it was a most grievious sight. Scattered or heaped up on the plain were
the bodies of 237 men, every one save that of Custer mutilated in the
most horrible manner known to the Indian mind. Not one had a vestage
of clothing upon it; all had been stripped off and carried away by the
exulting fiends. In Custer’s body there were the marks of two bullet
wounds, and undoubtedly I was the first man to look upon the terrible
sight. It was too much for me and I turned and rode swiftly away down
the river, shortly afterward meeting General Terry and his soldiers.
To him I gave my dispatches and was immediately sent back to Major
Reno with instructions to bury the dead. This was completed about 1
o’clock in the afternoon of the 27th. The wounded in Reno’s command
were taken to the mouth of the Big Horn river, and thence conveyed down
the Yellowstone on the steamer Far West to Bismarck. The next day we
gathered up large quantities of pemmican and other provisions and camp
utensils left by the Sioux in their hurried flight, and burned them.
Although I was but a youth when this occurred, it made an impression
upon my mind that I shall never forget, and the details of those
horrible two or three days are as fresh now as they were at the time
of occurrence. Five years ago I went over ‘The Custer Battlefield,’
where the soldiers are buried, with Mrs. Eustis, whose son Jack, then
a recent graduate from West Point, had been one of the victims under
Custer. She had cherished a hope of recovering his bones, but although
we had with us a number of Sioux and Cheyennes who had taken part in
the fight, and each tried his best to recall all of the fearful scene,
we were unable to help her, and she was obliged to return to her
Eastern home with frustrated hopes. The incident, however, called up in
mind all of the gruesome details of the battlefield as I saw it on that
memorable morning, and I shall never care to repeat the experience.”
General Terry, in his official report dated Camp on Little Big Horn,
June 27, 1876, noticed the military movement in the direction where
Custer and his men had fallen, and submitted for the information of the
war department the following important explanation:
“At the mouth of the Rosebud I informed General Custer that I should
take the supply steamer Far West up the Yellowstone to ferry General
Gibbon’s column over the river; that I should personally accompany
that column, and that it would in all probability reach the mouth of
the Little Big Horn, on the 26th inst. The steamer reached General
Gibbon’s troops, near the mouth of the Big Horn, early on the 24th,
and at 4 o’clock in the afternoon all his men and animals were across
the Yellowstone. At 5 o’clock the column, consisting of five companies
of the Seventh Infantry, four companies of the Seventh Cavalry, and
a battery of three gatling guns, marched out to and across Tullock’s
creek, starting soon after 5 o’clock on the morning of the 25th. The
infantry made a march of twenty-two miles over the most difficult
country I have ever seen. In order that scouts might be sent into
the valley of the Little Big Horn, the cavalry with the battery was
then pushed on thirteen or fourteen miles further, reaching camp at
midnight. The scouts were sent out at 4:30 on the morning of the 26th.
The scouts discovered three Indians, who were at first supposed to be
Sioux, but when overtaken they proved to be Crows, who had been with
General Custer. They brought the first intelligence of the battle.
Their story was not credited. It was supposed that some fighting,
perhaps severe fighting, had taken place, but it was not believed that
disaster could have overtaken so large a force as twelve companies of
cavalry. The infantry, which had broken camp very early, soon came up
and the whole column entered and moved up the valley of the Little Big
Horn. During the afternoon efforts were made to send scouts to what was
supposed to be General Custer’s position, and to obtain information
of the condition of affairs, but those who were sent out were driven
back by parties of Indians, who, in increasing numbers, were seen
hovering on General Gibbon’s front. At twenty minutes before 9 o’clock
in the evening the infantry had marched between twenty-five and thirty
miles; the men were very weary and daylight was falling; the column
was, therefore, halted for the night at a point about eleven miles in a
straight line above the mouth of the stream. Next morning the movement
was resumed, and after a march of nine miles Major Reno’s intrenched
position was reached. The withdrawal of the Indians from around Reno’s
command, and from the valley, was undoubtedly caused by the appearance
of General Gibbon’s troops. Major Reno and Captain Benteen, both of
whom are officers of great experience, accustomed to see large masses
of mounted men, estimated the number of Indians engaged at not less
than twenty-five hundred. Other officers think that the number was
greater than this. The village in the valley was about three miles in
length and about a mile in width. Besides the lodges proper, a great
number of temporary brushwood shelters were found in it, indicating
that many men, besides its proper inhabitants, had gathered together
there.”
