1815.
Message from the Tuileries--My interview with the King--
My appointment to the office of Prefect of the Police--Council at
the Tuileries--Order for arrests--Fouches escape--Davoust
unmolested--Conversation with M. de Blacas--The intercepted letter,
and time lost--Evident understanding between Murat and Napoleon--
Plans laid at Elba--My departure from Paris--The post-master of
Fins--My arrival at Lille--Louis XVIII. detained an hour at the
gates--His majesty obliged to leave France--My departure for
Hamburg--The Duc de Berri at Brussels.
Those who opposed the execution of the treaty concluded with Napoleon at
the time of his abdication were guilty of a great error, for they
afforded him a fair pretext for leaving the island of Elba. The details
of that extraordinary enterprise are known to every one, and I shall not
repeat what has been told over and over again. For my own part, as soon
as I saw with what rapidity Bonaparte was marching upon Lyons, and the
enthusiasm with which he was received by the troops and the people, I
prepared to retire to Belgium, there to await the denouement of this new
drama.
Every preparation for my departure was completed on the evening of the
13th of March, and I was ready to depart, to avoid the persecutions of
which I expected I should be the object, when I received a message from
the Tuileries stating that the King desired to see me. I of course lost
no time in proceeding to the Palace, and went straight to M. Hue to
inquire of him why I had been sent for. He occupied the apartments in
which I passed the three most laborious and anxious years of my life.
M. Hue, perceiving that I felt a certain degree of uneasiness at being
summoned to the Tuileries at that hour of the night, hastened to inform
me that the King wished to appoint me Prefect of the Police. He
conducted me to the King's chamber, where his Majesty thus addressed me
kindly, but in an impressive manner, "M. de Bourrienne, can we rely upon
you? I expect much from your zeal and fidelity."--"Your Majesty,"
replied I, "shall have no reason to complain of my betraying your
confidence."--" Well, I re-establish the Prefecture of the Police, and I
appoint you Prefect. Do your best, M. de Bourrienne, in the discharge of
your duties; I count upon you."
By a singular coincidence, on the very day (the 13th of March) when I
received this appointment Napoleon, who was at Lyons, signed the decree
which excluded from the amnesty he had granted thirteen individuals,
among whose names mine was inscribed. This decree confirmed me in the
presentiments I had conceived as soon as I heard of the landing of
Bonaparte. On returning home from the Tuileries after receiving my
appointment a multitude of ideas crowded on my mind. At the first moment
I had been prompted only by the wish to serve the cause of the King, but
I was alarmed when I came to examine the extent of the responsibility I
had taken upon myself. However, I determined to meet with courage the
difficulties that presented themselves, and I must say that I had every
reason to be satisfied with the manner in which I was seconded by M.
Foudras, the Inspector-General of the Police.
Even now I am filled with astonishment when I think of the Council that
was held at the Tuileries on the evening of the 13th of March in M. de
Blacas' apartments. The ignorance of the members of that Council
respecting our situation, and their confidence in the useless measures
they had adopted against Napoleon, exceed all conception.
Will it be believed that those great statesmen, who had the control of
the telegraph, the post-office, the police and its agents, money-in
short, everything which constitutes power--asked me to give them
information respecting the advance of Bonaparte? What could I say to
them? I could only repeat the reports which were circulated on the
Exchange, and those which I had collected here and there during the last
twenty-four hours. I did not conceal that the danger was imminent, and
that all their precautions would be of no avail. The question then arose
as to what course should be adapted by the King. It was impossible that
the monarch could remain at the Capital, and yet, where was he to go?
One proposed that he should go to Bordeaux, another to La Vendee, and a
third to Normandy, and a fourth member of the Council was of opinion that
the King should be conducted to Melun. I conceived that if a battle
should take place anywhere it would probably be in the neighbourhood of
that town, but the councillor who made this last suggestion assured us
that the presence of the King in an open carriage and eight horses would
produce a wonderful effect on the minds of the troops. This project was
merely ridiculous; the others appeared to be dangerous and impracticable.
