through more than
two hours, a record never before equalled.
[Illustration: ONE OF THE PERILS OF MINE-SWEEPING
An explosion close astern of the Patapsco. The greatest care was
exercised to avoid accidents of this character, but to eliminate them
entirely was impossible.]
[Illustration: THE MINE-SWEEPERS PROVED WONDERFUL SEA BOATS
These tiny craft rode many a rough sea which worried larger and more
powerful ships.]
[Illustration: UNITED STATES NAVAL OFFICES IN IMPORTANT COMMANDS
Left to right: Admiral Sims, Admiral Mayo, Captain Nathan C. Twining,
Captain O. P. Jackson, Admiral Wilson.]
[Illustration: AMERICAN AND BRITISH NAVAL OFFICIALS
Left to right: Admiral Benson, Secretary Daniels, Sir Eric Geddes,
Admiral Duff.]
Dangerous as was the work, there were very few casualties. One man
fell overboard from the _Saranac_ and was drowned, but he was the only
man lost at sea, and there were but four other deaths in that force of
4,000. Laden with high explosives, navigating waters where enemy mines
had been laid, operating near mine fields, and in danger of premature
explosion from those they themselves had laid, it is remarkable that
not one of these ships was lost or seriously damaged.
The eighth excursion in which British and American squadrons joined,
both in command of Admiral Strauss, closed the western end of the
barrier, off the Orkneys. The next expedition was conducted in the
same manner, with Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, of the British Navy, in
command. The American squadron made fifteen excursions, the British
eleven, operations being completed October 26th. In four hours on one
expedition, 6,820 mines were planted, 5,520 by our vessels, 1,300 by
the British. Our squadron alone planted a field 73 miles long in one
day.
Seventy thousand, two hundred and sixty-three mines were laid--13,652
British, 56,611 American. Numerous lines were laid near the surface;
others were placed at from 90 to 160 feet; and the lowest went to
depths from 160 to 240 feet.
Beginning near the northern Orkneys, the barrier ran to Udsire Light,
near Bergen, on the coast of Norway, 230 miles. Its average width was
25 miles, in some places it was 35 miles across, and at no point was
it less than 15 miles wide. At its narrowest, this meant more than
an hour's run for a submarine. Mines were planted, row after row, at
various depths. If a U-boat proceeded on or near the surface, it would
encounter from six to ten lines of mines. If it tried to break through
by going deeper, there were more of the deadly explosives. Submergence
was, in fact, as dangerous as running the gauntlet on the surface. No
matter how far the sub went down there were mines to meet it, to the
furthest limit of submarine descent. One touch--even a slight jar from
the vibration of the U-boat--was enough to set off one of these mines,
and when it exploded the U-boat was done for.
Mine-laying was not the only role played by the American force, Captain
Belknap wrote:
In addition to the value of the barrage itself, in keeping the
enemy submarines in or from their bases, the mine squadrons were
expected to serve as bait, to draw out the German fleet; the
squadrons' role being neatly expressed by one high officer as
"an important military offensive with a front seat at the Second
Battle of Jutland." This ever present possibility and the fact
that the working ground lay in the principal thoroughfare of enemy
submarines, with attendant incidents of periscope sightings,
submarine reports, depth charges, smoke screens, floating mines,
and dead Germans floating by, lent spice to the work, which, like
the proverbial sporting life, was often hard but never dull. * * *
On every excursion, during the mine laying, one or more of the
mines would go off fairly close astern--lest we forget! The mines
were very sensitive, and no witness of an excursion could retain
any doubt as to the fate of a submarine that "luckless dares our
silent wake."
The eastern end of the barrage extended to the territorial waters of
Norway. That country being neutral we could not, of course, mine to its
shores. With the growth of the barrier, U-boats took advantage of this,
going within the three-mile limit to slip by into the open sea. The
Norwegian Government then announced its decision to mine its waters,
which closed that gap.
Our original plan was to plant mines clear to the Orkneys, and this we
urged. But Admiral Beatty and others strongly objected, fearing that
it might hamper the operations of the Grand Fleet. So the mine-fields
ended ten miles east of the islands. But this ten-mile passage was
heavily patroled, and any "sub" attempting to pass that way must run
the risk of attack by numerous naval vessels. Thus the U-boats could
not get through anywhere except at great risk. Months were required to
lay that barrier, and during that time there were unmined areas through
which vessels could pass.
The barrage was completed October 26th, almost coincident with
Germany's recall of its U-boats, which practically ended submarine
warfare. Some of those recalled did not reach these waters until the
armistice had been signed, hostilities were over, and they were immune
from attack. Some "ran" the barrage, and several met the fate of the
U-156, one of the undersea cruisers which operated off our own coasts.