William Sellow, who now lives in Teton county, Montana, also one of the
scouts who served under General Custer, contributes the following to
the Dupuyer Acantha, July 15, 1899:
“Quite often, especially of recent years, I have seen articles in
papers and magazines relating to the actions and motives of General
Custer that led up to the massacre of his historic band. Most of these
do grievious wrong to the bravest and best officer the United States
government ever sent out to fight Indians on the frontier. Books, too,
go so far as to call him a suicide and murderer for going at the head
of his men into the battle of Little Big Horn on June 25, 1876.
“At that time I was in Custer’s employ as a civilian scout, and had
known him for a long time. I knew his ways of attacking Indians, and
knew his unbounded confidence in his men. I had known him to win
Indian fights against greater odds than his last one. For instance, at
Wichita, he routed them with a force that numbered ten to one. Had he,
in his last fight been supported as he could and should have been, he
would have won the day, and then the Sitting Bull war would have ended
and not have lasted until it cost much money and many lives. Not until
the buffalo were killed and other game became scarce were the Indians
satisfied to accept government rations and spend their honeymoon at
home. An Indian’s heart is never good until he is hungry and cold.
“Custer has been accused by would-be historians of going contrary to
orders in his last campaign, and to refute these charges I write to
follow him as far, or farther, than anyone else is truthfully capable
of doing. That he did not go contrary to orders in his last movements
the captain acting as General Terry’s adjutant at the time, if he is
alive, will gladly, doubtless, testify. Unfortunately, I have forgotten
his name. He will remember the greater part of the orders.
“After we, the scouts, delivered to Custer his last orders, I know he
had no opportunity to receive any more, and as I recount the events as
nearly as I can remember them at this length of time, it will be seen
that I am correct.
“General Terry started myself and another scout to overtake and join
Custer. After leaving the supply train and headquarters on about June
22, 1876, we reached the camp that night and delivered our message. The
reader will see that in those stirring times when a scout was given
a message it was in duplicate, one for the perusal of the scout and
one for the receiver. These precautions were taken for fear one or
both might be lost en route. In the first case the open one could be
delivered, and in the second the scout might deliver the message from
memory. I have yet in my possession the extra copy of this message, but
unfortunately, it is so old and pocket-worn as to be only partially
decipherable. From this, aided by memory, I give the message:
“‘To Lieutenant Colonel Custer, Seventh United States Cavalry:
“‘The brigadier general commanding desires that you proceed up the
Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians, whose trail was discovered by Major
Reno’s scouts a few days ago. Of course, it is impossible for me to
give definite instructions with regard to this movement, and were it
not impossible to do so, the department commander places too much
confidence in your zeal, energy and ability to wish to impose upon
you orders that would conflict with your own judgment and which might
hamper your actions when nearly in contact with the enemy. I will,
however, indicate to you his ideas of what your movements should be and
he desires you to conform to them unless your own judgment should give
you sufficient reasons for departing from them. He thinks you should
proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in
which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found that it turns
toward the Little Big Horn he thinks you should still proceed southward
as far as the headwaters of Tongue river and then toward the Rosebud
and the Little Big Horn, keeping scouts out constantly to your left, so
as to prevent the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south
or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel
Gibbons is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it
reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up as far at
least as the forks of the Big Horn and the Little Big Horn. Of course,
its future will be controlled by circumstances as they exist. But it is
hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Big Horn, may be so nearly
enclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.
“‘The department commander desires that, on your way up the Rosebud,
you should have your scouts thoroughly examine the upper part of
Tullock’s fork, and that you should endeavor to send scouts through to
Colonel Gibbon’s command with the result of your examination. The lower
part of this will be examined by Colonel Gibbon’s scouts.
“‘The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks
of the Big and Little Big Horn, if the river is found navigable that
far.
“‘The department commander, who will accompany the column of Colonel
Gibbons, desires you to report to him there no later than the
expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in
the meantime you receive further orders.’