I declared to the Council that, considering the situation of things, it
was necessary to renounce all idea of resistance by force of arms; that
no soldier would fire a musket, and that it was madness to attempt to
take any other view of things. "Defection," said I, "is inevitable.
The soldiers are drinking in their barracks the money which you have been
giving them for some days past to purchase their fidelity. They say
Louis XVIII., is a very decent sort of man, but 'Vive le petit Caporal!'"
Immediately on the landing of Napoleon the King sent an extraordinary
courier to Marmont, who was at Chatillon whither he had gone to take a
last leave of his dying mother. I saw him one day after he had had an
interview with the King; I think it was on the 6th or 7th of March.
After some conversation on the landing of Napoleon, and the means of
preventing him from reaching Paris, Marmont said to me, "This is what I
dwelt most strongly upon in the interview I have just had with the King.
'Sire,' said I, 'I doubt not Bonaparte's intention of coming to Paris,
and the best way to prevent him doing so would be for your Majesty to
remain here. It is necessary to secure the Palace of the Tuileries
against a surprise, and to prepare it for resisting a siege, in which it
would be indispensable to use cannon. You must shut yourself up in your
palace, with the individuals of your household and the principal public
functionaries, while the Due d'Angoulome should go to Bordeaux, the Duc
de Berri to La Vendee, and Monsieur to, the Franche-Comte; but they must
set off in open day, and announce that they are going to collect
defenders for your Majesty.--[Monsieur, the brother of the King, the
Comte d'Artois later Charles X.]
". . This is what I said to the King this morning, and I added that I
would answer for everything if my advice were followed. I am now going
to direct my aide de camp, Colonel Fabvier, to draw up the plan of
defence." I did not concur in Marmont's opinion. It is certainly
probable that had Louis XVIII. remained in his palace the numerous
defections which took place before the 20th of March would have been
checked and some persons would not have found so ready an excuse for
breaking their oaths of allegiance. There can be little doubt, too, but
Bonaparte would have reflected well before he attempted the siege of the
Tuileries.
--[Marmont (tome vii. p. 87) gives the full details of his scheme
for provisioning and garrisoning the Tuileries which the King was to
hold while his family spread themselves throughout the provinces.
The idea had nothing strange in it, for the same advice was given by
General Mathieu Dumas (Souvenirs, tome iii. p. 564), a man not
likely to suggest any rash schemes. Jaucourt, writing to
Talleyrand, obviously believed in the wisdom of the King's
remaining, as did the Czar; see Talleyrand's Correspondence, vol.
ii. pp. 94, 122, 129. Napoleon would certainly have been placed
in a strange difficulty, but a king capable of adopting such a
resolution would never have been required to consider it.]--
Marmont supported his opinion by observing that the admiration and
astonishment excited by the extraordinary enterprise of Napoleon and his
rapid march to Paris would be counterbalanced by the interest inspired by
a venerable monarch defying his bold rival and courageously defending his
throne. While I rendered full justice to the good intentions of the Duke
of Ragusa, yet I did not think that his advice could be adopted. I
opposed it as I opposed all the propositions that were made in the
Council relative to the different places to which the King should retire.
I myself suggested Lille as being the nearest, and as presenting the
greatest degree of safety, especially in the first instance.
It was after midnight when I left the Council of the Tuileries. The
discussion had terminated, and without coming to any precise resolution
it was agreed that the different opinions which had been expressed should
be submitted to Louis XVIII. in order that his Majesty might adopt that
which should appear to him the best. The King adopted my opinion, but it
was not acted upon until five days after.
My appointment to the Prefecture of the Police was, as will be seen, a
late thought of measure, almost as late indeed as Napoleon's proposition
to send me as his Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland. In now
accepting office I was well convinced of the inutility of any effort that
might be made to arrest the progress of the fast approaching and menacing
events. Being introduced into the King's cabinet his Majesty asked me
what I thought of the situation of affairs. "I think, Sire, that
Bonaparte will be here in five or six days."--"What, sir?"--"Yes, Sire."
