CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. CHAMBERLAIN
As I have said, we felt that the result of the Conference had been
a very serious set-back and discouragement to all our wishes. I
therefore watched public opinion very carefully and with considerable
anxiety, and I noticed two or three uncomfortable indications. In the
first place a restlessness manifested itself among the manufacturing
classes in Canada, particularly in the woollen trade, against the
British preference which pressed upon them, while Canada received no
corresponding advantage, and a discussion began as to whether the
British preference should not be cut off. The next thing which alarmed
me was that during the following winter a movement arose in the United
States to secure the establishment of a reciprocity treaty with
Canada. Suggestions were made to renew the sittings of the High Joint
Commission which had adjourned in 1898 without anything being done.
This was evaded by our Government, but a strong agitation was commenced
in the Eastern States, and supported in Chicago, to educate the people
of the United States in favour of tariff arrangements with Canada.
The more far-seeing men in the United States were uneasy about the
movement for mutual preferential tariffs in the British Empire. They
saw at once that if successful it would consolidate and strengthen
British power and wealth and would be a severe blow to the prosperity
of the United States, which for fifty years had been fattening upon
the free British markets, while for thirty years their own had been
to a great extent closed to the foreigner and preserved for their
own enrichment. I felt that the failure of the Conference would give
power to our enemies in the United States and aid them to enmesh us in
the trade entanglements which would preclude the possibility of our
succeeding in carrying our policy into effect.
Every week I became more and more alarmed. It will be remembered
that there was then no Tariff Reform movement in England. That Lord
Salisbury was dying, that Mr. Chamberlain had not yet openly committed
himself, and that nothing was being done, while our opponents were
actively at work both in the States and in Canada. The small faction in
Canada who were disloyal were once more taking heart while the loyal
element were discouraged.
Still further to cause anxiety the Imperial Federation Defence
Committee took this opportunity, through Mr. Arthur Loring, to make
an imperious demand upon the Colonies to hand over at once large cash
contributions in support of the Navy, or practically to cut us adrift.
Had the desire been to smash up the Empire, the attack could not have
been better timed than when everything was going against the Imperial
view. I wrote a reply which appeared in _The Times_ on the 2nd March,
1903:
SIR,
With reference to your issues of January 9th and 10th which contained
the letter of Mr. Arthur Loring, Hon. Secretary of the Imperial
Federation (Defence) Committee, and your leading article upon the
question of colonial contributions to the Imperial Navy, I desire to
send a reply from the Canadian point of view.
Mr. Loring's proposition is practically that the Mother Country
should repudiate any further responsibility for the defence of the
Empire, unless the Colonies pay over cash contributions for the Navy
in the way and under the terms that will suit the Imperial Federation
(Defence) Committee. The British Empire League in Canada and the
majority of the Canadians are as anxious for a secure Imperial Defence
as is Mr. Loring, but the spirit of dictation which runs through the
publications of his committee has always been a great difficulty in
our way, by arousing resentment in our people, who might do willingly
what they would object to be driven into. Because we hesitate to pay
cash contributions we are attacked as if we had made no sacrifices for
the Empire. Mr. Loring seems to forget our preference to all British
goods, which has caused Germany to cut off the bulk of our exports
to that country, to forget that we imposed a duty on sugar in order
by preference to help the West Indies in the Imperial interest, that
we helped to construct the Pacific cable for the same reason, or
that numbers of our young men fought and died for the cause in South
Africa. We have proved in many ways our willingness to make sacrifices
for the Empire, and yet, because we will not do just exactly what Mr.
Loring's committee suggest, they wish to cut us adrift.
This is a very impolitic and dangerous suggestion. It is so important
that we should understand each other, and that you in England should
know how we look at this question, that I hope you will allow me to
say a few words upon this subject.
The British Empire League in Canada requested me as their president to
go to Great Britain last April to advocate a duty of 5 to 10 per cent.
all round the Empire on all foreign goods in order to provide a fund
for Imperial Defence. This proposition was approved of at a number of
meetings held in various parts of Canada, and by political leaders of
all shades of politics and I am certain it would have been confirmed
by a large majority in our Parliament had Great Britain and the other
Colonies agreed to it.