Attempting to get through the barrier, she struck a mine and went down.
So far as known, only 21 of her crew were saved.
The Northern Barrage cost us approximately $80,000,000. Shipping sunk
by submarines averaged, for a long period, over $70,000,000 a month, at
times ran over $80,000,000, in actual monetary value, not counting the
resultant military effect of its loss. Admiral Sims estimates that the
war cost the Allies $100,000,000 a day. Thus, if the Northern Barrage
shortened the war one day, it more than repaid its cost.
Our mining projects were not confined to the North Sea. Plans had been
accepted and mines were in process of manufacture for a like barrage
across the Straits of Otranto, from Brindisi, the heel of Italy, to
Saseno Island. This would have effectually shut up German and Austrian
submarines in the Adriatic. We had also agreed to undertake to provide
and lay 26,800 mines for a barrage in the Aegean Sea from Euboea Island
to Cape Kanaptitza, except for the part resting on Turkish territorial
waters, which was to be established by Great Britain, since the United
States was not at war with Turkey. The armistice made these barrages
unnecessary.
But our mining operations were by no means concluded with the cessation
of hostilities. Clearing the seas was our next duty, for navigation
would not be safe until the many thousands of mines were removed.
This work was divided among the various nations. The United States
volunteered to remove all the mines we had laid.
Admiral Strauss, in charge of these operations, had his base at
Kirkwall, and his force comprised 34 mine-sweepers, 24 sub-chasers, two
tugs, two tenders and 20 British trawlers, which were also manned by U.
S. naval personnel:
Repair Ships and Force Auxiliaries--_Black Hawk_ (flagship);
_Panther_, _Seneca_, _Chesapeake_, _Aspenleaf_, _Crenella_, and the
British vessels _Hickorol_, _Petronel_ and _Hopkiln_.
Submarine Chasers--Numbers 37, 38, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 95, 110,
164, 178, 181, 182, 206, 207, 208, 254, 256, 259, 272, 329, 354,
and 356.
Mine-Sweepers--_Auk_, _Avocet_, _Bobolink_, _Chewink_, _Cormorant_,
_Curlew_, _Eider_, _Falcon_, _Finch_, _Flamingo_, _Grebe_, _Heron_,
_Kingfisher_, _Lapwing_, _Lark_, _Mallard_, _Oriole_, _Osprey_,
_Pelican_, _Penguin_, _Quail_, _Rail_, _Robin_, _Sanderling_,
_Seagull_, _Swallow_, _Swan_, _Tanager_, _Teal_, _Thrush_,
_Turkey_, _Whippoorwill_, _Widgeon_, _Woodcock_, _Patapsco_,
_Patuxent_.
Trawlers--_William Johnson_, _Richard Bulkeley_, _Thos.
Blackhorne_, _Thomas Buckley_, _George Cochrane_, _John Collins_,
_William Caldwell, eorge Clarice_, _William Darnold_, _Siam
Duffey_, _John Graham_, _Thomas Laundry_, _William Ashton_, _George
Burton_, _John Dunkin_, _Thomas Graham_, _Thomas Henrix_, _John
Fitzgerald_, _John Clay_, _Pat Caharty_.
I had the pleasure of visiting our mine base in Scotland just before
the squadron sailed on its first expedition. Everything was ready
for operations. The spirit of officers and men was inspiring. Not
minimizing for a moment the difficulties they had to face, all were
eager to begin the task.
They were to set forth on April 28th, but the heaviest snowstorm of the
year was raging, causing 24 hours delay. The next morning the sweepers
and a division of sub-chasers got under way for the barrage, while the
_Black Hawk_ and other chasers proceeded to the new base at Kirkwall.
That excursion, which was experimental, was completed May 2nd.
Mines sometimes fouled in the "kites" which picked them up, and
exploded as the sweep was being hauled in. The _Patuxent_ was the
victim of an accident of this kind on May 12th. Severed by an
explosion, its sweep had to be hauled on board to be repaired. When
the kite came within sight, a mine was seen hanging by its towing
cable. The commanding officer sent all hands forward to a place of
safety, going aft himself to clear it, with the assistance of his chief
boatswain's mate. When the mine got within ten feet of the ship, it
exploded. Several men were blown overboard by the mass of flying water,
but all were rescued. The commanding officer had a narrow escape. Only
a few feet from the exploding mine, his thumb was cut off by a flying
fragment of steel, but luckily he escaped further injury.
