POLITICS AND REVOLUTIONS
Political parties.--Elections.--Relation between politics and
revolutions.--Conduct of revolutions.--Casualties.--Number of
revolutions.--Effect of revolutions.
The characteristic features of Dominican politics are the violence of
political antagonism and the absence of differences of principle
between the political parties. None of the three parties existing
to-day has a platform, and the distinction between them is entirely a
matter of the personality of the leaders. Each party alleges that it
has the best people and the purest motives and views with alarm the
government of the country by any other party. In practice therefore,
politics follows the rule only too common in the Spanish-American
countries, of resolving itself into a personal struggle between the
"ins" and the "outs."
In the early days of the Republic different policies were occasionally
seriously considered. It was then held by some that independence
should be preserved at any cost while others contended that in view of
the constant, civil wars the country should seek peace and progress
under the protection of some foreign power. Although the
annexationists were at first called conservatives and their opponents
liberals, these divergent views were not the exclusive property of any
designated group of men, but the annexation idea was generally
espoused by the party that happened to be in power, which thus hoped
both to save the country and perpetuate its own rule, while
independence was invariably supported by the opposition, which
bristled with patriotic indignation and the fear that it might be
permanently excluded from the banquet-table. Thus Santana obtained a
return to Spanish rule in 1861 and Cabral a few years later agitated
the question of American annexation and their action was denounced by
Baez; yet shortly after Baez almost succeeded in securing annexation
to the United States and was stigmatized as a traitor by Cabral.
Another issue which existed for a few years after the separation from
Haiti in 1844 was the division between clericals on the one hand and
liberals on the other, a party division that has created havoc in
other parts of Spanish America. The very indefinite claims on each
side and the practical unanimity of the country in its attitude
towards the church caused this issue to disappear.
The real parties that kept see-sawing in and out of power from the
early days of the Republic down to the time of Heureaux were those
founded by General Pedro Santana and General Buenaventura Baez.
Intimate friends in the struggles with Haiti which followed Santo
Domingo's declaration of independence, their ambitious and domineering
natures soon clashed, and each collected a group of friends and
incessantly conspired against the other. The partisans of Baez, or
Baecistas, adopted red for the color of the cockades and ribbons which
distinguished them in the civil wars, and came to be known as the
"Reds," while the followers of Santana, or Santanistas, adopted blue
and were known as the "Blues."
On the death of Santana in 1863, Luperon and Cabral became the leaders
of the Blue party, and for several years after the expulsion of the
Spaniards in 1865 the Reds and Blues took turns in setting up
governments and having them overthrown. In 1873 General Ignacio Maria
Gonzalez, a former adherent of Baez, assembled a following from both
factions and formed a Green party with which he ousted the Reds who
were then in power. In the next six years the Reds and Greens
alternated in control, but in 1879 the Greens were driven out and
definitely scattered by the Blues, who thereby gained a foothold which
they did not lose for years. The death of Baez in 1884 threw the Reds
into confusion and their constant persecution by the "blue" President
Ulises Heureaux effectually crushed them. Ulises Heureaux with Blues,
Reds and Greens built up his own party of "Lilicistas" which remained
in power until his death in 1899. In the later years of Heureaux's
rule the distinguishing color used by his troops was white.
On the death of Heureaux, Juan Isidro Jimenez, as president, and
Horacio Vasquez, as vice-president, came into power. The rivalry
between Jimenez and Vasquez caused a division between their respective
followers, who called themselves Jimenistas and Horacistas, thus
forming the principal parties which continue to the present time. The
old Reds and Blues had disappeared and their survivors aligned
themselves with Jimenez and Vasquez indiscriminately; members of the
Baez family joined old Blues to follow Jimenez, while other old Reds
and Blues as well as the Lilicistas seemed to prefer Vasquez. In 1901
an attempt was made to form a party known as the Republican Party,
which it was intended to endow with a platform, but being composed
largely of Jimenez' friends, it was viewed with suspicion and
fell with him.
In 1902 the Horacistas revolted and obtained the government, only to
be overthrown in 1903 by followers of Jimenez. The new administration
proving odious to both parties they combined to drive it out in the
fall of 1903. The Horacistas gained the upper hand in the succeeding
government and remained in power until 1912, though a serious division
developed in the party, to the extent that the nominal leader, Horacio
Vasquez, himself joined in conspiracies and uprisings against the
administration. His efforts, combined with those of the Jimenistas,
led to the choice of Archbishop Nouel as compromise candidate for
president in 1912. Monsignor Nouel unsuccessfully attempted to govern
with both parties and on his resignation in 1913 another Horacista
became president. Again there was opposition from Horacistas as well
as Jimenistas and in 1914 a Jimenista became provisional president.