I addressed a number of meetings in England and Scotland, and
discussed the question with many of the political leaders in London.
I soon discovered while the audiences were receptive, and many
approved of the proposition, that nevertheless it was new, contrary
to their settled prejudices, and that it would take time and popular
education on the subject before such an arrangement could be carried
in the House of Commons. When Sir Wilfrid Laurier came over just
before the Conference, knowing that I had been discussing the subject
for two months, he asked me if I thought the proposition I had been
advocating could be proposed at the Conference with any prospect of
success. I replied that I did not think it could, that Great Britain
was not ready for it, that Australia at the time was engaged in such a
struggle over her revenue tariff that she could not act, and that if
I was in his place I should not attempt it. He did, however, make a
number of suggestions at the Conference which, if accepted by the home
Government, would have gone a long way to place the Empire on a safer
footing. The Mother Country would not agree to relieve Canada from the
corn duty, but was quite willing to accept and ask for contributions
for defence. This Sir Wilfrid refused; and a large portion of our
people approve of that course, not because they do not feel that they
ought to contribute, not because they are not able to contribute, but
because they do not feel disposed to spend their money in what they
would consider a senseless and useless way.
We feel that to save our Empire, to consolidate it, to make it strong
and secure, there are several points that must be considered and that,
as all these points are essential, to spend money on some and leave
out others that are vital would be a useless and dangerous waste.
If our Empire is to live, she must maintain her trade and commerce,
she must keep up her manufactures, she must retain and preserve her
resources both in capital and population for her own possessions, she
must have bonds of interest as well as of sentiment, and she must have
a system of defence that shall be complete at all points. An army or
a navy might be perfect in equipment, in training, in weapons, in
organisation, in skilled officers, &c., and yet if powder and cordite
were left out all would be useless waste. If food were left out it
would be worst of all, and yet Mr. Loring asks us to contribute
large sums to maintain a navy, and to have that navy directed and
governed by a department in which we would have little or no voice--a
department under the control of an electorate who in the first war
with certain Powers (one of which we at least know is not friendly)
would be starving almost immediately, and would very soon insist on
surrendering the fleet to which we had contributed in order to get
food to feed their starving children. They might even be willing to
surrender possessions as well. While you in England maintain this
position, that you will not include food in your scheme of defence,
do you wonder that we in Canada should endeavour to perfect our own
defence in order to secure our own freedom and independence as a
people, if the general smash comes, which we dread as the possible
result of your obstinate persistence in a policy, which leaves you at
the mercy of one or two foreign nations.
I wish to draw attention to the following figures, which seem to show
that there is weakness and danger in your commercial affairs as well:
1900.
United Kingdom imports (foreign) £413,544,528
United Kingdom exports (foreign) 252,349,700
------------
Balance of trade against United Kingdom £161,194,828
1901.
United Kingdom imports (foreign) £416,416,492
United Kingdom exports (foreign) 234,745,904
------------
Balance of trade against United Kingdom £181,670,588
We see the result of this great import of foreign goods in the
distress in England to-day. The cable reports tell us of unemployed
farm labourers flocking into the towns, of unemployed townsmen
parading the streets with organised methods of begging, of charity
organisations taxed to their utmost limit to relieve want. We see the
Mother Country ruining herself and enriching foreign nations by a
blind adherence to a fetish, and we begin to wonder how long it can
last.
Adopt the policy of a duty upon all foreign goods, bind your Empire
together by bonds of interest, turn your emigration and capital into
your own possessions, produce ten or twelve million quarters more of
wheat in your own islands, no matter what the cost may be, and then
ask us to put in our contributions towards the common defence, for
then an effective defence might be made.
Yours truly,
GEORGE T. DENISON.
I was so alarmed at the state of affairs that on the 23rd March, 1903,
I wrote to Mr. Chamberlain the following letter, which shows my anxiety
at the time:
DEAR MR. CHAMBERLAIN,
There are one or two very important matters I wish to bring to your
attention.