“After sleeping about two hours that same night we got fresh horses and
Custer started us with instructions to go to the east of Tullock’s fork
and to follow it down to its mouth at Tullock’s creek and to keep a
sharp lookout for any signs of Indians, and to report to him again that
night if possible. This we did, seeing nothing but the trail of a small
war party going toward the Big Horn.
“We had been rolled up in our blankets but a few hours when Charlie
Reynolds and a half-breed Sioux scout, Bill Cross, came in with a
report which caused Custer to send for us again. After getting fresh
horses we were given a dispatch to carry to Colonel Gibbon’s command.
We reached the river, which we crossed by the aid of our horses’ tails
with our clothes tied so as to keep them as dry as possible. We reached
the command that day. The next morning I was sent back to the supply
train, which was still at Powder river, and my companion was sent to
join Benteen’s command. He was with the latter during his engagement
with the Indians, and he gives Colonel Benteen great credit for
bravery. The colonel, he says, when the men behind the breastworks ran
short of ammunition, with his own hands carried it and threw it over to
them, being all the time exposed to the deadly fire of the enemy.
“In twenty-four hours I reached the supply train and was afforded
another opportunity to fill up and get some sleep. On the 26th we met
a Sioux scout, Bloody Knife, coming in badly scared and he seemed
to think that Custer had been killed, although he had not seen him.
Another scout, George Mulligan, and myself had been sent out to find
Custer.
“We had not gone far when we met Bill Cross and eight Ree Indian
scouts. They had a few Sioux ponies which they said they had captured.
They told us that Custer and his command were killed, but they did
not seem to know much about it. They could not tell us just where the
fight took place, hence we took little stock in their story. We learned
afterward, however, that when Custer made the charge they gathered up
the Sioux horses that had strayed out on the hills, and pulled out
for a more healthy climate. Scout Reynolds had the same privilege,
but chose to go into the battle, and was afterward found in the same
deadly circle with General Custer with many empty shells around them as
evidence of a desperate fight.
“Reynolds well knew of Custer’s ability to deal with the Indians
against fearful odds, for he had previously fought with him. He also
knew the odds he had to face that day, as we spoke of it when we last
met and he proved by his actions that he could not have been aware of
any wrong-doing on the part of the general when he, of his own free
will, followed him that day.
[Illustration: RAIN-IN-THE-FACE (SIOUX WAR CHIEF).]
“After leaving Cross and the Ree scouts we met Curley, the Crow
Indian scout, who was with Custer at the beginning of the fight.
That pock-marked villain and liar, Rain-in-the-Face, says Curley
is a liar, that he was not there, but I know for a fact that
Rain-in-the-Face had never met Curley, nor to the best of my knowledge
has he ever seen him since. I have heard Rain talk and he will never
get into the happy hunting grounds if veracity is to be his passport.
“When we met Curley he was so badly scared that I doubt if he would
have known himself. He had a Sioux medicine or war pony in full paint
and feathers, a Sioux blanket and part of a war bonnet that he wore in
his escape, and which he got from a dead Sioux medicine man who was
killed near him in the first attack. The blanket had some blood on
it. His own horse was killed and he appropriated the medicine man’s
property, and instead of trying to run the gauntlet he moved along with
the enemy, trusting to his disguise to deceive them. When he saw an
opportunity he dropped out of his bad company and escaped. When I last
saw him with Custer he had his Crow clothes on and had his own pony,
and he had no other chance to get the outfit. Had he been a white man
he would not have had any chance of escape even with that rig. He does
not claim to have tried to fight, but only to escape, and his first
account of the affair is no doubt the correct one, as anyone acquainted
with the Indians and their mode of fighting will admit its feasibility.
“I understand that there was an ex-soldier at the World’s Fair in
Chicago, who posed as a soldier in the Seventh cavalry, who escaped
from the fatal field. He was an impostor, for none but Curley left the
ground alive. He may have dreamed it and believes in dreams.
[Illustration: A CROW SCOUT (Winter costume).]
