CHAPTER II.

SENT TO CHINA.

Importance of appointment -- New position created by Treaty

of Nanking -- Exceptional responsibility of the new consuls

-- The evolution and scope of foreign intercourse --

Pioneer traders -- Mutual experiences of Chinese and

foreigners -- Results -- English inheritors of the record

-- An intolerable state of things -- Drastic remedy --

Where it failed -- Chasm between Eastern and Western ideas

-- Commerce alone supplied a safe medium of intercourse --

Its healing qualities -- But social and political

concomitants created friction -- Arbitrary interferences of

Chinese Government -- Their traditional mode of treating

barbarians -- Denial of human rights -- Absence of law in

their intercourse -- Spasmodic resistance to Chinese

tyranny aggravated the evils -- East India Company

submitted for the sake of gain -- Close of the Company's

charter -- Followed by endeavour of British Government to

establish official intercourse -- Determined resistance of

Chinese -- Lord Napier, first British envoy, not received

-- Loaded with insults -- Contradictory instructions given

by British Government -- To conciliate Chinese as in days

of Company, and at same time to open diplomatic relations

-- Lord Napier's appeal to experience -- His death at Macao

-- Captain Ellis, a third envoy, reverts to the policy of

submission -- Has no success.

When thus thrown upon his beam-ends in 1844, an appointment was

conferred on Mr Alcock which was not only honourable to him but

creditable to the Government which selected him. He was among the five

chosen to fill the office of consul in China under the treaty of

Nanking, which had been concluded in 1842. And if any event in human

life be deserving of such distinction, the opening thus provided for

the talents of Mr Alcock is on many grounds entitled to rank as

providential. To the end of his days he himself recognised that his

previous training had not been thrown away, but "had been

unconsciously preparing him for the great work of his life." The

Minister responsible for the appointment may be excused if, while

selecting a man of proved capacity for a post of unknown requirements,

he did not realise the full value of the service he was rendering to

his country. Governments are not always so perspicacious in gauging

the merits of the uncovenanted, and other nominations made under

circumstances not dissimilar have shown how easily the efficiency of

the candidate may be subordinated to considerations extraneous to the

public weal.

The China consulates were a new creation, a venture into the unknown,

a voyage without landmarks or chart, where success depended on the

personal qualities of the pioneer navigators--their judgment,

resourcefulness, and faculty of initiative. Great issues hung upon the

opening of the new world of the Far East, the success of which was

largely in the hands of the agents who were employed, for they were

practically beyond the reach of instructions. There was no telegraph,

and the so-called Overland Route to India was just beginning to be

exploited for the conveyance of mails and passengers. Nor was it

possible for even the wisest Government to frame general instructions

providing for eventualities out of the range of common experience. The

conditions of service were therefore such as to constitute an ordeal

under which a bureaucratic official would shrivel into uselessness or

worse, while to a strong man they were a powerful stimulant, the very

breath of life.

It was therefore a matter of serious consequence who should be

intrusted with the actual inauguration of the new relations with

China; and in the course of the present narrative it will probably

appear that it was a happy accident by which the country lost one

distinguished surgeon among many and gained in exchange a political

representative whose services must be considered unique.

FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

To understand fully the state of our relations with China created by

the treaty of Nanking, the whole history not only of our own

commercial intercourse, but of that of the nations who were our

forerunners in the Far East, would have to be kept in mind. For much

as we tried and hoped then, and ever since, to confine the

international question to a few bald propositions respecting trade,

personal protection, and so forth, it is impossible to eliminate the

historical, the human, and the general political elements from the

problem. For both good and evil we are the necessary outcome of our

own antecedents, as are the Chinese of theirs, and if we had acquired

a stock of experience of the Chinese, no less had they of us; indeed,

if we fairly consider the matter, theirs was the more comprehensive.

For to the Chinese we represented not ourselves alone, nor the East

India Company, nor a generation or two of timid traders, but

Christendom as a whole--our Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch

precursors, the Romish propaganda, and all the abortive missions to

Peking.