Just before the Conference I had a conversation with you and Lord
Onslow in reference to Canada's action. You considered that it would
be useless at the time to attempt to carry the proposition that I
had been advocating in Great Britain, of a 5 to 10 per cent. duty
around the Empire for a defence fund. You told me what line you
thought the most likely to succeed, and advised me that Canada should
try to meet your views by further concessions to Great Britain in
return for advantages for us in your markets. I urged this upon Sir
Wilfrid Laurier, and I understand that he was willing to meet you, if
possible, on the lines indicated. Unfortunately, nothing was done. I
fancy your colleagues got frightened, for I know that you personally
had a clear insight into the matter, and fully appreciated the
importance of something being done.
Now I wish to tell you how matters stand out here. Our people are very
much discouraged. Many of our strongest Imperialists in the past are
beginning to advocate the repeal of our preference to Great Britain.
The manufacturers who were in favour of the preference, provided we
had a prospect of getting a reciprocal advantage in your markets,
are, many of them for their personal ends, now desirous of stopping
it. All the disaffected (there are not very many of them) are using
the failure of the Conference to attack and ridicule the Imperial
cause. This is all very serious. The gravest danger of all, however,
is that the United States will never give our Empire another chance to
consolidate itself if they can prevent it. They are already agitating
for the reassembling of the High Joint Commission to consider, among
other things, reciprocal tariffs. Only the other day a member of the
Massachusetts House of Assembly declared in that house that he had
assurances from Washington that the passage of a resolution in favour
of reciprocity with Canada would be welcomed by the administration. We
see the danger of this, and our Government have made excuses to delay
the meeting of the Commission until October. Now if nothing is done
in the meantime towards combining the Empire--if nothing is done to
make such a start towards it as would give our people encouragement,
what will happen? The United States will give us the offer of free
reciprocity in natural products. What would our people be likely to
do in that case? All along the frontier our farmers would find it very
convenient to sell their barley, oats, hay, butter, poultry, eggs,
&c., to the cities on the border. In the North West it would appeal
to our western farmers, who would be glad to get their wheat in free
to the mills of Minneapolis and St. Paul. Such a proposition might
therefore carry in our Parliament, and would probably bind us for ten
or fifteen years. This would be a dead block against any combination
of the Empire for preferential trade, for then you could not give us
a preference, as we would be debarred from putting a duty on United
States articles coming across our border, which would be necessary if
an Imperial scheme were carried out.
A proposition for reciprocity with the United States was made in 1887.
At the dinner given to you in Toronto that year I fired my first
shot against Commercial Union, and ever since I have been probably
the leader in the movement against it. My main weapon, my strongest
weapon, was an Imperial discriminating tariff around the Empire. We
succeeded in getting our people and Parliament and Government to
take the idea up and to do our side of it, and we have given the
discriminating tariff in your favour. We hoped that you would meet us,
but nothing has been done, and our people feel somewhat hurt at the
result. Where will we Imperialists be this autumn when the High Joint
Commission meets? The people of the United States will be almost sure
to play the game to keep back our Empire, and we will be here with our
guns spiked, with all our weapons gone, and in a helpless condition.
I feel all this very deeply and think that I should lay the whole
matter before you. I do not wish to see the Empire "fall to pieces
by disruption or by tolerated secession." I do not wish to see "the
disasters which will infallibly come upon us." I wish to see our
Empire "a great Empire" and not see Great Britain "a little State,"
and I do urge upon you as earnestly as I can to get something done
this Session that will give us a preference, no matter how small, in
order that our hands may be tied before the High Joint Commission
meets, so that we may escape the dangers of a reciprocity treaty, for
if we are tied up with one for ten years, our Empire may have broken
up before our hands are free again.
If something was done on the preference, I believe we could carry
large expenditures for Imperial Defence in our Parliament. I enclose a
letter to the _Times_ which appeared while you were on the sea, which
I believe pretty fairly expressed the views of most of our people.
I send my hearty congratulations on the success of your mission to
South Africa, and on the magnificent work you have done there for our
Empire,
Believe me,
Yours, &c.
