THE FRUITS OF THE WAR AND PROSPECTS OF PEACE.
Pretensions of British and Chinese irreconcilable --
International equality inconceivable by Chinese -- British
aims as set forth by merchants -- The inadequacy of their
demands -- Clearer insight of their Government --
Unsteadiness of British policy -- Consistency of Chinese
policy -- Treaty to be observed so far as needful to
obviate another war -- Canton irreconcilable -- Ransoming
the city in 1841 the cause of much subsequent trouble
there.
The pretensions of the contending parties being absolutely
irreconcilable, no spontaneous accommodation was possible between
them. The Chinese could never acknowledge, or even comprehend,
equality among nations, the single relationship of victor and victim
being the beginning and the end of their international ethics. If,
therefore, they ever set before their minds the issue to be decided by
a war, it must have assumed the brutal but simple oriental form, Whose
foot is to be on the other's neck? The question, then, to be submitted
to the ordeal of battle between Great Britain and China was, Which
should be the uppermost; which should henceforth dictate to the other?
In justice to the Chinese, it must be admitted that they realised more
clearly than their adversary what the quarrel really signified. What
disconcerted them and led to chronic misunderstanding in the sequel
was the after-discovery that the victor was slack in claiming the
fruits of his victory. Whether they really expected success to attend
their arms may be an open question, for their ingrained habit of
boasting of their prowess may have deceived even themselves. With this
caveat the temper in which the Chinese entered on hostilities may be
gathered from a proclamation of the High Commissioner and the viceroy
of Canton in September 1839:--
Let it be asked [they say], though the foreign soldiers be
numerous, can they amount to one tenth-thousandth part of
ours? Though it be allowed that the foreign guns are
powerful and effective, can their ammunition be employed
for any long period and not be expended? If they venture to
enter the port, there will be but a moment's blaze and they
will be turned to cinders. If they dare to go on shore, it
is permitted to all the people to seize and kill them. How
can these foreigners then remain unawed?
From the British point of view the object of the China expedition was
set forth with conspicuous moderation by the merchants of London and
of the great industrial centres. And here it seems not unfitting to
remark upon the lively and intelligent interest which the commercial
community of that period was wont to take in the affairs of China. The
trade of Great Britain and of British India with that country had not
reached the annual value of £12,000,000 sterling including treasure,
yet we find in the years 1839 and 1840 a series of ably drawn
memorials to Government bearing the signatures of all the important
houses in the kingdom, showing the most intimate acquaintance with
everything that was passing in China, even though they failed to
apprehend the full signification thereof. The signatories of these
papers pointed out without circumlocution the measures necessary to
be taken in order to place the commercial interests of her Majesty's
subjects on a satisfactory footing. It would appear, therefore, that
it was from the independent merchants and manufacturers of Great
Britain and British India that the true inspiration came to Lord
Palmerston, who was then Foreign Minister; and not the inspiration
only, but the courage which was needed to throw over the pusillanimous
traditions of the Honourable East India Company, and to apply the
maxims of common-sense to our relations with the Chinese authorities.
Among the memorials addressed to, and by request of, the Foreign
Secretary, that from the East India and China Association,
representing the merchants of London interested in the Far East, gives
perhaps the clearest exposition of the whole case from the commercial
point of view. After a succinct historical _résumé_ of our successes
and failures in China, each traced to its cause, the memorialists
state their opinion that "submission will now only aggravate the evil,
and that an attempt should be made, supported by a powerful force, to
obtain such concessions from China as would place the trade upon a
secure and permanent footing." And they conclude with an outline of
the commercial treaty which they think would conduce to that result.
_First._ Admission not only to Canton, but to certain ports
to the northward--say Amoy, Fuh-cho-foo, Ningpo, and the
Yang-che-keang and Kwan-chou--situated between 29° and 32°
north latitude, near the silk, nankin, and tea districts,
and it is on this coast that the chief demand for British
woollens, longells, and camlets exists.
_Second._ Commercial relations to be maintained at these
places, or at Canton, generally with the Chinese natives;
but if the trade be limited to certain _hongs_, which we
must strongly deprecate, then the Government to be
guarantees of the solvency of such parties so chosen by it.
_Third._ That British subjects in China carrying on a
legitimate trade shall not be treated by the Government or
its officials as inferiors, but be left free in their
social and domestic relations to adopt European customs, to
possess warehouses, and to have their wives and families
with them, and to be under the protection of the Chinese
laws from insult and oppression.
_Fourth._ That a tariff of duties, inwards and outwards, be
fixed and agreed upon by the British and Chinese
Governments, and no alteration be made but by mutual
consent.
_Fifth._ That the Queen's representative, as superintendent
of the trade, be allowed direct communication with the
Emperor and his Ministers, as well as with the local
authorities; and that he be permitted to reside at Peking,
or at a given port, for the protection of British subjects
and the regulation of the trade.
_Sixth._ That in the event of any infraction of the Chinese
laws, the punishment for the same shall be confined to the
offender; and British subjects shall not be considered
responsible for the acts of each other, but each man for
his own--the innocent not being confounded with the guilty.