“When the Seventh cavalry rode away from Fort Lincoln with the White
Horse company, the band belonging to it played one of Custer’s
favorites, ‘The Girl I Left Behind Me.’ Ever after that, when I heard
the familiar tune on the plains, my mind was carried back to the
parting scene at the fort, and in the foreground of memory’s picture
stands, with tear-dimmed eyes, a sad, brave woman. Well might her heart
nigh break, for she knew, as no one else did, that her brave husband
was going on an expedition fraught with untold, hidden dangers, and not
upon a summer outing.
“Crazy Horse and Goose, each with a band of Cheyennes, fought against
Custer. In fact, the former was looked upon as the head war chief,
Sitting Bull being more of a medicine man and prophet. The prevalent
belief is that Sitting Bull was the worst Indian and head war
chief. This is a mistake. There were several worse than he and more
treacherous, but as most of them are dead and good Indians, I will not
take the trouble to name them or to recount their good (?) deeds. Gall
was the head man among those who fought Reno and Benteen, and would
have got away with them only for the personal bravery of the latter.
“When General Terry left the field and General Miles took command
all Terry’s and Custer’s scouts who were alive went to work for the
new commander, except George Mulligan and Jimmy-from-Cork. But there
were only five of us left--Bob and Bill Jackson, Vick Smith, Cody and
myself. However, Miles re-enforced us with several others.
“Scout Billy Jackson was with Custer on the morning of the 25th,
but left before the engagement to join Reno, and knew nothing of
the terrible conflict until the next day. On the 27th they came to
the battlefield, and Jackson, with four other scouts, identified
the remains of General Custer and Scout Reynolds. His report of the
battlefield may be vouched for, as he was ever known as a brave, cool,
clear-headed and truthful scout, whom General Miles said he could
always depend upon. He, too, maintains that Custer did not go contrary
to orders.”
Custer had divided his force into three parts. Benteen had orders to
sweep everything before him to the left, and Reno was to drive right
at the enemy. But it seems that neither he nor any other officer who
was in this campaign had an idea that the Indian forces were as strong
as they proved to be. There were at least eight Indian warriors to one
soldier; neither did he know that they were so well supplied with arms
and ammunition. Here is where Custer was deceived, or likely he would
have kept his men together and won the battle.
On the arrival of General Gibbon the dead were buried and the wounded
men of Reno’s and Benteen’s commands were given attention. After Gibbon
and his men returned to Fort Shaw, I had an interview with the general
and with many of the soldiers who were on the battlefield and assisted
in burying the dead. They said that all the men, except Custer, were
horribly mutilated and divested of all their clothing.
Again we return to Sitting Bull. Soon after the death of Custer,
Sheridan, who was at the head of the war department, called out troops
and fought him the balance of the season almost continuously, but
the great chief always avoided open battle. In October General Miles
drove him across the Missouri river, killing some Indians, capturing
two thousand men, women and children, and destroying many of their
supplies. The warriors who remained were scattered and discouraged;
skulked back into the mountains, while Sitting Bull, with his followers
crossed the line into the British possessions. In the meantime Generals
Crook and Terry fought and defeated Chief Crazy Horse on the Rosebud
towards the close of the year.
To give an idea of the vastness of the country where the hostile
Indians had established their camps, I will give the approximate area,
which was 125 by 200 miles, or 25,000 square miles. The Yellowstone
river is about 350 miles long, 200 of which was included in this area.
The length of Powder river is 150 miles; the Tongue river the same,
the Rosebud 125, the Big Horn about of similar length. With all of the
tributaries of these rivers, and with the hills and mountain passes,
the Indians were familiar; in this respect they had the advantage
over the military. To go into details of those campaigns, extending
over this great territory--the fearful severity--the long marching
for months at a time through an untrodden wilderness, and sometimes
a scarcity of food, clothing and bedding--the many battles that were
fought, to which I have made no reference; burying the dead and taking
care of the wounded--to tell all this would make a book in itself. But
one thing I will insert here: That monument in Custer county, which
marks the graves of those who have given their lives for this mountain
land, and are peacefully sleeping at the base of it, will be kept erect
by the Montanians as long as those everlasting peaks which overlook
this sacred spot from the mountain tops near by shall remain.
ROBERT VAUGHN.
July 24, 1899.
GENERAL SHERMAN’S LETTERS.