_The Right Hon Joseph Chamberlain, M.P._
On the 16th April, 1903, I received a letter from Mr. Chamberlain which
was quite discouraging. I wrote to him again on the 18th April, and on
the 10th May received an answer which was much more encouraging.
I was not surprised when, on the 15th May, Mr. Chamberlain made his
great speech at Birmingham, which resulted soon afterwards in his
resignation from the Government, and the organisation of the Tariff
Reform movement, which he has since advocated with such enthusiasm,
energy, and ability.
The result of this speech was like the sun coming out from behind a
cloud. Instantly the whole prospect brightened, every Canadian was
inspirited, and confidence was restored. Such an extraordinary change
has seldom been seen. The Toronto correspondent of the _Morning Post_,
17th May, 1903, said:
Canada has seldom before shown such unanimity over a proposed Imperial
policy, as that which greets the project of Mr. Chamberlain for the
granting of trade concessions to the British Colonies in the markets
of Great Britain.
It is this hope in the ultimate triumph of Mr. Chamberlain's policy
which has caused the Canadian people to wait patiently for that result.
The extraordinary defeat of the Unionist party in the elections of 1906
has not destroyed this confidence, and the Empire has yet a chance to
save herself.
The 6th annual meeting of the British Empire League took place on 19th
May, 1903, in the Railway Committee Room, House of Commons, Ottawa.
A very unpleasant event occurred about this time in the Alaskan Award.
I had looked into the matter very closely while Sir Wilfrid Laurier was
in Washington engaged in the negotiations over the dispute, and I felt
confident that we had a very weak case for our contentions, in fact I
thought we had none at all. I saw Chief Justice Armour, who was to be
one of the Canadian Commissioners, just before he left for England.
He was a friend of mine, and one of the ablest judges who ever sat in
the Canadian Courts, and I told him what I thought. He evidently felt
much the same. I said to him that I wished to make a remark that might
be stowed away in the back of his head in case of any necessity for
considering it. It was that when he had done his very best for Canada,
and had done all that he could, if he found that Lord Alverstone
would not hold out with him, not to have a split but if the case was
hopeless to join with Lord Alverstone and make the decision unanimous.
I said if Lord Alverstone went against us the game was up, there was
no further appeal, no remedy, and there was no use fighting against
the inevitable, and it would be in more conformity with the dignity
of Canada, and good feeling in the Empire, to have an award settled
judicially, and by all the judges. Unfortunately the Chief Justice
died, and the Government appointed a very able advocate Mr. Aylesworth,
K.C., who happened to be in England at the time, to fill his place.
Mr. Aylesworth had been the advocate all his life. At that time he had
absolutely no knowledge of political affairs. The award was better
than I expected and gave us two islands, which the United States had
held for years, and on one of which a United States Post Office had
been long established. Mr. Aylesworth forgetting there was no appeal,
and that the matter was final, prevailed on Lt.-Governor Jetté who was
with him to make a most violent protest, and a direct attack upon Lord
Alverstone. Owing to this, the award created a good deal of resentment
in Canada. The people were very much aroused, and believed they had
been betrayed.
By the time Mr. Aylesworth arrived in Toronto he had time to think
the matter over. The Canadian Club had organised a great banquet in
his honour, and I am of opinion that when he arrived at home, he was
astonished at the storm he had aroused. He at once allayed the excited
feelings of his audience by a most loyal, patriotic, and statesmanlike
speech, and quieted the feeling to a great extent, although it is still
a very sore question in Canada, and Lord Alverstone is placed on the
same shelf with Mr. Oswald of the treaty of 1783, and Lord Ashburton
who gave away a great part of the State of Maine; but had I been in
Lord Alverstone's place, and I am an out and out Canadian, with no
sympathy whatever with the United States, I should have done as he did.
In the spring of 1903 a controversy arose between Mr. Joseph
Chamberlain and the present Lord Salisbury in which I was able to
intervene on Mr. Chamberlain's side with some effect.
