_Of raising, depressing, or embasing of Money._
Sometimes it hath happened, that States (I know not by what raw
advice) have raised or embased their money, hoping thereby, as it
were, to multiply it, and make it pass for more then it did before;
that is, to purchase more commodity or labour with it: All which
indeed and in truth, amounts to no more then a Tax, upon such
People unto whom the State is indebted, or a defalkation of what
is due; as also the like burthen upon all that live upon Pensions,
established Rents, Annuities, Fees, Gratuities, &c.
2. To explain this fully, one might lanch out into the deep Ocean
of all the Mysteries concerning Money, which is done for other ends
elsewhere; nevertheless I shall do it the best I can, by expounding
the reasons _pro & contrà_ for embasing and raising of Money: and
first of embasing.
3. Copper or Tin Money made _ad valorem_ in its matter, is no
embasing; the same being onely cumbersom and baser then silver
money, onely because less convenient and portable.
And Copper money _ad valorem_ in workmanship and matter both
together; (such as on which the Effigies and Scutcheon are so
curiously graven and impressed, as the moneys seem rather Medalls)
is not embasing, unless the numbers of such pieces be excessive,
(the measures whereof I shall not set down, until I shall hereafter
propound the fittest Sections of the abstracted pound into which
I would have money coyned, and determine how many pieces of each
Section should be in an hundred pound) for in case of such excess,
the workmanship being of no other use but to look upon, becomes
base by its being too common.
4. Nor are such Tokens base as are coyned for Exchange in retailing
by particular men, (if such men be responsible and able to take
them back, and give Silver for them.)
5. But that Gold I count to be embased, which hath more allay
either of Copper or Silver in it, then serves to correct its too
great natural softness and flexibility, whereby it wears too
fast in Money: And that Silver I reckon also embased, wherein is
commixed more Copper then will sufficiently toughen it, and save it
from cracking under the Hammer, Press, or Mill that must coin it,
or the like.
6. Base Money is therefore such as Dutch Shillings, Stivers, French
Soulz, Irish Bon-galls, &c. and for the most part consisting of
great pieces, though of small value. To answer the first reason or
pretence of making them, which is, that the said Pieces might be
more bulky, handleable, and the silver in them less apt to be lost
or worn away.
7. The other reason (besides that of allay which we must allow in
the Measures abovementioned) is to save it from being melted down
by Goldsmiths and Bullioners, or exported by strangers; neither of
which can happen but to their loss: for suppose a Stiver of two
pence, had a penny of pure silver, if the Bullioner melts it for
the sake of the silver onely, in the separation he shall lose the
Copper and charge of refining the Silver; nor will strangers export
it into places where the local value of the Piece perisheth, the
intrinsick leaving him to loss.
7. Now the reasons against this kinde of Money are, first the
greater danger of falsification, because the colour, sound, and
weight by which men (without the test) guess at the goodness of
the material of Money is too much confounded, for the vulgar (whom
it concerns) to make use of them for their marks and guides in the
business.
8. Secondly, In case small pieces of this Money, _viz._ pieces of
two pence should happen to be raised or depressed twelve, fifteen,
or sixteen _per cent._ then there will be a certain loss by reason
of the fractions, which the vulgar cannot reckon: As for example,
if such Money were depressed but ten, eleven, or twelve _per cent._
then the two pence piece would be worth but three half pence, which
is twenty five _per cent._ and so of other proportions.
9. Thirdly, In case the Inconvenience of this Money should be so
great as to necessitate a new Coinage of it, then will happen all
the losses we mentioned before in melting it down by Bullioners.
10. Fourthly, If the two pence piece contained but 1./5.^{th.}
part of the Silver usually in a shilling, then Dealers would have
fifteen pence paid in this money for the same Commodity, for which
they would take a shilling in Standard Silver.
11. Raising of Money is either the cutting the pound _Troy_ of
Standard Silver into more pieces then formerly, as into above
sixty, whereas heretofore the same was made but into twenty, and
yet both sorts called shillings, or else calling the money already
made by higher names: The reasons or pretences given for such
raising are these, _viz._ That the raising of Money will bring it
in, and the material thereof more plentifully; for trial whereof
suppose one shilling were proclaimed to be worth two, what other
effect could this have, then the raising of all Commodities unto
a double price? Now if it were proclaimed, That Labourers Wages,
&c. should not rise at all upon this raising of Money, then would
this Act be as onely a Tax upon the said Labourers, as forcing
them to lose half their wages, which would not be onely unjust but
impossible, unless they could live with the said half, (which is
not to be supposed) for then the Law that appoints such Wages were
ill made, which should allow the Labourer but just wherewithall to
live; for if you allow double, then he works but half so much as
he could have done, and otherwise would; which is a loss to the
Publick of the fruit of so much labour.
12. But suppose the _Quart d’ Ecus_ of _France_ commonly esteemed
worth eighteen pence were raised to three shillings, then ’tis
true, that all the Moneys of _England_ would be indeed _Quart d’
Ecus_ pieces; but as true, that all the English Money would be
carried away, and that our _Quart d’ Ecus_ would contain but half
so much Bullion as our own money did; so that raising of Money may
indeed change the _species_, but with so much loss as the Forreign
Pieces were raised unto, above their intrinsick value.