The following letters were written by General Sherman, then general
of the United States Army, to Secretary McCrary, describing his tour
through the valley of the Yellowstone soon after the Sioux war. They
were published at the time in some newspaper, the clippings of which I
have had in my possession ever since.
Thinking that there are no other records of these interesting letters,
I give them place in this book, for they are a valuable addition to
the history of Eastern Montana, or what was then termed “the Sioux
country,” and of that eventful time when the military had taken
possession after Sitting Bull and his followers had been driven across
the border into Canada.
LETTER I.
“Cantonment on Tongue River, M. T., July 17, 1877.
“_To Hon. Geo. W. McCrary_:
“My Dear Sir: Before leaving Washington I promised to write you from
time to time of matters of public and private interest.
“As originally appointed, I left St. Louis the evening of July 4,
accompanied by my son; reached Chicago on the 5th and St. Paul the
6th. Here I was joined by my aides, Colonels Poe and Bacon; also by
Gen. Terry and his aide, Captain Smith, and the quartermaster of his
department, General Card. Leaving St. Paul by rail the morning of the
7th, we reached Bismarck the evening of the 8th. There were three
steamers there, two of which, the Rosebud and the Ashland, were
loading for the Yellowstone, and we selected the former because she
was smaller and safer, and better adapted to the strong current of
the river. During the day of the 9th we crossed over by ferry to Fort
Abraham Lincoln, and inspected the post. It is composed of two distinct
posts--a small infantry post, perched on a high hill overlooking the
country and valley of the river, and a larger cavalry post on the
river bank below, raised about twenty feet above the bottoms, which
are usually overflowed by the spring freshets. There is but a small
garrison there, because the Seventh Cavalry, its regular garrison, is
detached to this point, and is now out on a scout.
“The Rosebud was boarded by 4 p. m. on the 9th, dropped down from
Bismarck three miles to Fort Lincoln, to take us on board, and began
the ascent of the Missouri, which was full, with a strong current. It
was about as large and of the same character as at Sioux City. In three
days we reached Fort Buford, on the north bank, just below the mouth of
the Yellowstone. We stopped there over the night of the 12th, making as
much of an inspection as the mosquitoes would allow, and at daybreak
on the 13th resumed the trip, entering the Yellowstone, which for a
hundred miles seemed almost as large as the Missouri, with numerous
islands and a wide valley. This valley contracted after about a hundred
miles, and the river changed its character somewhat, being lined on
either side with fantastic hills, known as ‘bad lands,’ making short
bends with a powerful current, against which we made slow headway,
but in four days we reached this post, on the south bank of the
Yellowstone, just above the mouth of Tongue river. The troops, mostly
the Fifth Infantry, occupy the huts made last winter, but a new post is
in process of construction, about a mile higher, and half a mile back
from the Yellowstone, the ground being higher and less in danger of an
overflow.
[Illustration: GEN. WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN, U. S. A.]
“General Miles is in command here--has about three hundred Indian
prisoners--says none of the boats on the river this year have been
molested--that all the hostiles which swarmed hereabouts last year are
gone, the greater part to the agencies, while Sitting Bull has taken
refuge across the border in Canada, about 250 miles north. When the
new post is finished, which will be before winter, the troops will be
comfortably quartered, and the Indians cannot return. Already a class
of frontiersmen are making ranches and settlements hereabouts, and in
a few years we can make the route to Montana by way of the Yellowstone
as safe as the Platte and Arkansas, thus forcing the hostile Indians to
break up into small and harmless parties. For some years hence we will
have to keep a pretty strong garrison here, because, besides defending
this point, detachments must go out to protect other threatened
points, and to follow any small parties engaged in depredations. In
other words, the forts along this line will not only have to defend
themselves, but be able to send out strong detachments.
“There is a great deal of valuable country along the line of the
Northern Pacific railroad. That road, from Duluth to Bismarck, although
a financial failure, has been and will continue to be of advantage
to the country at large. As far as Bismarck it is done, and well
done. The next link, from Bismarck to the mouth of Powder river, is
very important. It will be a distance of 250 miles, but will cut off
300 miles of the Missouri river and 150 of the Yellowstone, leaving
the Yellowstone from Powder river to the mouth of the Big Horn for
navigation.