Mr. Chamberlain had said in a public letter that the late Lord
Salisbury had favoured retaliation and closer commercial union with
the colonies. The present Lord Salisbury wrote to _The Times_ saying
that his father profoundly dissented from Mr. Chamberlain's fiscal
policy. Several letters followed from Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Michael
Hicks-Beach. I published in _The Times_ on the 18th May, 1905, the
following letter:
SIR,
The controversy which has been lately going on in the Press in
Great Britain over the question of the late Lord Salisbury's view
on protection and preferential tariffs has excited considerable
interest in this country. As I am in a position to throw some light
upon the late Premier's opinions on these questions, I would ask your
permission to say a few words.
I was for some years president of the Imperial Federation League
in Canada, and since it was merged in the British Empire League I
have held the same position in that body. In 1890 I was appointed
specially to represent the Canadian League in England for the
purpose of advocating the denunciation of the German and Belgian
treaties, and of urging the establishment of a system of preferential
tariffs between Canada and the Mother Country. In two interviews
with Lord Salisbury, I urged both points upon him as strongly as
possible, and pointed out to him that our League had taken up the
policy of preferential tariffs in order to counteract the movement
for commercial union or unrestricted reciprocity between the United
States and Canada, which at that time was a very dangerous agitation.
After hearing my arguments, Lord Salisbury said that he felt that the
real way to consolidate the Empire would be by a Zollverein and a
Kriegsverein. This was substantially our policy, and I begged of him
to say something on that line publicly, as it would be a great help
to us in the struggle we were having on behalf of Imperial Unity. He
did not say whether he would do so or not; but a few months later at
the Lord Mayor's banquet at the Guildhall in November, 1890, he made
a speech which attracted considerable attention, and which gave us in
Canada great encouragement. He spoke of the hostile tariffs and said:
"Therefore it is that we are anxious above all things to conserve,
to unify, to strengthen the Empire of the Queen because it is to
the trade that is carried on within the Empire of the Queen that we
look for the vital force of the commerce of this country. . . . The
conflict which we have to fight is a conflict of tariffs."
At Hastings on May 18th, 1892, he made another speech still more
pronounced the terms of which are well known.
We carried on a correspondence for many years, and I saw him on
several occasions when I visited England. We discussed the policy of
preferential tariffs and the denunciation of the German and Belgian
treaties, which were denounced by his Government in August, 1897. His
letters to me show how strongly he was in sympathy with us; but he was
a statesman of great caution and evidently would not commit himself to
practical action in regard to either preference or fair trade, as long
as he believed that the prejudice against any taxation on articles of
the first necessity was too strong to be overcome.
The following extracts are taken from letters received by me from Lord
Salisbury, and they give a clear idea of what his opinions were. In
the early days of the movement I was probably the only one who was
pressing on Lord Salisbury the urgent need of some action being taken,
and he may not have had occasion to express his views upon the subject
to many others.
In a letter dated March 21st, 1891, in reply to one from me telling
him of the danger of reciprocity or commercial union with the United
States, he wrote:
"I agree with you that the situation is full of danger, and that the
prospect before us is not inviting. The difficulties with which we
shall have to struggle will tax all the wisdom and all the energy of
both English and Canadian statesmen during the next five or ten years.
I should be very glad if I saw any immediate hope of our being able
to assist you by a modification of our tariff arrangements. The main
difficulty I think, lies in the great aversion felt by our people here
to the imposition of any duties on articles of the first necessity. It
is very difficult to bring home to the constituency the feeling that
the maintenance of our Empire in its integrity may depend upon fiscal
legislation. It is not that they do not value the tie which unites us
to the colonies; on the contrary, it is valued more and more in this
country, but they do not give much thought to political questions and
they are led away by the more unreasoning and uncompromising advocates
of free trade. There is a movement of opinion in this country, and I
only hope it may be rapid enough to meet the necessities of our time."
In another letter, dated November 22nd, 1892, he wrote:
"I wish there were more prospect of some fiscal arrangements which
would meet the respective exigencies of England and Canada, but that
appears still to be in the far distance."
"In another letter written nine years later, dated March 1st, 1901, a
little over a year before his final retirement from office, referring
to a report of the speeches at the annual meeting of our League in
Canada, which I had sent to him, he wrote:
"It is very interesting to read Mr. Ross's address about the error
into which free trade may run, for I am old enough to remember the
rise of free trade, and the contempt with which the apprehensions of
the protectionists of that day were received. But a generation must
pass before the fallacies then proclaimed will be unlearnt. There are
too many people whose minds were formed under their influence, and
until those men have died out no change of policy can be expected."