--"But proper measures are taken, the necessary orders given, and the
Marshals are faithful to me."--"Sire, I suspect no man's fidelity; but I
can assure your Majesty that, as Bonaparte has landed, he will be here
within a week. I know him, and your Majesty cannot know him as well as I
do; but I can venture too assure your Majesty with the same confidence
that he will not be here six months hence. He will be hurried into acts
of folly which will ruin him."--"De Bourrienne, I hope the best from
events, but if misfortune again compel me to leave France, and your
second prediction be fulfilled, you may rely on me." During this short
conversation the King appeared perfectly tranquil and resigned.
The next day I again visited the Tuileries, whither I had at those
perilous times frequent occasion to repair. On that day I received a
list of twenty-five persons whom I was ordered to arrest. I took the
liberty to observe that such a proceeding was not only useless but likely
to produce a very injurious effect at that critical moment. The reasons
I urged had not all the effect I expected. However, some relaxation as
to twenty-three of the twenty-five was conceded, but it was insisted that
Fouche and Davoust should be arrested without delay. The King repeatedly
said, "I wish you to arrest Fouche."--" Sire, I beseech your Majesty to
consider the inutility of such a measure."--" I am resolved upon Fouches
arrest. But I am sure you will miss him, for Andre could not catch him."
My nocturnal installation as Prefect of the Police took place some time
after midnight. I had great repugnance to the arrest of Fouche, but the
order having been given, there was no alternative but to obey it. I
communicated the order to M. Foudras, who very coolly observed, "Since we
are to arrest him you need not be afraid, we shall have him fast
tomorrow."
The next day my agents repaired to the Duke of Otranto's hotel, in the
Rue d'Artois. On showing their warrant Fouche said, "What does this
mean? Your warrant is of no force; it is mere waste-paper. It purports
to come from the Prefect of the Police, but there is no such Prefect."
In my opinion Fouche was right, for my appointment, which took place
during the night, had not been legally announced. Be that as it may,
on his refusal to surrender, one of my agents applied to the staff of the
National Guard, requesting the support, in case of need, of an armed
force. General Dessolles repaired to the Tuileries to take the King's
orders on the subject. Meanwhile Fouche, who never lost his self-
possession, after talking to the police officers who remained with him,
pretended to step aside for some indispensable purpose, but the door
which he opened led into a dark passage through which he slipped, leaving
my unfortunate agents groping about in the obscurity. As for himself, he
speedily gained the Rue Taitbout, where he stepped into a coach, and
drove off. This is the whole history of the notable arrest of Fouche.
As for Davoust, I felt my hands tied with respect to him. I do not mean
to affect generosity, for I acknowledge the enmity I bore him; but I did
not wish it to be supposed that I was acting towards him from a spirit of
personal vengeance. I therefore merely ordered him to be watched. The
other twenty-three were to me in this matter as if they had never
existed; and some of them, perhaps, will only learn in reading my Memoirs
what dangerous characters they were thought to be.
On the 15th of March, after the conversation which, as I have already
related, I had with Louis XVIII, I went to M. de Blacas and repeated to
him what I had stated to the King on the certainty of Bonaparte's speedy
arrival in Paris. I told him that I found it necessary to devote the
short time still in our power to prevent a reaction against the
Royalists, and to preserve public tranquillity until the departure of the
Royal family, and that I would protect the departure of all persons who
had reasons for withdrawing themselves from the scene of the great and
perhaps disastrous events that might ensue. "You may readily believe,
Count," added I, "that considering the great interests with which I am
entrusted, I am not inclined to lose valuable time in arresting the
persons of whose names I have received a list. The execution of such a
measure would be useless; it would lead to nothing, or rather it would
serve to irritate public feeling. My conviction of this fact has
banished from me all idea of keeping under restraint for four or five
days persons whose influence, whether real or supposed, is nil, since
Bonaparte is at Auxerre. Mere supervision appears to me sufficient, and
to that I propose confining myself."--"The King," replied M. de Blacas,
"relies on you. He knows that though only forty-eight hours have elapsed
since you entered upon your functions, you have already rendered greater
services than you are perhaps aware of." I then asked M. de Blacas
whether he had not received any intimation of Bonaparte's intended
departure from the island of Elba by letters or by secret agents. "The
only positive information we received," answered the Minister, "was an
intercepted letter, dated Elba, 6th February. It was addressed to
M. -----, near Grenoble. I will show it you." M. de Blacas opened a
drawer of his writing-table and took out the letter, which he gave to me.