At about this time a small third party appeared, led by Federico
Velazquez, a former Horacista. His followers are known as
Velazquistas, though the party has adopted the official name of
Progresista. In the elections of 1914 he joined forces with Jimenez,
who thus secured the presidency. The government, or what remains of it
under the present military occupation, is still constituted largely by
followers of Jimenez and Velazquez.
Though both Jimenistas and Horacistas claim to have the larger
following in the country in general, it is probable that they are
about equally matched, the Velazquistas holding the balance of power.
The Jimenistas are often vulgarly called "bolos" or bob-tailed cocks,
and the Horacistas "rabudos" or "coludos," meaning bushy-tailed or
long-tailed cocks. In the fighting on the Monte Cristi plains the
Jimenistas would often attack, but retire as soon as their opponents
showed fight, and as such tactics reminded the Dominicans of the
habits of bob-tailed fighting cocks, the nicknames were imposed.
The men who attain prominence in politics range all the way from rude
ignorant military chiefs to polished members of the aristocracy. In
looking over the annals of Dominican history the same family names
constantly recur and it may be affirmed that the government of the
country has during the time of independence been in the hands of some
twenty families, the members of which have swayed its councils and led
its revolutions. They have tasted the sweets of power but also the
bitterness of defeat, alternately occupying high positions in the
government and pining in prison or exile. Almost all the chiefs of
state since 1899 would have done honor to any country, but all have
been obliged by the exigencies of politics to give places in their
entourage to men of low standing, whose deeds or misdeeds when in
power and whose unbridled ambition, have been a factor in the civil
wars. At the present moment perhaps the most prominent political
figure is Federico Velazquez, a man of unusual force of character, who
as minister of finance under Caceres, enforced the settlement of the
Dominican debt and gave what was probably the most honest
administration of public revenues in the Republic's history. He is one
of the few men having the moral courage openly to advocate American
cooperation in the government of the country. He is about forty-seven
years old, was born in Tamboril, near Santiago, and advanced through
the stages of schoolmaster, shopkeeper, secretary to Vasquez and
Caceres, and cabinet minister, to the position of a political leader.
The ill-feeling akin to hatred between many members of the political
parties is incredible to one not accustomed to Latin-American
politics. They will have nothing in common, neither will acknowledge
the existence of any good in the other, they endeavor to keep apart in
the clubs, they do not care to buy in each other's stores. Even the
women enter into this bitterness and engagements have been broken
because the bridegroom was discovered to favor one party while the
bride or her family sympathized with the other.
The parties are not unalterably composed of the same individuals. On
the contrary a great number of the leaders and of the rank and file
are continually drifting from one party to another, evincing
particular anxiety to "get on the band-wagon." These changelings,
while they belong to any one party, affect to be its most ardent
supporters in order to avert any suspicion of insincerity. Much of the
disorder which has sapped the life-blood of the Republic has been due
to disappointed office-seekers who suddenly veered about and joined
the opposing party.
Not only to personal ambitions and corruption of the persons in power,
but also to the perfunctory mode in which elections have been
conducted the many revolutions are to be ascribed. The municipal
councils in the communes and the justices of the peace and two
residents in the cantons form the election board before which the
voters of the respective commune or canton are supposed to appear to
deposit their votes. It is evident that if anything more than a small
proportion of the qualified voters appeared, such election boards
would be swamped, yet no difficulty has ever been registered. The
election of the presidential candidate supported by the government was
generally so certain that all other aspirants realized the futility of
launching their candidacy, and their followers either voted for the
official candidate or refrained from voting. In this connection I am
reminded of the convincing political speeches attributed to one of
the foremost men of La Vega during the farcical campaigns preceding
the elections of Heureaux. He is quoted as saying: "My friends, this
Republic is founded on the free and unrestricted suffrage of its
citizens. It is the proud boast of the Dominican that under the
constitution he may vote as he pleases. You are therefore free to cast
your vote for whomsoever you prefer. I would not be your friend,
however, if I did not advise you that whoever does not vote for
Heureaux might as well leave the country." In elections for municipal
councilmen and members of Congress there was occasionally an exception
to the rule of having a cut and dried program and contests sometimes
arose for a seat.
The real campaigns and expressions of the people's will have therefore
been the revolutions, and politics and revolutions have thus come to
be regarded as going hand in hand. In a town of the Cibao an
expression of the garrulous landlady of the inn attracted my
attention. The old lady, after regaling me with the local gossip,
started with her own troubles. "Two revolutions ago," she said--and
her mode of measuring time struck me as peculiar--"my eldest son took
a gun and went into politics." "Cojió un fusil y se metió en la
politica"--"took a gun and went into politics," the phrase is sadly
expressive.