Two days later, the same accident befell the _Bobolink_, killing its
commanding officer, Lieutenant Frank Bruce, and badly damaging the
ship. Seeking first the safety of his crew, Lieutenant Bruce went aft
to clear the mine. Before anything could be done, it exploded, killing
him and blowing the boatswain and three other men into the water.
All four were rescued, though the boatswain was unconscious from the
shock. The _Teal_ took her in tow and, accompanied by the _Swallow_ and
sub-chaser No. 45, towed her to Scapa Flow.
While clearing the largest mine-group in June the force found
impressive evidence of the success of the barrage. Crossing the lines
of mines, the _Heron_ and the _Sanderling_ were brought to a standstill
by an obstruction which fouled their sweeps. Oil rose to the surface,
and spread out astern, giving evidence of the wreck of a submarine
underneath. This was the locality in which the mine-laying squadron
had sighted the body of a German sailor floating in the water. From
the records of the Admiralty, it appeared that the obstruction was the
wreck of the German submarine UB-127.
Six mines exploded under and around the _Pelican_ one day in July.
Deluged by the mass of water thrown up by the explosion, the forward
part of the ship ruptured and flooded, the mine-sweeper was rapidly
sinking. Captain R. C. Bulmer, directing the operations, went at
once to her assistance. Placing his flagship, the _Auk_, alongside
the _Pelican_, he connected his wrecking hose with the forward
compartments, and set the pumps going to keep the damaged ship afloat.
The _Eider_ got on the other side, and did the same thing. The _Teal_
took the three ships in tow, and the four, lashed together, headed
slowly for port. The bow of the _Pelican_ was hardly above water, but
for several hours constant pumping held her up.
Then a heavy head sea arose, and the pump-lines were carried away.
Water rose in the _Pelican_, buckling the forward bulkhead, and the
vessel was liable to burst at any moment, going down in a flash. Every
man on her was in danger, and it was decided to leave aboard only a
few men to do necessary work. Twelve volunteers were called for. Every
member of her crew stepped forward. The dozen strongest were chosen and
the others, against their will, were ordered off the ship.
Fifty miles of open sea were still to be traversed. Darkness had
fallen. Crews of _Auk_ and _Eider_ struggled desperately to get the
lines repaired and pumps going. Men stood by with axes to cut the
mooring lines, in case the _Pelican_ should sink. All through the night
this struggle continued, and there was a sigh of relief when day dawned
with the vessel still afloat, and the ships reached the shelter of
Tresness Bay.
A curious accident befell the _Flamingo_. While weighing anchor,
steel touched copper and exploded a mine which her anchor had fouled,
damaging her rudder, bending her skeg, and dishing in her stern.
The most serious disaster encountered in all our mine sweeping occurred
on July 12th, the sinking of the _Richard Bulkeley_. Caught in its
kite, a mine was seen close to her stern, near the surface. To get it
further away the kite wire was being veered when the mine exploded. The
after part of the ship's hull was shattered. She sank in seven minutes.
Commander Frank R. King, who was in command of the division of trawlers
as well as the _Bulkeley_, went down with the vessel. When the blast
came, his first thought was the safety of his crew. Half stunned by the
explosion, one man, whose life-preserver had been blown off, struggled
to the deck. Commander King took off his own life-belt, buckled it
around the sailor, and helped him get clear of the ship before she took
her final plunge. Until the vessel disappeared he was still hunting
for members of the crew who might be left aboard. When last seen, as
the _Bulkeley_ went lower into the water, he was on the bridge. He
went down with his ship, a heroic figure, sacrificing his life to save
his men. It was a solemn privilege to me, a few months later, to pay
tribute to the memory of this gallant officer by naming one of our new
destroyers in his honor.
Altogether, two officers and nine men were killed during these
hazardous operations, and 23 ships were damaged. Regrettable as was
this loss of life, it was small in comparison with that of our comrades
in the British mine-sweeping service.
The mine field was removed, consisting of 50,000 mines, spread over an
area of some 6,000 square miles of the stormy North Sea, and the entire
barrage swept up by September 30th. On that day the hazard to shipping
by this vast enterprise in the North Sea was removed.
When the Mine Force returned to the United States, it was given
a welcome as genuine as that accorded our battleships when they
returned from service abroad. As the vessels steamed up North River,
November 24, 1919, they were reviewed by the Secretary of the Navy,
distinguished officers and citizens on Admiral Strauss' flagship, the
_Black Hawk_.
This marked the end of that enterprise which "shut up the hornets in
their nests"--that bold adventure which was the greatest new naval
offensive of the war.