The writer thanked his correspondent for the information he had
transmitted to "the inhabitant of Elba." He was informed that everything
was ready for departure, and that the first favourable opportunity would
be seized, but that it would be desirable first to receive answers to
some questions contained in the letter. These questions related to the
regiments which had been sent into the south, and the places of their
cantonment. It was inquired whether the choice of the commanders was
conformable to what had been agreed on in Paris, and whether Labedoyere
was at his post. The letter was rather long and it impressed me by the
way in which the plan of a landing on the coast of Provence was
discussed. Precise answers were requested on all these points. On
returning the letter to M. de Blacas I remarked that the contents of the
letter called for the adoption of some decided measures, and I asked him
what had been done. He answered, "I immediately sent a copy of the
letter to M. d'Andre, that he might give orders for arresting the
individual to whom it was addressed."
Having had the opportunity of closely observing the machinery of a
vigilant and active Government, I was, I must confess, not a little
amazed at the insufficiency of the measures adopted to defeat this well-
planned conspiracy. When M. de Blacas informed me of all that had been
done, I could not repress an exclamation of surprise. "Well," said he,
"and what would you have done?"--"In the first place I would not have
lost twenty-four hours, which were an age in such a crisis." I then
explained the plan I would have adopted. A quarter of an hour after the
receipt of the letter I would have sent trustworthy men to Grenoble, and
above all things I would have taken care not to let the matter fall into
the hands of the police. Having obtained all information from the
correspondent at Grenoble, I would have made him write a letter to his
correspondent at Elba to quiet the eagerness of Napoleon, telling him
that the movement of troops he spoke of had not been made, that it would
take eight days to carry it out, and that it was necessary to the success
of the enterprise to delay the embarkation for some days. While
Bonaparte was thus delayed I would have sent to the coast of Provence a
sufficient body of men devoted to the Royal cause, sending off in another
direction the regiments whose chiefs were gained over by Napoleon, as the
correspondence should reveal their names. "You are perhaps right, sir,"
said M. de Blacas, "but what could I do? I am new here. I had not the
control of the police, and I trusted to M. d'Andre."--" Well," said I,
"Bonaparte will be here on the 20th of March." With these words I parted
from M. de Blacas. I remarked a great change in him. He had already
lost a vast deal of that hauteur of favouritism which made him so much
disliked.
When I entered upon my duties in the Prefecture of Police the evil was
already past remedy. The incorrigible emigres required another lesson,
and the temporary resurrection of the Empire was inevitable. But, if
Bonaparte was recalled, it was not owing to any attachment to him
personally; it was not from any fidelity to the recollections of the
Empire. It was resolved at any price to get rid of those imbecile
councillors, who thought they might treat France like a country conquered
by the emigrants. The people determined to free themselves from a
Government which seemed resolved to trample on all that was dear to
France. In this state of things some looked upon Bonaparte as a
liberator, but the greater number regarded him as an instrument. In this
last character he was viewed by the old Republicans, and by a new
generation, who thought they caught a glimpse of liberty in promises, and
Who were blind enough to believe that the idol of France would be
restored by Napoleon.