For three centuries and more what may be called the foreign education

of the Chinese had been proceeding: their habits were being formed in

so far as their dealings with strangers were concerned, and their

judgment was being trained by the authentic data with which they had

been plentifully supplied. European intercourse, in short, had been

one long lesson to the Chinese in the art of managing men from the

West. Without meaning it, we had been teaching them how to treat us,

just as we train animals to perform tricks; and the worst we can say

of the Chinese is that they have bettered the instruction, to their

loss perhaps as well as ours.

In the chronicles of that long history there are many deeds worthy of

remembrance, as well as many of another hue, neither being confined to

one side. There were good and bad among the early adventurers, as

there are at all times in every other section of mankind. Of two

brothers, for example, connected with the very early times, the first

comer ingratiated himself with the Chinese, and left such a good

impression behind him that the second was received with open arms:

very soon, however, he abused the liberality of the natives,

committing outrages upon them, which led ultimately to his forcible

expulsion from the country and to restrictions on the outlets for

trade. Taking it as a whole, the record of the pioneers in China is

rather a despicable one, in which violence, cupidity, and cowardice

formed large ingredients.

The English, as latest comers, being served heirs to the turpitudes

of all Europe, paid the penalty for the misdeeds and shortcomings of

their predecessors and their neighbours, as well as for their own. The

penalty was the intolerable degradation they had been made to endure,

with ever-increasing aggravation, at the only port where they were

permitted to trade--Canton.

As there are forms of impurity which can only be cleansed by fire, so

there was no possible remedy for the miseries of Anglo-Chinese

intercourse short of open war. The hostilities begun in 1839, and

brought to a conclusion by the treaty of Nanking in 1842, were

naturally held as a drastic liquidation of long-standing grievances

and the harbinger of a new era of peace and mutual respect. Why even

the decisive and one-sided war should have proved an inadequate

solvent of the perennial strife may partly appear as our story

proceeds.

The chasm between the Chinese and the Western world, as then

represented by Great Britain, was in fact much too deep to be bridged

over by any convention. Intercommunion between bodies so alien was as

the welding of heterogeneous metals, contact without fusion. From one

point of view, indeed, circumstances were highly favourable to a

sympathetic attachment, for there is no safer medium of intercourse

between nations than the commerce which blesses him that buys and him

that sells. It was the pursuit of commerce alone that drew men from

afar to the Asiatic coasts, and the reciprocal desire on the part of

the natives which opened for the strangers, be it ever so little, the

gates of the Chinese empire. The purely commercial relation left

little to be desired on the side of mutual goodwill. The impression

of it left on the mind of old residents in Canton is thus recorded by

Mr W. C. Hunter, an American merchant, who lived there from 1824:

"From the facility of all dealings with the Chinese who were assigned

to transact business with us, together with their proverbial honesty,

combined with a sense of perfect security to person and property,

scarcely a resident of any lengthened time--in short, any 'Old

Canton'--but finally left them with regret."

Mr Hunter goes further and testifies to the "vigilant care over the

personal safety of strangers who came to live in the midst of a

population whose customs and prejudices were so opposed to everything

foreign."

Why, then, was it that on the ground-level of common material

interest, and under the sunshine of the protection spontaneously

accorded by authority, the parties failed in two hundred years to

evolve between them a _modus vivendi_? The solution of this riddle can

only be found in a patient survey of events both before and after the

war.

It would carry us far beyond our limits even to summarise the history

of foreign intercourse with China. Nor is such a task necessary, since

our concern lies mainly with those later developments which culminated

in the war of 1839-42, a glance at which seems essential to any fair

appreciation of the sequel.

That there was no material cause of difference between the Chinese

Government and people on the one hand and the foreign traders and

their representatives on the other was made manifest by the

persistence and continuous growth of their mutual commerce. And their

common appreciation of the advantages of the trade is shown by the

readiness of each in turn to resort to the threat of stopping

business as a means of pressure on the other side. It is not therefore

the substance, but the accidents and conditions, of the intercourse

that generated the friction which led through outrage to reprisals;

and the two conditions most fruitful in conflict were the necessary

absence of law and the inevitable incomprehension of each others

status.

Left to themselves, the traders on either side, though without law,

would have been a law to themselves, both parties having been

habituated to a discipline of custom more potent within its sphere

than any code, commercial or penal. But as no problem in life can ever

be isolated, so in this case the twofold interference of the State and

the populace constantly obstructed the genial flow of commercial

intercourse.

