MISSION TO ENGLAND, 1897
I left for England via Montreal on the 31st May, 1897, and expected to
arrive in Liverpool a day or two before Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who was
to sail some days later from New York on a fast ship. We were delayed
for some days by fogs, and did not arrive in Liverpool till after Sir
Wilfrid Laurier had left that place. He had arrived in the old world
for the first time of his life, and at once fell into the hands of
the Liverpool merchants and business men, at that time generally free
traders. He had not a colleague with him and naturally was affected
by the atmosphere in which he found himself, and in his speech at
the great banquet given by the British Empire League with the Duke
of Devonshire in the chair, he made a few remarks in reference to
preferential tariffs for which he was severely criticised at home.
I joined the party at Glasgow two days later, and Sir Wilfrid, who
seemed pleased to see me, had a long talk with me between Glasgow
and Liverpool on the special train which took the party down. On the
following morning the Liverpool papers had cables from Canada giving
an account of the discussion in the Canadian House of Commons over the
cabled reports of Sir Wilfrid's speech. He was attacked vehemently by
Alexander McNeill, our champion in the House, on one point of his
speech at Liverpool, and Sir Richard Cartwright and his colleagues, in
defending Sir Wilfrid, did so on the ground that the reports of what he
said could not be taken as correct, and asking the House to withhold
comment until the full reports should be received. This was a desirable
course to adopt, for cable despatches have so often conveyed inaccurate
impressions.
The real secret of the trouble was that in the busy rush of his work as
leader of the opposition, and then as Premier, Sir Wilfrid had not been
able really to master the question, but he soon grasped the subject,
and his later speeches were very effective. His reception by the
British people was wonderfully favourable, and the impression he made
upon them was remarkable. He stood out from all the other Premiers--and
there were eleven in all--and he was everywhere the central and
striking figure.
On the 5th July, 1897, a meeting of the British Empire League was held
in the Merchant Taylors Hall. The Duke of Devonshire was in the chair
and made an able speech welcoming the Premiers from the colonies. He
was followed by Rt. Hon. R. J. Seddon, Premier of New Zealand, Sir
William Whiteway, Premier of Newfoundland, Mr. G. H. Reid, Premier
of New South Wales, and Sir Edward Braddon, Premier of Tasmania. Sir
Wilfred Laurier had not been able to attend, and as President of the
League in Canada I was called upon to speak. As to the treaties, I said:
I have come here from Canada to make one or two suggestions. In the
first place in reference to preferential tariffs, we have shown you
that we wish to give you a preference in our markets. (Cheers).
But treaties interfere with us in the management of our own tariff,
and I wish to emphasise the fact that some steps should be taken to
place us in absolute freedom to give every advantage we wish to our
fellow-countrymen all over the world. (Cheers.) We wish to give that
advantage to our own people, and we do not wish to be forced to give
it to the foreigner. (Hear, hear.) . . .
Now my last point is this. In Canada we have viewed with considerable
alarm the fact that the wealthiest and most powerful nation in all
history is at this moment dependent for her daily food for three out
of every four of her population upon two foreign nations, who are, I
am thankful to say, friendly to her, and who, I hope, will always be
friendly, but who, it cannot be denied, might by some possibility be
engaged in war with us at some future time. These two nations might
then stop your food supply, and that harm to you would spread great
distress among the people of our country. I have been deputed by the
League in Canada to ask you to look carefully into this question. If
there is no real danger, relieve our fears; but if you find there is
any danger let me urge upon you as strongly as I can to take some
steps to meet that danger. Let the method be what it may, great
national granaries, a duty on food, a bounty or what not, but let
something be done.
A special meeting of the Council of the League was held on the 7th
July, 1897, to meet the deputation of our League. In my address I once
more dealt with the question of the German and Belgian treaties. I
said, "The Canadian people have now offered, in connection with their
desire regarding these treaties, to give what they propose to all
nations, but with the express intention of giving an advantage to our
own people. I am deputed to ask you to use what influence you can on
the Government and people of this country to give us that full control
of our own tariff to which we contend we are entitled."
Lord Salisbury in 1890, although favourable to the idea, was not
able to secure the denunciation of the German and Belgian treaties,
although I knew from his conversation with me that personally he felt
that they should be denounced. In 1892 Lord Knutsford peremptorily
refused a request by Canada to denounce the treaties. Lord Ripon was
not quite so peremptory in 1894-'95 after the Ottawa Conference, but he
refused permission to Mr. Rhodes to arrange a discriminating tariff in
Matabeleland. We had been held off for six years, but the action of the
Canadian Government brought matters to a head.