In February 1815, while everything was preparing at Elba for the
approaching departure of Napoleon, Murat applied to the Court of Vienna
for leave to march through the Austrian Provinces of Upper Italy an army
directed on France. It was on the 26th of the same month that Bonaparte
escaped from Elba. These two facts were necessarily connected together,
for, in spite of Murat's extravagant ideas, he never could have
entertained the expectation of obliging the King of France, by the mere
force of arms, to acknowledge his continued possession of the throne of
Naples. Since the return of Louis XVIII. the Cabinet of the Tuileries
had never regarded Murat in any other light than as a usurper, and I know
from good authority that the French Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of
Vienna were especially instructed to insist that the restoration of the
throne of Naples in favour of the Bourbons of the Two Sicilies should be
a consequence of the restoration of the throne of France. I also know
that the proposition was firmly opposed on the part of Austria, who had
always viewed with jealousy the occupation of three thrones of Europe by
the single House of Bourbon.
According to information, for the authenticity of which I can vouch, the
following were the plans which Napoleon conceived at Elba. Almost
immediately after his arrival in France he was to order the Marshals on
whom he could best rely to defend to the utmost the entrances to the
French territory and the approaches to Paris, by pivoting on the triple
line of fortresses which gird the north and east of France. Davoust was
'in petto' singled out for the defence of Paris. He, was to arm the
inhabitants of the suburbs, and to have, besides, 20,000 men of the
National Guard at his disposal. Napoleon, not being aware of the
situation of the Allies, never supposed that they could concentrate their
forces and march against him so speedily as they did. He hoped to take
them by surprise, and defeat their projects, by making Murat march upon
Milan, and by stirring up insurrections in Italy. The Po being once
crossed, and Murat approaching the capital of Lombardy, Napoleon with the
corps of Suchet, Brune, Grouchy, and Massena, augmented by troops sent,
by forced marches, to Lyons, was to cross the Alps and revolutionise
Piedmont. There, having recruited his army and joined the Neapolitans in
Milan, he was to proclaim the independence of Italy, unite the whole
country under a single chief, and then march at the head of 100,000 men
on Vienna, by the Julian Alps, across which victory had conducted him in
1797. This was not all: numerous emissaries scattered through Poland and
Hungary were to foment discord and raise the cry of liberty and
independence, to alarm Russia and Austria. It must be confessed it would
have been an extraordinary spectacle to see Napoleon giving liberty to
Europe in revenge for not having succeeded in enslaving her.
By means of these bold manoeuvres and vast combinations Napoleon
calculated that he would have the advantage of the initiative in military
operations. Perhaps his genius was never more fully developed than in
this vast conception. According to this plan he was to extend his
operations over a line of 500 leagues, from Ostend to Vienna, by the Alps
and Italy, to provide himself with immense resources of every kind, to
prevent the Emperor of Austria from marching his troops against France,
and probably force him to terminate a war from which the hereditary
provinces would have exclusively suffered. Such was the bright prospect
which presented itself to Napoleon when he stepped on board the vessel
which was to convey him from Elba to France. But the mad precipitation
of Murat put Europe on the alert, and the brilliant illusion vanished
like a dream.
After being assured that all was tranquil, and that the Royal family was
secure against every danger, I myself set out at four o'clock on the
morning of the 20th of March, taking the road to Lille.--Nothing
extraordinary occurred until I arrived at the post-office of Fins, in
front of which were drawn up a great number of carriages, which had
arrived before mine, and the owners of which, like myself, were
impatiently waiting for horses. I soon observed that some one called the
postmaster aside in a way which did not appear entirely devoid of
mystery, and I acknowledge I felt some degree of alarm. I was in the
room in which the travellers were waiting, and my attention was attracted
by a large bill fixed against the wall. It was printed in French and
Russian, and it proved to be the order of the day which I had been
fortunate enough to obtain from the Emperor Alexander to exempt
posthorses, etc., from the requisitions of the Allied troops.
I was standing looking at the bill when the postmaster came into the room
and advanced towards me. "Sir," said he, "that is an order of the day
which saved me from ruin."--"Then surely you would not harm the man by
whom it is signed?"--"I know you, sir, I recognised you immediately.
