CONSUL ALCOCK'S VIEWS ON GENERAL POLICY.
Essays on international relations -- Foresight -- Its
connection with succeeding events -- The Canton city
question resuscitated.
Among serious students of the international problems arising out of
the forced intercourse of the Western nations with China, Sir
Rutherford Alcock occupies the first rank. In the long roll of
consular and diplomatic agents employed by the British Government
since 1833 he stands alone in the effort to evolve a reasonable
working scheme out of the chaos of blunders and misunderstandings
which marked the opening of China to foreign trade. Mr Taylor Meadows,
another consular officer, though equally far-sighted, was perhaps too
philosophical for the exigencies of current business. Consul Alcock's
political philosophy, on the other hand, grew entirely out of the
facts with which he had to deal from day to day, and was therefore
essentially practical.
It might seem that fifty-year-old disquisitions on what we now call
the "China question" must have too much of the musty odour of ancient
history about them to afford profitable reading to a generation which
has only been aroused by the thunder of events to take an
interest--and that as yet perfunctory--in the affairs of the Far East.
But as Mr Alcock had the faculty of getting to the heart of things, of
seizing the principles which do not change, his early studies have
lost neither validity nor value through the lapse of years. On these
well-digested observations, accordingly, modern inquirers may
confidently rely as on a corner-stone of Anglo-Chinese politics well
and truly laid. And the lapse of time, so far from detracting from the
utility of these opinions, enhances their value. For by extending the
base of observation over a long period, errors due to personal
equation, change of circumstance, and other temporary causes, are
eliminated from the survey, and the seeker after truth is thus
furnished with a trustworthy criterion by which he may verify his
conclusions. The forecast of 1849, realised in the developments of
1900, affords strong proof that the earlier generalisations were not
the result of ingenious speculation.
It seems reasonable, therefore, here to introduce some of the
reflections of Consul Alcock while he was as yet comparatively new to
China. These occur in various forms, as in confidential despatches, in
private memoranda, and notes for literary articles apparently never
extended. One of these notes, dated January 19, 1849, summing up the
results of six years' working of the treaty of Nanking, may well serve
as a landmark in the record of foreign intercourse with China.
Some extracts from this and other papers are printed for the
convenience of the reader in an Appendix to the present volume.[16]
Though bearing directly on the policy of the time when they were
written, they are no less applicable to present circumstances. They
show that nothing had changed then, as nothing has changed since, in
the attitude of the Chinese to foreign nations. "The same arrogant and
hostile spirit exists, and their policy is still to degrade foreigners
in the eyes of the people.... Without the power [on our part] of
commanding attention to any just demands, there is every reason to
believe the Chinese rulers would still be the most impracticable of
Orientals.... We cannot hope that any effort of ours or of the emperor
would suffice to change at once the character and habits of the people
or even the population of a city."
While advocating a resolute policy in maintaining all British rights
granted by treaty, the far-sighted consul uttered a timely caution
against pushing demands for concessions too far. In this he was in
accord with the policy, often enunciated by the British Government, of
not imperilling what we already possessed by striving after more. Mr
Alcock indicates clearly the danger which threatened British interests
from the prospective influx of Western Powers pressing through the
doors which Great Britain might be constrained to open:--
Powers who, having no such great interests to jeopardise,
are without this beneficial and most needful check, and may
therefore be induced to repeat at a semi-barbarian Court
the intrigues and counter-projects for the destruction of
our influence and the injury of our trade in the East which
are at work in our own times in every capital in Europe, as
formerly in India and the Eastern Archipelago.
Nor could a much more accurate description of the state of affairs now
existing be given than the picture of the future drawn by Consul
Alcock:--
Russia, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and America, with
their several jealousies and united rivalry with England,
their missionary enterprises or commercial and political
schemes clashing in their aim and development, are all
capable of creating such turmoil, strife, and disturbance
throughout the empire, if free access to the Court and the
provinces were insisted upon by Great Britain, as could
only end in the ejection of Europeans from China as
formerly from Japan, or an intestine war in which European
force would probably be involved on opposite sides, and to
their mutual destruction as States with commercial
interests in the country. These, again, might lead to
attempts at territorial possession, suggested in the first
instance, as in India, in self-defence, and afterwards
continued from necessity. With Russia spreading her
gigantic arms to the north and east, Great Britain on the
south and west, Spain, Holland, and Portugal with their
colonies in the Chinese and Indian seas, a struggle for
superiority on the soil of China for exclusive advantages
or predominant influence might be centred in Peking and
embroil the whole of Europe in hostile relations.
An interesting feature in the prognostications of both Mr Alcock and
Mr Meadows in those early days was the ignoring of the Power which is
now assuming such an active part in the rearrangement of the Far East.
Germany was not even thought of as a world Power, but her entry on the
stage has only added confirmation to the soundness of all these
predictions.
The more immediate significance, however, of the elaborate exposition
of the Anglo-Chinese situation which we are now considering, lay in
its connection with the chain of events which followed within a few
years, and its coincidence with the progress in the views of the
British Government, which might almost be traced back to the date of
the paper. The year 1849 was one of the critical epochs in foreign
intercourse with China, for it was then that the last promissory note
as to the opening of Canton became due, and was dishonoured. The years
of grace successively granted to the Chinese authorities to enable
them to prepare for the execution of the treaty stipulation had been
used by them, or at any rate by the populace, to render its execution
permanently impossible. Mr Bonham, who proceeded up the river to apply
for the fulfilment of the agreement of 1847, which promised admission
to the city within two years, was received, not with the suave evasion
of Kiying but with the coarse rebuff of Governor-General Seu, who amid
popular enthusiasm caused a memorial arch to be erected to commemorate
the third repulse of the barbarians. The turning-point of affairs had
been now reached; the scales fell from the eyes of the British
Government. Reluctantly they were driven to the conclusion that they
had for seven years been trifled with, that their agents, one after
another, had been duped; that while they deluded themselves by
imagining that by their concessions they were pouring oil on water,
they were, in fact, throwing that inflammable substance on fire. Such
systematic blunders could not be made with impunity. It began, in
short, to be perceived that the ground so weakly surrendered at Canton
could not be recovered without, in the prophetic words of Lord
Palmerston, "coming to blows" once more with the Chinese.
The attention of the British Government being thus seriously directed
to China, they entered into correspondence with their plenipotentiary,
the governor of Hongkong, as to the best means of arresting the
decline of British prestige and of placing the interests of trade and
residence on a satisfactory footing. The plenipotentiary had no
resource but one for obtaining either information or advice on such
large questions, and that was always Consul Alcock at Shanghai, a
thousand miles from the seat of trouble, who had not then even seen
Canton. Mr Alcock was alert to respond to the invitation of his chief,
copiously, fearlessly, and with masterly lucidity as well as
comprehensiveness. In a despatch to Sir George Bonham dated January
13, 1852, the development of the new policy may be traced.[17] And the
whole situation is fully laid bare in a further despatch of June 17,
1852.[18]
This confidential official correspondence,[19] carried on for a number
of years, constitutes a natural introduction to the chapter of history
which was about to open. In the transactions which led to a second
rupture with China Consul Alcock had personally no part, for he was on
leave in England, but there also his voice was heard in the discussion
of the causes and objects of the war.
In a series of letters to the press, during 1857-58, commenting on the
progress of events, Mr Alcock endeavoured to keep the British public
informed of what was transpiring in China, the reasons for it, and the
probable consequences. These letters were republished in pamphlet
form, of course anonymously.
FOOTNOTES:
[16] See Appendix I.
[17] See Appendix II.
[18] See Appendix III.
[19] See Appendices I., II., and III.