The interference of the Chinese bore no resemblance to the

restrictions imposed on trade by Western Governments, for these, even

when most oppressive, are usually specific and calculable. There is a

tariff of duties, there are harbour and police regulations, and there

are the laws of the land. The peculiarity of the Chinese official

supervision of foreign trade was that it was incalculable and

arbitrary, governed by cupidities and jealousies, and subject to

individual caprice. Having barbarians to deal with, the Chinese

authorities followed the maxims of their ancient kings and "ruled them

by misrule, which is the true and the only way of ruling them." And

finding the barbarians submissive, they grew accustomed to practise on

them such indignities as a wanton schoolboy might inflict on a captive

animal, unrestrained by any consideration save the risk of

retaliation. The Chinese had no conscience to be shocked by the

persecution of foreigners, for in relation to them justice and

injustice were meaningless terms. Such arrogance was not so much the

result of any formulated belief as of a traditional feeling lying at

the bottom of their moral conceptions; and just as the Chinese people

to-day speak of foreigners, without consciousness of offence, as

"devils," so did the best educated officials in the days before the

war sincerely regard strangers as an inferior, if not a degraded,

race. As late as 1870 a British representative writing to the Chinese

Prime Minister complained that "the educated class, both by speech and

writing, lets the people see that it regards the foreigner as a

barbarian, a devil, or a brute." And there has been no change since

except what is enforced by prudence. To the absence of law in their

intercourse was therefore superadded a special negation of human

rights, naturally accompanied by an overbearing demeanour on the side

of the natives. The strangers were in effect outlawed. The attempts

made from time to time to assert their independence resembled the

spasmodic kicking of the ox against the goad which led rather to

aggravation than amelioration of the pain. The prevailing tone was

that of submission, inviting more and more aggression, until the cup

overflowed and war ensued.

If we ask how it could happen that Britons of any class came to submit

to such ignominy, the only answer forthcoming is that they did it for

the sake of gain. And if, further, we try to press home the

responsibility to any particular quarter, there is very little doubt

that the principal blame must be laid at the door of the East India

Company, which ruled and monopolised the English trade with China

until the expiration of their charter in 1834. The Board of Directors

in Leadenhall Street demanded remittances, and cared nothing for the

indignities which their distant agents might be forced to undergo in

order to supply these demands. "The interests at stake were too

valuable to be put at issue upon considerations of a personal nature,

... and the Court leave the vindication of the national honour to the

Crown." Such was their unchanging attitude. The agents on their side,

balancing the pros and cons, concluded that at any cost they must

retain the favour of the omnipotent Board. By this course of procedure

the prestige which would have protected British subjects from outrage

was bartered away; the Chinese were induced by the subservience of the

Company's officers to practise constantly increasing insolence, and

small blame to them. The demeanour of the Company's representatives

was that of men carrying out instructions against their better

judgment. Occasionally, indeed, their judgment got the better of their

instructions, and they would attempt to make a stand for their rights.

A case occurred in 1831 when new restrictions on the export of silver

were imposed by the Chinese authorities. Mr H. H. Lindsay, head of the

Company's committee, resented the proceeding, and threatened to stop

the trade. In the event, however, the committee gave way, and in token

of surrender delivered the keys of their factory to a Chinese

mandarin.

The process which had been consecrated by time naturally did not stop

when the principal cause of it was removed. It continued uninterrupted

after the monopoly of the Company had ceased. Indeed the case became

much aggravated when the British agents, beginning with Lord Napier,

became representatives of the Crown instead of the Company. And so

little was the position understood by the authorities in Great Britain

that, yielding to considerations of convenience, they appointed some

of the very men whom the Chinese had been long accustomed to treat

with contumely to be the representatives of the King. But the Chinese

had a true presentiment of the nature of the changes which this new

departure threatened. They had learned from Captain Weddell, Commodore

Anson, and others what were the pretensions of the commander of a

Kings ship; and then justly inferred that a King's representative

would stand on a wholly different footing from a Company's

superintendent. They resolved, therefore, to nip in the bud every

effort to open international relations, employing to that end all the

weapons which were familiar to them. The viceroy of Canton not only

declined communication with the British envoy, but imprisoned him and

intercepted his letters, so that a naval force was required to release

him from captivity. Yet it was not malevolence but policy that guided

the hand of the Chinese authorities--the settled policy of keeping

foreigners at arm's-length at all costs.