Such campaigns were only too easily begun. When a new president
entered upon office on the crest of a successful revolution,
apparently with the whole country behind him and his adversaries
silenced or scattered, his popularity generally lasted until the
spoils were distributed. ("To the victors belong the spoils" was the
policy of the past; the American military authorities are making an
important innovation by the introduction of civil service principles
for selecting public employees.) The disappointed spirits immediately
entered into the plots which the vanquished opponents were not slow in
fomenting. The leader of the adverse party or one of his trusted
lieutenants raised the standard of revolt and issued manifestoes which
echoed with patriotic sentiments and decried the faults of the
administration. He was joined by a number of disgruntled "generals"
and their followers. The telegraph wires were cut and the revolution
had begun.
Before 1905 the seizure of a custom-house was invariably the next
step, which would at the same time provide the insurgents with the
sinews of war and make it impossible for the government to pay its
employees in that province. The custom-houses were eliminated as pawns
in the revolutionary game by the fiscal treaty with the United States,
according to which the customs receipts were paid over to an American
receiver-general. Revolutions for a short time became more difficult,
but where there's a will there's a way, and under a new routine the
necessary funds were derived from the government's internal revenues
and from levies on private citizens.
The first two or three weeks of a revolt constituted its critical
period, for the government at once poured troops into the district in
order to suppress the insurrection, while the rebels sought to obtain
as many strategical points as possible. Both sides lived on the
country while roaming about in pursuit of each other. If the
government was victorious the leaders of the revolt would usually
scramble across the border into Haitian territory, or leave the
country by boat, or otherwise make themselves inconspicuous until the
time was ripe for another rebellion. When the government was unready
or unsuccessful, the insurrection spread with great rapidity from town
to town until it arrived before the walls of Santo Domingo City.
There was more or less of a siege and when the president capitulated
he was permitted to board a vessel and go into exile. The head of the
new revolution then assumed charge of the government and had himself
elected president and the game began all over again.
The personal property of the fallen adversaries was respected and
there was no confiscation, such as has occasionally been witnessed in
certain other Latin republics. When Baez was overthrown in 1858 there
was an exception to the rule, his properties being seized by the
Santana government on the ground that he was a traitor ready to
deliver the country over to the Haitians and was guilty of other high
crimes and misdemeanors. But when the wheel of fortune again brought
Baez to the top he promptly reentered upon his lands.
During the uprisings there has rarely been wanton destruction of
property, the property of foreigners being especially respected. The
owner of a plantation near Macoris told me that on one occasion the
general of an insurgent force even halted at his gates and sent him a
polite request for permission to cross the property. Such
consideration was not universal, however, and large sums have been
paid to foreigners for damages inflicted during revolutions. A serious
inconvenience was caused farmers by revolutions as many laborers were
enrolled in one army or the other, either voluntarily or by
impressment.
In the course of the insurrection there were numerous encounters
between the rebels and the government troops, most of them being mere
skirmishes. There is hardly a town where there are not houses which
show the marks of bullets. The walls and gates of Santo Domingo City
and the houses in the vicinity are full of such marks, though
generally painted over now. In 1904 and 1905 one of the sights of the
city was a beautiful villa opposite the Puerta del Conde, which had
served as target for the government forces while occupied by the
insurgents and was so peppered by shot and shell as to look like a
sieve. The sieges of Santo Domingo City sometimes lasted for many
months. At such times almost every citizen took part in the
excitement, barricades were erected at every street opening and the
rattle of musketry was heard at all hours.
The proportion of shots fired to casualties inflicted is known to be
enormous in all wars and in Santo Domingo it is almost incredible.
Battles have been fought lasting for hours with thousands of shots
fired, yet with not one man lost. There have been revolutionary
uprisings lasting for months with not a man wounded. In Puerto Plata
it is said that when the government troops attacked the city in 1904 a
fierce battle ensued which continued from morning till the town was
taken by storm in the evening; yet only one man was killed and his
death was due to his own carelessness, for he appeared not far from
where soldiers of the other side were training a cannon and refused to
obey their warning to get out of the way, whereupon the cannon was
discharged and his arm shot off, causing a mortal wound.
At other times, however, the results have been far more serious, as
many a maimed soldier and bereaved family can testify. The graves of
victims of the revolutions are scattered all over the Republic. How
many have fallen in the disturbances of the past fifteen years it is
impossible to determine; I have heard estimates ranging from 1000 up
to 15,000. Nor is revolutionizing a pleasant business when continued
for any length of time. When the men entered a town contributions
could be levied on the merchants, but when they were harassed and
forced to retreat to the mountains they roamed for weeks half nude,
bare-headed, barefooted, exposed to the weather, living on what
bananas and wild fruits they could find or occasional wild hogs they
were able to kill, undermining their constitutions and brutalizing
their natures. The landlady whose son sought political distinction
with a gun told me amid sobs that her boys were dutiful, industrious
lads before being caught in the revolutionary torrent, but that in the
woods they lost all inclination for work and returned home completely
demoralized. From grieving relatives of victims I have heard many
another story of ruined lives and early deaths. It is saddening to
reflect on the tears which have been shed and the misery which has
been caused by this long continued civil strife.