During June and July, 1897, in London the most profuse and
large-hearted hospitality was shown on every hand to the colonial
visitors, and I was fortunate enough to be invited to all the large
functions. I felt the importance of taking every opportunity to press
upon the leading men in England the necessity for the denunciation of
the treaties, and I knew Sir Wilfrid Laurier could not urge it with the
freedom or force that I could. Consequently in private conversations
I talked very freely on the subject, whenever and wherever I had an
opportunity.
I found that in meeting friends, almost the first remark would be an
approving comment on the friendliness of the Canadian Parliament in
giving the British people a preference in the markets of Canada. My
reply always was that it was no more than was right, considering all
that Great Britain had done for us. This was usually followed by the
remark that the Government were afraid, from the first impression of
the law officers of the Crown, that Great Britain would not be able to
accept the favour. My reply was very confidently, "Oh yes! you will
accept it." Then the remark would be made that the German and Belgian
treaties would prevent it. "Then denounce the treaties," I would say.
"That would be a very serious thing, and would be hardly possible." My
reply was, "You have not fully considered the question, we have." Then
I would be asked what I meant, and would reply somewhat in these terms:
Consider the situation of affairs as they stand. To-day at every port
of entry in Canada from Sydney, Cape Breton, to Victoria in the Island
of Vancouver, along 3,500 miles of Canadian frontier, German goods
are charged one-eighth more duty than goods from Great Britain, and
goods from Great Britain one-eighth less duty than on German goods.
This was being done yesterday, is being done to-day, and will be done
to-morrow, and it is done by the Government of Canada, backed by a
unanimous Parliament, and behind it a determined and united people.
We have made up our minds and have thought it out, and have our teeth
set, and what are you going to do about it?
This did not usually bring out any indication that any clear decision
had been arrived at by them, and then I would go on:
Of course we know that you can send a large fleet to our Atlantic
ports, and another to our Pacific ports, and blockade them, paralyse
our trade, and stop our commerce, until we yield, or you may go
farther and bombard our defenceless cities, and kill our women and
children. Well, go on and do it, and we will still hold out, for we
know that any British Government that would dare to send her fleets
to jamb German goods down our throats when we want to buy British,
would be turned out of office before the ships could get across the
Atlantic. The thing is absurd, the treaties are an outrage, and the
only course out of the difficulty is to denounce them.
These arguments carried weight with all to whom I spoke, and I spoke
to Ministers, Privy Councillors on the Government side, M.P.'s, and
others. Once only the head of one of the great daily newspapers seemed
to be annoyed at my aggressive attitude, and said, "You had better
not be too sure. We might send the fleet and be very ugly with you."
My reply was, "Well, go on and send it. You lost the southern half
of North America by trying to cram tea down their throats, and you
may lose the northern half if you try to cram German goods down our
throats. I should have hoped you had learned something from history."
It will be seen that the plan which was, I understand, originated by
D'Alton McCarthy, worked out very successfully. There could only be
one result, and within a month the treaties were denounced, and I felt
that the first great step of our programme had been made. The amusing
feature, however, was, that this object for which we fought so hard
three years before at the meeting at Lord Avebury's, when the British
Empire League was founded, and which was opposed by nearly all our
English friends, was no sooner announced as accomplished, than men of
all parties and views seemed to unite in praising the act, and the
Cobden Club even went so far as to present the Cobden Medal to Sir
Wilfrid Laurier.
Sir Wilfrid Laurier in all his speeches had upheld abstract theories
of free trade, and with considerable skill succeeded in allaying the
hostility of the free trade element. This, I think, helped to secure
the denunciation of the treaties, with the approval of all parties. On
my return to Canada I was interviewed in Montreal by the representative
of the Toronto _Globe_. Being asked by the reporter my opinion of the
probable effect of the denunciation of the German and Belgian treaties,
I said:
The denunciation of these treaties marks an epoch in the history of
the British Empire. The power of Canada has made itself felt not
only in British but in European diplomacy. It has affected Germany,
Belgium, and other countries, and every one of these countries knows
that it was Canada's influence that produced the result. Another point
in connection with the denunciation of these treaties is, that it is
a tremendous step towards preferential trade within the Empire. Great
Britain was going along half asleep. Canada has awakened her, and made
her sit up and think. She has been jostled out of the rut she has been
following, and is now in a position to proceed in the direction that
may be in her own interest and in that of the Empire.