"These extracts show very clearly Lord Salisbury's views, and prove
that personally he would have favoured preferential tariffs in order to
save and preserve a great Empire."
Yours,
GEORGE T. DENISON.
This was much commented on in the British Press.
_The Times_ said:
The extraordinarily interesting letter which we publish from Colonel
Denison, the president of the British Empire League in Canada, shows
how deeply sensible was the late Lord Salisbury of the obstacles which
prejudice and tradition offer to the adoption of a genuine policy
of tariff reform, and how conscious he was of the difficulties to a
practical statesman of overcoming them.
The London _Globe_ said:
Few more remarkable contributions have been made recently to the
controversy over fiscal reform than the letters of the late Marquis of
Salisbury, which Colonel Denison, of Toronto, has communicated to _The
Times_.
The _Outlook_ said:
The invaluable letter in _The Times_ from Colonel G. T. Denison, of
Toronto, has disposed once for all of Lord Hugh Cecil's theory that
the system of free imports ought to be regarded as a Conservative
institution. Passages cited by Colonel Denison from unpublished
letters and forgotten speeches prove that the late Lord Salisbury's
agreement with the principles of Mr. Chamberlain's policy was complete.
Lord Hugh Cecil had the following letter in _The Times_ of the 20th
May, 1905.
SIR,
I have no desire to enter into any controversy with Colonel Denison
as to Lord Salisbury's opinion in 1891 or 1892. The extracts from the
letters published by Colonel Denison do not seem to me to have any
bearing on Lord Salisbury's attitude towards any question that is now
before the public.
I myself think that it is undesirable to quote the opinions of the
dead, however eminent, in reference to a living controversy. But
since the attempt continues to be made by tariff reformers to claim
Lord Salisbury's authority in support of their views, it is right to
say that I have no more doubt than have any of my brothers that Lord
Salisbury profoundly dissented from Mr. Chamberlain's proposals so far
as they were developed during his lifetime. Not only did he repeatedly
express that dissent to us, and to others who had been in official
relations with him, but he caused a letter to be written in that sense
to one of my brothers.
In conclusion, may I point out that it would have been more courteous
in Colonel Denison, if he had at least consulted Lord Salisbury's
personal representatives before publishing extracts from Lord
Salisbury's private correspondence?
Yours obediently,
ROBERT CECIL.
_19th May._
I replied to this in the following letter to _The Times_, which was
published in the issue of 13th June, 1905:
SIR,
I have seen to-day, in _The Times_ of the 20th inst., Lord Robert
Cecil's letter in reply to mine, which appeared on the 18th inst. As
his letter contains a reflection on my action in publishing extracts
from the late Lord Salisbury's letters to me, I hope you will allow me
to make an explanation.
Mr. Chamberlain had claimed that the late Lord Salisbury had approved
of his policy of preferential tariffs, while the present Lord
Salisbury held that his father "had profoundly dissented from Mr.
Chamberlain's fiscal policy."
As Lord Salisbury and his brothers had published their father's
private opinions, which may have referred more to the time and method
and details of Mr. Chamberlain's action than to the general principle
of preferential tariffs, I had no reason to think that there could be
any objection to publishing the late Premier's own written words on
the subject. The letters from which I quoted, although not intended
for publication at the time, contained his views on a great public
question, and did not relate to any person, or any private matter, and
as he was not here to speak for himself, I felt that it was desirable
to publish the extracts in order to show clearly what his views were.
Lord Robert Cecil says that it would have been more courteous in me to
have consulted with his father's representatives before publishing,
but in view of their own action in publishing his oral, private
opinions, it would seem discourteous to assume that they could, under
the circumstances, desire to suppress positive evidence on a matter of
grave public importance to our Empire.
Yours, etc.,
GEORGE T. DENISON.
TORONTO, CANADA, _31st May, 1905_.
This closed the episode.