While women have been heavy sufferers from the revolutions they have
not hesitated to take sides and contribute their mite. Many are the
stories current in Santo Domingo of women who smilingly passed through
the enemy's ranks and carried ammunition and supplies concealed
beneath their garments to their friends in the woods.
Excluding the revolution by which the Haitian yoke was thrown off in
1844 and that of 1863-65, which expelled the Spaniards, there have
occurred in the seventy years of Dominican independence no less than
twenty-three successful revolutions. One occurred in each of the years
1848, 1844, 1849, 1857 and 1864, three in 1865, one each in 1866, 1867
and 1873, three in 1876, one each in 1877, 1878, 1879, 1899 and 1902,
two in 1903 and one each in 1912 and 1914. At times hardly had a
revolution proved successful when a counter-revolution broke out and
secured the victory. The longest intermissions were from 1879 to
1899 when the party of the dictator Heureaux was in power, and from
1903 to 1912, when the indirect protection of the United States was
sufficient to sustain the government.
These were the successful revolutions; the unsuccessful insurrections
are innumerable. It has been unfortunate for the credit of Santo
Domingo that almost every little shooting affray is classed as an
insurrection or revolution. Most of these unsuccessful uprisings have
been unimportant excursions into the country by some disaffected local
chief and a handful of followers, the band being promptly rounded up
or scattered by government forces or induced to come in by promise of
a job or some other consideration.
The circumstance that the provincial governors found it to their
advantage to have disturbances in their district explains many of the
smaller commotions. Upon the outbreak of an insurrection or before the
threat of an outbreak the authorities in the capital would authorize
the provincial governor to recruit troops and draw funds for their
payment. The governor would do so, but if two or three thousand men
had been authorized he would raise only two or three hundred and
forget to account for the balance of the money. The suppression of the
"revolution" would thus benefit both his military reputation and his
pocketbook. Governors were therefore prone to exaggerate rumors of
insurrection and sometimes themselves sent out men to fire a few shots
in the woods and create alarm.
Other insurrections have been fierce and formidable and some
administrations were obliged to engage in constant warfare in order to
maintain themselves. A serious unsuccessful insurrection was that led
by Gen. Casimiro de Moya against Heureaux in 1886, which lasted six
months. The most widespread was that of Jimenez against the Morales
government, lasting from December, 1903, to May, 1904, and during
which the insurgents gained possession of practically the entire
Republic. Other serious outbreaks occurred in 1904, 1905, 1906, 1909,
1911, 1913 and 1916. The fires smouldered constantly, especially in
the Cibao, which raises the largest crops of everything, including
revolutions.
The effect of such continuous commotion has been most disastrous to
the country and the people at large. This is all the more saddening
when it is considered that, less than ten per cent of the people took
part in the disturbances. Revolutions, successful and unsuccessful,
have been fought to a finish with less than a thousand men on either
side. Ninety per cent of the population are law-abiding citizens who
would like nothing better than to be let alone and permitted to pursue
their vocations in peace. The other ten per cent were not entirely to
blame: they have been the victims of their environment.
Not only have the revolutionary disturbances caused enormous indirect
loss to the country through paralyzation of agriculture, arrest of
development and loss of credit, but they have also been a large direct
expense. A considerable portion of every budget was devoted to
appropriations for the purchase of war material and the maintenance of
the military and naval establishment. When uprisings occurred the
additional amounts necessary for their suppression have been taken
from other appropriations, those for public works usually being the
first to be cancelled. If the uprisings became serious the other
appropriations of the budget were reduced by fifty or even
seventy-five per cent until all the available cash was devoted to war
purposes. In 1903 military and naval expenditures absorbed 71.7 per
cent of the Republic's disbursements, and in 1904 72.6 per cent. At
such times the government was reduced to a desperate struggle for
existence; the loss of the custom-houses in power of the insurgents
made its position still more precarious; it contracted loans on
ruinous terms; it neglected its foreign obligations and paid its
employees in promissory notes and even in postage stamps, which they
would then peddle about the streets. Under such conditions it is
natural that nothing was left for public improvements. Even under the
peaceful administration of Heureaux a disproportionate part of the
national funds was expended for military purposes and three gunboats
were acquired and maintained, but not a single mile of improved road
was laid out.
With the American military occupation political conditions in the
Dominican Republic have radically changed. The system of waging
political campaigns by force of arms has stopped abruptly and
absolutely. Revolutions have become a matter of history. Ballots will
hereafter take the place of bullets, and politics will be conducted in
the same manner as in other orderly countries. Evolution, not
revolution, will be the characteristic of the future.