Being then asked if I had any opinions to express in regard to the
Premier's remarks in Great Britain on the question of free trade, I
said:
His remarks were general and theoretical. The great point of the whole
movement was to secure the denunciation of the treaties. Nothing could
be done while these treaties were in existence, and in my opinion
it would have been a most indiscreet thing for Sir Wilfrid Laurier
to have pursued any line of argument that would have aroused the
hostility of the great free trade party in Great Britain. The great
point was to secure the united influence of all parties in favouring
the denunciation of the treaties, which was an important step in
advance.
Being asked to account for the fact that Sir Howard Vincent, of the
United Empire Trade League, a strong protectionist, and the Cobden Club
both united in applauding the denunciation of the treaties, I replied:
Sir Howard Vincent and his League saw plainly that this action made
for a preferential tariff. The Cobden Club are whistling to keep up
their courage.
In the Conference of Premiers, held in 1897, it was not possible to
secure an arrangement for mutual preferential tariffs. The other
colonies were not ready for it, the Imperial Government was not ready
for it, nor were the people, but as the German and Belgian Treaties
were denounced to take effect the following year, in August, 1898, the
path was cleared, and from that date the Canadian Preference came into
force, and has since been in operation.
It will be remembered that the deputation of our British Empire League
to England, in 1897, was instructed to express the great desire of
the Canadian Branch that, as a guarantee of the general safety of the
Empire, vigorous steps should at once be taken to provide that the
British Food supply should be grown within the Empire. As chairman of
the deputation I did all in my power to stir up inquiry on the subject.
Being introduced to Principal Ward of Owens College, Manchester, when
at that city, I talked freely with him on the point, and he suggested I
should discuss it with Mr. Spencer Wilkinson, the well-known author and
journalist. He gave me a letter introducing me to Mr. Wilkinson, and we
had several interviews. Shortly after reaching London I called to see
my friend Lord Wolseley, then Commander-in-Chief. He took me with him
to his house to lunch, and as we walked over, I at once broached the
subject of the food supply, principally wheat and flour, and he told
me that the Government had been urged to look into the matter some two
or three years before, and that there had been a careful inquiry by
the best experts, and the report was that the command of the sea was
a _sine quâ non_, but if we maintained that, and paid the cost which
would be much increased by war prices, the country could get all the
grain they would want.
I said suppose a war with Russia and the United States, what would be
done if they combined and put an embargo on bread-stuffs? How would it
be got then even with full command of the sea? He did not seem himself
to have understood the difficulty, or studied the figures, and said,
"I cannot explain the matter. All I can say is that the Government
obtained the advice of the best men in England on the subject, and
that is their report." My reply was, "I wish you would look into it
yourself," and I dropped the subject.
I met Lord Roberts shortly after and I pressed the matter upon him. He
had not known of the Government report, and consequently listened to my
arguments attentively and seemed impressed, for I may say that 1897 was
the worst year in all our history as to the manner in which the supply
of food was distributed among the nations.
Mr. Spencer Wilkinson seemed to be much interested in my talks with
him, and one day he said, "I wish you could have a conversation with
some great authority on the other side of the question, who would
understand the matter and be able to answer you." I replied, "That is
what I should like very much. Tell me the best man you have and I will
tackle him. If he throws me over in the gutter in our discussion it
will be a good thing, for then I shall learn something." Mr. Wilkinson
laughed at my way of putting it, and said, "If that is what you want,
Sir Robert Giffen is the man for you to see." I said I would try and
get a letter of introduction to him. Mr. Wilkinson said he would give
me one, and did so.
I called to see Sir Robert Giffen. He received me very kindly, and we
had an interesting interview of about an hour. The moment I broached
the subject of the food supply he said at once, "That question came up
some two or three years ago, and I was called upon to inquire into the
whole matter and report upon it, and my report in a few words was, that
we must have the command of the sea, and that once that was secured,
then, by paying the somewhat enhanced war prices, we could get all
the grain required." My reply was, "Then, as you have fully inquired
into the question, you can tell me what you could do under certain
conditions. In case of a war between Great Britain and Russia combined
with the United States, followed by an embargo on food products,
where and how would you get your supplies?" Sir Robert said, "We do
not expect to go to war with the United States and Russia at the same
time." I said, "You were within an ace of war with the United States
only a year ago over the Venezuelan difficulty, and Great Britain and
Russia have been snarling at each other over the Indian Frontier for
years, and if you go to war with either, you must count on having the
other on your hands."
Sir Robert then said, "But I said we must have the command of the sea."