_Seventh._ That supposing the Chinese to refuse opening
their ports generally, the cession by purchase, or
otherwise, of an island be obtained, upon which a British
factory could be established.
Upon terms such as these the British trade with China
could, we think, be carried on with credit and advantage to
this country; and if force must be used to obtain them, we
cannot believe that the people of Great Britain and the
European community in general would offer any objection to
its exercise; at least we humbly suggest that the adoption
of this course is worth the trial, for if it be not
followed, the only alternative seems to be the abandonment
of this important and growing commerce to smugglers and to
piracy.--We have, &c.,
G. G. DE H. LARPENT.
JOHN ABEL SMITH.
W. CRAWFORD.
These stipulations, and the hypothetical form in which they were
advanced, show how imperfect, after all, was the grasp which the
mercantile community had as yet taken of the situation. While fully
recognising the necessity of force and urging its employment, they yet
seem to have clung to the hope that in some way or another the
expected treaty was to be the result of amicable negotiation. They did
not clearly realise that as without force nothing could be obtained,
so with force everything could be.
And from what an abyss the status of British subjects had come to be
regarded when it could be deemed a boon that they be placed under the
protection of Chinese law--instead of being kept for ever outside the
pale of law and of common human suffrages! Fortunately the Government,
profiting by past experience and better versed in political science,
held a more consistent course than that marked out for it by the
merchants, and went far beyond them in the concessions demanded of the
Chinese Government. Instead of trusting to Chinese law, protection for
the persons and property of British subjects was provided for under
the laws of Great Britain, a stipulation in the treaty which has been
the palladium of the liberties of all nationalities in China for sixty
years. The ambiguity which characterised the public appreciation of
the China question, even when expressed through the most authoritative
channel, deserves to be noted here on account of the influence it was
destined to exercise on the future conduct of affairs; for though the
British Government was perspicacious in the conduct of the war and in
arranging terms of peace, yet, lacking the sustained support of a
well-instructed public opinion, its Chinese policy was subject to
many backslidings. During protracted intervals of inadvertence the
pernicious influences which it was the purpose of the war to suppress
were allowed to regain lost ground, with the result that during the
whole sixty years our Chinese intercourse has been marred by the
chronic recrudescence of the old hostile temper which inspired the
outrages before the war.
On the part of the Chinese Court there was undoubtedly a desire for
such substantial fulfilment of the treaty as might obviate the risk of
a renewal of the war. The final instruction of the Emperor Tao-kuang
while the negotiations were proceeding was, "Be careful to make such
arrangements as shall cut off for ever all cause of war, and do not
leave anything incomplete or liable to doubt." And so long, at least,
as the material guarantee of Chusan was retained by Great
Britain--that is, until 1846--no open violation was to be apprehended.
The Chinese war party, however--as distinguished from the more
reasonable Manchus--were furious in their denunciations of the treaty;
and it was the opinion of Sir John Davis that the situation was only
saved by the financial exhaustion of the country: "the ordinary taxes
could not be collected." There would in any circumstances have been a
strong presumption of covert evasion being resorted to, a presumption
which was reduced to a certainty by the indulgence extended to that
ancient focus of mischief, Canton. By one of those aberrations of
judgment which it is scarcely unfair to call characteristic, Captain
Elliot desired to save Canton, of all places in the Chinese empire,
from the pressure of war, and in 1841, in the midst of hostilities on
the coast, he accepted ransom for the city, a transaction so
inexplicable that her Majesty's Treasury, at a loss what to do with
the money, after much explanatory correspondence declared itself
unable to appropriate the fund in the manner intended by her Majesty's
representative. The arrogance of the Cantonese had been so
immeasurably puffed up by this misguided clemency that the peace left
the populace of the city and district absolutely convinced of their
invincibility. As the eradication of this dangerous delusion was among
the primary purposes of the war, so the pandering to the pride of
Canton proved, as was inevitable, the malignant root of all subsequent
bitterness.[12]
FOOTNOTE:
[12] It is impossible to review, however summarily, the events of that
period without free reference to the officer who was during the time
charged with the care of British interests in China. But no pretence
is made in these pages to pass a verdict on the public record of
Captain Elliot. His acts involved too many solecisms in finance, for
one thing, to have escaped the attention of Parliament; but, like
others who come before that tribunal, he was neither attacked on his
merits nor defended on his merits. None could question the sincerity
of the encomiums passed by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Melbourne
on his "courage, coolness, and self-devotion"; to which might well be
added a quite exceptional fearlessness of responsibility. But the
first representatives of the British Crown in China were doomed to
failure by the nature of their commission. The terms of their
instructions were more than contradictory--they were mutually
destructive. To conciliate the Chinese while opening official
relations with them was to mix the ingredients of an explosive. A
dilemma was, in fact, presented unwittingly by the British Government
to their agents. Lord Napier impaled himself on one horn--that of
claiming a diplomatic status; Captain Elliot on the other--that of
gaining over the Government by conciliation; and no earthly skill
could have saved either of them.