The rule of conduct enjoined by the British Government on the first

representatives of the Crown in China was emphatically conciliation,

as in the time of the East India Company and its superintendents. They

were to "cautiously abstain from all unnecessary use of menacing

language, or from making any appeal for protection to our military or

naval force (except in extreme cases), or to do anything to irritate

the feelings or revolt the opinions or prejudices of the Chinese

people." That article of the "Sign-manual Instructions to the

Superintendents of Trade in China" was faithfully carried out; while

the one ordering the envoy to "take up your residence at the port of

Canton" could not be obeyed because the Chinese provincial authorities

placed their veto on it. The conciliatory demeanour of the British

representative was met by the refusal, accompanied by the grossest

insults, of the Chinese to receive or acknowledge him. And not by

insults only, such as perverting the phonetic rendering of his name by

the substitution of characters bearing odious meanings, and by various

indignities offered to his person, but by interference with his

domestic servants, and even cutting off his food-supply, did they

coerce him into abandoning his post at Canton. Their conduct evoked

the opinion from Lord Napier, in reporting the incidents to his

Government, that "the viceroy of Canton was guilty of an outrage on

the British Crown calling for redress," which drew from the Duke of

Wellington (February 2, 1835) the chilling comment that "it is not by

force and violence that his Majesty intends to establish a commercial

intercourse between his subjects and China, but by the other

conciliatory measures so strongly inculcated in all the instructions

which you have received." Lord Napier's despatches prove that he

understood the situation perfectly. "What advantage or what point did

we ever gain," he wrote, "by negotiating or humbling ourselves before

these people, or rather before their Government? The records show

nothing but subsequent humiliation and disgrace. What advantage or

what point, again, have we ever lost that was just and reasonable, by

acting with promptitude and vigour? The records again assure us that

such measures have been attended with complete success." And he

recommended his Government "to consult immediately on the best plan to

be adopted for commanding a commercial treaty, or a treaty which shall

secure the just rights and embrace the interests, public and private,

of all Europeans,--not of British alone, but of all civilised people

coming to trade according to the principles of international law."

Driven to death by Chinese official barbarities, and by the

discouragement of his own Government, Lord Napier was succeeded first

by one then by another of the East India Company's old staff, who

could only maintain themselves by sinking their character as British

national envoys and submitting to the indignities which the Chinese

more than ever delighted in imposing on them, increasing in virulence

in proportion as the resistance to them grew weaker.

The line of policy inculcated upon Lord Napier was, in fact,

scrupulously followed after his death, notably by Captain Charles

Elliot, the third in succession, who received the King's commission in

1836. That officer indeed went far beyond his instructions in his

efforts to conciliate the Chinese; for though repeatedly ordered by

Lord Palmerston to communicate with the authorities direct, and not

through the Hong merchants;[3] and not to head his communications with

the word "petition"; and notwithstanding his own reiterated opinion in

the same sense, Captain Elliot entirely yielded to the Chinese

pretensions. He communicated through the Hong merchants, and

explicitly received the "commands" of the authorities with

"reverence." As was natural, the more he conceded the more was exacted

from him, until conciliation reached the point of exhaustion and there

was nothing left to give up. Matters had nearly reached this stage

when the British envoy could thus address the Governor of Canton

(through the Hong merchants) in 1837: "The undersigned respectfully

assures his Excellency that it is at once his duty and his anxious

desire to conform in all things to the imperial pleasure." The result

of this extreme humility was that Captain Elliot was forced to strike

his flag at Canton and withdraw to the Portuguese settlement of Macao,

on the ground that he was unable to maintain intercourse with the

authorities on the conditions prescribed for him by her Majesty's

Government.

[Illustration]

FOOTNOTE:

[3] These were a syndicate appointed by the Chinese Government to

conduct the foreign trade and be responsible to the Government for the

proceedings of the foreign merchants.

The Englishman in China During the Victorian Era, Vol. 1 (of 2) As Illustrated in the Career of Sir Rutherford Alcock, K.C.B., D.C.L., Many Years Consul and Minister in China and Japan · 第 2 / 19 章