I replied, "I will give you the complete, undoubted, absolute command
of the sea, everywhere all the time, although you are not likely to
have it; and then in case of an embargo on wheat and foodstuffs where
are you to get your supplies?" He said, "We would get some from Canada
and other countries." I pointed out that all they sent was only a
fraction. Sir Robert then said, "They could not put on an embargo,
for it would ruin their trade." I told him that I was talking about
war and not about peace and trade, and said that no desire for trade
induced the Germans to sell wheat to Paris during the siege of 1870.
His idea had been that, in case of war with Russia or the United
States, or both, holding the command of the sea, Great Britain would
allow foodstuffs to be exported to neutral countries such as Belgium or
Holland, and then England would import from those countries. My answer
to that was, that if England had the command of the sea, the United
States or Russia would have only one weapon, an embargo, and they would
certainly use it. He seemed cornered in the argument, and said, "Well,
if we cannot get bread we can eat meat. I eat very little bread." I
said, "The British people use about 360 lbs. per head of wheat per
annum, and about 90 lbs. of meat, and a great deal of meat would be
stopped too"; and I said on leaving, "I wish you would investigate this
thoroughly again, and let the Government know, for I know they are
depending upon your report at the War Office"; and then I left him.
When at Liverpool shortly after on my way back to Canada, I asked
the manager of the Bank of Liverpool, to whom I had a letter of
introduction, if he would introduce me to the highest authority on
the corn trade in Liverpool. He introduced me to the late Mr. Paul,
ex-President of the Corn Exchange, and I had a long conversation with
him on the question of the food supply. As soon as I mentioned the
subject he told me that the corn trade people in Liverpool had been
asked from London to make a report on the possibility of supplying
grain in case of war. Mr. Paul told me that they had considered the
matter (I suppose he meant the leading corn merchants), and that their
report was practically that they must have the command of the sea, that
was essential; but that secured, and the enhanced war prices paid, they
could supply all the corn required in any contingency. I questioned
him as I had Sir Robert Giffen and found the same underlying belief.
The law of supply and demand would settle the question. The corn
would be allowed to go in neutral ships to neutral ports, and then be
transhipped to England. An embargo had not been considered or treated
seriously as a possibility, and when I cornered him so that he could
not answer my arguments, he said, "Well, if we could not get wheat we
could live on potatoes." I told him potatoes could not be kept over
a year, that a large quantity was imported which would be stopped.
I said he had better make another report. The whole thing was very
disheartening to me, for I saw how the Government were depending upon
peaceful traders for information how to guard against war dangers.
In 1902 when Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,
proposed a small tax on wheat and flour, I was pleased to see that
Sir Robert Giffen was the first prominent man to write to the Press
endorsing and approving of the bread tax, as it was called. It showed
me that Sir Robert had carefully considered the question, and was manly
enough to advocate what was not altogether a popular idea.
After my return to Canada I prepared an article for the _Nineteenth
Century_ on the "Situation in England," and it appeared in the December
number, 1897. In this I pointed out the danger of the condition of
the food supply, and the article attracted a considerable amount of
attention in the British Press, in comments, notices, letters, etc. Sir
Michael Hicks-Beach in a speech at Bristol, in January, 1898, referred
to the question, and in a way contradicted the points I had brought out
in the _Nineteenth Century_ article. My conversations the summer before
with Lord Wolseley, Sir Robert Giffen, and Mr. Paul had so alarmed me
at the false security in which the Government were resting, that when
I saw Sir Michael Hicks-Beach relying on the same official reports,
I determined, although I had never met him, to write him direct, and
on the 20th January, 1898, I wrote, drawing his attention to a remark
which he was reported to have made that "in any war England would have
many friends ready to supply corn," and I said, "Our League sent a
deputation to England last summer to draw attention to the danger of
the food supply. I was chairman of it. Since my return I published
an article in the _Nineteenth Century_ giving our views. I enclose a
reprint which I wish you could read. If you have not time please give
me one minute to examine the enclosed diagram (cut out of the _Chicago
Tribune_) showing the corn export of the world. This shows that Russia
and the United States control, not including the Danubian ports, nearly
95 per cent. of the world's needs, and if they were to put an embargo
on the export of food of all kinds, where would be the 'many friends
ready to supply England with corn?'"
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, now Lord St. Aldwyn, with great courtesy wrote
me a personal letter, in which he thanked me for my letter, and went on
to say:
I do not think that the sentence you quote "that in any war England
would have many friends ready to supply corn" quite accurately
represents what I said on that subject. The report was necessarily
much condensed. But it would be true if (say) we were at war with the
United States alone: or if we were at war with one or more of the
European Powers and the United States were neutral. In either of such
cases the interests of the neutral Powers in access to our market
would be so strong, that our enemy would not venture to close it to
them, in the only possible way, viz.: by declaring corn contraband of
war. And I think that if the United States were the neutral party,
self-interest would weigh more with them than their ill feeling
towards us, whatever the amount of that feeling may be.