13. But for remedy of this, suppose we raised the _Quart d’ Ecus_
double, and prohibited the Exportation of our own money in Exchange
thereof. I answer, that such a Prohibition is nugatory, and
impossible to be executed; and if it were not, yet the raising of
the said _species_ would but make us sell the Commodities bought
with raised _Quart d’ Ecus_, in effect but at half the usual rate,
which unto them that want such commodities will as well yield the
full; so that abating our prices, will as well allure strangers to
buy extraordinary proportions of our Commodities, as raising their
money will do: But neither that, nor abating the price will make
strangers use more of our Commodities then they want; for although
the first year they should carry away an unuseful and superfluous
proportion, yet afterwards they would take so much the less.
14. If this be true, as in substance it is, why then have so many
wise States in several ancient, as well as modern times frequently
practised this Artifice, as a means to draw in money into their
respective Dominions?
I answer, that something is to be attributed to the stupidity
and ignorance of the people, who cannot of a sudden understand
this matter: for I finde many men wise enough, who though they be
well informed that raising of money signifies little, yet cannot
suddenly digest it. As for example, an unengaged person who had
money in his purse in _England_, and should hear that a shilling
was made fourteen pence in _Ireland_, would more readily run
thither to buy Land then before; not suddenly apprehending, that
for the same Land which he might have bought before for six years
Purchase, he shall now pay seven. Nor will Sellers in _Ireland_
of a sudden apprehend cause to raise their Land proportionally,
but will at least be contented to compound the business, _viz._ to
sell at six and an half; and if the difference be a more ragged
fraction, men under a long time will not apprehend it, nor ever be
able exactly to govern their practice according to it.
15. Secondly, Although I apprehend little real difference between
raising Forreign Money to double, and abating half in the price of
our own Commodities, yet to sell them on a tacite condition to be
paid in Forreign present Money, shall increase our money; forasmuch
as between raising the money, and abasing the price, is the same
difference as between selling for money and in barter, which latter
is the dearer; or between selling for present money, and for time;
barter resolving into the nature of uncertain time.
16. I say, suppose English Cloth were sold at six shillings a Yard,
and French Canvas at eighteen pence the Ell, the question is,
whether it were all one in order to increase Money in _England_ to
raise the French Money double, or to abate half of the price of
our Cloth? I think the former better, because that former way or
proposition carries with it a condition of having Forreign Money
in _specie_, and not Canvas in barter, between which two wayes
the world generally agrees there is a difference. Wherefore if we
can afford to abate half our price, but will not do it but for
our neighbours money, then we gain so much as the said difference
between Money and Barter amounts unto, by such raising of our
Neighbours Money.
17. But the fundamental solution of this Question depends
upon a real and not an imaginary way of computing the prices
of Commodities; in order to which real way I premise these
suppositions: First then, suppose there be in a Territory a
thousand people, let these people be supposed sufficient to Till
this whole Territory as to the Husbandry of Corn, which we will
suppose to contain all necessaries for life, as in the Lords Prayer
we suppose the word Bread doth; and let the production of a Bushel
of this Corn be supposed of equal labour to that of producing an
ounce of Silver. Suppose again that a tenth part of this Land, and
tenth of the people, viz. an hundred of them, can produce Corn
enough for the whole; suppose that the Rent of Land (found out as
abovementioned) be a fourth part of the whole product, (about which
proportion it really is, as we may perceive by paying a fourth
Sheaf instead of Rent in some places) suppose also that whereas but
an hundred are necessary for this Husbandry, yet that two hundred
have taken up the Trade; and suppose that where a Bushel of Corn
would suffice, yet men out of delicacy will use two, making use of
the Flower onely of both. Now the Inferences from hence are;
First, That the goodness or badness, or the value of Land depends
upon the greater or lesser share of the product given for it in
proportion to the simple labour bestowed to raise the said Product.
Secondly, That the proportions between Corn and Silver signifie
onely an artificial value, not a natural; because the comparison
is between a thing naturally useful, and a thing in it self
unnecessary, which (by the way) is part of the reason why there are
not so great changes and leaps in the prices of Silver as of other
Commodities.
Thirdly, That natural dearness and cheapness depends upon the
few or more hands requisite to necessaries of Nature: As Corn is
cheaper where one man produces Corn for ten, then where he can
do the like but for six; and withall, according as the Climate
disposes men to a necessity of spending more or less. But Political
Cheapness depends upon the paucity of Supernumerary Interlopers
into any Trade over and above all that are necessary, _viz._ Corn
will be twice as dear where are two hundred Husbandmen to do the
same work which an hundred could perform: the proportion thereof
being compounded with the proportion of superfluous Expence,
(_viz._ if to the cause of dearness abovementioned be added to the
double Expence to what is necessary) then the natural price will
appear quadrupled; and this quadruple Price is the true Political
Price computed upon naturall grounds.
And this again proportioned to the common artificiall Standard
Silver gives what was sought; that is, the true Price Currant.
18. But forasmuch as almost all Commodities have their Substitutes
or Succedanea, and that almost all uses may be answered several
wayes; and for that novelty, surprize, example of Superiours, and
opinion of unexaminable effects do adde or take away from the price
of things, we must adde these contingent Causes to the permanent
Causes abovementioned, in the judicious foresight and computation
whereof lies the excellency of a Merchant.
Now to apply this Digression, I say, that to encrease Money, it
is as well necessary to know how to abate as raise, the price of
Commodities, and that of Money, which was the scope of the said
Digression.
19. To conclude this whole Chapter, we say, that raising or
embasing of Moneys is a very pittiful and unequal way of Taxing the
people; and ’tis a sign that the State sinketh, which catcheth hold
on such Weeds as are accompanied with the dishonour of impressing a
Princes Effigies to justifie Adulterate Commodities, and the breach
of Publick Faith, such as is the calling a thing what it really is
not.