I saw you in Paris when you were Director of the Post-office, and you
granted a just claim which I had upon you. I have now come to tell you
that they are harnessing two horses to your calash, and you may set off
at full speed." The worthy man had assigned to my use the only two
horses at his disposal; his son performed the office of postilion, and I
set off to the no small dissatisfaction of some of the travellers who had
arrived before me, and who, perhaps, had as good reasons as I to avoid
the presence of Napoleon.
We arrived at Lille at eleven o'clock on the night of the 21st. Here I
encountered another vexation, though not of an alarming kind. The gates
of the town were closed, and I was obliged to content myself with a
miserable night's lodging in the suburb.
I entered Lille on the 22d, and Louis XVIII. arrived on the 23d. His
Majesty also found the gates closed, and more than an hour elapsed before
an order could be obtained for opening them, for the Duke of Orleans, who
commanded the town, was inspecting the troops when his Majesty arrived.
The King was perfectly well received at Lille. There indeed appeared
some symptoms of defection, but it must be acknowledged that the officers
of the old army had been so singularly sacrificed to the promotion of the
returned emigrants that it was very natural the former should hail the
return of the man who had so often led them to victory. I put up at the
Hotel de Grand, certainly without forming any prognostic respecting the
future residence of the King. When I saw his Majesty's retinue I went
down and stood at the door of the hotel, where as soon as Louis XVIII.
perceived me he distinguished me from among all the persons who were
awaiting his arrival, and holding out his hand for me to kiss he said,
"Follow me, M. de Bourrienne."
On entering the apartments prepared for him the King expressed to me his
approval of my conduct since the Restoration, and especially during the
short interval in which I had discharged the functions of Prefect of the
Police. He did me the honour to invite me to breakfast with him. The
conversation naturally turned on the events of the day, of which every
one present spoke according to his hopes or fears. Observing that Louis
XVIII. concurred in Berthier's discouraging view of affairs, I ventured
to repeat what I had already said at the Tuileries, that, judging from
the disposition of the sovereigns of Europe and the information which I
had received, it appeared very probable that his Majesty would be again
seated on his throne in three months. Berthier bit his nails as he did
when he wanted to leave the army of Egypt and return to Paris to the
object of his adoration. Berthier was not hopeful; he was always one of
those men who have the least confidence and the most depression. I could
perceive that the King regarded my observation as one of those
compliments which he was accustomed to receive, and that he had no great
confidence in the fulfilment of my prediction. However, wishing to seem
to believe it, he said, what he had more than hinted before, "M. de
Bourrienne, as long as I am King you shall be my Prefect of the Police."
It was the decided intention of Louis XVIII. to remain in France as long
as he could, but the Napoleonic fever, which spread like an epidemic
among the troops, had infected the garrison of Lille. Marshal Mortier,
who commanded at Lille, and the Duke of Orleans, expressed to me their
well-founded fears, and repeatedly recommended me to urge the King to
quit Lille speedily, in order to avoid any fatal occurrence. During the
two days I passed with his Majesty I entreated him to yield to the
imperious circumstances in which he was placed. At length the King, with
deep regret, consented to go, and I left Lille the day before that fixed
for his Majesty's departure.
In September 1814 the King had appointed me charge d'affaires from France
to Hamburg, but not having received orders to repair to my post I have
not hitherto mentioned this nomination. However, when Louis XVIII. was
on the point of leaving France he thought that my presence in Hamburg
might be useful for the purpose of making him acquainted with all that
might interest him in the north of Germany. But it was not there that
danger was to be apprehended. There were two points to be watched--the
headquarters of Napoleon and the King's Council at Ghent. I, however,
lost no time in repairing to a city where I was sure of finding a great
many friends. On passing through Brussels I alighted at the Hotel de
Bellevue, where the Duc de Berri arrived shortly after me. His Royal
Highness then invited me to breakfast with him, and conversed with me
very confidentially. I afterwards continued my journey.