It is possible, though most improbable, that the two great
corn-producing countries might be allied against us. If they were, I
believe that our navy would still keep the seas open for our supply
from other sources, though no doubt there would be comparative
scarcity and suffering. I am no believer in the enclosed diagram, the
production of corn is constantly increasing in new countries such as
the Argentine, and better communication is also increasing the total
amount available for export. Bad harvests in the United States and
Russia, and good ones in India and the Argentine, would show quite
another result to that shown in the enclosed, though, as I have said,
I do not believe it is true, even of the year which it professes to
represent.
On receipt of this letter I wrote to Mr. Geo. J. S. Broomhall, of
Liverpool, editor of the _Corn Trade News_, and author of the _Corn
Trade Year Book_, and received from him a certificate of the correct
figures of corn exports. I forwarded it to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach,
showing that in 1897 India and the Argentine only exported 200,000 qrs.
and 740,000 qrs. respectively, and that the diagram I sent could not
have been a very great way out. In 1902 Sir Michael Hicks-Beach put a
tax of one shilling a quarter on imported wheat, and as I have already
said, Sir Robert Giffen wrote to the _Times_ approving of it. I was
very glad to see this action on the part of both of them.
On the 4th December, 1897, the Hon. George W. Ross gave an address
before the British Empire League in St George's Hall, Toronto, in
which he strongly favoured preferential tariffs and came out squarely
against reciprocity with the United States. This action was a great
encouragement to our cause and attracted considerable attention all
over Canada.
On the 8th December, 1897, the National Club gave a complimentary
banquet to his Excellency the Earl of Aberdeen, Governor-General. I
attended the banquet and sat second to the left of the president of
the club, Mr. McNaught. I was under the impression that Mr. Blake, who
had been a few years away from Canada, and who had joined the Irish
Nationalist party, would be sure to speak in a strain not acceptable
to our club. I mentioned this to Dr. Parkin who sat next to me. When
Mr. Blake began to speak he very soon uttered sentiments strongly
opposed to all that the Canadians had been working for in the Imperial
interest. I said to Parkin that as an ex-president of the club,
and president of the British Empire League, I would not allow his
remarks to pass without comment. I leaned over and told the chairman
I intended to speak a few minutes when Mr. Blake finished. He raised
some objection, but I told him I must speak. He mentioned it to the
Governor-General, who said he would wait for fifteen minutes. I told
Dr. Parkin I would divide the time with him.
After Mr. Blake sat down, I said:
I have been a member of this club almost from its foundation. I was
for many years on the Board of Directors, and for some years its
President, and I feel that I should state that the speech of my friend
Mr. Blake does not represent the views nor the national aspirations
which have always been characteristic of the National Club. . . .
I agree with what Mr. Blake has said as to the importance of
preserving friendly relations with the United States. We hope to live
at peace with them, but because we do not wish to beg for reciprocity
or make humiliating concessions for the sake of greater trade, it is
no reason why we should be charged with wanting war. We want peace,
and no one can point to any instance where the Canadian people or
Government have been responsible for the irritation. Mr. G. W. Ross
pointed this out clearly in his admirable speech of Saturday night.
The great causes of irritation have come from the United States.
The invasion of 1775, the war of 1812, the Trent affair, and the
Venezuelan business were all matters in which we were absolutely free
from blame. Nor were we to blame some thirty years ago when I had to
turn out with my corps to help defend the frontier of this province
from the attacks of bands of Fenians, organised, armed, and equipped,
in the United States, who invaded our country, and shot down some of
my comrades, who died defending Canada. These raids were maintained
by contributions from our worst enemies in the United States,
but we drove them out, and now I am glad to say that, while the
contributions still go on, the proceeds are devoted to troubling the
Empire elsewhere, and I hope they will continue to be expended in that
direction rather than against us.
I approve of Mr. Blake's remarks about the defence of Canada, and the
expenditure of money to make our country safer, but I object strongly
to the hopeless view he takes. We are 6,000,000 of northern men, and,
fighting on our own soil for our rights and freedom, I believe we
could hold our own in spite of the odds against us, as our fathers did
in days gone by, when the outlook was much more gloomy.
Dr. George R. Parkin followed with an eloquent and powerful speech
pointing out the various arguments which showed the growth of the
movement for Imperial unity.
It was thought at that time that Mr. Blake had some idea of returning
to Canadian politics, but the result of this meeting and the Press
comments must have put an end to any such idea if it ever existed.